



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Princeton University Library



32101 066154087

BATTLES SIEGES AND CAMPAIGNS

1834
.05
434
V.3

Library of



Princeton University.

HARPER'S PICTORIAL LIBRARY OF THE WORLD WAR

In Twelve Volumes
Profusely Illustrated

VOLUME III

BATTLES, SIEGES AND CAMPAIGNS

**The Military Achievements
of the War**

HARPER'S PICTORIAL LIBRARY OF THE WORLD WAR

*In Twelve Volumes
Profusely Illustrated*

FOREWORD BY CHARLES W. ELIOT, PhD.
President Emeritus, Harvard University

VOLUME III

Battles, Sieges and Campaigns

The Military Achievements of the War

INTRODUCTION BY MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD

Edited by

MAJOR CHARLES A. KING, Jr.

and

CAPTAIN A. E. POTTS

*With the collaboration of seven other officers of the
Military Academy at West Point*

GENERAL EDITORIAL BOARD

PROF. ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
Harvard University

GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff, 42nd Division

ADMIRAL ALBERT GLEAVES
U. S. Navy

PROF. W. O. STEVENS
U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis

PROF. JOHN SPENCER BASSETT
Professor of History, Smith College

GEN. ULYSSES G. McALEXANDER
U. S. Army

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN
President of Princeton University

J. B. W. GARDINER
Military Expert, *New York Times*

COMMANDER C. C. GILL, U. S. N.
Lecturer at Annapolis and aide
to Admiral Gleaves

MAJOR C. A. KING, JR.
History Department, West Point

HENRY NOBLE MACCRACKEN
President of Vassar College

PROF. E. R. A. SELIGMAN
Columbia University

DR. THEODORE F. JONES
Professor of History, New York
University

CARL SNYDER

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
Established 1817

(RECAP)

14094

05

434

5.3

VOL. 3 — HARPER'S PICTORIAL LIBRARY OF THE WORLD WAR

Copyright 1920, by Harper & Brothers
Printed in the United States of America

A-U

CONTENTS OF VOLUME III

	PAGE		PAGE
<i>Introduction</i> . . Major-General Leonard Wood	vii	III. The Deadlock at Gallipoli	170
The Western Front . . Major Adam E. Potts		IV. The Gallipoli Expedition Withdrawn	174
I. The Situation in August, 1914	1	The Mesopotamia Campaign,	
II. The Invasion of Belgium	10	Captain Willis McDonald Chapin	178
III. The French Counter-Offensive	16	Egypt and Palestine . Captain Albert W. Draves	188
IV. The Retreat to the Marne	20	The Salonika Campaign,	
V. The First Battle of the Marne	30	Captain H. C. Holdridge	201
VI. Battles of the Aisne and Ypres	36	The Rumanian Campaign,	
VII. Military Operations in 1915	41	Major Chas. A. King, Jr.	214
VIII. The Battle of Verdun	46	The Italian Campaigns . Captain E. A. Everts	
IX. The Battle of the Somme	55	I. First Moves—The Trentino	224
X. Military Operations, 1917	62	II. Blows and Counterblows	239
XI. The Battle of Arras	70	African Campaigns . Captain H. C. Holdridge	250
XII. French Offensive Operations on the		The Siege of Tsing-Tau . Major J. H. Grant	257
Aisne	73	Caucasus and Armenia, Major Chas. A. King, Jr.	260
XIII. Battle of Messines Ridge	76	Russia in August, 1914	264
XIV. The American Expeditionary Force	82	Collapse of the Russian Army	267
I. Military Operations, 1918	84	The "River of Steel"	271
II. The Second Battle of the Somme	86	In Burning Louvain	273
III. The Battle of the Lys	91	The Retreat from Mons	277
IV. The Third Battle of the Aisne	92	The Serbian Retreat	281
V. The Second Battle of the Marne	95	The "Siege of France"	286
VI. Operations in the Moreuil Salient	98	First Gas Attacks on Russians	288
VII. Reduction of the St.-Mihiel Salient	99	The Capture of Przemyśl	292
VIII. "The Battle of France"	100	Caught in a Shell Storm	294
The Russian Front . . Major Chas. A. King, Jr.		In the Wake of the Foe	297
I. Russian Invasion of East Prussia, 1914	104	In a German Prison Camp	300
II. First German Invasion of Poland	116	"They Shall Not Pass"	302
III. Teuton Advance in 1915	135	The Horrors of War	316
IV. Brusiloff, and After	141	The Siege of Kut	318
The Serbian Campaigns , Major Robert G. Guyer		"Gassed"	320
The Tragedy of a Nation	148	The Liberation of Jerusalem	322
The Gallipoli Campaign . . Major J. H. Grant		Furious Fight at Fort De Vaux	327
I. Objects of the Expedition	161	In the Cradle of the World	329
II. Battle of the Landing	166	The French Louvain	334
		"Byng's Battle"	337
		With the Turks on Gallipoli	340
		The Canadian Triumph	343

CONTENTS OF VOLUME III

	PAGE		PAGE
Doing and Dying at Gallipoli	349	The Darkest Days of All Philip Gibbs	381
"With Our Backs to the Wall"	359	The Lafayette Escadrille	391
The Mesopotamia Disaster	363	The Martyrdom of Serbia	393
British Generalship Philip Gibbs	370	When the Armistice was Signed . E. A. Barron	400
The Night of the Ultimatum	378	The Wages of War	403

ILLUSTRATIONS IN COLOR

The Poilu	<i>Frontispiece</i>
The Last Farewell	<i>Facing page</i> 100
Italy Joins the Allies	" 230
Home from France	" 348
Belgium Triumphant	" 380

MAPS IN COLOR

Bird's-eye View of the Battlefield of Verdun	<i>Facing page</i> 50
Perspective Map of the British Campaigns in Palestine and Mesopotamia	" 190
Topographical Map of Southeastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula .	" 212
Perspective Map of the Italian Front	" 246

INTRODUCTION

BY MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD

IN the volume on the larger strategy of the struggle, General Maurice, Captain Gardiner, and other writers have presented in a comprehensive and effective manner the broad outlines of the World War. In this volume the military operations, the great battles and sieges are presented in detail. This work will be of great value to the student of military history as well as to the public.

The story of what happened in Europe should point to the American people the need of a rational preparedness,—preparedness which is without a tinge of militarism.

Had Belgium been as well prepared as Switzerland, the French Armies and the English Expeditionary Force would, in all probability, have met the Germans in the eastern sector of Belgium, and the invasion of the greater portion of Belgium and much of Northern France would have been avoided.

Switzerland had made her preparation for national defense through recognition of the basic principle which must govern in a democracy; that is, that hand in hand with privilege and opportunity goes obligation for service in war as well as in peace,—service where one can best render it.

Belgium had been as effectually protected as a country could be by treaty. That this was an insufficient protection, we all know. Switzerland had been neutralized, but, wiser and more far-seeing, she had followed the old policy which had so long governed in the Swiss Confederation: "The independence of the Swiss Confederation rests not upon assurances or promises of emperors or kings, but rests on a foundation of iron, that of our swords."

Belgium, trusting to treaties and promises, had made comparatively little preparation for her own defense. Her small army did gallant and splendid service and rendered invaluable aid in checking the German advance. Had her preparations been founded upon as broad a foundation as the Swiss, she would have had a citizen army of approximately a million men, and could have held her eastern defensive line until the French and English forces arrived.

Fortunately for Europe, France had prepared long in advance for the attack. Fortunately, too, her armies were under the command of a soldier of commanding ability, who had the courage to carry out a sound military policy unaffected by popular clamor or public alarm, a policy which gave him an opportunity to strike with full strength at the most favorable moment.

The Central Powers believed they could overrun Belgium and France before effective aid would come from other sources. They underestimated England's ability to rapidly build up an effective army, or the effectiveness of the British Fleet in holding command of the seas. The magnificent work of the French Army, which grew stronger and more determined as the danger became greater, the marvelous victory of the Marne, the prompt gaining of sea control by the British Fleet, were great determining factors of the war.

The Germans were thrown back and held. The ocean was kept free of enemy ships, save the submarine, and its activity was held in check. Coal and iron from England, and vast quantities of supplies from America, were brought to France,—supplies without which it would have been impossible for her long to continue the war.

Later on, the British Fleet, in coöperation with our own and those of the Allies, made it possible to move our troops to France, and the troops of the Allies wherever it was necessary to send them. Finally came a unity of command, coördination of effort, and—Victory. The efficiency of the preparedness of France on land and of England on sea made it possible for the Allies to win the war. Had either failed in that crucial period which preceded the entry of Italy, and, finally, of America, into the war, the war would have been lost.

The French Army always rose to the level of the tremendous demands upon it, and in the battle of the Marne checked and turned the tide of invasion, holding on grimly until the splendid army of Great Britain gradually assembled, later to be reinforced by America's gallant divisions which, although trained in haste and in some particulars inadequately equipped, nevertheless, regardless of loss, rendered splendid service and were a determining influence in winning the war.

Had we been reasonably well prepared—our inalterable opposition to the war being known—it is probable that there would have been no war.

What lesson will America draw from the war? Will she heed the lesson of all time that national unpreparedness means tremendously unnecessary sacrifices of life and treasure, and possibly national downfall?

Fortunately for us, we had the hard-fighting line of the Allies behind which to make good, as best we could with their assistance, the failure to provide in time of peace for the needs of possible war. We may not have in our next war allies to hold the enemy while we make those preparations which should be made in time of peace. We must make adequate preparations to insure our own safety,—preparations which will make us an immediately available force for the maintenance of peace.

I trust that those who read Captain Gardiner's story of the war will be able to visualize what would have happened to America had we, in our unprepared condition, without trained men or the necessary arms and equipment, been forced to meet the great military machine of the Central Powers unaided; that they will remember that we must still



© Harris and Ewing.

Major-General Leonard Wood

A graduate of the Harvard Medical School, later an Army surgeon, he organized, with Theodore Roosevelt, the regiment of "Rough Riders" in the Spanish-American War. From October, 1898, till 1902 he was Governor-General of Cuba. He is an ardent advocate of preparedness, with a fine record both as a soldier and as an administrator of proved ability.

judge the future—so far as war is concerned—largely by the past, for, strive as we may, and must, to settle matters by arbitration or other peaceful means, war may be forced upon us, and we may find it necessary to do our clear duty through war, as we did in the recent great conflict.

THESE BE THE DAYS THAT CALL FOR MEN

By JOHN TROTWOOD MOORE.

These be the days that call for men;
Not traffickers in meaner things,
Which ancient stars bring back again—
Vain bubbles and their vaporings.

Not they who walk in ruts of wrong
Down immemorial paths of kings:
Nor they who sing their holy song
To venal, base imaginings.

Who see no glory of the sun,
Save where it sweats the slave of old;
No road to sweetness, save it run
To cloisters of their calf of gold.

Who steal from state, nor give again;
Who cringe to creed and passing power.
Who'd corner in a trust the rain
For their own golden bower.

The beauty and the beckoning
Of wanton morns and midnight moons,
To them is but a reckoning
Of profitless and thirsty noons.

Grafting the ground to gullies bare,
To dying streams in dewless morn;

A desert and a treeless glare
To blight brave eyes unborn.

These be the days that call for brawn,
Not khaki-clad and bayoneted,
From mother's breast race hatred drawn;
Steel-sheathed their souls, and turreted.

But battle-men of brother blood,
From field and furnace, store and tent;
Whose bugles blow for brotherhood,
Whose long drum beats for betterment.

One God within, and part of him;
One sky above, his gallery;
One spirit in the heart of him;
Creedless, he knows not cruelty.

A gentler knight 'mid those who ran,
Samaritan, on battlefield;
Not *God and Country*, but *God and Man*;
Not *Self* but *Others*, on his shield.

Great Spirit of the Endless Span,
Hear us, forget us not again!
From newer stars send forth Thy ban—
God of our Fathers, give us men!

Battles, Sieges and Campaigns

THE WESTERN FRONT

BY ADAM E. POTTS

Major, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army

I

THE SITUATION IN AUGUST, 1914

Theater of War—Forces Engaged—Plans of Campaign—Germany Strikes—Fall of Liège, Brussels, and Namur—Investment and Capture of Antwerp

FATE decreed that the little kingdom of Serbia was to witness the birth throes of the mighty World War, about which for generations statesmen had dreamed and soldiers had warned. From the rocky slopes and wooded valleys of the Balkans the war-delirium swept with the speed of a wind-driven fire over Central and Eastern Europe. But it was in another portion of the continent, in the region destined to become immortal under the general name of the Western battlefield, that the brunt of the stupendous struggle was to be borne. On western Belgium and northeastern France was focused the gaze of all mankind, as it followed with fascinated interest the successive steps in the fearful tragedy which was to eclipse the greatest conflicts recorded in all history.

THE EIGHT BLACK DAYS

During the latter part of July and the first days of August, 1914, dramatic changes in the international situation occurred with incredible rapidity. The startled world, not yet able to grasp the significance and the magnitude of the impending catastrophe, saw as in a nightmare the "eight black days" go reel-

ing off the loom of time. In this period were included the humiliating ultimatum of Austria to Serbia; Serbia's conciliatory reply; Austria's refusal of the Serbian offers; Russia's threat to prevent the destruction of Serbia; attempts at mediation by Great Britain, France, and Italy as neutrals; Germany's threat in support of Austria; Germany's bid for British neutrality; the invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium; and the decision of the British government to enter the conflict. It was while discussing the British declaration that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, made his notorious "scrap of paper" remark:

"The step taken by His Majesty's Government is terrible to a degree; just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in war time has so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain is going to make war on a kindred nation who desires nothing better than to make friends with her."

Speaking in the Reichstag the same day, von Bethmann-Hollweg said:

"We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law."

Germany's spokesman had struck the keynote of her policy of ruthlessness, and we shall

see later that, whether guided by necessity or not, in the attainment of her ambitions Germany recognized no law.

The first of the long series of illegal acts by which she laid herself open to much harsh criticism was the invasion of Belgium. It seems certain that this move had been deliberately pre-determined in case of war with France, and the German statesmen must have



Chancellor Von Bethmann-Hollweg
Conversing with Dr. Helfferich. Von Jagow,
German Foreign Secretary, is in the background.

carefully considered its effects. Let us glance at the military reasons that probably influenced the Great General Staff to take this momentous step.

THE TERRAIN

By reference to any map showing the topographical features of this theater it will be seen that from south to north the Vosges Mountains, the mountains of western Germany, and the Ardennes Mountains in south-

ern Belgium, form a wide outer barrier of difficult country, to the west of which lie concentric belts of plateaus with steep scarps on their eastern faces—outer rims of the Paris basin. These defend the most direct routes from the German frontier to Paris and constitute military obstacles of great strength. Hence, in a plan such as the German General Staff approved, by which success depended upon striking at the heart of the French nation by rapidity of advance and fury of attack with overwhelming numbers, it was essential to select the longer and more circuitous route through Belgium into Northern France over a level pathway, sufficiently wide and free from obstacles to offer every facility for the rapid advance and sustenance of Germany's great armies.

In modern warfare, where rapidity of action is the prime requisite of successful offensive operations, any country which lends itself to good roads for motor transportation, railways, and water traffic, is the natural route traversed by a moving army. Belgium possessed all of these, and, consequently, was destined to receive the initial blow and withstand the first shock of the onrushing Teutonic hordes.

ARTIFICIAL DEFENSES

The artificial defenses constructed by the French along their eastern boundary also played a considerable part in determining Germany's action. The Franco-German frontier, 150 miles in length, runs roughly through Belfort-Epinal-Longwy, the latter city being situated near the intersection of the French-German-Luxemburg boundaries. In addition to the natural barriers on this frontier, the French had constructed two great defensive lines; one extending from Belfort to Epinal, the other from Toul to Verdun, thus leaving gaps at Belfort and Toul.

Belfort is situated where the Vosges descend to a low pass connecting the Saône and Rhine valleys, and forms an easy point of communication between France and Germany. However, this pass is sufficiently narrow to be effectively defended by the mighty fortress which stands in its center, and which, in the Franco-Prussian War, capitulated only after the armistice had been signed and its com-

mander, Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, ordered by his own government to cease military operations.

The fortified cities of Toul and Verdun defend the defiles cut by the Meuse in the great escarpment near these cities, and add their resistance to that contributed by nature. To nature, therefore, in a large measure is due the credit for upholding the slogan of Verdun, "They shall not pass!"

North of Verdun lies the Franco-Belgian frontier with only a weak defensive line running through Mézières-Maubeuge-Lille, weakly fortified because of the neutrality of Belgium as guaranteed by treaty, to which both France and Germany were signatory powers. This was the treaty of 1839, which was later confirmed in 1870, and again emphasized by the Hague Convention in 1907.

Since the French counted so confidently on the neutrality of Belgium, it was obvious that a German thrust through that country would come as a complete surprise to the French armies. The Great General Staff well knew the truth of the military axiom, "a surprised enemy is already half defeated," and the military leaders of the German Empire believed in foregoing no possible advantage. Moreover, the French mobilization plans called for a concentration behind the barrier forts and, once the machinery was set in motion, changes could not be made until after considerable delay.

It seems likely that all these points were considered by the men who directed the military policy of Germany.

THE FORCES ENGAGED

Upon this stage, made by nature and arranged by man, was to be played the world's greatest tragedy. The vastness of the operations and the magnitude of the numbers engaged were so staggeringly appalling that, before hostilities commenced, it was practically impossible to convince the average layman that a World War was possible in this day and generation of advanced science, thought, and brotherhood of man.

At the outset the contending forces represented the greatest powers in Continental Europe, and the British Empire. It is well, therefore, to analyze now the military assets

of these combatants and see why Germany could, with assurance, challenge the rights of nations in a war of attempted ultimate world control.

FRANCE

REALIZING for many years how her safety and her very existence were jeopardized, but hoping against hope that the inevitable would in some way be prevented, France had striven since the Franco-Prussian War to place her army on a parity with that of her natural enemy, Germany. The Army had undergone several reorganizations within that time, the last being under General Joffre, the hero of the Marne.

In order to maintain a force great enough to cope with the ever-present German menace, compulsory military service was adopted on the following plan: A man physically fit entered the service at the age of 20, spent three years in the regular army, eleven years in the regular army reserve, seven years in the territorial army, and seven years in the territorial army reserve. Although the exact figures are not obtainable, it is probable that at the beginning of the war France had two and a quarter million men, with a maximum attainable force of about three million more. One month after hostilities commenced four million troops had been mobilized and utilized as follows:

First line army.....	1,500,000;
Second line army.....	500,000;
Reserve	2,000,000.

The organization of tactical units closely resembled that of the German Army both as to size and arrangement. The greatest unit was the Army Corps, of which France had twenty, nineteen in France and one in Algeria, all located according to population and geographical divisions.

The French General Staff was well known to be brilliant, and the French officer the equal of any in the world. Here a radical difference existed between the French and German Armies, for the German officer held his commission by virtue of a caste system, whereas, with the French officer, it was a matter of nation-wide competition. The French soldier was justly famed for his cour-

age, loyalty, and patriotism; and the "poilu" of 1914 was to prove himself fully equal in these soldierly qualities to the axe-men of Charles Martel and the grenadiers of Napoleon.

GREAT BRITAIN

GREAT BRITAIN had an excellent, but very small army. It was its diminutive size that inspired the German Emperor to characterize it as the "contemptible little British Army" before his forces had had a chance to clash with the Britishers.

Due to the efforts of a few far-seeing men who realized England's negligence and national insecurity, between the years 1907-1910, a new system was adopted which called for a force of volunteers who would serve seven years with the colors and five years in the reserve. As a result of this Great Britain had altogether about a quarter million men at the beginning of the war and would, in three years, have had four million troops.

The organization of the British Army was analogous to that of the continental systems, except that there were no army corps, the division (18,000 men) being the largest unit.

Man for man, the British regular had no superior in the world for fighting qualities and thoroughness, and the following quotation from Lord Kitchener's "benediction" to those ordered to the front shows what he knew could be expected of the men he commanded:

"You are ordered abroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common enemy. You have to perform a task which will need your courage, your energy, your patience. Remember that the honor of the British Army depends upon your conduct. . . . Be invariably courteous, considerate, and kind. Never do anything likely to injure or destroy property, and always look upon looting as a disgraceful act. . . . Keep on your guard against any excesses."

BELGIUM

FOR her famous stand, taken at the beginning of the war, all honor is due Belgium. This plucky small nation, with only 7,500,000 population, deliberately defied the great mili-

tary machine of Germany, preferring annihilation to dishonor, and staked her all on the defense of her inviolable pledge of neutrality.

In order to make her neutrality effective Belgium had resorted to a system of compulsory military training, dividing her forces into three main parts:

Field army	150,000;
Fortress army	130,000;
Reserve	60,000.

However, in 1914, there were but 263,000 men available for service. These were organized into six divisions and located as follows:

1st Division	Ghent;
2nd Division	Antwerp;
3rd Division	Liège;
4th Division	Namur;
5th Division	Mons;
6th Division	Brussels;
Cavalry Division	Brussels.

For defense the fortress of Antwerp formed the main citadel, with the fortified cities of Liège and Namur as outposts. No enemy could invade the country without first reducing these fortifications, and, as we shall later see, the German plan of attack recognized this fact and did not attempt the invasion until after suitable heavy mobile artillery had been constructed to reduce them. Directly in the path of the invader stood, first, the fortifications of Liège, and then Namur. But, in addition to these, it was desirable to secure Antwerp also, as the line of communications would not be entirely safe from attacks in rear by troops in these defenses.

GERMANY

THE German Army was credited with being the most perfect and magnificent military machine in the world. Forty years of Prussian cunning and ingenuity had been expended to create an instrument which would be the means of the immediate conquest and subjugation of France and the ultimate Prussianization and control of the entire world.

When Germany declared war it meant a nation in arms. There were twenty-five army corps organized on a territorial basis, except for the Prussian Guards.




© Underwood and Underwood.

With the British in Northern France

Soon after the Germans invaded neutral Belgium, 80,000 troops of England's "contemptible little army" were moved across the Channel and joined the French. In the battles which followed, about 80 per cent of these troops were killed or wounded.

The greatest tactical unit was the corps, which consisted of a staff, two infantry divisions, two regiments of field artillery, one battalion of riflemen (Jaegers), a cavalry detachment, and various corps troops; in all, some 35,000 men. The total fighting force at the beginning of the war was about four million, with a further available force of about double that number.

til it had become a model for the armies of all nations. The noblest blood and the best brains in Germany were to be found in the corps of officers, and for those who gave evidence of unusual ability no reward was considered too great. As a rule the officers were arrogant and overbearing in manner; however, they were energetic, efficient, and devoted to their profession. It was the constant ef-



The Famous Bridge Across the Meuse at Liège

It was blown up by the Belgians to impede the German army's advance in August, 1914.


Military service was compulsory; in fact, it had been since the days when Prussia suffered so rudely at the hands of Napoleon, and her army was fixed by him at a figure (40,000) which he considered would not leave her an important military nation.

One of the greatest assets of the German army was the thorough and scientific system of organization upon which it was based. The Great General Staff, organized by Scharnhorst, in 1814, had been developed and perfected by a long line of brilliant soldiers un-

fort of the War Office to discover the particular kind of work for which each man was best fitted, and thus to utilize the commissioned personnel to the best possible advantage. How well this original system worked is proved by Germany's own military record from 1914 to 1918.

Prior to the present war the army was divided into a Standing Army, a *Landwehr* (first reserve), and a *Landsturm* (second reserve). Military service for all able-bodied men embraced the ages from 18 to 45, and

11-1



From Nelson's History of the War.

The Original German Concentration Just Before the Invasion of Belgium

annual grand army maneuvers kept Germany's forces in a high state of military training under actual war conditions.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

MILITARISM in Austria-Hungary was modeled as closely after the pattern of her Germanic ally as her own mixed population would permit. There was the Imperial Army, two *Landwehrs* (one Austrian and

one Hungarian), and a general *Landsturm*, or levy-in-mass.

The army consisted of fifteen corps, each composed of two infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, one artillery brigade, and some corps troops. The total peace strength was fixed at 350,000, with a war strength of two million in addition to the *Landsturm*, making in all about four million.

Austria-Hungary had to contend with the added problem of her many races, which she attempted to solve by sending the Tyrolese to

the Carpathians and Galicia, and the Galicians, Croats, and Serbs to the Italian front.

MATERIEL

AS regards military equipment and war matériel, Germany was far better prepared than any of her adversaries, especially in heavy artillery and transportation facilities. After the Russo-Japanese War in all the leading nations there was a considerable reluctance to adopt the idea of having guns of larger caliber than the 75 mm. accompany troops on the march. When, therefore, guns of large caliber were made mobile, that nation which possessed this equipment had an enormous advantage over those countries which did not. In this war Germany and Austria possessed these weapons in quantity from the very start, whereas France and England both had to construct theirs after the beginning of hostilities. The cupola forts of Belgium were impregnable until the howitzer, or curved-fire artillery of large caliber, was designed to drop shells with such an angle of impact that the shell would be effective in either demolishing or otherwise putting out of action the cupola battery. The first practical test of this new class of weapons was at Liège.

Next to Germany, France was best-prepared, although she had not, until shortly before the World War, given serious thought to heavy mobile artillery, and the last army reorganization had not been put fully into effect.

In other respects the beginning of the war found Germany well-prepared, France poorly so, England not at all, and Belgium's pittance almost negligible in the face of such overwhelming odds of men and matériel. It must be remembered that the airplane was developed during the war, and that tanks were purely a war creation, as were many other innovations too numerous to mention in detail.

ALLIED PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

THE general plan of campaign of the Allied nations was to conform to that of France, the only really military nation of the alliance, and the country on which would fall

the brunt of the burden of repelling the first German invasion.

Conducted offensively, had France been the aggressor, this plan would have called for an advance through Lorraine into the provinces of southern Germany. However, as it was, the feint which attempted this and resulted in the capture of Mülhausen (Mulhouse) proved disastrous, and it was soon seen that the great rôle to be played was that of driving the Teuton back into his own land through territory over which he had come. In the attainment of this the British conformed to the French plan, and the Belgians lent such assistance as they could.

TEUTONIC PLANS

WAR is the national industry of Prussia," according to Mirabeau, the distinguished French statesman; hence it is well to understand the basic principles of war as interpreted in Germany to anticipate properly the plan of campaign. These basic principles are:

1. It is the duty of a nation to be prepared for war at any time.
2. War declared, it must be prosecuted with the utmost vigor, ample troops must be poured into the fighting line and no effort should be spared to crush the enemy as soon as possible and force him to sue for peace.
3. All enemies are classified as "combatants" and "non-combatants." The former must wear the uniform and be officially connected with the military establishment. The latter must not assist their own troops in any way, on pain of punishment, but must comply with all demands of the Teuton troops of occupation.
4. War should always be conducted in the enemy's country so as to spare the German nation.

The specific German plan was divided into three parts:

A—Against France and Belgium it was planned to move an army of two and one-half million men, defeat their armies, and force a peace upon them. Due chiefly to the impassability of the French frontier south of Verdun, the route of invasion through Belgium was adopted.



From Punch, Oct. 21, 1914.

Unconquerable

The Kaiser—"So, you see—you have lost everything."
The King of the Belgians—"Not my soul."

(The Kaiser offered to spare Belgium and to re-imburse her in case of damage to Belgian property if Belgium would agree not to oppose the German army's advance. This attempt to bribe King Albert into acquiescence was haughtily declined.)

B—While this operation was in progress, the Austrians, with German assistance, were to move against Russia by an advance on Warsaw and hold the Slavs in check until the German troops, released from the French front by the Franco-Belgian defeat, could arrive to insure the new victory.

C—Great Britain was to be defeated after France, or else at the first convenient opportunity.

II

THE INVASION OF BELGIUM

BLOKED by the defenses on the Franco-German frontier, Germany concentrated her armies in the north near Cologne for the invasion and occupation of Belgium, and at Coblenz to advance into Luxemburg; these two neutral states were to be occupied as bases for the further invasion of France.

The occupation of the unarmed neutral Duchy of Luxemburg was easily accomplished, and almost without incident, other than the official protest of its ruler and inhabitants.

Not so with Belgium. Although her neutrality had been guaranteed, she realized that this guarantee was effective only so long as she was able to enforce it, consequently she had constructed a fortress system of no mean proportions. The Belgian forts, built in 1888-1892 by General Brialmont, were noted for their strength, and their number and arrangement were such that they were generally considered impregnable. And so they were, perhaps, until the invention of the great long-range howitzers by which they were surprised and demolished in the early days of the war. As has been said, the main citadel was at Antwerp, with outlying fortification systems at Liège and Namur guarding the eastern gateway into Belgium.

Having pre-determined to invade France through Belgium, the Germans concentrated their armies in the vicinity of Cologne to cross the Belgian frontier between Visé and the Ardennes.

The German Army was divided into six parts:

1st Army—Gen. von Kluck—In the north—troops from Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein.

2nd Army—Gen. von Bülow—Prussian Guards.

3rd Army—Duke Albrecht of Württemberg—In the Ardennes—Saxons and Württembergers.

4th Army—German Crown Prince—Near Neufchâteau—troops from the Rhineland, Lorraine, and Hesse.

5th Army—Bavarian Crown Prince—South of Metz—Bavarian troops.

6th Army—Gen. von Heeringen—In Alsace—troops from Baden and Alsace.

The German plan of advance by armies was as follows:

Right Wing—Ist and 2nd Armies to advance through Belgium north of the Meuse, cross the Sambre and sweep south on Paris.

Center—3rd, 4th and 5th Armies to form on a line running roughly through Metz-Luxemburg-Neufchâteau, and advance against the central Meuse positions and Verdun.

Left Wing—6th Army to be responsible for the defense of Alsace.

THE ATTACK ON LIÈGE

Nothing could be accomplished, however, until Liège and Namur were permanently in German possession; consequently General von Emmich was given three army corps for the purpose of taking these forts with the least possible delay. The Germans moved to attack Liège on August 4th, 1914, hoping to take it by assault, but the guns of the twelve forts around the city simply mowed them down, inflicting frightful casualties. As we have seen, surprise was the essence of the invaders' plan, hence the German commander's determination to force the guards who defended so heroically the Belgian gateway. Should he be compelled to conduct a regular siege the French would be forewarned and ready; should he march past Liège the defenders would sally out and cut his communications. Furious at the check he had received, von Emmich drove his infantry again and again to the assault. As a result, the attackers suffered heavily and accomplished nothing.

Having failed in all his attempts to take the forts by storm, von Emmich brought up his siege howitzers. The situation was now completely changed. These huge guns quickly demolished two of the forts and enabled the



General Map of Northern France and Belgium

Germans to enter the city on August 7th, although some of the other forts held out until August 15th. In this attack seven German army corps had been concentrated at this one point. Following the reduction of Liège these troops easily brushed aside Belgian resistance and continued their impetuous rush towards France.

GENERAL LEMAN'S STORY

Credit for the heroic defense of the city is due the Belgian general, Leman, who, forced

from his post in one fort, withdrew to another, and continued to direct the defense of the broken ring of forts. The following extract from his diary, written while a prisoner of war at Magdeburg in Germany, will give some idea of the last stand made in defense of the city. Describing the last stage of the battle in Fort Loncin, General Leman writes:

"On the 11th, the Germans started bombarding us with 7 cm. and 10 cm. cannon, and on the 12th and 13th, they brought their 21 cm. guns into action, but it was not until

the 14th that they opened fire and began their destruction of the outer works. . . .

"The third phase of the bombardment began at 5 a.m. the 15th, firing they kept up without a break until two in the afternoon. . . .

"After some time passed amid these horrors, I wished to return to my observation tower; but I had hardly advanced a few feet into the

me, also a German officer, who offered me a glass of water. They told me I had swooned, and that the soldiery I had taken for Belgian gendarmes were, in fact, the first band of German troops who had set foot inside the forts. In recognition of our courage, the Germans allowed me to retain my sword."

In declining to receive it, the German com-



© Underwood and Underwood.

The First Recipients of the French War Cross

Gen. Lienard distributing the first crosses to wounded men at Vincennes.

gallery when a great blast passed by, and I was thrown violently to the ground. . . . Looking out of a peep-hole, I saw to my horror that the fort had fallen. . . . My last thought was to save the remnant of the garrison. I rushed out to give orders, and saw some soldiers whom I mistook for Belgian gendarmes. I called them, then fell again. Poisonous gases seemed to grip my throat as in a vise.

"A shell had fallen in the powder magazine, and most of the garrison were overwhelmed by the explosion.

"On recovering consciousness, I found my aide-de-camp, Capt. Colland, standing over

me, also a German officer, who offered me a glass of water. They told me I had swooned, and that the soldiery I had taken for Belgian gendarmes were, in fact, the first band of German troops who had set foot inside the forts. In recognition of our courage, the Germans allowed me to retain my sword."

GERMAN MARCH THROUGH BELGIUM

Simultaneously with the fall of the last of the defenses of Liège an expedition was sent against the fortifications of Dinant, a small town about ten miles south of Namur, located at the junction of the road from Charleroi with that leading from Namur to Sedan. Believing that the French might attempt to march to the relief of the beleaguered fortress of Namur, the Germans dispatched a German Guard division, a cavalry division, several in-



© Underwood and Underwood.

A Château near Dinant, on the Meuse

Dinant was sacked and destroyed by the Germans in August, 1914. According to the report of the Belgian Commission, 84 Belgian civilians were shot in the Parade Square. Many women, young girls and little children were killed, and of 1400 houses in town, only 200 remained.

fantry battalions, and a few batteries of light artillery to take the town and hold it against the French.

However, the Germans were wrong in thinking they could do this by sheer preponderance of numbers, for the French moved up some of their batteries of "75s" and so posted them that they played havoc with the advancing enemy columns, destroying some of the bridges over which they had to pass, and forcing some of the units into the river.

Though a minor operation compared to others then in progress, this French success brought renewed courage and hope to the dispirited troops who had for days been contending with vastly superior odds and fighting on the defensive.

After the fall of the first forts at Liège, the German cavalry, 50,000 strong, swept through Belgium, driving the Belgians out of the path of advance of the Teuton troops. The Belgian forces were consequently pushed west toward Brussels and Louvain, while other detachments retreated to the south and joined the French, who were rapidly taking their place on the battle line to help check the invader. In these operations bloody battles of local character were fought at Tongres, Tirlemont, Haelen, Diest, and Eghezee.

At Haelen, however, the enemy met a decided check when the Belgian force at that place inflicted a decisive defeat upon a cavalry division and an infantry regiment.

THE SACK OF LOUVAIN

In the midst of these operations stood the historic seat of learning, Louvain. Here was situated a great university, and the city itself was one of Belgium's greatest treasures of art and history. The Germans entered it on August 19th, and, about a week later, on the pretext that some of the civil population had fired upon German troops, burned and sacked the town, committing atrocities which shocked the entire civilized world and added one more count to the arraignment of Germany as the foe to civilization. The invaders did not propose to neglect any measure which they considered might strike terror to their enemies, and expedite the fulfillment of the Kaiser's words: "You will return to your homes before the autumn leaves fall."

The German cavalry entered Brussels on the afternoon of August 20th, without firing a shot, after the evacuation by the government departments. The Civil Guard retired to Ostend and Ghent, while the King and the rest of his forces took their places in one of the remaining fortresses.

While safety in flight was the slogan of the day in Brussels, Burgomaster Max installed himself in the town to make certain demands on General von Arnim, commander of the 6th German Army Corps. Although he dared not deny passage through the town to the invaders, Max demanded that they must pay cash for all supplies requisitioned, that public and private property be respected, and that the Municipal Council be allowed to continue its civil administration of the city unmolested. These guarantees were promised, provided no harm was done German troops. No serious disorders occurred in Brussels.

NAMUR AND ANTWERP

Second to Liège, Namur presented the greatest obstacle in the direct path of advance, and its possession to the Germans was of prime importance. With the possession of Liège, Brussels, and Ghent, the Germans controlled the principal railways leading to France, but until this last stronghold was reduced their main advance was checked, for, masked by these defenses, a French army, extending from Dinant to Charleroi, was supposed to be intrenched, supported on its left by two British army corps. The positions of the latter extended through Mons, from which place the celebrated British retreat commenced.

After placing their 21 cm. and 28 cm. guns the Germans opened fire upon the Namur defenses on August 20th, and by the 23rd, had secured a passage of the Meuse and Sambre, though some of the forts still continued to hold out a few days longer.

Though heroically defended, the casualties among the garrison were frightful, whole regiments being decimated. The mortality among the officers was unusually high, with the result that there were left disorganized and demoralized masses of leaderless troops who soon adopted the idea of every man for himself, as many escaping as possible.

Following the occupation of Liège, Brussels, Ghent and Namur, the German hosts spread out like a gigantic fan over the flat plain of Flanders. Within a short time practically all Belgian troops had withdrawn toward the advancing French, or into Antwerp, the citadel of the nation.

Strategically, the situation of Antwerp was

ceed to reduce the Scheldt fortress at their leisure. This was the course followed. During the great Teuton sweep through northern France, raiding forces sallied forth from Antwerp and Malines from time to time to harass the enemy columns, but the Germans resolutely refused to be diverted from their main object. At last, on September 27th, they



© Underwood and Underwood.

A "Fighting Priest" in the Belgian Trenches

Led by Cardinal Mercier, the priests of Belgium were personally reckless of their own safety in opposing the German invasion, even braving death in the trenches side by side with the troops.

entirely different from that of Liège. The possession of the latter place was absolutely necessary if the Germans were to be allowed the free use of the Belgian gateway. Once that gateway was secured, however, the Kaiser's legions could debouch into the wide level country beyond. All that was then required to prevent an interruption of the march was the detachment of a force to mask the works of Antwerp; then, once the French armies were destroyed, the victors could pro-

bombarded and took Malines, and on the following day began an attack on Antwerp.

THE FALL OF ANTWERP

The conflict was of short duration. By the use of heavy artillery, especially the 42 cm. howitzers, the assailants were soon able to pound to pieces the hitherto impregnable forts. Without the assistance of an assaulting army they drove the Belgians from their strong-

holds by means of artillery fire alone. Although a few British marines and sailors arrived to reinforce the garrison, the town was evacuated on October 8th, and occupied by the Germans the next day. A portion of the defending force made good its escape, but a considerable number of the soldiers were forced to flee across the border of Holland, where they were promptly interned by the Dutch authorities.

With the exception of a tiny corner of the coast around Ypres all Belgium was now in German hands. From this time onward to the end of the struggle King Albert's little kingdom was to be the chief military and naval base for operations against the Allies in the west.

III

THE FRENCH COUNTER-OFFENSIVES

WHILE the Germans were forcing their way through Belgium and knocking at the gates of France, a small part of General Dubail's army, detached from the defenses of Belfort and under the personal command of General Paul Pau, crossed the German frontier, advanced on Thann and Altkirch, and, by the evening of August 7th, carried both positions. Continuing the attack, General Pau advanced, driving all opposition before him, and took Mülhausen (Mulhouse) by dark of the following evening.

In order to check the rapid advance of the French, the Fourteenth German Army Corps advanced from Colmar and Neu Breisach against Mülhausen, threatening the flanks and communications of the French. This move forced Pau to give up Mülhausen and retire to Altkirch. However, in these operations the French succeeded in advancing as far north as Colmar itself.

This advance on the extreme right consisted of a reconnaissance in force to determine what German forces were defending that frontier, and, if possible, what were the German plans. At the same time it was desired to make a political demonstration to inspire the French nation that the time had come to assure the people of the "lost prov-


inces of France," Alsace and Lorraine, that France intended to liberate and restore them to their ancient allegiance. Although these provinces had been separated from France since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, General Pau was hailed by the natives of French descent as the liberator and savior of their country. The moral effect of this short but brilliant campaign did much to bolster up French spirits at a time when France and her allies, England and Belgium, were held in suspense waiting for the German plan to develop, and news from the fighting fronts in the north held little that was encouraging.

As will be remembered, France counted on a strict neutrality of Belgian soil; consequently she concentrated her armies on the Franco-German frontier from Longwy to Belfort. Possessing the advantage of having troops on the ground and not yet positive that the battlefield would be on that frontier, French forces were dispatched to take and hold the passes of the Vosges. Consequently, simultaneously with General Pau's success at Mülhausen, several Army Corps were sent into Alsace to operate against the German left. By the 10th the French held all the passes of the Vosges and were preparing to attack the German line Strassburg-Neu Breisach, on which were located some of the principal Rhine fortresses.

FRENCH ADVANCE IN LORRAINE

To the north of General Pau's forces five Army Corps, under General Castelnau, invaded Lorraine and took up a position on the line Delme-Morhange-Saarburg, August 18th. To the left of General Castelnau other armies under General Langle de Cary and General Ruffey moved up to oppose the Duke of Württemberg and the German Crown Prince in the Ardennes region.

Forced to realize that Belgium's neutrality had been violated, as a defensive measure a French Army under General Lanrezac crossed into Belgium and took up a position south of Namur between the Sambre and Meuse Rivers. To the left of General Lanrezac, occupying a line from Condé (France) to Mons and Binche (Belgium), two British Army Corps took position August 21st. This shows roughly the Allied line in the first days of



© Brown Bros.

The Civilian Population of Antwerp Fleeing Across a Bridge of Barges

The Germans took Antwerp as part of their scheme to occupy the channel ports, and thereby menace Britain's communications. Of this prosperous commercial city, Napoleon once said that it was a pistol pointed at the heart of England.

the war before the German plan of attack had been disclosed.

BATTLE OF THE SARRE

However, General Pau with his augmented forces, commenced the battle of the Sarre



© Underwood and Underwood.

A Unique Way of Searching for the Enemy

With the aid of a dog the officer is inspecting a house to see that no Germans are still hidden there.

August 18th. He advanced and took Saarburg, thus cutting the line of communications between Strassburg and Metz, the two most important fortified German positions on the Franco-German frontier. The added laurels of his new operations made General Pau the hero of the hour and the idol of the French at a time of nation-wide depression.

BATTLE OF THE SELLE

To the north, General Castelnau, with the Second Army, was not so fortunate. He had occupied a position on the Selle River (August 19th) preparatory to an advance over terrain which had been carefully "oriented" by the German gunners. On the following day, after an advance by rushes, the line of the Second Army ran from Bisping through Verganelle, Couthell, Delme, and Nomény. The next day, however, General Castelnau found himself confronted by superior numbers who were attempting to turn his flank, and he could advance no further.

It is interesting to note that in this battle of the Selle General Foch made his first appearance in the World War as Commander of the Twentieth Army Corps, which formed part of the Second Army of General Castelnau. In this battle the farthest advance and the majority of the fighting was done by General Foch's corps, and the following account, translated from the French, will throw some light on the details of these operations:

"August 20. With its usual intrepidity, the Twentieth Army Corps crossed the heights of Marthel, Baronville, and Couthel. It is a question of taking Morhange and then Benestroff, a railroad center of prime importance. The Army of the Bavarian Crown Prince is there with his *corps d'élite*, at least numerically equal to the French, and with incomparably more powerful equipment besides.

"The losses are frightful, more frightful than bravery can overcome.

"Now, to the left, the Ninth Army Corps is menaced in its flanks by the forces from Metz and has to stop, while to the right the Fifteenth Army Corps, in the swamp region has to withdraw, uncovering the right flank of the Twentieth Army Corps and exposing it to the attacks of the Seventh German Army.

"To hold on is folly; the foreseen victory which everyone believed to be certain must be abandoned in favor of a retirement to the Meuse, which was reached August 22.

"The situation is critical. The right of the Second Army seems for a while put out of action and the enemy, profiting by this, can either drive straight ahead on the gap at Charmes in the space between the Armies of Castelnau and Dubail, or move all his forces against Nancy and crush the Second Army.

"The Twentieth Army Corps is exhausted, cut to pieces, but worthy of its chief, whose spirit and faith animate it. It is then with this Corps alone that General Foch goes to cover Nancy and the Charmes gap at the same time, and installs it in a strong central position south of St. Nicholas du Port where he finds himself on the flank of two possible directions of march for the German columns.

"It is towards the gap at Charmes that the invasion is directed. Drunk with enthusiasm, the Germans pass on to Lunéville, exposing their right flank to the Twentieth Corps. August 24, while they were assailing the unyielding resistance of Dubail's army holding the Meurthe, General Foch received orders to take the offensive towards the east. That day the heights of Sanon were taken: to the north he took the Crévic woods, to the south Flanival. Next day the whole army of Castelnau advanced.

"Thus taken in flank, and already hard pressed in front by Dubail's army, the enemy halted in spite of his crushing numerical preponderance. The invasion is broken up on this

front. Nancy remains unscathed; the Germans will not cross the Meurthe."

This check of the French advance on the Selle was due in part to greater numbers of the enemy, but principally to his superior machine gun and artillery fire. Six days of continuous marching and fighting had exhausted the troops of the Second Army, and a general retirement ensued, which was based on the Grand Couronné of Nancy, the former capital of Lorraine, as a pivot.

Attacked on three sides at once by the armies of General von Heeringen, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, and the forces of the Metz garrison, General Castelnau succeeded in extricating his army only with the greatest difficulty, and retired to a defensive position behind the Meurthe River, assuming the defensive before Nancy.

In this retreat the French had to abandon practically all the ground they had won in



© Underwood and Underwood.

Belgian and British Cavalry Wintering in the Trenches

Cavalry, after the first weeks of the war, had little to do, but in the great German retreat in 1918 they came again into their own, being actively employed in sweeping the enemy back.

their meteoric successes of a few days before. They lost Lunéville to the attacking Germans, and were also forced to yield the passes of the Vosges to the invader.

WITHDRAWAL IN ALSACE

On account of the forced retreat of the Second Army and in view of the rapid advance of the Germans toward Paris, it was decided to abandon operations in Alsace, so on August 25th the French evacuated Mülhausen and the line of the Vosges Mountains, and operations in this theater of the war came to a close.

Though disastrous from a military standpoint, the unsuccessful operations in Alsace had not been devoid of success. All France had been stirred up to reconquer the "lost provinces," and upon this point France was united. Animated by the cherished dream of a generation, the attainment of which at last seemed possible, the poilu was nerved to bear with fortitude the reverses which were to be his lot in the depressing retreat preceding the battle of the Marne. So, as affecting the raising of French morale, the effects of the Alsace offensive may be considered as salutary.

RETIREMENT FROM THE ARDENNES

Even while the Second Army of General Castelnau was being pushed back from the Selle, the French armies of Generals Ruffey and Langle de Cary, which had taken up advanced positions in Luxemburg and Belgium, were thrown back on the French frontier by the violent assaults of the armies of the Grand Duke of Württemberg and the German Crown Prince.

These armies, the Third and Fourth, planned to attack the German forces while they were separated by the River Meuse and whip them in detail. The plan was a feasible one and held hope of a great victory, by which the communications of the German forces in the north would be menaced and an avenue opened to invade Germany. The line was about fifty miles in length and the country difficult, but these disadvantages proved no damper to the French spirits.

The Germans, however, had quite anticipated the French plan, and reserved, instead

of seven, thirteen Army Corps and three Cavalry divisions in the Ardennes to meet the French attack. In addition, the Germans had a great superiority in heavy guns, airplanes for artillery reconnaissance, machine guns, and *matériel* in general, as well as an ably-trained personnel in infantry and engineering work, which put the odds in their favor.

In the operations which followed, the French were successful on the flanks, but overwhelmed in the center and forced to withdraw.

The difficult nature of the country, which in many instances caused units to lose contact with each other, caused flanks to be exposed to attack, and was in general responsible for a lack of coördination between units of the French Armies. Thus the French were forced to retire before the better prepared and equipped German troops.

RETREAT FROM NAMUR

Exposed on his right flank by this retirement of the Third and Fourth French Armies, General Lanrezac, who was already under pressure of vastly superior numbers, was forced to withdraw from his position south of Namur where he had taken a stand between the Sambre and Meuse Rivers.

The spectacular retreat of the British from their position extending through Mons was necessitated for the same reason, and deserves fuller discussion later.

IV

THE RETREAT TO THE MARNE

AS has been noted, France distributed her first line troops in five armies: First (Dubail) in the Vosges from Mt. Donon to Switzerland; Second (Castelnau) from Mt. Donon to Metz; Third (Ruffey) opposite the line from Metz to Thionville; Fourth (Langle de Cary) and Fifth (Lanrezac) along the Belgian frontier. The left flank of the French Army was supported by the British Army, consisting of two corps under General French. Opposed to these were nine German Armies, composed of forty-four army corps, ready to advance on a grand front extending

through Aix-la-Chapelle-Malmédy-Trèves-Metz-Strassburg.

While General Foch, corps commander of the Twentieth Army Corps in General Dubail's Army, was checking the advance of the Bavarian Crown Prince along the Selle, the German Armies were concentrating in the north and descending with full force on the weakly-held Allied line on the Belgian frontier. General von Kluck, without waiting the outcome of the siege of Liège, crossed the Meuse below that city, defeated the Belgians

After engagements of the French Second Army, resulting in the German check before Nancy, the Third and Fourth French Armies dashed their force against the German masses advancing through Belgian Luxemburg (August 21-22), only to be thrown back with losses by the vastly superior forces of the invader. This retreat uncovered the right flank of the Fifth French Army which extended nearly to Namur, necessitating its withdrawal, which in turn demanded the retreat of the British in order to conform to



A Peaceful Valley in Alsace

at Aerschot and occupied Brussels August 20th.

Von Bülow, coming from Eupen near the Belgo-German frontier, crossed the Meuse at Huy, southwest of Liège, and advanced in the direction of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur. On his left von Hausen and the Duke of Württemberg advanced from the line Malmédy-St. Vith and crossed the Ardennes, marching on Dinant and Neufchâteau (Belgium). To the left of these armies was that of the Prussian Crown Prince, in position on a line from Trèves to Metz through Luxemburg.

the general retirement. The retreat thus commenced did not revert to the offensive until the battle of the Marne.

This great strategic retreat was ordered by the able French Commander-in-Chief, Joffre, who realized that the only ultimate hope of success lay in concentrating his armies, leading his adversary to a field of his own selection, and there giving battle. This he did, although it meant the sacrifice of Belgium and that part of France north of the line from Paris to Verdun. To attempt to rush his inferior forces north and throw them before the crushing German columns to be whipped

in detail, was out of the question. Joffre, therefore, resolved to do the only logical thing which offered a possibility of success, although at the time great pressure was brought to bear to force him to make a stand further north. With the victory won it is easy to see that this advice given by civilian politicians was in error, and it is a measure of the greatness of this professional soldier, the "Hero of the Marne," that he was true to his original con-



© G. P. Putnam's Sons.

"Where Did That One Go To?"

Cartoon by Bairnsfather.

victions and triumphed over the enemy without and the meddler within.

RETREAT FROM MONS

One of the most spectacular features of this great strategic retreat was the withdrawal of the "contemptible little British Army" from Mons. The British Expeditionary Force, consisting of two Army Corps, had landed in France on August 16th, and gone immediately to take position on the left of the French line. Here they occupied a line running from Condé east to Mons, and thence southeast to Binche, forming a salient at

Mons. August 22nd, the First Army Corps (Haig) held the line from Mons to Binche, the Second Army Corps (Smith-Dorrien) from Mons to Condé; the cavalry division had placed the 5th Brigade at Binche, and four remaining brigades on the western flank. The Third Army Corps was still mobilizing at a base in France.

On August 23rd the British Commander-in-Chief, General French, received information from the French that two army corps and one cavalry division of the enemy were in front of him. This he later confirmed by his own patrols and air scouts. At 3:00 p.m. the Germans delivered a fierce attack on the First Army Corps, which caused it to retire its right flank to the south of Bray, while the 5th Cavalry Brigade moved south of Binche, allowing the enemy to occupy that town.

Mons thus becoming a dangerous salient, the Second Corps was directed to retire its center behind the town, which was accomplished before dark. At 5:00 p.m. information was received from the French that the Fourth and Ninth and a reserve German corps were moving to attack the Second British Corps, while engaged in a turning movement near Tournai. The message also stated that the French Fifth Army was retreating south in the direction of Hirson, to which movement General French was requested to conform. In compliance with this request preparations were made to retire to the previously elected line, Jenlain-Maubeuge—at best only a temporary expedient.

The next day, covered by a demonstration towards Binche, the withdrawal of the First Corps to the new line commenced. The Second Corps conformed, taking position first on the line Dour-Frameries and later reaching the line Jenlain-Bavai, about 7:00 p.m. At 7:30 p.m. the 5th Division of the Second Army became heavily engaged, so the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was sent to its assistance. The latter was unfortunately caught in an entanglement and required the assistance of the 19th Infantry Brigade to extricate itself. At the close of the day's fighting the First Corps held the line Bavai-Maubeuge, the Second Corps, Jenlain-Bavai; the 19th Infantry Brigade, Jenlain-Bry, and the cavalry the west flank.

GERMANS PRESS RETREATING BRITISH

August 25th found the British Army, unable to throw off the persistent von Kluck, in a further retirement to the line Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies. In the meanwhile, the Third British Army Corps was rapidly mobilizing and was now partially detrained at Le Cateau.

The Fourth Division of the newly-arrived Third Army was sent forward to La Chaprie to cover the retreat of the Second Army Corps, which was assisted in this dangerous withdrawal by the 19th Infantry Brigade and two cavalry brigades. After heavy rear guard action throughout the day it reached its line Le Cateau-Caudry about 6:00 p. m.

With the assistance of two French reserve divisions, the First Army Corps, in spite of heavy attacks which it had to repulse at Landrecies and near Marouilles, reached its new position about 10:00 p. m.

Describing the fighting on this day an observer tells of a British cavalry charge near the end of the great retreat:

"Strange sights were seen by some of the men in that charge. A non-commissioned officer of the 9th (Lancers) ran his lance through a German officer, who, thus impaled, struck at the lancer and severed his hand at the wrist. One trooper of the 9th ran his lance straight through a German till his hand touched the doomed man's breast. A German horse was seen galloping away with a corpse pinned to its back with a lance." (From *From Mons to Ypres with General French*, by Frederic Coleman.)

Owing to the nature of the fighting the cavalry had become considerably scattered during these two days (24th-25th), but in the evening of the 25th reassembled south of Cambrai.

The following account of the fighting on the British left will give some idea of the desperate nature of the struggle on both sides:

"The battle of Le Cateau was in the main an artillery duel, and a very unequal one at that. The afternoon infantry attack was only sustained by certain devoted regiments who failed to interpret with sufficient readiness the order to retire. Some of these regiments—as the price of their ignorance of how to turn

their backs to the foe—were all but annihilated. . . . Our infantry lined their inadequate trenches and were bombarded for some half a dozen hours on end. Our artillery replied with inconceivable heroism, but they were outnumbered by at least five to one. They also—perhaps with wisdom—directed their fire more at the infantry than at the opposing batteries. The former could be plainly seen massing in great numbers on the crest of the ridge some two thousand yards away, and advancing in a



© G. P. Putnam's Sons.

"Well, If You Knows of a Better 'Ole, Go To It."

Cartoon by Bairnsfather.

succession of lines down the slope to the hidden ground below. They presented a tempting target, and their losses from our shrapnel must have been enormous. By the afternoon, however, many of our batteries had been silenced, and the German gunners had it more or less their own way. The sides were too unequal." (From *The First Seven Divisions*, by Capt. E. W. Hamilton.)

THE BRITISH STILL FORCED BACK

August 26th found the British Army still in grave danger, though holding its lines of the night before. But it soon became appar-

ent that a further retirement was imperative, so, being unable to support each other, the two British Corps appealed to General Sordêt for his French cavalry division, which was denied owing to the fatigued condition of his horses. In an effort to make the best of the situation, a retreat was ordered at 3:30 p. m., and by nightfall the enemy had been partially evaded.

After a general withdrawal during the night, the next day found the Allies holding



© R. Haines.

Field Marshal Sir John French

the following lines: British, Guise-north of St. Quentin to Somme River; French, Mézières-Hirson-Guise. Though in retreat, the Allies were rapidly consolidating their lines with good contact between units, just what the French Commander-in-Chief purposed when he decided upon the withdrawal. During the day great assistance was given by Sordêt's cavalry, which drove the enemy back on Cambrai; and by the 61st and 62nd Divisions under General D'Amade, who attacked the enemy's flank from Arras.

Action on the following day (August 28th)

was not as severe as for the past two days. The retreat continued without interruption from the line Guise-north of Rethel-Verdun by the French, and Noyon-Chaulny-La Fère by the British. When the retirement was again resumed in the evening, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades had severe encounters with German columns moving southeast from St. Quentin.

August 29th the British left flank received the support of the Sixth French Army, which had just arrived under command of General Manoury and had taken position on the left towards Amiens. The British were now supported on their right at Guise by the French Fifth Army, and on the left by the French Sixth Army. The arrival of the latter was timely, as that day the attacks on this flank became more violent than before. Three or four corps were opposing the French Sixth Army, two the British Army, and five or six the French Fifth Army.

The two commanders, Joffre and French, consulted and decided to continue the retreat, but, in so doing, the French Fifth Army was to make a demonstration on the Somme, and the British were to move to the line Compiègne-Soissons to be within one day's march of the Fifth Army.

The general line on August 30th was Compiègne-Soissons-Rheims-Verdun. The fighting was more favorable to the Allies. The Prussian Guard, Guard Reserve, and the Tenth German Corps were driven back, but still it was decided to continue the retreat. A notable addition on this day came in the form of the Seventh French Army, commanded by General Foch, the gallant defender of Nancy in the battle of the Selle. (In some accounts this army is referred to as the Ninth.) Expecting greater resistance at what would be his center when he had reached the line where he intended to give battle, General Joffre directed the Seventh Army to take its position between the Fifth and Fourth Armies.

FRENCH'S OFFICIAL DISPATCH

The following excerpts from the official dispatch of Sir John French, dated September 7th, give an interesting portrayal of the account the British Army gave of itself in these operations:

September 7, 1914.

My Lord:

I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch. . . .

The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows:

From Condé to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

About 3:00 p. m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the effect that the

eral Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German Corps, viz., a reserve corps, the Fourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournai. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the 5th French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.

RETIREMENT TO MAUBEUGE POSITION

In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitered.



© Underwood and Underwood.

After the Battle of Barcy

One of the fiercest engagements of the first battle of the Marne was fought here on the Barcy road when French and German troops engaged in a hand-to-hand encounter.

enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened. . . .

The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the Commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the center behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5:00 p. m., I received a most unexpected message from Gen-

This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jemlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a

result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th. . . .

About 7:30 a. m. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured to bring direct support to the 5th Division.



© G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Coiffure in the Trenches

"Keep yer 'ead still, or I'll 'ave yer blinkin' ear off."

Cartoon by Bairnsfather.

During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyse the further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the Brigade. . . .

With the assistance of the Cavalry, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening

his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so. . . .

The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops. . . .

FRENCH ORDERS FURTHER RETREAT

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts—owing to the information I received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy against me—as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.

Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Forêt De Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10:00 o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest.

The enemy, however, would not allow them

this rest, and about 9:30 p. m. a report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wassigny on Guise.

By about 6:00 p.m. the Second Corps had got into position with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and the line of defense was continued thence by the 4th Division towards Seranviller, the left being thrown back. . . .

GERMANS CONCENTRATE ON ALLIES' LEFT

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the 4th Division.

At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.

The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.

There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The artillery, although outmatched by at



© Underwood and Underwood.

A Scene on a Marne Battlefield, 1914

The retreating Germans left behind them a host of dead on the battlefields of the Marne valley. Woods, fields, and ditches were littered with bodies, and the peasants were compelled to leave their harvesting to bury them. This picture taken near Lizy shows the bodies of some of the soldiers of a crack regiment of Prussian Guards.

least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3:30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command on the morning of August 26th could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.*

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then throw off the weight of the enemy's pursuit.

(Signed) J. D. P. French, Field-Marshal,
Commander in Chief, British Forces in
the Field.

ON THE LINE OF THE MARNE

August 31st and September 1st-3rd saw the retirement continued, with the Allies winning local successes. September 1st the 1st Cavalry Brigade was successful in an encounter at Compiègne and recaptured four of its own guns and twelve from the enemy besides, while the 4th Guards Brigade had a severe engagement at Villers-Cotterets. However, an orderly retreat continued, allowing the enemy to cross the Marne in force September 3rd.

This crossing was an unexpected change in the enemy's plans, for it was expected that von Kluck would drive straight on Paris with

that city as his goal. Believing this, General Gallieni had been directed to prepare Paris for a siege and its defense was entrusted to General Manoury's Sixth Army and six territorial divisions.

Von Kluck was true to the teachings of both Clausewitz and von Moltke, who had taught that, before marching on Paris, the French Army must first be beaten and broken up. Had the Allies given battle successively on the natural lines of the Somme, Oise, Aisne, and, finally, the line Paris-Verdun, they would undoubtedly have been defeated. Joffre, fully appreciating this, abandoned Northern France to the ravages of the enemy in order to remain true to the principles by use of which he knew he could bring victory out of defeat. (See article on Joffre's strategy in Vol. II.)

VON KLUCK AVOIDS PARIS

Whereas it was a deception to the German troops to find themselves diverted from the coveted Paris, yet the plan had been predetermined, as was evidenced by the triple map packets found on German officers. Only two of these had been used up to the time of the battle of the Marne: one was for Belgium, the other for northeast France from the Belgian border to the region of the upper Seine and Aube Rivers, but not including Paris. The third packet covered the country south of the Loire and all the territory south of Paris as far as the Cher. The evident intention, therefore, was to invest Paris *after* battles in the northern areas—battles which Joffre was too prudent to risk. It is interesting to note that these maps were dated 1906.

Inasmuch as the infallible German General Staff plan had not met with its expected success, it became necessary to follow the retreating Allied Army; consequently von Kluck's immediate objective became the outer flank of the enemy's army, and, for this reason, the little British Army had to bear the weight of the heaviest attacks in the Germans' vain attempt to turn the Allied left flank. When, therefore, the French Sixth Army, which had later arrived to support the British left, retired to Paris, and the British withdrew to the east of Paris behind the Marne, there was but one thing to do—follow.

* French, in his book 1914, published in 1919, severely censures Smith-Dorrien and declares his praise of that general to have been due to insufficient information. See article on this episode in Vol. II.



From Punch, Nov. 4, 1914.

Scene: Ticket office at — (Censored).

Trippler Wilhelm: "First Class to Paris." Clerk: "Line blocked." Wilhelm: "Then make it Warsaw." Clerk: "Line blocked." Wilhelm: "Well, what about Calais?" Clerk: "Line blocked."


Wilhelm: "Hang it! I must go somewhere! I promised my people I would."

(The German High Command expected to capture Paris within a short time after the German steam-roller had overpowered Belgian and French resistance, and the story was widely circulated that the Kaiser had made plans to dine in Paris on a certain day.)

When, therefore, on September 3rd, von Kluck marched across the Marne, he was where Joffre had tried to lead him for a fortnight. Now the German Armies had one flank covered by Verdun, the other by Paris, and the exhausted but undefeated French Army in their immediate front. The time to

General Foch and placed it at the threatened point.

The following is an outline of the German plan: Part of the 1st Army (von Kluck) was to hold the River Ourcq, the remainder was to cross the Marne at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château-Thierry, and Mézy, moving



Sept. 5, 1914—Distribution of French and German Forces at First Battle of the Marne

take the offensive had come, and Joffre was not slow to take advantage of it.

on the general line Coulommiers-Montmirail. The other German armies were to conform to this movement.

V

THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE

WORN out with exhaustion and reduced in numbers by the severity of weeks of fighting, von Kluck slid quietly by to the southeast of Paris for the purpose of attacking the left flank of Franchet d'Esperey's Army. At the same time the change in plan of the main German attack called for the concentrated efforts of the armies of Bülow and Hausen, 300,000 men, to break the Allied center between Franchet d'Esperey (Fifth Army) and Langle de Cary (Fourth Army) at Epernay and Châlons, respectively.

Foreseeing such an attempt, General Joffre had already created the Seventh Army for


JOFFRE TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

On the other hand, the French Commander-in-Chief had plans of his own, and decided to take the offensive. His dispositions were: The Sixth French Army, pivoted on the Marne, was to wheel to the right and attack the Germans on the River Ourcq. The British Army, with flanks resting on the Marne and the French Fifth Army, was to fill the gap between the Fifth and Sixth French Armies. Franchet d'Esperey, Foch, and Langle de Cary, with the Fifth, Seventh and Fourth French Armies, respectively, from left to right, were to conform to a general offensive. The exact moment to strike would be when the two corps from Nancy and Epinal were in line, the British ready to attack, and Manoury ready to move N-E towards Meaux.

THE "TAXICAB ARMY"

On September 5th General Manoury received reinforcements from General Galli ni, commander of Paris. This was the famous "Taxicab Army" that attacked von Kluck in flank and, at the time, was popularly sup-

ported by the French assault. Knowing if the right flank were enveloped or destroyed that the entire German line would be imperiled, von Kluck sent an urgent request for reinforcements and ordered his whole army to retire (September 6th). Simultaneously with this retreat a German forward movement between Ma illy



Sept. 10, 1914—The French and German Lines at the First Battle of the Marne After Foch's Sudden Counter-Attack Forced the Enemy to Retreat

posed to have been responsible for the Allied victory. The attack on von Kluck was somewhat premature, as Joffre had not yet fully completed his arrangements. However, as soon as the news reached the French commander he issued an order to stop the retirement and take the offensive—"to die rather than retreat."

Upon General Foch, in the center of the line, fell the weight of the attacks of B ulow and Hausen. That he could hold his own in the face of 300,000 men was wonderful, as he had but 70,000 troops, or only two men to the yard, whereas Napoleon held that five men were necessary under such conditions, when it was intended to change to the offensive after a protracted retreat.

Meanwhile, Manoury and Galli ni were attacking the extreme German right (von Kluck) with the greatest intrepidity, and were slowly forcing it back. Von Kluck soon saw that he had overreached himself; his weary troops could not stand against the fury of the

and St. R my marked the farthest advance made by the German Army during the entire war.

On the same day General Foch was ordered to support on his left the offensive of Franchet d'Esp rey, while on his front he was to hold the enemy so the rest of the Allied line could pass to the offensive.

The attack continued to rage with unprecedented fury all of the next day (September 7th). The French made good headway on the River Ourcq, while the army of Franchet d'Esp rey inflicted terrific losses on the enemy and pushed him back as far as the Petit Morin. The British, too, took their toll of the slaughter.

FOCH'S GREAT MANEUVER

In the center, however, the Germans assaulted in dense masses in spite of the frightful toll taken by the artillery of the French Seventh Army, and continued to rush forward

with unabated fury. In fact the Seventh French Army could scarcely hold its positions, but the seriousness of the situation did not alarm its clear-headed commander, who merely commented: "Since they wish to attack with such fury, it is evident that their plans have

day (September 8th) sent powerful reinforcements to check Manoury, while fresh assaults were directed at Foch in the center by Bülow and Hausen. However, it was too late to aid von Kluck. The retreat had commenced and the day was spent in furious rear-guard



London Times History.

The Germans Crossing the River Marne, 1914

An artist's drawing of a fierce hand-to-hand encounter between the French defenders of the world and the enemy.

miscarried elsewhere." His statement was well founded, for at that very time the combined attacks of General Manoury's Sixth Army and the British Army, now on the offensive, had beaten back the Sixth German Army Corps at Rebais and Coulommiers.

In an effort to save the victory which they saw rapidly slipping from their grasp, the German High Command on the following

actions in which the Germans lost heavily. The French Fifth and Sixth Armies and the British Army, now increased by the Third British Corps as a unit, continued to hold the Petit Morin line throughout the day, in spite of the heavy counter-attacks delivered by the enemy to cover his withdrawal.

In the center the left of the Seventh French Army advanced, but was driven back by the

German heavy artillery, and forced to give up Fère-Champenoise and Mailly.

Seeing this retreat on the left center, the Prussian Guard was sent against the center of the Seventh Army to take Mondement. If Mondement fell, the Seventh Army would be cut in two, the French line pierced, and the victorious German advance resumed. No graver situation ever faced any commander during the entire war than that which now confronted the commander of the Seventh Army. As a professor of Military History, Strategy, and Applied Tactics at the French War College, and also as author of *The Conduct of War* and *The Principles of War*, General Foch had enunciated many principles for his students. Now was his time to practice his teachings. Two of his most famous maxims were: (1) "Victory equals will power—a battle gained is a battle in which defeat is not admitted." (2) "Victory always goes to him who merits it by possessing the greatest force of will and intelligence." Again, he defines the art of war as: "To be informed, to know how to think, to know how to decide."

Possessing the rare gift of combining the theoretical with the practical and keeping a clear head, Foch relied on his expounded principles as he sat calmly chewing his cigar and listening over the telephone to the alarming and disastrous reports from his own army. However, he also heard of the success of Manoury on the Ourcq, and Franchet d'Esperey at the Petit Morin, and realized that he must hold his line at all costs until nightfall.

FOCH'S NERVE STOPS THE GERMANS

Knowing that the following day would be still worse, he sent to the Fifth Army for reinforcements and secured from General Franchet d'Esperey the Tenth Army Corps and the 51st Reserve Division. Another commander would probably have sought excuses for his army and prepared for a retreat, under the terrific pressure, but General Foch sent to his Commander-in-Chief the following characteristic message: "Strongly pressed on my right; my center in retreat; impossible to move; situation excellent. I shall attack——"

Believing fatigue a mental condition, and that the weaker a force is the more necessity

for it to take the offensive, General Foch ordered a general advance. The 42nd Division, supported by d'Esperey, gained ground. but elsewhere the odds were too great. Nevertheless, the enemy advance was checked and the Allied positions held until night.

Replacing his worn out divisions by fresh reserves, General Foch directed an attack on the flank of the Tenth German Army Corps, September 9th. In desperation a combined attack by the Seventh, Tenth, and Twelfth German Corps and the Tenth and Twelfth Reserve Corps was delivered simultaneously in a supreme effort to crush the Seventh French Army. However, the French left center made progress in the face of this attack, while the Moroccans, or "Turcos," as they were called, prevented the Prussian Guard from taking Mondement. The right center fell back and the Germans took Mailly.

Fortunately for the French, the Germans were also exhausted. The Teuton lines of attack became thinner, and the French "75s" played havoc with them. Another factor which cannot be overlooked is the marsh of St. Gond, which the Germans must cross to reach their adversaries. This was a serious obstacle alike to pursuer and pursued. Depending upon this barrier to check the French, the Germans detached certain forces to help von Kluck further west, leaving only a thin line behind the marsh and a gap between Bülow and Hausen.

FOCH ATTACKS

Taking advantage of this fact, and before the gap could be closed, General Foch struck with all the fury of the renowned offensive power of the French Army. His object was the right flank of the Twelfth German Army Corps, protecting the east end of the marsh. General Foch had now played his last card, and his confidence in the outcome was equaled only by his coolness. As soon as the attack had been launched, it is said that he mounted his horse and took a pleasure ride with a young lieutenant, during the course of which he discussed questions of philosophy and political economy.

The French attack was stopped only by the fall of darkness. Next day (September 10th), when the attack was resumed at 5:00 a. m.,

it was discovered that the Germans had retreated during the night in such haste that in some localities, especially in Fère-Champenoise, officers and men of the Prussian Guard Corps who had partaken too freely of the spoils of the wine cellars were left to be captured in a drunken condition.

The advancing Seventh Army met with determined resistance in the evening on the lines Morains-Normée and Lenharrée-Som-

four years later at the hands of the Americans.

The British conformed to the advance and, as von Kluck wheeled west to fight off Manoury, attacked his exposed southern flank. Assailed in front and on his left flank he faced south once more and retired as rapidly as possible, with the French Sixth Army (Manoury) clinging to his right flank.

Some criticism had been offered because the



© Underwood and Underwood.

Celebrating the Victory of the Battle of the Marne

The archbishop of Lens praying before the graves of the Marne heroes at Barg Cemetery, on the first anniversary of the Marne battle.

mesous, but on the following day crossed the Marne between Épernay and Châlons.

CLINCHING THE VICTORY

The Allied left had progressed with varying vicissitudes. The French Sixth Army met serious opposition on the Ourcq, due to reinforcements which had been taken from the German left. The Fifth Army, after heavy fighting at Montmirail, drove the enemy across the Marne at Château-Thierry, which place was again to mark a German defeat

British failed to press their advantage when von Kluck faced west, exposing his flank to them. It must be remembered, however, that this Army had been fighting for weeks, that it was depleted in numbers, and exhausted. Furthermore, von Kluck, one of Germany's ablest generals, had taken advantage of all natural barriers and protected this flank with all the means at his disposal. Outflanked by Manoury and attacked by the British, there seemed for a while a possibility of the capture or annihilation of this German Army, but fate withheld this trophy from the Allies.

The latter had to be contented with a general German retreat to the line of the Aisne with the invaders closely followed by the reanimated Allied Army. The retreat and pursuit continued until September 19th; the German First and Second Armies being in full retreat, but fighting severe rear guard actions with the British. The French Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies met with practically no opposition.

This battle was not a decisive victory, inasmuch as the fighting power of the German

to assume the offensive after weeks of retreat, and snatch victory from an aggressive army flushed with success. The total number involved is given roughly as: Allies, one million; Germans, 900,000; though by concentrations the Germans preserved a numerical superiority at all points where attacks were delivered by them. German losses are figured at about 150,000, Allied only slightly smaller. The total length of fighting front is given at a little more than 150 miles.



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

Clemenceau Near the Front

The French soldiers adored Clemenceau, and he was often among them. The scene is at Beaumont and the figure in black, cane in hand, is that of the French Premier.

Army was not destroyed. However, its aggressiveness had been considerably lowered and its morale shaken to have what seemed a sure victory snatched from it by an army it considered already defeated and whose fighting qualities it had hitherto held in contempt.

WHAT THE VICTORY MEANT

The victory of the Marne, for it may be considered an Allied victory, is remarkable for the numbers involved, length of front, and the ability of an apparently defeated army

It must be remembered that as the German Army advanced it was necessary to leave a large number of troops to guard its ever-lengthening line of communications, besiege Antwerp, and garrison the capitulated forts along the line of march. Joffre realized this when he planned his retreat, knowing that, for each mile he retired, the nearer completion would be the French and British mobilization, and, consequently, the stronger his force, whereas the enemy's strength was being constantly expended. Furthermore, the unexpected surprise consisting of the army he

secretly collected in Paris and put under Manoury, which allowed von Kluck to pass and then attacked him from the flank and in rear, may be considered a masterpiece of strategy and the turning point in the retreat. Though this attack was somewhat premature, von Kluck was already outflanked and out-generated by the French Commander-in-Chief, and he displayed his own genius by admitting

VI

BATTLES OF THE AISNE AND
YPRES

UNABLE to consolidate their shattered forces behind the natural defensive barrier of the Marne, the Germans decided to continue their retirement to their prepared



International News. Courtesy of Leslies Weekly.

Making War in the Sand Dunes of Flanders

German guns being moved in the vicinity of Ostend. The coast of Flanders is low and sandy and the country back of it consists mainly of rolling sand hills. Here some of the most desperate fighting of the war took place. Here the British massed their men to defend the coast from the enemy and to prevent the invasion of England.

the situation and retreating as fast as he safely could.

The battle of the Marne will go down in history as one of the most important battles of the world, as it marked the high tide of the German invasion and doomed the German campaign for world-conquest to utter disaster. What a coincidence that four years later the Marne valley was to bear the fruits of final victory!

positions along the river Aisne. This stream formed the first strong obstacle in their rear after the line of the Marne had been given up. They retired to it closely pursued by the Franco-British Army. On September 12th the first pause was made at the Aisne and it was not long before the Allies knew that their adversary intended to make a determined stand.

The Aisne valley is a natural ditch run-

ning east and west from near Berry-au-Bac to Compiègne, where the Aisne River, a narrow but deep and unfordable stream, flows into the Oise. The river banks are lined with steep limestone cliffs and quarries whence the stone has been removed for building purposes. The Germans had added to this natural barrier every device of man to strengthen it against the Allied advance.

GERMAN DELUGE OF AMMUNITION

Fighting strong rearguard actions, the German Army crossed the Aisne September 12th-13th, burned all the bridges, and then poured a hail of artillery and machine-gun fire upon the Allies in the meadows on the south bank of the river. So lavish were the German gunners in the expenditure of ammunition to annihilate the pursuing foe that the following illustration demonstrates what slight provocations were necessary to call forth a burst of hostile artillery fire:

"... The gunners had wondered at the heavy shelling not many hundred yards from their funk-holes, but had seen no human beings near the hedge, before or after the bitter bombardment.

"Nonplussed, the officer walked back to the devastated area, and, just as he was leaving, discovered the cause of all the trouble.

"There, caught on a twig of the hedge, swinging lazily in the wind, was a bright-bottomed empty sardine can, thrown carelessly aside by some satiated luncher.

"The sun, catching the bright bit of moving tin, had made of it a tiny reflector.

"Surely, never had so insignificant an object or one so intrinsically worthless caused the Huns so great an expenditure of costly ammunition."

And again:

"The same day the German look-outs must have taken a herd of a couple of dozen cows for some of our horses. A battery of howitzers opened on the inoffensive cattle, driving them from one corner of a large field to another. For quite half an hour the enemy guns pounded away at the herd. It seemed odd that any of the poor beasts were left alive, but only five were killed—in spite of the tons of metal embedded in their pasture by the Boche gunners." (From *From Mons to Ypres with General French*, by Frederic Coleman.)

Baffled by heavy rains which flooded the river, the Allies struggled against odds to throw across their pontoon bridges and attack the Germans on the heights beyond.

FAILURE OF THE OFFENSIVE

In this attack the French occupied the line from Compiègne to Soissons; the British from Soissons to Berry-au-Bac. With great intrepidity and disregard for losses the French forced a crossing and occupied the north shore, from which point they hoped to launch their attack (September 14th). The British were less successful on their front and reached the northern bank in only a few places, which was insufficient to warrant a general attack.

The French, however, realizing the danger of their position with a flooded river on their line of communications, assaulted and carried the heights but were unable to hold their gains longer than a few days, due to lack of British support on their right. They were later pushed back to the river and the Germans won the decision in this fight.

After an attempted French advance north towards Laon and the German sortie south on Rheims, both of which were checked, operations in the battle of the Aisne came to a close with an unusually severe bombardment of Rheims, September 28th.

The close of operations on the Aisne marked the close of mobile operations on this sector of front and the beginning of trench warfare. Each army "dug in" to watch the other, and at the same time held its line with reduced numbers. Meantime, all possible spare forces were rushed to the flanks: to the east where the Crown Prince attempted to force his way through the Allies south of Verdun; to the west, where both armies made a "rush to the sea," as the French attempted to envelop the right flank of von Kluck's army.

FIRST BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL

Realizing that the French depended largely on the natural and artificial defenses of the line from Verdun to Toul, and had, accordingly, robbed this sector of men and guns to use elsewhere, the German Crown Prince concentrated four army corps on the plains of the Woëvre to move through the passes in the scarp to the west and attack this line.

Operations commenced September 20th and Forts Camp des Romains and Troyon soon crumbled under the rain of high explosive shells, permitting the advance of the German corps. By September 26th the salient made in this line formed a sharp, narrow, re-entrant angle in the Allied line, to include the city of St. Mihiel. All efforts to recapture the town during the next four years were futile, and it remained in German possession until recaptured by the Americans, who wiped out the salient September 13th, 1918.

THE RACE TO THE SEA

Deadlocked in the center, where the Aisne position defied all attempts to dislodge the enemy, the French Commander-in-Chief decided to move rapidly around the right flank of the First German Army and envelop it. Preparatory to this he moved the Sixth French Army to the west, but the artful von Kluck conformed, and thereupon commenced a race north between the two which later culminated in the battle of Flanders. The French pressed the advantage of the initiative, forcing back the whole German line until it ran almost north and south, making a right angle with the line of the Aisne, which ran east and west. The new line commenced south of Noyon and ran north near the towns of Roye, Péronne, Arras, Lens, La Bassée, Armentières, Messines, Ypres, Dixmude and Nieuport. All of these were destined to become famous from the military operations which were soon to ensue.

It is not probable that the German High Command deliberately picked such a battlefield as Flanders with its swamps and marshes, through which ran a maze of dikes and canals. The terrain was so low that even the rivers must be confined by artificial means to prevent them from flooding the country. In addition, in this country practically devoid of trees, it was impossible to conceal the concentration of armies; consequently, any invader on this sector was exposed to the fire of the defense almost as soon as he entered the theater of operations. It has, therefore, remained a disputed question as to why the German Armies attempted to break this line through a country which offered only natural difficulties and was devoid of all concealment;

where deep trenches were impossible, and retirement as hazardous as the advance. It was into this country that the Kaiser's armies were led to sink in the swamps and streams of Flanders, or perish under the terrific Allied fire after this difficult natural barrier had been crossed.


FOCH TAKES COMMAND IN NORTH

This northern extension of the Allied left was placed under the command of the able General Foch, who had already proved his ability in the battle of the Selle and the retirement to the Grand Couronné of Nancy, and as commander of the French center in the battle of the Marne. By a telephone message, on October 4th, he was announced as Commander of the French Army Group of the North, this to take effect at once.

For these operations Castelnau's Army had been brought from Alsace just in time to stop the German drive at Roye (September 20th), and General Maud'huy's Army was placed further north at Arras, barely in time to break the force of a drive of 300,000 Germans advancing in that sector. Other troops on this line were four territorial divisions under General Brugère, and the Cavalry Corps of Conneau and de Mitry. At the instigation of General Foch the left of the French line was prolonged by four British Army Corps, reinforced by the British marines, who had aided the Belgians at Antwerp. Thus the British held a line from La Bassée to Ypres, on the left of which were the Belgians between Ypres and Dixmude. Other Anglo-French troops took position on the left to support the sector held by the Belgian Army.

After the evacuation of Antwerp (October 9th) a considerable part of the Belgian Army outwitted their attackers and escaped on a narrow strip of land between the Scheldt River and the sea, later reassembling behind the Yser, where they defended the extreme Allied left. Only the Belgian rear guards were cut off; these made their escape into Holland, where they were interned.

The Germans followed the Belgians slowly, taking Ghent, Bruges and Ostend without fighting. With the siege of Antwerp thus ended, troops and guns became available for



Approximate Line of the Western Front on Nov. 11, 1914

further German offensive efforts. The German High Command thereupon massed an army of twelve Army Corps and four cavalry corps between the Lys and the sea for a quick dash to seize the Channel ports, Dunkirk and Calais, and, if possible, to turn the Allied left. This decision of the German General Staff was fortunate for the Allies, who, to help the hard pressed Belgians around Dixmude, had evacuated about twenty miles

ruined their initial plans for a short and victorious war. However, supported by the French and British, all attacks were repulsed except in one instance, at Ramscapele, and there the German success was short lived.

These attacks included some of the bloodiest and most desperate fighting in the whole war. The German troops were composed mostly of the youngest class in the military service, flushed with hope and victory, and possessing vitality more than commensurate with the hardships which a campaign in this marshy country would naturally entail.

On the Allied side were the hurriedly mobilized British, French, and Belgian forces who had for months now been fighting against everything but hope. When, therefore, General Foch learned that his troops and ammunition were both nearly exhausted, he directed that the dikes of the Yser be cut and the country flooded. (See Map on p. 43.)

This done (October 28th), the field of battle disappeared under a flood of water. Furious to be thus again cheated out of the victory which was in their grasp, the Germans made a supreme effort to break the Belgian line. After a terrific artillery bombardment, the attack was launched on October 30th, but failed everywhere, except at Ramscapele, where the Prussian Guard broke through, only to be evicted by the bayonet charge of the 42nd French Division which had already distinguished itself in the French Seventh Army at the Marne.

An interesting occurrence is reported to have taken place October 30th, when the British were ready to retreat under the tremendous pressure of the German onslaught at Dixmude. General Foch arrived at British Headquarters, where General French told him of his intentions to withdraw. General Foch protested, but the British Commander-in-Chief simply showed him a copy of the order of retreat which he had dictated, explaining that he knew no other course. General Foch was so insistent in his original demands that the British commander finally turned the order over and simply wrote on the back: "Execute the order of General Foch." This is the first instance of the Allied armies being under a single commander during the war, and it is singular to note that the same commander was officially chosen four



Sketch map of country around Dixmude with Allied line as it stood in 1917.

of line between Ypres and La Bassée, which was protected only by cavalry patrols. Happily this fact was not discovered by the Germans and the fighting took place further north on a well defended sector.

BATTLE OF THE YSER

For fifteen days (October 13th-28th) the German army concentrated its assaults against the Belgian sector at Dixmude. The Teutons hoped to crush the already decimated Belgian Army, which they had come to hate for having

years later to assume an identical rôle for all the Allied armies.

FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

Foiled at Dixmude with a loss of nearly 300,000 men, the Germans next concentrated two corps of picked troops opposite Ypres. The assault commenced October 30th and continued until the middle of November without much success.

For days the fighting was of the most desperate character, culminating in an unusually heavy assault (November 11th), in which the Prussian Guard pierced the British front and gained a footing in the outskirts of Ypres. The British counter-attack, however, soon dislodged and drove them back to their own lines.

With the approaching rigors of winter, the last six weeks of the year 1914 saw no further general offensive, but only local attacks to improve lines, as both sides dug in for the winter and awaited further developments. The first Zeppelin air raid on London (December 24th) was the last German offensive effort of the year.

In summarizing the operations for the first year, it is seen that the initial fury of the German offensive had been everywhere broken; on the Marne, at the Aisne, and in Flanders. Belgium had been crushed and Northern France occupied, but decisions must be reserved so long as two armies continue to oppose each other, neither of which has been decisively beaten nor failed to preserve the continuity of its line. Discouraged in the West, the German General Staff was content to settle down to a passive defense, while all available troops were withdrawn and sent to the Eastern front to the armies of von Hindenburg, who had been given the mission to put Russia out of the war.

VII

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1915

BEFORE discussing military operations in the second year of the great war, it is well to locate the battle line as it existed in January, 1915. This line extended from the

North Sea to Switzerland, in all, a distance of about 600 miles. The following outline shows the three main divisions of the front: (a) Northern sector, extending roughly from Nieuport almost to Compiègne. Held by Franco-Belgian forces from Nieuport to Ypres, by British from Ypres to Béthune, and by French from Béthune to the Oise.

(b) Central sector, extending generally southeast from Soissons through the Champagne region, north of Rheims and to the Meuse, northwest of Verdun. The whole sector was held entirely by the French.

(c) Eastern sector, running from Verdun through St. Mihiel along the Lorraine border and across the Vosges Mountains into Germany, where Thann still remained in French hands. This sector was also held by the French.

An inspection of this line cannot but impress the most casual observer that the war in the West was essentially between France and Germany. Of this great line, the Belgians held only eighteen miles of front, the British thirty-one, and the French Army, with two and one-half million men, the remaining five hundred and forty-three miles.

The outstanding feature of the operations in 1915 was a mutual effort on both sides to break the deadlock of trench warfare and pass to a mobile offensive. It will be noted, therefore, in each detailed operation that this is the direct aim of the attack, or else to gain a base from which ultimately to launch such an attack, which, if successful, would change the nature of the fighting from the trench to open warfare.

BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE

After the local battle of Givenchy, January 26th, the first effort in this direction was the British attempt to take Neuve Chapelle and the region beyond, with Lille as the final objective. With their customary dash the British advanced and took Neuve Chapelle, but failed to attain the heights beyond the town, due to lack of proper artillery support. This latter fault was attributed to the ammunition shortage, for lack of which the British suffered 13,000 casualties without achieving their final goal.

Operations on this front remained quiet

until April 17th, when the taking of Hill 60 by the British precipitated a violent German counter-attack which later developed into the Second Battle of Ypres.

SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

Awaiting an opportunity to resume the offensive, the Germans took advantage of operations at Hill 60, initiated by the British, to counter-attack and attempt to break the British lines holding the Ypres salient. Failing in reckless frontal assaults, a more extensive plan to crush the northern face of the salient was adopted.

The attack was launched April 22nd, when, favored by a light breeze in the direction of the Allied trenches, the Germans sent over clouds of chlorine gas, which chokes and asphyxiates with horrible pain. After the gas had sufficiently penetrated the enemy lines, the German infantry, properly masked, stormed the Allied position.

This was the first use of this deadly gas in an offensive operation, and it took the Allies wholly by surprise. This was not unnatural, considering that the use of poison gases had been barred from use in civilized warfare.

The French troops between Steenstraete and Langemarck, knowing no defense against this new method of warfare, broke and fled. The Canadians on their right were less affected by the gas, although two infantry regiments were almost destroyed, but the retreat of the French had uncovered their left wing and their situation became precarious. The day was finally saved by the gallant assistance of the Canadians and the timely arrival of five British battalions, under Colonel Geddes, which filled the gap in the line.

In the meanwhile the Germans had crossed the Yser Canal and secured a footing in Lizerne, and were using every possible means to press the advantage against the demoralized and exhausted defenders. Consequently, April 24th, another gas attack was launched, which succeeded in driving back the Allies. By May 3rd, Grafenstafel, Zonnebeke, Westhoek, and Veldhoek were in Teuton hands, and two days later Hill 60 fell into their grasp.

New assaults on the 8th and 9th forced a further retirement, and on the 13th the Brit-

ish cavalry, fighting a dismounted action, was badly beaten between Hooze and Verlorenhoek.

In spite of still further gas attacks in the latter part of May, the Allies fought stubbornly, yielding only under the greatest pressure, and counter-attacking with such desperation that the Ypres salient was merely reduced, but not wiped out. Seeing the futility of further efforts on this sector, the Germans ceased their attacks and, except for minor actions, the battle died out in the early days of June.


BATTLE OF ARTOIS

General Foch, commander of the French Army Group of the North, planned an offensive in the hills of Artois, to be launched as soon as the German assaults at Ypres could be checked.

This plan had as an objective for the French Army the city of Lens, with its important railway center and coal mines; for the British the goal was Aubers Ridge, east of Neuve Chapelle. When these objectives had been attained, it was the further intention of the Army Group Commander to press on to Lille. Between Arras and Neuville St. Vaast an intricate trench and underground system had been constructed by the Germans, called the "Labyrinth." To take this would require a mighty effort, but General Foch never seemed to quail before any task, no matter how disproportionate it seemed to his force in hand.

On May 9th the offensive was launched. By the 12th the first objectives were carried, and from the 13th to the first week in June the French Army was busy capturing and consolidating the numerous trench systems of the "Labyrinth." The only objective denied them was Lens, which resisted all efforts of the attackers and was doomed to remain in German hands for several years.

To the north, the British failed in their initial assault on Aubers Ridge, due to insufficient artillery preparation. A second assault, delivered by the British on a point a little further south, May 16th, was more successful. This attack became known as the "Battle of Festubert," and lasted for ten days, during which period 3,200 yards of first line



Map to Illustrate the Battle of the Yser

The shaded part indicates where the country was flooded by order of General Foch, when he learned that his troops and their ammunition were nearly exhausted.

trench system and two miles of first and second line trenches were taken, according to Sir John French's official report.

Though a distinct victory in so far as the combat was concerned, the results were short of expectations, and both armies again resumed the original deadlock of trench warfare.

Aside from a feverish attempt at an offensive in the Argonne by the German Crown Prince in June and July, which proved of no

importance, the Artois offensive put an end to military operations on the Western front for the summer.

LESSONS LEARNED BY ALLIES

Even though relatively little had been accomplished in the way of pushing the invaders back, yet the Allies had learned that to cope with their adversary it was imperative that

they acquire equipment of similar character to that possessed by the Germans, and in unlimited quantities. This included gas equipment, grenades, mines, and a greater supply of machine guns and artillery.

Some critics have dwelt upon the nature of trench fighting, as opposed to open warfare,

by the same principles, produces the same effects. If it takes a different form, it is because one of the adversaries is notably inferior to the other. Such, for instance, is the case when an army without artillery and without munitions is opposed to one provided with all the modern engines of destruction. Under such circumstances, war assumes the aspect of the chase,



Night Scene in a Front Line Trench

A flash-light photograph of a battle-field during a heavy bombardment, lighting up the country for miles around. On the right a shell has just burst on a farm house, setting it on fire.


as being responsible for so many incomplete successes. The following extract from Colonel Azan's book *The War of Position* is of peculiar interest on this subject:

"It is a mistake to say that there are different principles of war for different fronts, or different countries. War between two adversaries, who possess sufficient forces, similar aims, and equivalent moral courage, is always dominated

and involves similar momentary risks; but there can be no doubt as to the outcome; victory is certain, and cannot be long delayed."

ANGLO-FRENCH ADVANCE—SEPTEMBER- OCTOBER, 1915

Offensive operations, in response to popular demands, were planned for the fall of 1915,



The Flanders Front from Arras to Neuve Chapelle

after severe artillery bombardment had been carried out along practically the whole line to break up enemy concentrations and weaken his defense. To the north the Franco-British armies were entrusted with the task of carrying out an offensive in the Artois, just north of Arras; while in the Champagne, between Rheims and Verdun, the French planned to strike the enemy and force him back while his lines were depleted on account of troops sent to the Russian front.

The initial attack was launched in the Artois September 25th-26th, and met with success everywhere. The Tenth French Army dashed forward north of Arras and captured Souchez, Hill 140, and the ridge overlooking the town of Vimy. The British, cooperating in this attack, carried the strong trench positions of the enemy on their front, and advancing, took Loos, Hill 70, and gained a footing in Hulluch.

THE CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE FAILS

In the meantime the French advanced in the Champagne (September 26th-27th), carrying the enemy's strong line of trenches on a seven and one-half mile front. However, the force of the attack was broken before the important railway center at Somme-Py was captured, consequently this operation was considered a failure.

The British operations in the Artois were subjected to bitter criticism in England, where it was claimed that great losses had been sustained without any material gain other than a small portion of territory. Had the railway center of Lens been captured and Lille taken, the effort would have caused great satisfaction. The failure to secure these positions, however, coupled with the French failure in the Champagne to seize similar railway communications, caused only disappointment in Allied circles.

After these attempts both sides settled down to trench warfare again while they prepared for greater efforts which were designed to pierce the opponent's line and drive him into the open to force a decision. This the Germans were planning at Verdun, and the Allies on the Somme, but it was not until the first part of 1916 that the first of these plans was disclosed and the attacks commenced.

At the expense of losing nearly five to one in the Artois and Champagne sectors, according to Berlin reports, the Allies were forced to realize that their enemy was superior in equipment and the disposition of his forces, and with inferior numbers could hold at bay the numerically superior Allied Armies.

While the lines of the center and north were deadlocked in trench warfare, a small offensive was launched by the French in the Vosges, which resulted in the capture of the summit of Hartmannswillerkopf in Alsace, which, after changing hands several times, finally remained in possession of the French, December 21st.

The last month of 1915 saw important changes in the commanders in the Allied ranks: General Joffre was promoted to the supreme command of all the French Armies, except the troops in the colonies, and General Castelnau was appointed French Chief of Staff. In the British Army Sir Douglas Haig, formerly a corps commander, was appointed to command the British Army (December 15th), relieving Sir John French, who was recalled to England to command the home forces.

VIII

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

DISAPPOINTED with the local successes made in their efforts during 1915, both British and French intensified their efforts to prepare an offensive of unprecedented proportions that would accomplish the desired results. The German General Staff, realizing this, decided to take the initiative from the Allies by an offensive of their own. They selected Verdun as the proper place to strike.

It is probable that Verdun was selected as the point of attack chiefly because it was known to be one of the most strongly fortified positions in France, and, consequently, was likely to be poorly garrisoned at this time when troops were so much needed elsewhere. Its forts had been originally built of stone in 1880, remodeled in concrete in 1885, and rebuilt of reinforced concrete as late as 1911. But, with the demonstrated ability of the German 13-inch howitzers, the

reduction of the permanent works was only a matter of a brief time, according to German calculations.

THE GERMANS NEED A VICTORY

Furthermore, the German Crown Prince had not been a brilliant success as a military leader, and at home the Socialists were taking advantage of every opportunity to vent their discontent on the Imperial Chancellor, Beth-

and might sign a separate favorable peace, and Russia, though not out of the war, had not yet recovered from her last reverses. So Falkenhayn thought he could with little anxiety draw on the Eastern front to make the adequate concentrations before Verdun. But, as we shall see later, the German Chief of Staff miscalculated.

In order to conceal their real intentions and, at the same time, force the Allies to keep their whole front defended, feints were



A Forest in a Quiet Sector Behind the Trenches in Alsace

mann-Hollweg. Hence, it was believed that a brilliant victory would not only placate popular sentiment but would also raise the reputation of the heir presumptive, and would generally enhance the prestige of the Hohenzollerns.

The blow could not be long delayed, for the French classes of 1916 and 1917 were already undergoing training, and the Allied production of arms and munitions was rapidly increasing. In addition, in German circles it was not considered likely that German troops would be needed elsewhere at this time, as Italy, it was thought, was sick of the war

made at various places before the preliminary bombardment of Verdun began.

The first of these feints was made January 24th at Nieuport, and it was at first thought that a new attempt would be made to take Calais. On the Somme, the village of Frise was attacked and captured. In the Artois, the Bavarian Crown Prince launched a series of extensive attacks on the Vimy ridge, January 23rd, 1916, which continued with intermittent violence until the middle of February. Even in the south, attacks were made on the French line southwest of Altkirch, followed by a long range artillery bombardment

of the great fort of Belfort, during which 15-inch shells were dropped into that place.

With these attacks to cope with, General Joffre did not yet know where the main German attack was destined to fall, but, from the information he had, and as a precautionary measure, he sent six infantry and six heavy artillery divisions to reinforce the line at Verdun about the middle of February. These troops hastily set to work to prepare the intrenchments laid out there by General



During the Battle of Verdun
The German Crown Prince observing the bombardment with his Chief of Staff.

Sarrail in 1914. In the meantime the Crown Prince concentrated fourteen divisions on a seven-mile sector held by three French divisions, between Brabant and Herbevois, about eight and one-half miles north of Verdun.

OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

The first German attack was launched February 21st, preceded by a terrific bombardment of such magnitude as had never been seen before in all history. Shells of every caliber and variety were hurled in such vast quantities that every vestige of construction

in the bombarded area was completely obliterated.

French troops and guns, under this bombardment, were all but wiped out, but those surviving remained at their posts waiting to make the German infantry pay dearly for the damage done.


It was not until it was thought that the positions were well leveled by the artillery that the German infantry was sent forward. It was hoped that, with such a preliminary bombardment, their function would be merely to occupy and hold the ground gained until the artillery could move forward to repeat the operation. To cover the infantry occupation, the artillery lengthened its range to lay down a barrage behind the primary objective to prevent reinforcements from the rear advancing to dispute the possession of the first line forts.

With clock-like precision the scheme worked in the first steps of the operations. On February 21st the German infantry advanced and took the three-mile line extending through Bois d'Haumont, Bois des Caures, and Herbevois, on the right bank of the Meuse. The next day the Bois d'Haumont was completely cleared of the French, and Brabant evacuated that night. The third day the advance continued, Samogneux, Beaumont, and Ornes falling into German hands.

In these three days of fighting the decimated and weary French defenders had sought vainly by counter-attacks to foil the numerically superior German forces, but finally, February 24th, under cover of a snow storm, they retired to previously prepared positions on Côte du Poivre (Pepper Hill) and the Douaumont plateau. Following closely were the Teuton besiegers, who, in four days, had advanced four miles, and had just reached the first of the outlying permanent fortifications of Verdun.

THE FIGHT FOR DOUAUMONT

One of the most memorable incidents of this siege was the attack on Fort Douaumont, which commenced February 25th. All day the German masses advanced up the wooded, snow-covered slopes of the Douaumont plateau, only to wither before the French machine guns, or melt under the accurate fire



Blue Devils Who Fought at Verdun

French veterans of the war's most furious battle who came to America to recuperate and to help the Third Liberty Loan.

of the "75's," which belched death on the attackers. Between the inferno of shell fire and the rigors of winter, the German suffering of this day was beyond description. Finally an overwhelming attack was launched in a supreme effort to succeed, which resulted in the fall of Fort Douaumont.



General Joffre at Verdun

Congratulating the General in command at Hill 304.

It is said that the German Kaiser witnessed the day's work from an adjacent hill, and personally directed the attacks which captured Fort Douaumont on the evening of the 25th.

This day (February 25th) was the most critical for both sides in this first phase of the mighty conflict. Though but a heap of ruins when captured, the site of Fort Douaumont was at an elevation of 388 meters, commanding the country for miles around and,

especially, the city of Verdun, five miles to the south. Could the French but be driven from all of their naturally strong positions before reinforcements arrived, the fate of Verdun would be certain.

THEY SHALL NOT PASS!

But already General Joffre had divined the German plans and was rushing reinforcements to the front by means of motor trucks from Bar-le-Duc. Also by Joffre's direction, General Pétain reported to take command of the defense on the fateful day of the fall of Fort Douaumont.

As miraculous as the formation of the "Taxicab Army" at the battle of the Marne, the motor truck line which supplied Verdun with troops and supplies was a creation born of necessity, and not contemplated by the German General Staff. The plans of the latter inferred that the Verdun garrison could be isolated and defeated, as the railroad line from the west was already under the fire of their guns, and the next most important line from the southwest had been put out of commission by the St. Mihiel salient. The main artery upon which the supply of Verdun depended was a small, narrow-gauge line from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun.

Quick to grasp the situation, the French collected the motor transportation of the Second and Third Armies and quickly pressed it into service on the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, until, within a few days, there were more than 6,000 big trucks (camions) hauling 25,000 troops and 200 tons of munitions per day. Day and night the steady stream of trucks moved along the route; those going forward loaded with men and munitions for the defense; those returning evacuating the wounded and civilians from the zone of operations. To France this highway has now become known as the Sacred Way (La Voie Sacrée).

General Pétain was a commander of proved ability and had displayed his genius in the campaigns in the Artois and Champagne sectors. The day after his arrival he ordered a counter-attack. Inspired by their new commander, the Twentieth Corps swept the Germans down the slopes of Douaumont plateau, but those installed in the ruins of Fort Douau-

mont (a Brandenburg regiment) continued to hold out. For four days the battle around Douaumont village and fort raged with unabated fury, when, on February 29th, the German attacks slackened, and the first phase of the fighting around Verdun closed.

Attacking in the Woëvre valley to the east of Verdun, the German troops had pushed the French back about six miles on a line between Etain and Eix. When they reached the base of the Meuse heights the French resisted further pressure and held their lines.

A survey of the situation at the beginning of this lull shows the French forced back to, but holding, the outer defenses of Verdun, except for Fort Douaumont. By this time reinforcements were arriving in ample numbers to cope with the situation and a resumption of the Teuton offensive at this point would not offer the promising possibilities which their original attack contained.

BATTLE OF VERDUN—SECOND PHASE

The German General Staff decided to continue the attacks on Verdun for sentimental and moral reasons, if for no other. No doubt they realized that, if it was impossible to break through a weak force, it was axiomatic that they could not do so with the reinforcements which Joffre had rushed forward to meet the new attacks. In addition to men, guns of large caliber had been installed, and it was only a matter of a short time before the powerful German artillery would be neutralized. However, to give up the attack would be a confession of defeat and humiliation for German arms, in addition to playing into the hands of the Von Tirpitz party, who were clamoring for a ruthless submarine campaign, and doing everything possible to embarrass the government, to force their demands. The Crown Prince's name as a general had been connected with defeats only—at the Marne, in the Argonne, and especially in the present offensive, which was a bid for popular approval. Unwilling to admit defeat, operations were soon resumed.

The attack now moved to the west of the Meuse where, on March 2nd, General Pétain learned from the artillery bombardment that the next attack could be expected near Forges village and Goose Ridge.

After four days of violent artillery preparation the German infantry stormed Forges village, crossed the brook of the same name and assailed the wooded slopes of the Ridge, and took the woods on the northern slope before evening. For a week the battle raged on this ridge, until March 14th, when the offensive moved further south against the key to the whole area—Le Mort Homme (Dead Man's Hill).

THE BATTLE FOR DEAD MAN'S HILL

This important hill is a double-crested mound, the northern crest about 260 meters high, the southern about 300 meters, overlooking the village of Bethincourt to the northwest, Chattancourt on the east, and Esnes on the south. Hills 304, and 310 in the west, command Le Mort Homme, but whoever possessed it could in turn command and make untenable positions on Goose Ridge.

On March 14th a force of 25,000 Germans stormed and took the northern, or lesser, crest of Le Mort Homme, but failed to dislodge the French from the higher southern crest. Again the Teutons were only partially successful, again the French were invincible.

The Crown Prince's next move was to the west through Avocourt wood, in the hope of winning Hill 304, from which to force the French from their hold on Le Mort Homme and Goose Ridge. These forces were stubbornly resisted by the French, and the end of a twelve-day battle found the French holding the hill with characteristic tenacity, although Malancourt and Haucourt had fallen into enemy hands.

A good measure of French resistance may be gained from the fact that, in the great assaults delivered almost without interruption between March 17th and April 8th, the Germans had advanced one mile on a six-mile front, but the main objectives, Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme, had not yet been wrested from the French. Nine infantry divisions were the price the Crown Prince had paid for these attempts west of the Meuse.

East of the Meuse the Teuton offensive had been resumed in the vicinity of Douaumont. After changing hands several times, the little hamlet remained in German possession, March 4th.

THE STRUGGLE FOR FORT VAUX

Attention was next directed towards Vaux, with its fort of the same name.

Attacks intended to capture Vaux were launched March 8th, 10th and 16th, all of which were unsuccessful. In the first, the Teutons gained the village, only to be ex-

lived, for the French counter-attacked and drove the Teutons back to their original positions.

The Germans continued their offensive with irrepressible energy. While their exhausted and cut-to-pieces troops were resting in the Douaumont and Vaux sectors, a new attack by twelve divisions was launched against Pep-



General Henri Philippe Pétain

Who took over the command at Verdun after the first phase of the German assaults.

pelled by the French counter-attack. In the next, they gained a footing in the village, but met with disaster in attempting to take the fort, and in the third attempt they met with the same fate.

After a lull of a couple of weeks the Germans attacked again with a full division, which moved up the "ravine of death," past Vaux, up over the Douaumont plateau, and through the Wood of la Caillete. The attack succeeded, but German success was short-

per Hill (April 18th), after violent artillery preparation. In this, as in other assaults on this front, the attack broke down under the deadly machine gun fire from every nook and cranny of the shattered French trenches, as the intrepid poilu sought his revenge.

This attack marked the last organized effort of the second phase of this great battle. Whereas local attacks of relatively minor importance were delivered almost daily in some part of the front, it was not until the first



The Cathedral at Verdun in 1916

week in May that the German offensive at Verdun was again resumed.

The net result of operations at Verdun up to this time was a gain of 120 square miles of territory, for which the Germans paid about 200,000 lives, while the French losses were about half that number. The situation no longer held any hope for a decision, or a line-piercing which would eventually lead to one. The motives for continuing the offensive were, as stated, to defend German prestige as long as there was a division left to feed into the flame of battle.

VERDUN—THIRD PHASE

German ire had been fanned to fury by the unyielding resistance of the French, upon whom not even the heaviest guns could impose the German will.

During the lull from the middle of April the Germans were massing artillery and men to break through the forts of Verdun at any cost. Le Mort Homme must first be taken, and then a systematic consolidation of the defenses held by the French was to follow.

After a preliminary bombardment in the

first part of May the infantry advanced to the attack, May 7th, and again, May 17th, but were unsuccessful in taking Le Mort Homme. On May 20th, however, 60 German batteries subjected this hill to such an inferno of fire that the French lines were literally blasted out of existence. After this, the infantry advanced in columns, preceded by waves of sharpshooters, and took the north crest of the hill. The French then evacuated the southern crest which became "No Man's Land."

The next German attempt was to move

In the meanwhile General Pétain had been promoted to command the Army Group on the Soissons-Verdun sector the first part of May, and General Nivelle named to succeed him in command of the defense of Verdun.

As soon as he took command, General Nivelle planned a counter-offensive on the right bank of the Meuse, and, as a preparatory step, secretly brought up a number of guns of large caliber, which he emplaced behind Vaux.

On May 20th the preliminary bombardment opened, and, on the 22nd, the French infantry



The Main Gateway at Verdun

behind Le Mort Homme and storm Cumières. After furious fighting the French were expelled. May 26th they returned and, after unprecedented hand-to-hand fighting in the ruins of Cumières, succeeded in expelling the Germans from that place.

In revenge for this French success, the 60 German batteries concentrated an intense bombardment for twelve hours on the French line from Cumières to Avocourt, followed by an assault in which five fresh infantry divisions participated. The result of this was to rout the French from Cumières and Le Mort Homme, except for the southern slopes of the latter place, where the French tenaciously held to every inch of ground.

advanced to the assault of Fort Douaumont. Though successful at first, the French were unable to expel the enemy entirely from Fort Douaumont, and, two days later, ceded the place to the Germans in the face of a counter-attack by two Bavarian divisions.

FALL OF FORT VAUX

The German Crown Prince next took the offensive in an effort to capture Vaux. During the first week in June a battle of most desperate and sanguinary character was waged, in which the French defenders were frequently sprayed with liquid fire, but still refused to yield. An encircling movement by the enemy

III—4

then cut off the defenders from their own lines, and, without food, water, or munitions, they continued to resist their besiegers until June 7th, when Fort Vaux capitulated.

In recognition for his gallant defense, the German commander permitted Major Raynal to retain his sword. The same honor, it will be recalled, was accorded General Leman for his defense of Liège.

With the chain of forts broken at Douaumont and Vaux, the next step was to take Fort Souville, a short distance southwest of Fort de Vaux. To accomplish this the Germans approached the fort from Thiaumont and Fleury, and also from Damloup Redoubt.

Thiaumont was captured June 23rd-24th, but retaken by the French. Damloup changed hands three times, remaining in German possession. During the remainder of June and throughout July the attack and defense were neutralized as Fleury, Thiaumont and Damloup changed hands repeatedly, but outside of this, no greater progress was made by the enemy in his effort to take Fort Souville.

About this time a new offensive of equal caliber to that at Verdun was being launched on the Somme, with the Allies on the offensive. This diversion definitely put an end to operations of any considerable magnitude at Verdun, and thus closed the third phase of one of the world's greatest battles.

For the sake of advancing their lines a few miles, the Germans had sacrificed between a quarter and a half million men, the French slightly fewer, with no decisive result or justification for the continued offensive after its first failure to break through. On the other hand, the French claim Verdun as a victory; their rôle had been to defend, and, in so doing, they had lived up to the spirit and letter of their slogan adopted at the very start: "They shall not pass."

IX

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

LACK of coöperation among the Allies had been an admitted fact since the commencement of hostilities in 1914. By the spring of 1916 even the most optimistic had been convinced that Germany could not be beaten until the Allies prosecuted their mili-

tary campaigns in thorough coördination. Pressure was consequently brought to bear which resulted in the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris, March 12th, where representatives of the Allied nations agreed upon the plans and policies to be pursued. At this conference, even though commands were not unified, yet plans were, and the greatest of these involved a great combined offensive on a line astride the Somme River, between Thiepval to the north, and a point near Chaunles, south of the river.

The primary object of this offensive was to relieve the pressure on Verdun by striking a weak point in the enemy line, thus forcing him to draw on his troops at Verdun for defense. Other considerations were to create a diversion in favor of Russia in the Carpathians; to aid Italy, who feared the coming Austrian offensive; and to induce Rumania, who was still vacillating, to enter the war on the Allied side.

WIDE SCOPE OF ALLIED PREPARATIONS

The Allied plans were the most extensive yet formulated; forty French divisions were assigned to the southern sector, to fight north with Péronne as their objective; and twenty British divisions were to coöperate in the north, with Bapaume as their goal. Attacking simultaneously, the two armies would conduct a converging movement, which would squeeze the enemy out, or cut him off entirely. Due to the heavy demands at Verdun, the French were unable to furnish but thirty divisions; fortunately, however, the British contributed twenty-six, instead of twenty divisions, as originally contemplated.

In addition to man-power, the Allies had many surprises in store for the enemy. Until now practically all military innovations of note, especially those in violation of the sanctioned means of warfare, had been of Teutonic origin. Now the Allies were to try their own hand.

These preparations included great fleets of aeroplanes which it was hoped would drive the Germans from the sky and "blind" their artillery; extensive use of gas and liquid fire, which General Haig in his report admitted his troops had "developed and perfected" for use in attack; and last, but greatest of all, was the "tank." This contrivance, a hitherto



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

The Somme Battlefield from an Airplane

The use of the airplane for photographing enemy positions made another striking difference between the World War and all others. The combatants not only had to conceal themselves from hostile eyes in front, but from above as well. This led to the development of a high degree of ingenious camouflage.

unknown war machine, had given great promise in its tests and seemed a sure weapon to break down the enemy's obstacles of defense and pour death into his ranks, while itself practically immune from injury in ordinary infantry fighting. Artillery had been materially improved, and the output increased to amazing proportions. Both the French and British had acquired heavy guns of caliber as high as 16-inch, equal or superior to those of the enemy, and ammunition in quantities sufficient to carry on an extensive offensive

for many months. It was later stated that on one single day as many shells were fired as in the seven months of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

The project proved a complete success and functioned like clock-work. According to plan, a violent artillery bombardment with high explosive shells was delivered June 30th, and on the following morning, when the huge guns ceased to roar for a few minutes, the Allied troops went with a cheer over the top to assail the German positions.

ARTILLERY FIRE OF TITANIC FURY

A vivid picture of the scene from the pen of the English historian, John Buchan, follows:

"The first day of July dawned hot and cloudless, though a thin fog, the relic of the damp of the past week, clung to the hollows. At half-past five the hill just west of Albert offered a singular view. It was almost in the center of the section allotted to the Allied

Every gun on a front of twenty-five miles was speaking, and speaking without pause. In that week's bombardment more light and medium ammunition was expended than the total amount manufactured in Britain during the first eleven months of war, while the heavy stuff produced during the same period would not have kept our guns going for a single day. Great spurts of dust on the slopes showed where a heavy shell had burst, and black and white gouts of smoke dotted the middle distance like the little fires in a French autumn field. Lace-



London Times History.

The Battle of the Somme

Pipers leading an attack by Highlanders at Longueval.

attack, and from it the eye could range on the left up and beyond the Ancre glen to the high ground around Beaumont Hamel and Serre; in front to the great lift of tableland behind which lay Bapaume; and to the right past the woods of Fricourt to the valley of the Somme. Every slope to the east was wreathed in smoke, which blew aside now and then and revealed a patch of wood or a church spire. In the foreground lay Albert, the target of an occasional German shell, with its shattered Church of Notre Dame de Bebrières and the famous gilt Virgin hanging head downward from the campanile. All along the Allied front, a couple of miles behind the line, captive kite balloons, the so-called 'sausages,' glittered in the sunlight.

like shrapnel wreaths hung in the sky, melting into the morning haze. The noise was strangely uniform, a steady rumbling, as if the solid earth were muttering in a nightmare, and it was hard to distinguish the deep tones of the heavies, the vicious whip-like crack of the field guns, and the bark of the trench mortars.

"About 7:15 the bombardment rose to that hurricane pitch of fury which betokened its close. It was as if titanic machine guns were at work round all the horizon. Then appeared a marvelous sight, the solid spouting of the enemy slopes—as if they were lines of reefs on which a strong tide was breaking. In such a hell it seemed that no human thing could live. Through the thin summer vapor and the

thicker smoke which clung to the foreground there were visions of a countryside actually moving—moving bodily in *débris* into the air. And now there was a fresh sound—a series of abrupt and rapid bursts which came gustily from the first lines. These were the new trench mortars—wonderful little engines of death. There was another sound, too, from the north, as if the cannonading had suddenly come nearer. It looked as if the Germans had begun a counter-bombardment on part of the British front line.

"The staff officers glanced at their watches, and at half-past seven precisely there came a lull. It lasted for a second or two, and then the guns continued their tale. But the range had been lengthened everywhere, and from a bombardment the fire had become a *barrage*. For, on a twenty-five mile front, the Allied infantry had gone over the parapets."

Prior to taking Bapaume or Péronne, it was necessary to take the ridge of hills on which are situated the towns of Thiepval, Pozières, Longueval, Ginchy, Combles and Sailly-Saillisel. Having taken this crest and there established their big guns, the Allies could advance more rapidly and securely towards their ultimate goals. In addition, the German salient across the Albert-Arras railroad would be so menaced as to cause a withdrawal at this point.

In the first day's fighting great progress was made, but north of Thiepval the British attacks failed completely. Further south the British troops carried Montauban and Mametz, in addition to breaking the German front line in this sector on a seven-mile front. The French attacked between Frise and Estrées, taking the assigned objectives for the day, in addition to 5,000 prisoners. To the north of the Somme the French stormed Courtu and Hem.

Before further progress could be made it was necessary to take the fortified villages of Thiepval, Ovillers, La Boisselle and Fricourt. These were all strongly fortified and well defended places, and required hand-to-hand fighting in the cellars and ruins of each town before the enemy could be driven out. But this did not deter the Allies, who took Fricourt on the 2nd, La Boisselle on the 5th, and Ovillers on the 16th of July.

Fighting was furious and continuous from the time of the first attacks on July 1st, in

order that the enemy should get no rest. Several Allied divisions were so used up that they had to be transferred to more tranquil sectors, while reserves took their places.

The second week of the offensive saw slower progress by the French, but north of the Somme they reached Hordecourt-aux-Bois, and south of the river they advanced by July 10th to within one mile of Péronne. This marked the end of the first phase of the Somme offensive.

THE SECOND PHASE

In a fortnight, from July 1st-14th, the British advanced to a maximum depth of about three miles on a ten-mile front, taking numerous strongly fortified positions and 10,000 prisoners. The French "bag" had been still better; they had advanced to a maximum depth of six miles on about the same length of front and taken over 12,000 prisoners.

Though the Allies had fought furiously and beaten back the Germans, they had not pierced the enemy line, which, after the first fortnight, stiffened its resistance. The defenders launched furious counter-attacks, retaking Biaches, opposite Péronne, only to be expelled again by the Allied counter-efforts. The French were unable to make further advances during July and August, but succeeded in extending the battle line to the south as far as Vermandovillers (July 20th), and captured Maurepas after extensive fighting between August 11th and 24th.

The British suffered a like fate; their advance was halted by the Germans, who concentrated their counter-attacks where the British had pierced their second-line positions (Bazentin-le-Petit, July 14th and 15th), and hurled a deluge of gas shells into this region to check the British attacks. At Longueval 13,000 Teutons advanced on a narrow front of 2,000 yards, and similar concentrations took place at Delville Wood. The fighting which followed was of a most desperate nature; July 29th, two German regiments were all but wiped out of existence, a battalion of the Prussian Guard was annihilated in the center (July 17th), and the British themselves had suffered severe casualties. However, at the end of July the British were victorious, having broken down the enemy's efforts to retrieve his lost lines, and in addition, taken

Pozières (July 26th) and twenty-four square miles of conquered territory.

A lull preparatory to the second phase of the battle took place in August, while General Foch moved his guns forward to blast a new path and resume the offensive.

The usual bombardment, September 2nd, prepared the way for the infantry advance on the 3rd. At noon of this day the Allies advanced simultaneously along the whole front and fought furiously. The British took Guillemont and part of Ginchy, high

ern warfare. These great monsters came lumbering over the field, broke down the German barriers of resistance, crossed trenches, and spread terror and death in the enemy's midst. Following in their wake were infantrymen with hand grenades, consolidating the captured positions and collecting prisoners. The tanks, combined with an inferno of artillery fire, were too much for the enemy, and his line from Thiepval to Combles was pushed over the ridge, leaving Courcellette, Lesbœufs and Morval in Allied hands. At



Bringing Up Ammunition by Light Railway to an Advanced Artillery Position

up on the Thiepval-Saillisel ridge, and behind the German second position. The French battled simultaneously for the ridge between Le Forest and Clery. A battle of unprecedented fury ensued. At Ginchy, Irish troops expelled the Germans with a bayonet charge and withstood all counter-attacks.

TANKS BREAK THE GERMAN LINES


The entrance of "tanks" into the battle at this point (September 15th) was of the greatest importance, not only for the moment, but also because of their future influence on mod-

ern warfare. These great monsters came lumbering over the field, broke down the German barriers of resistance, crossed trenches, and spread terror and death in the enemy's midst. Following in their wake were infantrymen with hand grenades, consolidating the captured positions and collecting prisoners. The tanks, combined with an inferno of artillery fire, were too much for the enemy, and his line from Thiepval to Combles was pushed over the ridge, leaving Courcellette, Lesbœufs and Morval in Allied hands. At

Thiepval and Combles the flanks still held out. However, Combles was already enveloped by General Fayolle's army, and was evacuated September 26th.

On the day of the evacuation of Combles, the British stormed Thiepval and pushed forward their center to Gueudecourt, a mile beyond the ridge.

Heavy rains put a check to the Anglo-French drive at this juncture. The end of the gigantic combined effort had come. Fighting continued, however, though usually of a more local character, as each side attempted to improve its lines.



Scene of the First Battle of the Somme

It was fought to relieve the German pressure on the French at Verdun, and was one of the bloodiest battles of the war; the casualties on both sides aggregated about 1,375,000 men.

At the close of operations in September, the French had taken a total of 35,000 prisoners, the British 26,000. The French Generals, Fayolle and Michler, and the British Generals, Gough and Butler, were decorated in recognition of their services in these campaigns.

In addition to the main attacks, other oper-

ations of note were in progress: On the right wing of the French Army in this battle, Chaunles had defied all attempts at capture, although the French took Chilly, and for four months were in its outskirts. On the left flank of the sector, the British had by successive attacks stormed the German salient to the northwest of Le Sars, which became

menaced by British guns posted on the ridge at Thiepval. This later resulted in the capture by the British in November of St. Pierre Divion, Beaumont, Beaucourt and part of Grandcourt.

In the total operations in the battle of the Somme the amount of territory was relatively small; 120 square miles, or only a slightly greater area than that taken by the Germans at Verdun. German losses, according to best obtainable estimates, were about 700,000, while Allied losses were about 675,000.

The German pulse of anxiety had been felt in the relief of the Chief of the General Staff, General Eric von Falkenhayn, and his replacement by the hero of Tannenberg, General Paul von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg, who chose his former Chief of Staff, General von Ludendorff, as his Quartermaster General. The German Armies were also reorganized on the Western front, with the Duke of Württemberg as Commander of the Northern Army Group, the Crown Prince of Bavaria in command of the Central Group,



The River Meuse at Verdun

The most significant fact is that neither General Haig nor General Foch had attained his set objective, Bapaume and Péronne respectively. However, the drive had been a success in other ways, viz.: (1) it had relieved the pressure on Verdun and checked the German offensive there; (2) it held Germany in the west while the Russians won a sweeping victory on the Eastern front, and at the same time it wore down German forces which could not be replaced; and (3) it had the strategic advantage of German positions from which to launch a mighty spring offensive, in anticipation of which the Hindenburg retreat was ordered by the German General Staff.

and the Prussian Crown Prince in command of the Verdun Group.

FRENCH COUNTER-STROKE AT VERDUN

While the Allies were progressing on the Somme, and attention was absorbed by this field, as well as by operations in Rumania, the Verdun front was all but forgotten. Consequently it came as a great surprise in the latter part of October, when General Nivelle launched a surprise attack on the east bank of the Meuse, pierced a four-mile sector of the German lines to a depth of two miles, and retook Douaumont Fort and Village, Thiaumont Farm and Redoubt, and the Hau-

drumont Quarries, in addition to about 3,500 prisoners.

Following up this success, General Nivelle pressed on to Fort Vaux (November 2nd), which the French found already evacuated by the enemy before the infantry could attack. November 5th, Dambloup and Vaux Village were likewise evacuated.

The only German reply on this sector was to storm Hill 304 on December 6th, but without result. The primary object of the attack was sentimental, rather than with ulterior motives, and was designed purely for home consumption.

For the wonderful success of his surprise attacks at Verdun, General Nivelle was promoted to the command of all the French Armies in France, the position which had just been vacated by General Joffre (December 11th), who was appointed technical adviser to the French War Council, formed December 13th. General Mangin was appointed to succeed General Nivelle as Commander of the Verdun Sector. The French now had two Commanders, General Nivelle commanding the northern and northeastern Armies in France, and General Sarrail commanding the Army of the East at Salonika.

As soon as he took command, General Mangin launched an offensive, December 15th-16th, after severe artillery preparation lasting several days. When the infantry attacked, they took the German lines on a six-mile front, captured 9,000 prisoners and eighty guns, and retook the villages of Vacherauville, Louvemont, Bezenvaux; the field works at Hardaumont and Benzonvaux, and the Chambrette farm.

The French had, with negligible losses, and in a single stroke, retaken all the strategic places from the Germans for which the Crown Prince had paid a half million men in the first instance. One reason advanced for this success is the effective French artillery fire, which with excellent aerial observation was able to conquer, so the infantry could occupy. By comparison, the French artillery at this time was far more superior and effective than had been the similar German preparation in the German offensive in the spring.

With the Allies steadily advancing on the Somme, the Verdun French counter-offensive put the Germans everywhere on the defensive

in the west. Both Allies and Teutons had replaced their Commanders-in-Chief—Joffre and Falkenhayn. The winter months were, therefore, filled with much speculation as to what manner of operations would be resumed in the spring on this battle front, already more than a year deadlocked in trench warfare.

X

MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1917.

MILITARY operations in 1917 commenced with a continuation of the battle of the Somme. The object was to press the advantages gained in the late fall of the preceding year, and to continue the advance which had been held up by weather conditions. The rest of the year was filled with well coördinated efforts of the French and British to hack the "Hindenburg Line," force the enemy into the open, and there administer a decisive defeat which would force him across the Rhine and lead to a victorious Allied peace. With this central idea in mind, the Allies conducted an offensive which kept the enemy everywhere on the defensive along the entire Western front, except in two local cases: The German counter-efforts near Oppy and Bullecourt, in May, and the Teuton offensive on the Yser in July.

CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Although operations on the Somme had been halted to await favorable weather conditions, this lull marked a period of great activity behind the Allied lines on this sector. Everywhere preparations were made for a mighty spring offensive of unprecedented proportions which bid fair to break through the German lines and strike the enemy in rear, thus rolling up his right flank, expelling him from France and Belgium, and carrying the war into German territory.

As the result of offensive operations the British had extended their line until it included practically the whole Somme sector, some 110 miles, and extended south to a point opposite Roye. In this whole area, roads and railroads had been built and repaired, ammu-

The "Blood-Bath" of the Somme

WE are still too close to events to attempt an estimate of the battle of the Somme as a whole. It will be the task of later historians to present it in its true perspective. Even now one thing is clear. Before 1st July Verdun had been the greatest continuous battle fought in the world's history; but the Somme surpassed it both in numbers of men engaged, in the tactical difficulty of the objectives, and in its importance in the strategical scheme of the campaign.

"In the first place, it relieved Verdun, and enabled Nivelle to advance presently to conspicuous victories. In the second place, it detained the main German forces on the Western front. In the third place, it drew into the battle, and gravely depleted, the surplus man-power of the enemy, and struck a shattering blow at his *moral*. For two years the German behind the shelter of his trench-works and the great engine of his artillery had fought with comparatively little cost against opponents far less well equipped. The Somme put the shoe on the other foot, and he came to know what the British learned at Ypres and the French in the Artois—what it felt like to be bombarded out of existence, and to cling to shell holes and the ruins of trenches under a pitiless fire. It was a new thing in his experience, and took the heart out of men who, under other conditions, had fought with skill and courage. Further, the Allies had dislocated his whole military machine. Their ceaseless pressure had crippled his Staff work, and confused the organization of which he had justly boasted.

"The battle of the Somme had, therefore, fulfilled the Allied purpose in taxing to the uttermost the German war machine. It tried the Command, it tried the nation at home, and it tried to the last limit of endurance the men in the line. The place became a name of terror. Though belittled in *communiqués*, and rarely mentioned in the Press, it was a word of ill-omen to the whole German people, that 'blood-bath' to which many journeyed and from which few returned. Of what avail their easy conquests on the Danube when this deadly cancer in the West was eating into the vitals of the nations? Winter might give a short respite—though the battle of the Ancre had been fought in winter weather—but spring would come, and the evil would grow malignant again. Germany gathered herself for a great effort, marshaling for compulsory war work the whole male population between seventeen and sixty, sending every man to the trenches who could walk on sound feet, doling out food supplies on the minimum scale for the support of life, and making desperate efforts by submarine warfare to cripple her enemies' strength. But what if her enemies followed her example? The Allies lagged far behind her in their adoption of drastic remedies, and even so they had won to an equality and more than an equality in battle power. What if they also took the final step? They had shown that they had no thought of peace except at their own dictation. They had willed the end; what if they also willed the ultimate means?

"No great thing is achieved without a price, and on the Somme fell the very flower of our race, the straightest of limb, the keenest of brain, the most eager of spirit. In such a mourning each man thinks first of his friends. Each of us has seen his crowded circle become like the stalls of a theater at an unpopular play. Each has suddenly found the world of time strangely empty and eternity strangely thronged. To look back upon the gallant procession of those who offered their all and had their gift accepted, is to know exultation as well as sorrow. The young men who died almost before they had gazed on the world, the makers and the doers who left their tasks unfinished, were greater in their deaths than in their lives. They builded better than they knew, for the sum of their imperfections was made perfect, and out of loss they won for their country and mankind an enduring gain. Their memory will abide so long as men are found to set honor before ease, and a nation lives not for its ledgers alone but for some purpose of virtue. They have become, in the fancy of Henry Vaughan, the shining spires of that City to which we travel." (From *Nelson's History of the War*, by John Buchan.)

Tanks at the Battle of the Somme

THE tanks had, for a new experiment, done wonders. Some of them broke down on the way up, and, of the twenty-four which crossed the German lines, seven came to grief early in the day. The remaining seventeen did brilliant service, some squatting on enemy trenches and clearing them by machine-gun fire, some flattening out uncut wire, others destroying machine-gun nests and redoubts or strong points like the sugar factory at Courcellette. But their moral effect was greater than the material damage they wrought. The sight of those deliberate impersonal engines ruthlessly grinding down the most cherished defenses put something like panic into troops who had always prided themselves upon the superior merit of their own fighting 'machine.' Beyond doubt, too, the presence of the tanks added greatly to the zeal and confidence of our assaulting infantry. An element of sheer comedy was introduced into the grim business of war, and comedy is dear to the heart of the British soldier. The crews of the tanks—which they called His Majesty's Landships—seemed to have acquired some of the light-heartedness of the British sailor. Penned up in a narrow stuffy space, condemned to a form of motion compared with which that of the queasiest vessel was steady, and at the mercy of unknown perils, these adventurers faced their task with the zest of a boy on holiday. With infinite humor they described how the enemy had surrounded them when they were stuck, and had tried in vain to crack their shell, while they themselves sat laughing inside." (From *Nelson's History of the War*, by John Buchan.)

munition and supplies collected, and, in general, every provision made to prosecute the coming offensive with relentless vigor.


In January the British commenced operations on the Ancre with a series of attacks to drive the Germans from Beaumont Hamel Spur (January 11th). By the end of the month they had succeeded in their object and pushed across the Beaucourt valley to the next spur, to the east. The capture of these high places gave the British admirable artillery positions from which to control the entire Beaucourt valley and take the ridge beyond, which formed part of the German second-line defenses. The British efforts were crowned with success, when, on the night of February 3rd-4th, they took about a mile of the German positions and fought off several powerful German counter-attacks. Unable to regain their lost positions, the Germans evacuated their lines around Grandcourt, which the British occupied February 6th.

This advance had now brought the British lines north of the Ancre level with the German positions south of that river; consequently, when the British extended their gains to the south of the Ancre by occupying Grandcourt, the German lines there were threatened and had to be drawn back.

The British took advantage of this and continued to press the attack until an assault delivered February 17th-18th gave them possession of high ground from which they commanded the German artillery in the upper Ancre positions and the defenses of Miramont and Pys, both of which were important strategic positions in the German scheme of defense on this sector.

Before the British could prepare their new attacks, the towns of Pys, Miramont and Serre had been abandoned (24th) by the Teutons, and were immediately occupied by the British. The following day the British attacked and took the German first-line positions from north of Gueudecourt to west of Sarre. The latter positions were remarkable for the fewness of the troops defending them, for whom a new form of rear-guard defense had been substituted, consisting of machine-gun nests in strategic points, supported by artillery in rear. British losses were lighter than usual.

The British pursuit continued. By March 2nd the strong line from near Beaulencourt to the south of Loupart Wood, to which the Germans had retired, was in British hands; and Gommecourt and Puissieux-au-Mont, north of the Ancre, had been abandoned by



One of France's "Big Bertha's"

© *International Film Service.*

This huge weapon was brought into action during the fighting on the Somme and helped to check the German advance.

the hard-pressed enemy in his hasty flight.

The enemy now took up a strong position on what became known as the Le Transloy-Loupart line. This line checked the British pursuit and forced them to spend about a week in preparing their new attacks. These were launched March 10th. The next day the German line was heavily bombarded, as the result of which it was evacuated by the enemy on the following night (March 12th-13th). The British immediately occupied Loupart

as a German withdrawal was now imperative, on account of the Allied advance which had made the Arras-Le Transloy line an untenable salient.

General von Hindenburg foresaw the necessity of a forced retirement of his armies in the west, so in order to prevent a surprise by which the Allies might break through his lines and get in his rear, he had a carefully prepared trench line built in rear on a line selected for its strategic value, as well as for



© Underwood and Underwood.

A View of Colmar, Alsace

One of the German centers of supply.

Wood and Grevillers. Bapaume, the main objective, was now within effective artillery range of the British guns.

THE "HINDENBURG RETREAT"

The ease with which the Germans recoiled before the British advance on the Ancre, yielding position after position, caused the Allies to believe that a general withdrawal on at least the northern end of the Western battle line was probable. In fact, those familiar with the situation realized by the middle of March that some drastic steps had to be taken,

economy in men necessary to defend it. It therefore meant the straightening of his line to shorten it, even at the sacrifice of a considerable amount of captured territory.

This line, known as the "Hindenburg (or Siegfried) Line," ran roughly from Nieuport past Lille, Arras, Laon, Rheims, Verdun, St. Mihiel, Château-Salins, Lunéville, Colmar and Mulhouse. Between Arras and Rheims a large area of territory had been evacuated, thus reducing the salient between these two cities, and at the same time shortening the line to be defended by about sixty miles. In addition, the prepared line had received the

greatest attention that German ingenuity could bestow upon it, and had been in process of construction for nearly a whole year. It contained concrete underground quarters for large bodies of men, officers' quarters, tunnels, supply rooms, and, in fact, provisions for every factor which enters into war. Whenever possible these galleries were electrically lighted and contained as many comforts as

Western front take care of itself while he turned his attention towards putting Russia definitely out of the war.

Although the line was prepared and pronounced impregnable, yet the withdrawal of such large masses of troops from the occupied areas was fraught with the gravest danger of disaster. This retreat was conducted by strategically placed machine-gun nests, sup-



© Central News Service.

The Ruins of Arras Cathedral

The adjoining buildings of the old abbey formed an art museum, before the Germans bombarded and practically destroyed them.

could be consistently installed under the circumstances. In some parts later captured by the British it was found that some of these underground covers were covered by sixty feet of concrete and earth, so as to be protected against the fire of the greatest caliber howitzer used by the Allies. When completed, General von Hindenburg is said to have remarked that it would take the Allies thirty years to break through this line alone. With this feeling of security, it is no wonder the famous German war chief felt content to let the

ported by artillery, similar to the system successfully used on the Ancre. The trenches were then practically emptied of troops, some of whom were used to transport ammunition and supplies to the rear, and others engaged in devastating the evacuated country, while the machine gunners and artillery held the pursuing British at a safe distance.

FRANCE PROTESTS GERMAN VANDALISM

The devastation of this area was carried out with customary German vandalism, and in

most thorough fashion. In the course of three years of war, Germany had repeatedly shocked the civilized world by her disregard for the rights of neutrals and non-combatants, and by her barbaric and uncivilized practices. By laying waste one of the most beautiful parts of France, Germany forfeited all rights to ever enter the society of civilized nations, and strengthened the Allied cause to fight for a victorious peace.

After this wanton vandalism, the French Government collected data, while the scenes of desolation were fresh, which it incorporated in a protest addressed to the neutral nations of the world. This report read in part:

The government of the Republic is gathering the elements of protest which it intends sending to the Neutral Governments against acts of barbarism and devastation committed by the Germans in French territory which they are evacuating while retreating. . . . No motive demanded by military necessities can justify the systematic devastation of public monuments, artistic and historical, as well as public property, accompanied by violence against persons. Cities and villages in their entirety have been pillaged, burned and destroyed; private homes stripped of all furniture which the enemy has carried off; fruit trees have been torn up or rendered useless for further production; streams and wells have been poisoned. The inhabitants, relatively few in number, who have not been removed, have been left with a minimum of rations, while the enemy seized stocks supplied by the neutral revictualizing commission which were destined for the civil population.

You will point out that this concerns not acts destined to hinder the operations of our armies, but of devastation having no connection with this object and having for its purpose the ruin for years to come of one of the most fertile regions of France.

The civilized world can only revolt against this conduct on the part of the nation which wanted to impose its culture on it, but which reveals itself once again as quite close to barbarism still, and, in a rage of disappointed ambition, tramples on the most sacred rights of humanity.

The only excuses advanced by the German authorities in extenuation for these outrages was that the devastated area might in future become a battlefield, and any struc-

ture on it might be used to advantage by the Allies. However, in spite of this enormous destruction and the tremendous handicaps it consequently presented to the rapidly advancing Allies, it is a tribute to the Allied troops that they built roads, railroads and bridges, and managed to keep close on the heels of the retreating foe throughout the retirement.

GERMANS RETREAT, BRITISH PURSUE

When the British discovered by the middle of March that the Germans planned an extensive withdrawal, General Haig ordered a general advance from Arras to Roye. The French simultaneously ordered a similar movement from Roye to Rheims.

March 17th Chaumes and Bapaume fell into the hands of the British; Péronne and Mont St. Quentin the next day, and the British crossed the Somme at Brie, while the French cavalry occupied Nesle. The Allied pursuit continued, and the British and French lines joined on the 20th.

When the British north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road had advanced to within two or three miles of the "Hindenburg Line" the resistance stiffened, and counter-attacks became more frequent and violent. The British, however, drove their adversaries into the "Hindenburg Line" itself, in spite of Teuton efforts to hold them at bay on a line further removed.

To the south, the French had advanced even more rapidly than had their allies to the north. So hotly did they press the Germans that the latter attempted little or no resistance, and the French advanced and occupied Noyon (March 18th) and pushed the enemy back on the Oise. The French then attempted the capture of St. Quentin, but were unsuccessful in all their attempts to wrest the city from the Germans as long as the "Hindenburg Line" held.

The French troops on the Ailette were not so fortunate as their forces to the north. After very severe fighting they forced a crossing of the river on the southern end of the line and took Coucy, but were unable to make any headway against the defenses of La Fère, or penetrate the Forest of St. Gobain. The latter position later proved to be one of the strongest points in the "Hindenburg Line,"



© Western Newspaper Union.

Over the Top at Vimy Ridge

Canadians swarming out of a trench to the charge. Dark spots show shrapnel bursting over them. In this assault the Canadians maintained their brilliant reputation for reckless courage and irresistible dash and initiative.

and it was here, in the following spring, that guns were emplaced to bombard Paris, seventy-five miles distant.

The end of this retreat found the German Army on the defensive, but securely placed within the protection of this great fortified line. The Allies had followed closely and were still bringing forward their materials and supplies, determined to force the enemy out of his cover. The rest of the year was, therefore, spent in futile Allied attempts to pierce and turn the German line. Some of these attempts, however, are among the most fascinating operations of the war; now a war of position, struggling by offensive operations to force a campaign in the open.

The reasons advanced for Hindenburg's retreat are numerous and varied. Those most commonly accepted are, that the German Army was beginning to feel the pinch of its losses; that the Allies had made great preparations for a gigantic spring offensive, and by his withdrawal Hindenburg deranged their plans. Moreover, the Allied advance in the battle of the Somme had wrested from him many of his strategic positions: his battle lines would be shorter after the retreat; the battle would be fought on a field of his own selection; and while the Allies hammered his "impregnable" line he would hold them at bay until Russia was broken to pieces, after which troops could be transferred from the Eastern front to the west, where a gigantic drive could be launched from this fortified line.

The result of the retreat was a restoration of about 1,000 square miles of French territory, 400 villages and towns, and nearly a quarter million inhabitants.

XI

THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

IN spite of the great retreat of the German Army, which, it was claimed, would spoil the Allied plans, the British launched a big offensive April 9, 1917, near Arras, and the French followed a few days later between Soissons and Rheims.

It will be recalled that in the military operations of 1916, the British had striven to gain the great coal center, the principal city of

which was Lens, and had been within range of this city for some time before their efforts ceased. This time they were again striving for Lens as their principal objective.

The battle started April 9th with a furious drive on a twenty-five mile front to the east of Arras, when the enemy positions were penetrated to a depth of two or three miles, and many important fortified points taken.

VIMY RIDGE


Chief of these positions, perhaps, was Vimy Ridge, dominating the coal fields to the east, which were of great value to the enemy.

The British had anticipated the strength of this position, and had prepared to meet all exigencies which might arise. The Germans had so strongly fortified this ridge that it was practically impregnable to infantry assaults, and any attempts at direct seizure could only hope to meet with failure at the expense of great losses. Its capture was therefore accomplished by an unstinted use of artillery, which on this occasion effected a "perfect barrage," literally sweeping the very top off the ridge and destroying practically all of the wire entanglements. When the infantry advanced, they found it a comparatively easy task to capture and hold the ridge, in addition to taking over 2,000 prisoners, or one-third of all taken in the drive on this whole sector.

Vimy Ridge was the pivot used in the "Hindenburg Retreat," and had already cost the French heavily in their efforts to capture it the year before. The task of taking it was assigned to the Canadians, who, by adding this success to their rapidly lengthening list of victories, made the mention of Vimy Ridge synonymous with Canadian prowess.

The second day of the battle of Arras (April 10th), the British added 5,000 more prisoners and reached Monchy-le-Preux. Minor gains were made elsewhere, except west of Cambrai, where the Germans successfully resisted the British advance.

After taking the strongly fortified town of Monchy, the British moved up their artillery and commenced to consolidate their positions. This was a timely step, as the newly arrived batteries successfully repelled the German counter-attacks, and Monchy remained in British possession.



Scene of the British Offensive East of Arras in April, 1917

On the fifth day of the battle (April 13th) the offensive was shifted north and an advance of about a mile made between the Scarpe River and Loos. In this drive the towns of Vimy, Ancre and Lieven were taken. The same day the British took St. Pierre, which together with Lieven placed the city of Lens in a pocket in the British lines. British troops then entered the suburbs of Lens, but were never able to gain the city until the following year, when the "Hindenburg Line" was broken, and the defeated Germans commenced their last great retreat. St. Quentin suffered a like fate: though desperate efforts were made to capture it, the Germans continued to hold the city against all attacks aimed to wrest it from them.

Operations now shifted south, where, April 23rd, an attack was delivered against the "Oppy Line," which was a switch trench of the "Hindenburg Line." This protecting trench was strongly fortified with machine-gun nests placed in villages and every conceivable form of protection, and could sweep an advancing enemy from front and flank. The British, however, took it after six days of severe fighting, and the Canadians occupied Arleux-en-Gohelle, and the English Oppy and Roeux. This fighting was of the most desperate and sanguinary character, with the Germans massed 10,000 to the mile of front and fighting stubbornly.

DESPERATE COUNTER-ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY

In addition to the gains it had netted the Allies, the persistent and unchecked British advance had served to infuriate their German adversaries, who now commenced to launch furious counter-attacks in an effort to check the British offensive, and, if possible, regain some of the strategic positions which had been yielded to the conquering Allied arms. In these counter-attacks the Germans used great masses of men, and the nature of the fighting for the next month was of a most desperate character. The windmill at Gavrelle is said to have changed hands as often as eight times before May 4th; before Monchy, Guemappe and Lagnicourt the German assaults broke down with frightful losses. At Roeux, Oppy and Bullecourt, which had recently been captured, further advances by the British forces (Canadians and Australians) were lost to the Germans in counter-attacks. It seemed, therefore, by the first of June that the British advance was checked at this point and a deadlock would ensue.

With the close of offensive operations on this front it may be remarked that, although the British troops, mostly composed of Canadians and Australians, had fought valiantly and been locally successful, yet they had been checked before they could achieve their aims,

German Losses at the Battle of Arras

THE battle of Arras may be regarded with some truth as an action complete in itself. It lasted just over a month. It was a limited victory—that is to say, it attained completely its immediate objectives; but owing to events outside the control of the British Command, it did not produce the strategical result upon the Western front as a whole which was its ultimate design. It was, therefore, an action on the Somme model, a stage in the process of attrition, the value of which must be measured in terms of its effect upon the enemy's *moral* and the efficiency of his military machine. Judged by such standards it compared brilliantly with every previous British advance. In a month we took more than 20,000 prisoners, 257 guns (of which 98 were of heavy caliber), 227 trench mortars, and 470 machine guns. If we contrast the first twenty-four days of the Somme with the first twenty-four days of Arras, we shall find that in the latter battle we took four times the amount of territory, engaged double the number of German divisions, and had half the casualties. We had advanced many stages in our knowledge of the new methods of war. . . .

"The German losses during this period on the Western front were not less than 350,000. They had 104 divisions in action, and of these seventy-four by the end of May had to be redrawn to refit." (From *Nelson's History of the War*, by John Buchan.)

viz.: to take Lens and break the "Hindenburg Line," and its switch line from Drocourt to Quéant. However, the British had succeeded in placing Lens in a pocket, and by their system of attack, prepared by artillery barrage, suffered comparatively slight casualties, whereas the German massed counter-attacks had been delivered without artillery preparation, consequently the British artillery and infantry had inflicted far greater losses on the enemy than their offensive had occasioned them. In fact, it is reported that the German casualty rate in these counter-attacks was one

had held since their retreat from the Marne in 1914.

In the first day's attack the first and part of the second line German positions were taken, together with over 10,000 prisoners and vast war stores. In three days the toll of prisoners was raised to 17,000, seventy-five captured guns had been counted, and the villages of Chivy, Ostel, and Bry-en-Laonnis taken. A separate powerful attack added Vailly to the trophy list.

As was the case at Arras, the Germans counter-attacked fiercely. Over 30,000 Ger-



A Charge by German Shock Troops on the Chemin des Dames

of the highest in the entire war. In carrying out their policy of attrition, therefore, it may be said that the British were successful.

XII

FRENCH OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE

(APRIL-NOVEMBER, 1917)

WHILE the British were taking Vimy Ridge and other points at the northern pivot of the "Hindenburg Line," the French launched an offensive against the southern pivot on April 16th. The attack was made on a twenty-five mile front between Soissons and Rheims, against a line which the Teutons

man shock troops were thrown in on the line between Berry-au-Bac and Juvincourt, only to wilt before the French artillery and machine guns. The story of Arras was again enacted, and the German losses were frightful and far in excess of those of the French.

FRENCH OPERATIONS ON THE CHEMIN DES DAMES

The placid road skirting the heights north of the Aisne,* built by Louis XV as a drive for the Royal Princesses, and called by the

* "The Heights of the Aisne, on which a century before a foreign invader had defied the genius of Napoleon, were, as we knew to our cost, one of the strongest positions in Europe. The limestone plateau, curiously wooded and cut by deep ravines, had been turned by the enemy into a veritable fortress. The sides of the glens had been forested with barbed wire; tunnels had been driven through the ridge, which formed perfect concealed com-

French the Chemin des Dames (or Ladies' Road), was the scene of the next serious fighting. Taking advantage of the wonderful opportunities for concealment and protection which this plateau afforded, the Germans had strongly fortified their positions on the Chemin des Dames, and in wresting it from them, the French realized they must pay a fearful price in lives.

On May 4th the French took Craonne, on the eastern end of the Chemin des Dames.

maison, which was located in this theater of operations, all proved futile.

The loss of both ends of the Chemin des Dames was keenly felt by the German Crown Prince, who made desperate but futile efforts to regain his lost ground and prestige. It is claimed that in his unsuccessful attacks to recapture these positions the German losses exceeded 100,000 men. In the course of these attacks he sought to take the offensive between Soissons and Rheims, but, despite local Ger-

A Word-Picture of the Mine Explosion at Messines Ridge

FROM Hill 60 in the north to the edge of Messines, with a shock that made the solid earth quiver like a pole in the wind, nineteen volcanoes leaped to heaven. Nineteen sheets of flame seemed to fill the world. For a moment it looked as if the earth, under a magician's wand, had been contorted into gigantic toadstools. The black cloud-caps seemed as real as the soil beneath them. Then they shook and wavered and thinned, leaving a brume of dust, rosy and golden atop with the rising sun. And at the same moment, while the ears were still throbbing with the concussion of the mines, every British gun opened on the enemy. Flashes of many colors stabbed the wall of dust, the bursts of shrapnel stood out white against it, and smoke barrages from our trenches burrowed into its roots. The sun was now above the horizon, and turned the fringes of the cloud to a hot purple and crimson. No battle had ever a more beautiful and terrible staging. And while the débris of the explosion still hung in the air the British divisions of assault went over their parapets.

"They entered at once upon a world like the nether pit—poisonous with gas fumes, twisted and riven out of all character, a maze of quarried stone, moving earth, splintered concrete, broken wire, and horrible fragments of humanity. In most places the German front lines had been blown out of existence. A few nerve-shattered survivors were taken prisoner in the dug-outs that had escaped destruction, and here and there a gallant machine-gun officer, who had miraculously survived, obeyed his orders till death took him." (From *Nelson's History of the War*, by John Buchan.)

The following day, attacks launched simultaneously against both ends netted 4,000 German prisoners, took the German salient in the Soissons-Laon road to a depth of four miles, and pushed the French line from east of Vauxaillon to north of Sancy, on the western end, while to the east the advancing troops took the hills which dominated the Ailette valley.

Repeated French efforts to take Fort Mal-


munications; machine guns had been cunningly emplaced at every angle of fire; and the many natural caves in the limestone had been converted into underground shelters and assembly stations. Moreover, he had all the viewpoints, and from the Chemin des Dames commanded everywhere the French lines. His only weakness was that he held an acute salient, the apex of which was south of the Aisne."

From *Nelson's History of the War*, by John Buchan.


man successes, the French continued to hold their positions.

It was during the course of these operations that Rheims and its famous old Cathedral received its greatest bombardments. It was confidently expected at the time that the cathedral, upon which numerous hits by high explosive shells had been registered, would collapse at any moment.

After waiting till fall to strike their final blow on the Aisne, the French launched an attack (October 23rd) on a six-mile front northeast of Soissons, which was one of the most brilliant operations of the year. The attack extended from near Vauxaillon to the vicinity of Malmaison, and was everywhere



The Battleground of the French Offensive Between Soissons and Rheims in 1917



Map Illustrating the Battle of Messines

successful. The French penetrated to an average depth of a mile and a half, took 12,000 prisoners, and large quantities of artillery and machine guns.

This attack, aside from its successful culmination, proved a boon to the Allied war chiefs, and a tribute to the genius of General Pétain, as it was characterized by the complete perfect coördination of infantry, artillery, "tanks," and airplanes working in unison.

The French gains in this thrust made the German position on the Chemin des Dames untenable, and by the first of November they had given up these positions and retired across the Ailette River in front of Laon. The French were now able to prepare offensive operations against Laon and the southern end of the "Hindenburg Line" as far as La Fère. By this the French still held the initiative.

XIII

BATTLE OF MESSINES RIDGE

IN spite of the German counter-thrusts, the Allies continued in 1917 to hold the offensive in the west, where their supremacy in the air more or less blinded the German artillery, but enabled their own gunners to be thoroughly cognizant of the situation and the effect of their fire at all times. Photographs enabled the Allies to keep in touch with German dispositions and be guided accordingly; aerial photography had now become invaluable.

Undaunted by the arrest of their efforts elsewhere, the British now planned to take Messines Ridge. This was a knoll about 300 feet high, which dominated the British positions at Ypres, and until it was captured, Brit-

ish possession of that city would remain uncertain.

Although activities on this immediate sector were comparatively quiet, the British sappers had for fifteen months been mining the German positions on the ridge. In all, they had dug nineteen galleries and placed 500 tons of high explosives under the foe's lines. When the mining operations were completed, a great offensive was planned to follow up the mine explosion. General Plumer of the British Army was put in charge of the whole operation.

The German defenses on the ridge were

sent up to summon aid which never arrived; for although there were six German divisions in the defenses, the British machine guns and artillery barrages were so perfect that these reserves could not pass through the curtains of death.

The British troops, composed of English, Irish and "Anzac" units, rushed forward and, within a few minutes, occupied the enemy first-line system. The barrage then lifted and switched to the rear areas, and the British advance resumed. In a few hours the whole ridge had fallen into British possession, and was held in spite of a strong counter-attack.



A Belgian Bridge Across the River Yser

of most elaborate character, consisting mainly of barbed wire over an area one mile deep, supported by artillery and machine guns in rear. To destroy this, the British artillery preparation was one of the greatest of the war. In one division alone the guns fired more than 46,000 heavy and 180,000 small shells.

By June 6th everything was ready for the attack, and the mine was sprung at 3:10 a. m. the following morning, simultaneously with which the artillery bombardment reached the height of its intensity. A stupefying roar which could be heard for 150 miles was the result, and when the smoke had cleared away, it was seen that the whole crest of the ridge had been blown off, and the original German positions obliterated. From the debris, however, were still to be seen German rockets,

In this brilliant victory the British suffered 10,000 casualties, as compared to 30,000 of the Germans, of whom 7,000 were taken prisoner; Messines and Wytschaete had been captured, and the Germans had been forced to abandon their lines between St. Yves and the Lys River. So long as they could continue to hold the Messines position, the British could hold this sector of their line without further anxiety.

GERMAN VICTORY ON THE YSER

In retaliation for the staggering blow they had received at Messines, the Germans planned a surprise offensive against the British, who held a very vulnerable position east of the Yser River.

These trenches, occupied by this British

force, were a relic of the old defensive line which had stopped the German drive against the Channel ports. However, with the River Yser between them and their main line, which lay wholly west of the river, this line could be of little value. It was, therefore, necessary to communicate between the two lines by crossing the river, in constant danger of being cut off, due to the destruction of the bridges by the enemy's artillery fire.

The Germans secretly collected artillery, and, on July 11th, launched an attack, follow-

BATTLE OF FLANDERS

Messines Ridge had a value possessed by few strategic positions on the whole battle front. As long as it had remained in German hands it controlled Allied activity on the left of the line, but now that the British possessed it, the Allies were at liberty to continue offensive operations on this flank. This they did as soon as proper preparations could be made, and the operations which occurred on this sector, more or less intermittently for the



The British Bombardment of the Passchendaele Ridge

ing the artillery bombardment which broke the bridges and isolated the front-line positions of the 3,000 British troops who were east of the river, practically all of whom were either killed or captured.

The assault was of local character and limited objective, but by destroying this force the Germans had achieved their goal. The destruction of the bridges would, of necessity, check any further attempt to advance across the Yser against the main British positions. This proved to be the only purely offensive operation attempted by the Germans during this year of the war.

next six months, became known as the battle of Flanders.

ALLIES TAKE PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE

The next immediate objective was the elevation in front of Ypres, known as Passchendaele Ridge, whereas the main aim of the whole offensive was to force an evacuation of the Belgian coast, especially the submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge, and take Lille and Roulers, both important commercial centers.

After careful artillery preparation the

Franco-British forces advanced on a twenty-mile front between Dixmude and Warneton, July 31st, and took the German first and second lines, and penetrated the third-line positions.

Unfortunately, at this time a rainstorm put an end to operations. It may be recalled that the predominating areas in this country are low lands and marshes; very little high ground is to be found, consequently, instead of digging trenches, cover was usually improvised by placing sand bags on the surface of the ground. A protracted downpour in such a country, therefore, can have serious bearing on active military operations.

When the offensive was resumed, August 10th, the British took Westhoek, and the French, who supported their left, took Bixschoote, both places falling after hard fighting. The following day the British gained a footing in Glencourse Wood.

The Germans had devised a new scheme of defense, extensively used for the first time in these operations, called by the British "pill boxes." These were concrete shelters built in shell craters, or hidden places, and well supplied with machine guns and ammunition. These forts could seriously check an infantry advance. The Allies, however, soon neutralized their effect by the remarkable work of their artillery, which had now become exceedingly effective and was supplied with an unlimited amount of ammunition. The work of the artillery was the outstanding feature of this offensive.

As soon as the Allies could consolidate their gains, they struck again (August 16th) on a nine-mile front to the east of Ypres and carried all of their objectives, except on their right, where the British were driven back by the German counter-thrust. In the center, Langemarck was taken and the British line pushed a mile beyond that town, but only at the expense of considerable sacrifices.

Rain again halted operations for a month, at the end of which the Allies launched five big attacks between the middle of September and the middle of October, which drove a big wedge in the German line, seized most of Passchendaele Ridge, and advanced the British line on the northwest to the Ypres-Roulers road and astride the Ypres-Menin road. The British heavy artillery could now

dominate all the plain of Flanders, as well as the city of Roulers.

General Haig was relentless in the sledge-hammer blows he was now dealing the enemy, and he followed this attack with another on the 22nd, when he advanced astride the Ypres-Staden railway, while the French occupied Houthoulst Forest. On the 26th, the Belgian Army joined the Allied advance and captured the Mercken peninsula. On the same day the British advanced west of Passchendaele, while the French seized Draebank.

Finally, on the 30th, the British succeeded in taking Passchendaele, only to be driven out by the German counter-attack. However, at the end of about a week, the Canadians retook and held it against mighty German efforts to recover it.

Weather conditions prevented further extensive military operations in this sector during the remainder of 1917. The rest of the time was taken up in clearing the Teutons from Passchendaele Ridge and in consolidating gains preparatory to new advances. Aside from several German reconnaissance attacks, the fighting on this front was desultory.

A brief survey of the situation shows that the operations as a whole had not been a success. Of all the desired aims, the taking of Passchendaele was the only *fait accompli*, and for the wonderfully brilliant local military achievements which Allied arms had won, the best that can be said is that it demonstrated the Allies' ability to maintain the offensive. Moreover, their positions were so improved that the coming year held hopes for the accomplishment of the objects of the two previous years' operation: to drive the German out of Belgium and carry the war into his own country.

FINAL FRENCH VICTORY AT VERDUN, 1917

The Verdun front had been allowed to idle for nine months while attention and interest were centered elsewhere. However, the final retrieving stroke fell on August 20th, when the French, after only slight artillery preparation, dashed forward in a quick surprise attack and retook Avocourt Wood, Le Mort Homme, Corbeaux, Cumières Woods, Côte de Talou, Mormont Farm and Hill 240; some 4,000 prisoners being captured.

In the next four days of fighting the French extended their gains and raised the total of prisoners to 15,000. Local attacks and consolidations continued until the middle of September, by which time they had recovered five-sixths of the territory originally taken by the Germans.

The Germans attempted in vain to dislodge the French from the recovered positions, which were held with grim determination.

Aside from the sentimental effect, the French now held all the strategic positions on this front, and were in a position to commence

were outflanked on their advanced lines from Monte Maggiore to the Bainsizza Plateau by General Mackensen's Austro-German forces. This move forced a general retreat of the Italian Army. The retreat continued from October 25th until late in November, when, assisted by Franco-British reinforcements, a final stand was made on the Piave line.

To create a diversion for their hard-pressed Italian allies, the British launched an attack against Cambrai, which developed into a battle lasting from the latter part of November until the middle of December.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Canadians Advancing Through Cambrai

Just before the Germans left this city, they mined every building of importance. The Hotel de Ville is seen to the left in flames.

offensive operations on the line Nancy-St. Mihiel to envelop the fortified area of Metz.

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

A comparative lull followed the battle of Flanders, in which major offensive operations had ceased by the middle of October. During this interim, forced by bad weather conditions, both sides were busy improving their lines, but it was not expected that any great offensive effort would be made during the remainder of the year.

However, conditions on another front materially changed the situation. The Italians

SURPRISE ATTACK BY BYNG'S TANKS


The most remarkable feature about this battle is that it was a surprise attack, launched with the aid of "tanks," and without artillery preparation. A large number of tanks had been collected in the sector opposite Cambrai, and under cover of a dense fog on the morning of the attack, they rolled through the barbed wire and over the German trenches, closely followed by the hard-fighting infantry. The attack was as complete a success as it was a surprise. German officers in their dug-outs in the front lines were taken in their pajamas, and in the second and third lines



Kadel and Herbert, Lentils Weekly.

June, 1917—American Regulars Arriving in France

The first American troops to reach the other side were men of the 1st Division of Regulars, who went at once to a training area. They arrived on June 26, 1917, at a time when the war was going against the Allies. Between that date and November, 1918, over 2,000,000 doughboys were sent across, of which number over fifty per cent were transported by American vessels.



Sketch Map of the Battle of Cambrai

the Teutons were surprised at breakfast and captured without resistance.

During the first two days General Byng's men advanced more than five miles and took nearly 10,000 prisoners. They reached Cantaing, less than two miles from Cambrai, and the British cavalry advanced even further, in some cases entering the city itself, but were unable to remain.

However, German resistance soon stiffened, and by November 26th Bourlon Wood, about three miles west of Cambrai, had changed hands no less than three times, as both sides fought furiously to retain its possession.

To the southwest of Cambrai an encircling movement by the British was likewise frustrated by the Teutons in the vicinity of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, where their machine guns, hidden in the woods of La Folie, checked the British advance.

After bringing up reinforcements, the Germans undertook to reduce the Cambrai salient. On November 27th the limits of the salient were at Bourlon Woods to the west, and Crèvecoeur to the southeast. Both of these limits were the objectives set for the surprise attack on this day. The Teuton surprise con-

sisted of an infantry assault without previous artillery preparation, but strongly supported by artillery after the attack was launched. The attack proved a success, the Teutonic forces penetrating the British lines to a depth of two miles and taking many prisoners.

On the southern end of the sector the Germans pierced the British lines south of Villers-Guislain, where they turned north to envelop the British flank, and succeeded in taking Gozeaucourt, Gonnelle, and La Vacquerie. In the northern attack the Germans passed Bourlon Wood and Moeuvres before the British rallied and attempted to make a stand.

By December 5th the British had been driven from Masnières, Cantaing, Noyelles, Graincourt and Anneux. The German attacks then shifted north to the region of Bullecourt, where they made slight gains.

The British now rallied and checked the German counter-offensive on nearly the same line from whence they had commenced the attack in November. Although the British lost five-sixths of the territory they had won in their first brilliant advance, yet they had inflicted severe casualties on the enemy and suffered comparatively few themselves, and for this reason, as well as for the effect it had had on the Italian front—from which Teuton forces had been taken for use at Cambrai—the battle has always been considered a British victory.

It is of interest to note that several American engineer units who were brigaded with the British took part in this offensive, and for their gallant assistance in repelling the German counter-attack, they won the special commendation of General Haig.

XIV

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

BEFORE closing the discussion of military operations for the year it is necessary to mention two events of the greatest importance: the entrance of the United States into the war, and the Rapallo Conference.

One of the most far reaching events of the year was the formal entrance of the United

States as a belligerent in the great World War (April 6th). This had an important bearing on the Allied situation, as it added to the resources of the Allies those of the richest country in the world, with more than a hundred million population, whose President announced that the United States had entered the struggle to fight "to the last man and the last dollar."

At this time Allied *morale* was waning; in fact, both sides were war weary and low in spirits. The entrance of the United States at this juncture put new life into her war-sick Allies, with corresponding moral depression to the Central Powers, although the latter feigned an attitude of indifference.

Although the Germans derided America's contemplated military effort, and boasted that no soldiers could be sent across the sea on account of submarines, yet the first American troops, consisting of a Regular Army contingent, debarked at St. Nazaire, France, June 26th. From that time, troops in ever increasing numbers continued to pour across the sea for the defense of liberty, and, as President Wilson announced: "To make the world safe for democracy."

Entering the war on such a vast scale, the United States Army faced a big project. To have a contemplated army of ten million men, if necessary, demanded great military establishments, both at home and abroad, for the concentration, equipping and training of these great levies of citizen soldiers. The first year was, therefore, devoted practically entirely to the construction of this great military establishment, and, aside from the small Regular Army, no troops could be classed as combatant troops, ready for field duty in this war, which science had taxed its ingenuity to make the most technical in all history.

AMERICA IN PREPARATION

The Conscription Act passed by Congress and signed by the President May 18th was a masterful stroke to coördinate the resources of the country. Eliminating the uncertainty of a volunteer system, the Administration knew for certain the numbers of men who could be called, and for whom it must provide.

In the United States a great system of can-

tonments was established in the most convenient localities, and their construction, as well as the production of military equipment, commenced immediately. In France it was very much the same problem: great docks had to be built at St. Nazaire, the port taken over from the French by the Americans, storage and distribution centers for various military supplies had to be selected and erected, and training camps and rest billets provided for the troops.

A great part of this time between the declaration of war and the first actual hostilities in which United States troops participated, was, therefore, consumed in building up the greatest Service of Supply System ("S. O. S.") on record. Among other items, it included the greatest bakery in the world, at Is-sur-Tille, and the second greatest refrigeration plant, at Gièvres. In addition, there were many other projects, the magnitude and importance of which cannot here be justly described, and which are still more remarkable when one considers that practically every board or nail used had to be transported from the United States.

However, the Americans were eager to en-



M. Painlevé

Minister of War in the Briand and Ribot governments. Afterwards he was prime minister, from September to November, 1917.

ter the fight, and shortly after their arrival most of them entered quiet sectors to undergo training under actual war conditions. The first instance of active military operations was contained in a *communiqué* of October 27th, which announced that the American artillery had fired its first shot at the Germans. The brass case of the first shell was suitably inscribed and sent to President Wilson, and the gun which fired it has since been transported to the United States and placed in the Museum of the United States Military Academy at West Point. The first instance of American prisoners taken by the Germans was announced in a Berlin dispatch of November 3rd. These were a few taken in a trench raid.

However, with the continual arrival of Americans from the United States, divisions were organized, equipped, and trained in the region of the Vosges Mountains, relieving from time to time French units which had formerly held that part of the line.

As it was the intention of the American Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing, to take over a sector and operate the American Army as a unit, rather than to use it as a replacement reserve for the Allies, it was necessary to await the arrival of sufficient troops before undertaking offensive military operations as an American unit; consequently, the force of the American Army could not be expected to strike until the coming offensive of the following spring. (*See Vol. V for a complete account of The A.E.F. in Europe.*)

THE RAPALLO CONFERENCE

The Rapallo Conference was composed of delegates from France, England and Italy, and was for the purpose of promoting Allied unity. To effect its purpose, it created the Supreme War Council, which, in turn, appointed an Inter-Allied General Staff, composed of Generals Foch, Wilson, and Cadorna, representing France, England and Italy respectively.

Premier Painlevé best expressed the object of the Council when he said in a speech in November that the objects for which it was created were for:

"a single army, a single front, a single nation—that is the programme requisite for future victory."

Although not represented at the Rapallo Conference, the United States gave its approval of the plan adopted, and Colonel House and General Bliss were sent to represent the United States at the first meeting of the Supreme War Council.

Victory had been withheld from the Allies several times, due to their lack of unity and coördination. However, necessity had now become the mother of unity, and, with the stated altruistic aims of the United States, better coöperation could be expected in the spring offensive of 1918, when, directed by a single Commander-in-Chief, Allied hopes offered the promise of being crowned by a long deferred victory.

MILITARY OPERATIONS—1918

German Successes Imperil the Allies' Cause, But Americans Arrive In Force and Turn the Tide of War Against the Enemy

I

MILITARY operations in the last year of the war may be divided into two general periods: The German offensive, which continued intermittently from March 21st until July 18th, and the Allied counter-offensive from July 18th until November 11th,

when the armistice put an end to further operations. The German offensive is further divided into the great battles which took place during this period, and which derive their names from the geographical locations in which they occurred; such as the second battle of the Somme, the battle of the Lys, and the third battle of the Aisne. In addition to these, cer-

tain other separate battles have been grouped independently and named accordingly; such as the attack on Amiens, Arras, Rheims, etc. What is true of the German offensive also holds true for the Allied counter-offensive, which included attacks on the salients of Château-Thierry, Moreuil, Merville, and St.

Eastern to the Western fronts all military forces. It was hoped to crush France speedily, force England to seek a separate peace because of the submarine menace, and nip in the bud the military effort of the United States, which from a "negligible" factor was speedily assuming the proportions of a menace.



© Underwood and Underwood.

A French Priest Being Decorated by Clemenceau

The Premier is pinning the cross of the Legion of Honor on the breast of a priest, for distinguished work and bravery under fire, in the battle of Mont Renaud, near Noyon.

Mihiel, the breaking of the Hindenburg Line between Marcoing and St. Quentin, and the final general attack (September 26th) which continued until the armistice became effective, November 11th.

The Allies' outlook for 1918 was not very promising at the start. The fifth year of the war found Germany true to her original plans to force Russia out of the war and then crush France. The Russian Revolution in the spring of 1917, with the subsequent defection in the Russian Army, gave Germany the opportunity she sought, and now Teuton efforts were concentrated to transfer from the

GERMAN OFFENSIVE FORESEEN

The Allies, therefore, knew that a great attack was planned, but just where and when it would come they could not tell. Regarding preparations made to receive the attack, General Haig in his report on these operations says:

"In order to ensure the greatest possible concentration of effort upon training, reorganization and defenses, and also in order to allow my divisions the maximum amount of rest after the continuous fighting of 1917, only such minor enterprises were undertaken by the British forces

during the winter months as were essential to keep us informed regarding the dispositions and intentions of the German forces opposed to us. Special attention was directed to disposing our forces in line in such manner as would best promote economy in men and reduce casualties."

According to the same report of General Haig, the enemy, in an effort to conceal his real purpose, made feint attacks east of Bullecourt, January 5th and 8th, both of which were unsuccessful. Other such attacks occurred also at Dixmude, astride the Menin Road, and south of Houthulst Forest. In addition, between December 8th and March 21st, the Germans had made 225 raids, in many cases leaving in the Allies' hands prisoners who had been prompted to say that the main attack would fall on the Lorraine front and in Flanders.

The actual sector chosen by the Germans for attack was a fifty-four-mile front between Croisilles, about ten miles southeast of Arras, and Vendeuil on the Oise. To do this, great masses of troops were concentrated in the angle of the salient made by the line from the North Sea to La Fère and from La Fère to Verdun. By this selection the Allies could be made to guess, on which side of the salient the attack would fall. As a matter of fact, however, the main blow was planned to fall on the right of the British Fifth Army, commanded by General Gough, where it joined the French forces to the south under General Fayolle.

GERMANY READY TO PAY THE PRICE OF VICTORY

Until the German offensive was launched, anxiety was tense on both sides. With the transfer of the Teuton armies from the Eastern front the Allies realized that their former numerical superiority had been obliterated, and with extended lines few troops could be spared for a general reserve, the only hope for which could be the speedy organization of such American forces as had arrived, but who were yet inexperienced in the science of war.

In Germany there was no such grave apprehension. On the contrary, German hopes ran high on the assured promise of a com-

plete and absolute victory on the Western front. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff had met the Reichstag in secret session in February and obtained its approval of their plan, which they admitted would cost the Fatherland a million and a half losses. Those Teuton diplomats who previously had clamored for the end of hostilities by compromising with the Allies, were now loudest in their demands for a dictated peace after the Allies had been crushed. A wave of confidence surged over Central Europe, and the following extract from a speech by Helfferich in March is typically indicative of Teuton sentiment at that time:

"Where is Hindenburg?" said he.


"He stands in the West with our whole German manhood for the first time united in a single theater of war, ready to strike with the strongest army that the world has ever known."

With the nation united behind him, von Hindenburg could now proceed with the execution of his plan; break through the Allied line at the junction between the British and French, roll up the British right flank and push that army back to the coast, then turn and defeat the French Army in the open. According to plan a speedy peace would follow these victories, and with the Franco-British forces eliminated, the United States would find it impracticable to continue the war and, consequently, be forced to sue for a separate peace. Von Hutier, the captor of Riga, and Otto von Bülow, the hero of Caporetto, both experienced in speedy, crushing attacks, were placed in command where the main blow was to fall, and the Kaiser personally commanded the whole operation.

II

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

THE first phase of this mighty battle began at dawn, March 21st, when a severe bombardment of the Allied line commenced. The greatest concentration was made against the British Third and Fifth Armies between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers. Aided by a thick



From the Sphere, London.

The Second Battle of the Somme, March, 1918

The shaded area shows the early stages of the German advance. It was at this crucial time that Haig wrote his famous "backs to the wall" dispatch.

blanket of fog which completely concealed the German movements, the enemy was able to send forward machine-gun groups to take position inside of the Allied positions, so they could operate in the British rear and flank when the main German assault was launched.



Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson
Commander of the British Fourth Army.

This scheme worked so well that in many instances artillery in the rear positions was taken by surprise when the infantry in their front were not even aware that parties of the enemy were in the vicinity.

At 9:45 a. m. the general attack was launched by the German infantry, which forced its way through the first defensive zone in most places, and assisted by the machine guns which had filtered through the lines earlier, made many of the Allies' best positions untenable. The continuity of the Allied line thus honeycombed with enemy machine guns and assaulted in front, could be preserved only by retreat.

ATTACK CONCENTRATES ON BRITISH FIFTH ARMY

It soon became apparent that the main German attack was directed against the British

Fifth Army at three principal points: the Cologne Valley, the Omignon Valley, and the Crozat Canal. Although the British fought heroically against stupendous odds—forty-two German divisions against seventeen British—it soon became necessary to conform to a general retirement.

At the close of the first phase of the battle on March 23rd, the British had been driven back to the Somme and forced out of their positions on practically the whole battle front from east of Arras south, and the French, on their right, were compelled to conform in order to protect their exposed flank. According to German bulletins the Teutons had advanced to a maximum depth of about nine miles, taken 25,000 prisoners, and over 400 guns.



General Sixt Von Arnim
Commander of the Fourth German Army

To celebrate the victorious onrush of their armies, the Germans opened fire on Paris on March 23rd with their phenomenal long-range gun situated in the Forest of St. Gobain, over seventy miles distant from the French capital. This bombardment, it was hoped, would serve to complete the moral depression following the retreat of the Allied Armies, but the French bore with indifference the bombardment of the "Fortress of

Paris," and Teutonic elation was doomed to another disappointment.

The second phase of the great retreat commenced March 24th, when the enemy was again favored by a heavy fog which made the defense difficult. The main effort was expended in an attempt to defend the Somme crossings and fill the breach between the Third and Fifth British Armies. The rapid retreat of the Third Army had seriously compromised the forces fighting on each of its flanks, and by the following evening (March 25th) the British front consisted of a series of overlapping salients. The enemy's efforts were now concentrated to split the British and French forces at Roye, the Third and Fifth Armies on the Somme, and the Fourth and Fifth British Corps at Serre.

FOCH AS GENERALISSIMO

The situation had become desperate. The Allies were now facing the "darkest hour" of the entire war; something must be done, and done quickly. A conference was accordingly held at Doullens (March 26th) between M. Clemenceau, Lord Milner, and the respective military commanders of the French and British Armies, when it was agreed to follow the precedent established in the battle of the Yser in October, 1914. Here General Foch, then commander of the northern army group, was placed in charge of both British and French forces fighting on that front. Again he was selected to "coördinate the operations of these armies," and placed in charge of the situation affecting both armies. Three days later he was appointed "Generalissimo of the French, English, American and Belgian forces fighting on the Western Front." Thoroughly equal to his responsibilities, General Foch commenced immediately to make his dispositions to repeat Joffre's wonderful feat at the Marne in 1914.

SITUATION CRITICAL TO ALLIES

On the 26th the situation was even worse. The Nineteenth Army Corps, which defended the way to Amiens, was about to break. There was no relief and no reserve, consequently General Grant, Chief Engineer of the Fifth Army, collected a reserve force made up

of all the casual detachments obtainable. This consisted of American and Canadian engineers, the personnel of a machine-gun school, and such army troops and stragglers as could be collected. All were placed under the command of Brigadier General Sandeman Carey, and were consequently known as "Carey's Detachment." All distinguished themselves for their gallant conduct while filling the breach in the line.


On the same day the New Zealand Division arrived, and, with the aid of "whippet" tanks, took Colincamps. This was the initial appearance of this weapon which was destined later to play a prominent part in the war.

Next day (March 27th), the situation was somewhat better north of the Somme, although the enemy had taken Albert, but south of the river the German attacks continued with unabated fury.

The following day (March 28th), however, was everywhere critical. The enemy was attacking from Arras to the Oise and gaining headway. By evening he had won the entire line of the old Amiens defenses. The Fifth Army made its last stand and was relieved by a force which became the Fourth Army, commanded by General Rawlinson. General Fayolle was hard pressed, and several British units were involved with him. However, the greatest attack took place on the northern end of the line, where General von Bülow hurled the full weight of his army against the lines in front of Arras to take that place, as well as Vimy Ridge, the capture of which had been a blow to German pride. The attack was everywhere repulsed by the Third Army, which was not seriously molested again for nearly a week.

The next few days were marked by a comparative lull, as the Germans consolidated their gains and moved forward their artillery and supplies to resume the advance. The Allies conformed as best they could, but continued to yield ground to protect the exposed flanks occasioned by the breaches in their line.

On April 4th, von Hutier again attempted to break through at the junction of the British and French Armies. The gallant resistance of General Fayolle's *poilus* frustrated the attempt, and although the French line was forced back between the Luce and the Avre by the sheer weight of the fifteen Ger-



The Battleground in the Lys Salient, April, 1918

man divisions which attacked this sector, it did not break.

The next two days witnessed some brilliant defensive fighting on the French front west of the Avre, where the lucky poilus not only checked the enemy, but made considerable gains in their counter-attacks. The enemy was likewise repulsed in front of Montdidier, Noyon and Mont Renaud.

April 6th marked the end of the Second Battle of the Somme, with the enemy in possession of the high ground west of the Avre and on the plateau east of Villers Bretonneux. The Allied line had now been unified and prepared for further defense against the advancing foe. Amiens had successfully barred the way to the invader, but was not yet se-

cure. On the whole, the situation was still precarious for the Allies, but was filled with hope, and the Allies had the encouragement of realizing that the enemy had been thwarted in his purpose to break their line and decisively defeat them individually.

In Allied circles the peril had been a good tonic for the national constitution. France had faced the danger with the same composure that marked her fortitude when her fate was weighed in the balance at Verdun. In England, labor and party disputes were laid aside, as all joined for the common good. Taking advantage of this patriotic revival, the Cabinet removed certain exemptions from military service, increased the age limit to fifty, and extended conscription to Ireland.

Probably, however, the greatest single act done in this perilous period was the unification of the Allied Army under command of General Foch, who had already proven himself the greatest military leader on either side.

III

THE BATTLE OF THE LYS

CHECKED on the Somme, and Amiens denied to his conquering arms, von Ludendorff turned next to the north to attack the British north of the La Bassée Canal, where they were known to be very weak.

The attack was made by the army of von Quast between Lens and Armentières on April 9th, after an intense bombardment with gas shells on the two previous days. The Second Portuguese Division broke and fled during the first attack. The enemy poured through the breach and turned the flank of the British supporting the Portuguese left. The German tide was too swift to stem, and the British were forced to yield the whole of their prepared line, though fighting furiously as they retired.

On the next day, the Germans had been reinforced by von Arnim's infantry, who pushed the attack and captured Messines and Wytschaete Ridge, only to be expelled by the South African Brigade of the Ninth Scottish Division.

The next day (April 11th), the Germans attacked with fresh reserves, but made practically no progress. General Plumer, however, decided to rearrange his lines on this day, which necessitated giving up positions east of Neuve Eglise and Hill 63.

VON LUDENDORFF BLUNDERS

Believing that he held the victory in the palm of his hand, von Ludendorff yielded to the lure of the Channel ports, which now seemed within easy reach. With the success which had blessed his arms he believed that the effort necessary to take these ports would be a minor diversion. He continued his assaults in the north, whereas originally he had commenced the Lys operations in an effort to open a way to Amiens by weakening the Al-

lied reserves. He had also left his flank exposed at Montdidier. The continued efforts to break through to Calais and Boulogne were, therefore, a costly blunder on the part of the German High Command; a blunder which was to deny a seemingly assured victory.

Ludendorff's set objectives in this newly conceived attack were, in order: Béthune, Kemmel Ridge, and Hazebrouck. The possession of these would allow him artillery positions which would command Calais and seriously menace the British line of communications.

Fighting from April 13th to the 17th showed little progress either way. In the next two days the intensity of the battle increased, and a concerted attack pierced the Belgian line near Bixschoote. As the enemy poured through the gap, the Belgian reserves attacked in flank and completely defeated the attacking force, taking over 700 prisoners, killing 2,000, and driving the rest into the marshes.

While the diversion on the Lys continued, von Ludendorff was fast losing the initiative on the Somme, where the main attack had been held up. Moreover, seventeen days had elapsed and his original objectives were still denied him, so on April 25th a final desperate effort was launched, which in the next few days of fighting, succeeded in taking Kemmel.

On April 29th the Germans made three main assaults—the first against the French at Loire and Mont Rouge, which failed; the second at the junction of the French and British Corps, and the third between the 21st and 49th British Divisions. All were doomed to final failure, due to the wonderful bayonet fighting of the Allies, and, with the close of this day's assaults, the battle of the Lys came to an end. Some desultory fighting continued, but was of local character. Between May 1st and 28th attacks were made by both sides for the purpose of improving their lines.

The battles of the Lys had been a local tactical success for the Germans. However, for the ground they had occupied they had paid a high price in casualties, and the time lost from the main attack on the Somme and before Amiens had been priceless.

During the time occupied by the Lys offensive, an attempt had been made southeast of Villers Bretonneux to break the Allied line

*French Official Photograph.*

Soissons Cathedral

A picture of the once beautiful Gothic cathedral, showing the destruction wrought by enemy artillery fire.

to secure a better position from which to launch an attack on Amiens. This proved disastrous, and in the counter-attack by Australian troops, the Germans lost their captured positions and 1,000 prisoners.

In this engagement British and German heavy tanks met for the first time, and the small "whippet" tanks were given an opportunity to demonstrate their ability, which they did to a most satisfactory degree.

IV

THE THIRD BATTLE OF THE AISNE

OPERATIONS on the Lys were allowed to cease while Ludendorff turned his attention south to the Somme sector. Here the army of von Hutier had created the base for an offensive between La Fère and Montdidier, with the Oise to aid the advance. How-

ever, this was useless so long as the wooded ridge from Compiègne to Villers-Cotterets remained in the hands of General Foch, as from these positions the Germans would be at the mercy of a French flank attack whenever they commenced to advance.

The French here were too strong for a frontal attack, hence it was planned to drive

twenty-two German divisions defending the line from Anisy-le-Château to Berry-au-Bac. On the first day the defenders were driven from their positions. On the second day the Germans advanced about eight miles and crossed the Vesle River. The following day (May 29th), the enemy took Soissons, and two days later, forced a crossing of the Ailette.



French Pictorial Service.

The Rolling Barrage at Cantigny

One of the French "75s" which made a perfect barrage for the 1st Division's assault. Its rapidity of fire and accuracy in "bracketing" were hardly surpassed.

the French off the Chemin des Dames and outflank the other positions. The Germans still possessed the numerical superiority of 212 divisions, as opposed to the Allied force of 172, and after the reverses which Allied arms had already suffered, it was believed by the German High Command that these strong positions which had baffled them for three years could now be taken with ease.

On May 27th the attack was launched with

On June 1st Château-Thierry fell and the Teutons held the right bank of the Marne between this town and Dormans.

In his rush to reach the Marne, von Hutier had created a salient which hinged on to the rest of his line at Soissons and Reims. He had, so to speak, passed through a gate whose pillars were at these points, so his efforts were next directed towards smashing the pillars.

Accordingly, from the 1st until the 7th of

June, repeated efforts were made to straighten the line at these points, but in spite of the fact that the city of Soissons had fallen, the enemy failed to make any material gains.

Fighting continued along the whole Marne salient as the enemy attempted to broaden its front. On June 5th, American troops came into action on the southern and western sides

maneuver as was then in progress, yet the conduct of the attack was indicative of the fighting spirit of the Americans, who at their first opportunity demonstrated their ability as offensive fighters. From this time on, the military value of the American Army as a fighting force was immeasurably enhanced. (*See Vol. V for a detailed account of this action.*)



© Underwood and Underwood.

Débris of the Second Battle of the Marne

of the salient, where they successfully counter-attacked in the wood of Neuilly-la-Poterie, and defeated an attempt to ford the Marne at Jaulgonne. (*See Vol. V.*)

THE BATTLE OF CANTIGNY


Simultaneously as the Germans commenced their drive south to the Marne, the 1st Division of the American Expeditionary Force, then brigaded with the Third French Army, attacked and captured the village of Cantigny, three miles west of Montdidier, and successfully held it against three determined enemy counter-attacks. Whereas relatively trivial as a military operation in such a vast

MONTDIDIER-NOYON

After the lull on the Marne salient, June 8th, von Hutier attacked on a twenty-five-mile front between Montdidier and Noyon, for the purpose of securing the line Compiègne-Château-Thierry, from which von Ludendorff wished to launch his attack on Paris.

On the first two days, June 9th-10th, the enemy advanced a total of six miles, with the result that General Foch ordered the salient south of Noyon evacuated, and the Germans occupied it.

Further south on the 11th, the Americans made a dashing advance at Belleau Woods



© Underwood and Underwood.

An American Battery of Heavy Guns That Took Part in the Second Battle of the Marne

and took 300 prisoners. Two days later (June 13th) the enemy's attempts to retake the lost wood broke down with heavy losses. This day marked the end of the enemy's effort to break through this part of the salient, and he next turned his attention to a new part of the line to renew his efforts.

It was five days later when the Crown Prince's Army attacked Reims on a ten-mile front. But so long as the Allies continued to hold the Montagne de Reims to the south of the city, attacks against the city itself could hope to meet with little success. The assault was a failure, following which a lull in offensive operations settled over the whole line. It was an open secret that the enemy was preparing a grand final smash, which he was confident would win his coveted objectives, and a dictated peace. During the

month which lapsed before the offensive was resumed, the Allies made their dispositions to meet the new attack, for they realized that could they but weather this storm, it would be the enemy's last great offensive effort, and in the realization of this fact the hard-pressed Allies found the solace of a new-born hope.

V

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

THE interim between the close of the Third Battle of the Aisne and the commencement of the Second Battle of the Marne was one of anxious waiting for the Allies. In Germany the coming battle was hailed as the

Friedensturm, or German peace victory. So open were the Teutons about their plans, that General Foch had little difficulty in obtaining from prisoners and deserters a detailed account of the foe's intentions. These were, roughly, to push beyond the Marne with the Eleventh German Army under von Eben, crossing through the salient near Château-Thierry where von Boehn was then trapped. Once across, the objective became the Paris-Nancy railroad. At the same time, the First and Third German Armies would split the French east of Reims, between Prunay and the Argonne. This accomplished, von Eben and von Boehn would descend on Paris via the Marne Valley. Simultaneously, von Hutier and von der Marwitz would break the Amiens-Montdidier line and converge on the capital from the north. This latter move would, in addition, cut off Haig from Pétain, and nothing but victory could possibly follow.

GERMANS RESUME OFFENSIVE

Flushed with confidence, the German offensive was resumed with a big artillery preparation on the night of July 14th, Bastille Day. The bombardment was plainly audible in Paris, but much to the surprise of the German High Command the Allied guns were replying with telling effect, and seriously interfering with the infantry concentrations for the assault.

The infantry assault was finally launched early on the morning of the 15th, and succeeded in crossing the Marne at various points between Château-Thierry and Dormans. The Germans had achieved a maximum advance of three miles on a twenty-two mile front. However, the front had not been broadened, as expected, for the Americans at Château-Thierry and the Italians on the Montagne de Reims had stood firm.

On the 16th, the fighting continued. The French under Berthelot were hotly pressed and fell back in the center, but the enemy was unable to extend his gains laterally, and it was evident that von Boehn would have difficulty in maintaining his Army beyond the river.

On the 17th the fighting continued in a persistent effort to break through and extend the front, all of which failed. Von Boehn's

eight divisions were now exhausted, and their line of communications in serious danger of being cut. On the Reims front the enemy had not only failed to advance, but the Italians had recaptured some ground from him.

The temptation was too great for General Foch, who, after consultations with Generals Pétain and Fayolle, decided to launch his counter-thrust against the exposed flank of von Boehn's army. General Mangin had prepared a jumping-off line on the west face of the salient between the Aisne and the Savières, and could be depended upon to make the main attack, in coöperation with the forces working against von Boehn to the south.

CHÂTEAU-THIERRY CAPTURED—THE ENEMY RETIRES FROM THE MARNE

Preceded by a fleet of mosquito tanks the armies of Mangin and Degoutte advanced to the assault at 4:30 a. m. on the 18th of July. The main attack was delivered on a line from Fontenay to Belleau, and before the enemy realized it, the French and Americans were through his lines and continued to advance, in spite of the reserves brought forward to check them.

(For American participation in this operation see the detailed account in Vol. V.)

On the following day the pursuit continued, and the Germans were everywhere driven across the Marne. By the evening of the second day, the French Army had captured 20,000 prisoners and over 400 guns. On the 21st Château-Thierry was captured by the Franco-American forces, who continued to force the enemy back along the whole salient.

In this attack the American First Corps under General Liggett had distinguished itself in the fighting northeast of Château-Thierry and "took the heights of Mont St. Thierry, while the American Third Regular Army Division drove the enemy across the Marne east of Château-Thierry and took the heights of Mont St. Père and the villages of Chartèves and Jaulgonne in the face of both machine-gun and artillery fire."

GERMAN RETREAT ORDERED

On the 22nd, the German High Command issued orders to their Armies to hold their

ground and beat off the pursuing Allies, but all efforts failed. Consequently, on the night of the 27th, after their advanced positions had been rendered untenable, the Germans retired from the Marne, closely followed by the war-worn, but tireless Allies.

Two days later (July 29th) Allied attacks developed north of the Ourcq, and that river was crossed between Fère-en-Tardenois and Ronchères, but at the latter place the advance was checked by murderous German machine-gun fire.


The Teuton armies in the salient were now fighting desperately, as Generals Mangin and Berthelot tried to close the neck of the salient at Soissons and Reims, respectively, and the Franco-American Army on their front continued to press forward with unabated vengeance. (*For American participation in this operation see the detailed account in Vol. V.*)

The retreat of the Seventh German Army was now precipitate, but to prevent the French from closing the neck of the salient, it extended across the whole front from Soissons to Reims in an effort to delay the attackers and escape from the net which was fast closing around it.

In spite of this resistance, General Mangin succeeded in reaching the Aisne by August 4th, and General Berthelot extended his gains on the Vesle as far as Reims.

The enemy finally escaped the salient and took up a line between the Vesle and the Aisne. In the retreat from this salient he had sacrificed the benefits of his gains on the Chemin des Dames, the Paris-Nancy railway was safe from this molestation, as well as the Château-Thierry-Épernay route, and the confident hopes of an early *Friedensturm* were abandoned.

For his brilliant exploit in this campaign,



Battleground on the Western Front Between March and September, 1918

the supreme military honor, that of Marshal of France, was conferred upon General Foch, the able Generalissimo, who, like his predecessor, General Joffre, had turned a victorious German advance into a complete Allied victory. No thrust at the heart of France was ever more ably parried and with such dire consequences to the enemy.

VI

OPERATIONS IN THE MOREUIL SALIENT

WITH the preconceived plans of the German High Command upset by the disastrous Château-Thierry retreat, both sides battled for such success as could be won, and victory belonged to him who could draw from the chaos the greatest spoils.

In the course of a lecture on strategy, General Foch, formerly professor of this subject at the French School of Applied Warfare, announced as a principle, that to be successful one must pick out the enemy's weakest spot and attack there. One of his hearers interrupted to ask what must be done in case the



Dead Acres in the St. Mihiel Sector

enemy had no weak spot. The laconic reply was to make one.

True to the principles he had taught, General Foch next turned north to the Moreuil-Montdidier-Noyon salient.

Here in a series of six great attacks by the Franco-British Armies between August 8th and September 24th, he drove the enemy back into the Hindenburg line by the same tactics used at the Marne. In fact, no enemy salient was secure with Foch on the offensive, which was most of the time, for the Allied Commander was ever ready to practice his well-known offensive tactics.

THE SIX MAIN ACTIONS

These six operations were roughly as follows:

1. To relieve the menace in front of Amiens, the armies of Debeney and Rawlinson assaulted the German line from Albert to Montdidier and advanced to a depth of about eight miles (August 9th). The thorough co-operation of aviation, heavy artillery, and tanks was one of the main features of this attack. To mask this operation, General Humbert attacked simultaneously between the Aisne and the Oise.

2. The British "push" between Albert and Bray-sur-somme, August 22nd, was a further pinch into the west flank of the salient. Albert was taken and the outskirts of Bapaume reached. This was accompanied by a French "drive" on the Ailette, which captured Roye and Lassigny. On the 29th, von Hutier had retired to the Péronne-Noyon line, and on the next day, von Marwitz abandoned Bapaume and Combles.

3. The third attack was further north, where Generals Horn and Byng attacked on the Scarpe, August 26th. The result of this was the retreat of von Quast's army between Bailleul and Béthune.

4. After their brilliant attacks before Amiens, Debeney and Rawlinson were ready for another thrust, September 6th, when they advanced and took Ham and Tergnier.

5. The next attack was destined to drive back the enemy right. General Haig advanced on a twelve mile front towards Gozeaucourt and here drove the enemy back into the Hindenburg line on September 18th.

6. September 24th was eventful; on this day Debeney and Rawlinson attacked between the Somme and the Omignon and drove the enemy into the Hindenburg line. Now he was everywhere from the North Sea to the Aisne back on the line from which he had started in the spring. Both sides now rested before resuming the struggle for victory.

EVACUATION OF THE MERVILLE SALIENT

On the northern end of the battle line the enemy had occupied a salient astride the Lys River. General Foch decided it was time to reduce it: consequently an offensive was

opened on this front, which continued from August 7th until September 10th.

The Teuton withdrawal to the south had already compromised their line between Ypres and La Bassée, hence when the British attacks on the Lys and to the north commenced, the enemy decided to evacuate the salient rather than resist. However, in the retirement the Germans fought stubbornly, and it was not until the line from Ypres to Armen-

After the concentration of some 600,000 troops, which were all moved at night so as to effect a surprise attack, the American Army consisting of three American and two French corps occupied a forty-mile line around the St. Mihiel Salient.*

Under cover of a fog, and after four hours' artillery preparation, the Americans advanced to the attack at 5:00 a. m., September 12th, and took the enemy by complete surprise.



In the St. Mihiel Sector

This sketch was made near the road between Beaumont and Fleurey. The ruins of the villages Lahaquille and St. Bausant are in the middle distance. Mont Sec, where fierce fighting took place, is seen against the horizon.

tières was reached that the Germans made their first determined stand, supported closely in rear by the Hindenburg Line.

VII

REDUCTION OF THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

THIS operation is important, because this task had long baffled the Allies and also because it was the first large operation entrusted to the new American Allies, and upon its success depended their military prestige.

Gains were made on all parts of the front, and by the morning of the 13th, the Fourth and Fifth American Corps had made their liaison at Vigneulles, thus closing the neck of the salient.

On the 14th, the advance continued until a line was established west of Thiaucourt, through Vigneulles, and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre.

The operation had cost 7,000 casualties, but 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns had been taken, and the Allies were now in a position from which to launch offensive operations against the fortified area of Metz.

* A detailed account of this important operation is given in Vol. V.

In his report on this operation, General Pershing says:

"The signal success of the new American Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found that they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with."

LOCAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE HINDENBURG LINE

During most of the month of September the Allies were occupied in driving the enemy back into the Hindenburg line, or else trying to breach it.

September 14th, Generals Mangin and Degoutte attacked in unison between the Aisne and the Vesle Rivers. General Mangin's army pushed forward north of the Aisne and in two days had gained a footing on the Chemin des Dames, and taken 2,500 prisoners. Degoutte met with a serious check between the Aisne and Vesle, and was held up temporarily.

Other local operations, combined with the British attacks to the north already described, prepared the way for the Allied offensive which was intended to force the demoralized enemy out of his stronghold, turn his flank, and defeat him in the open. Because of the magnitude of its scope, and the significance of its outcome, the great decisive battle which was now pending has been fittingly called "The Battle of France."

VIII

"THE BATTLE OF FRANCE"

GENERAL FOCH now had his enemy where he wanted him; what was better yet, he still controlled the offensive and was prepared to launch a general attack along the whole line. But the attack was to commence progressively, that he might keep his opponents guessing and profit by their demoralization. The battle may be said to have commenced September 26th and continued until the signing of the Armistice, November 11th.

On the night of September 25th-26th, the American Third, Fifth and First Corps relieved the French holding the line from the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne

Forest. The American Army was, therefore, the pivot for the great Allied offensive.

THE GENERAL ATTACK

The first phase of the general attack took place between September 26th and October 14th, and commenced with an Allied advance between the Suippe and the Meuse.

On the 26th, the Fourth French Army (Gouraud) and the First American Army (Pershing) delivered a strong attack between the Meuse and the Suippe, supported on the right by local American attacks. In the face of strong resistance, especially along the Meuse, the advance continued, and by the evening of the 28th, the French had captured more than 10,000 prisoners, and the Americans over 16,000, in addition to many villages and strong positions. Among the latter was Montfaucon and its commanding hill, both of which were taken by the Americans.*


The advance in this sector continued until October 3rd, when the enemy resistance became greater. All the while the irrepressible Allies were taking prisoners, inflicting casualties, and robbing the retreating foe of some of his best strategic positions. The country over which the advance was made is naturally difficult, but in addition, the enemy had prepared lines with reinforced concrete shelters for machine-gun nests, and the disregard which the advancing Franco-American Army displayed for these obstacles is indicative of their determination to force a victory and a dictated Allied peace.

FLANDERS

The scene next changed to Flanders, where on September 28th, the Belgian Army, in co-operation with the British, attacked from south of Dixmude to Ypres. The "impregnable" forest of Houthulst was taken in a few hours. The spoils for the day included some eight important towns, 9,000 prisoners and 200 guns.

During the next two days the attack progressed, and on October 1st efforts were concentrated on Roulers. Reinforcements from both British and French Armies arrived, and

* The history of American operations in this sector is given in great detail in Vol. V.



The Last Farewell

By J. F. Boucher

Digitized by Google

on the 2nd the enemy retired in all haste, closely pursued by the Allied forces, who penetrated into Aubers, La Bassée and Lens, and reached the outskirts of Armentières.

The next day the French, British and Belgians pushed their lines still further. They were now beyond the high ground of this low country, but this advance was necessary to threaten the coast defenses, as well as the defenses of Lille.

The spoils of this victory amounted to

The advance of the Third British Army had now rendered untenable that part of the Hindenburg line around Cambrai, since it could now be taken in rear.

On the 29th, an attack south of Cambrai, led by the Australians and supported by the 27th and 30th American divisions, broke the Hindenburg line between Cambrai and St. Quentin on the 30th. The work of the American tanks on this day was especially brilliant.

Between the Ailette and the Aisne the Al-



A Trench That Was Fought For Again and Again

A struggle for a few yards in the Meuse-Argonne. This position was occupied by the French, after long and desperate encounters with the enemy.

10,000 prisoners, including over 200 officers, 200 trench mortars, and 600 machine guns.

OPERATIONS IN THE CENTER

The next point of attack was in the center, where on September 27th the Third British Army crossed the Canal-du-Nord and defeated the Seventeenth German Army, taking 10,000 prisoners, 100 cannon, and many villages to the west of Cambrai.

On the next day the Ninth German Army commenced its retreat between the Ailette and the Aisne Rivers. This retirement meant that the enemy had no intentions of holding his positions on the Chemin des Dames.

lies advanced and took prisoners during this part of the attack.

On October 1st the British had largely extended their gains, and entered St. Quentin. On the next day, Debeney's Army broke the Hindenburg line between St. Quentin and the Oise.

GENERAL ADVANCE FROM THE LYS TO THE MEUSE

On October 4th a general advance took place from the Lys River in Flanders, to the Meuse in eastern France. For the next ten days towns and villages fell so fast that a mere mention of them would read like a "pronounc-



© Underwood and Underwood.

The French Entering Noyon in the Summer of 1918

ing gazetteer." The American Army shared in the honors and took Bois-de-Chetel, Cernay, Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, and Cunet. The German retirement now became general throughout the entire line, and the famous Hindenburg line was now, for the most part, in Allied possession.

THE SECOND PHASE—(OCTOBER 14TH-31ST)

The second phase commenced with a Belgian advance in Flanders, in which the Allies

carried their operations across the Yser and advanced nearly 12 miles on a thirty-mile front.

The British were encircling Lille, while the Belgian advance progressed. The Belgians were soon to have the satisfaction of again entering Bruges, Zeebrugge, and many other towns from which they had been driven in the early part of the war. By the 20th the Belgians had reached the Holland border, and by the 23rd had passed the forest of Raismes.

III—7

The sector between the Aisne and the Meuse was taken over on the 10th by the First and Second American Armies, under Generals Liggett and Bullard, respectively, who continued very heavy pressure against the enemy on this sector and on the line of the Woivre.

The German retirement in both flanks was now rapid, and in the center their line was being withdrawn as fast as circumstances would permit. The most noteworthy feature of the actions of this phase is, that whenever an Allied attack was delivered, the objective was always won. This may be accounted for in two ways: First, the Allied determination to squeeze a victory out of the situation, and second, the rapidly lowering German morale as the result of the miscarriage of the Teuton plans.

By the 27th of October the French Army alone had taken 18,493 prisoners and 509 guns since the 14th.

THIRD PHASE—OCTOBER 31ST-NOVEMBER 11TH

The set objectives of the third and last phase of the gigantic battle were Mézières, Hirson and Maubeuge. To attain these would cut the lines of communications supplying six German Armies, covering a front from Holland to the Meuse.

BELGIANS ADVANCE IN FLANDERS

The operation was commenced by the resumed offensive of the Belgian Army, which, in spite of bad weather, continued to make progress. The Belgians were supported on their right by the British.

At the Escaut River the Belgian advance was held up by the resistance of the enemy, and it was not until the 8th, the day he first requested an armistice, that the Belgians forced a crossing. On the 11th the Belgian Army entered Ghent just before operations ceased.

OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE AISNE AND MOSELLE

On November 1st the Franco-American Armies opened an offensive between the Aisne

and the Meuse. The French advanced almost unrestrained, but the American center was temporarily held up at Grand Pré, where the Americans finally broke through and took 3,600 prisoners and 50 guns.

By the 4th, the German retreat on this front was general, and continued until the armistice put an end to hostile operations. On the 7th the Americans occupied Torcy, just west of Sedan, and the next day the outskirts of Mézières were reached.

In this operation the German railway communication line between Longuyon and Mézières had been cut, and, therefore, the set objective attained.

It is interesting to note here that although the Americans reached the outskirts of Sedan they would go no further, but reserved to the French the honor of taking it, because of its sentimental significance. (See Vol. V.) Here in 1870 France had felt the iron heel of Prussia. Near fifty years later many of the veterans of that memorable day had the joy of seeing their ill fortune reversed on the same field.

OPERATIONS IN THE CENTER

The Franco-British Armies continued to push forward in the face of comparatively little resistance until November 7th. On the 4th, in an attack between Valenciennes and the Oise, the British took 14,000 prisoners and 180 cannon.

In spite of the fact that much of this fighting was against prepared trenches of the Hindenburg line system, the Anglo-French drive continued. On November 9th the French crossed into Belgium, taking in their pursuit Hirson and Mézières, two of the set objectives of the drive. However, there was no let-up, as the Allied forces still pursued the enemy with relentless vigor, until the armistice became effective and put an end to active operations, saving the German Army from a complete collapse and an ignominious defeat at the hands of a foe whom only a few months before they were pursuing as if to crush them.

CONCLUSION

In the counter-offensive between July 18th and November 11th, 212 German divisions

had been defeated and routed by 172 Allied divisions. The toll of prisoners and guns taken is as follows:

	Prisoners	Guns
English Army	188,700	2,840
French Army	139,000	1,880
American Army	43,300	1,421
Belgian Army	14,500	472

It is singular to note that so perfectly had his plans worked that General Foch was never forced to call upon his general reserves. The Allies were never in better fighting form, nor their promise of victory better. It is a tribute to the German High Command, who predicted that the war would be settled on the Western front, that they were more willing to admit defeat than to swallow disaster.

THE RUSSIAN FRONT

BY MAJOR CHARLES A. KING, JR.
Infantry, United States Army

I

RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA—1914

Survey of the Situation on the Eastern Front—Advance of Samsonoff and Rennenkampf—Hindenburg's Victory at Tannenberg

RUSSIA'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

HISTORY bears witness to the truth of the assertion that a disastrous war is sometimes a disguised blessing—at least in so far as the military establishment of the defeated state is concerned. It was the annihilation of the Prussian army at Jena by Napoleon that led to the formation of the "universal service" army of Scharnhorst which, fostered and perfected by von Moltke, was to develop into the most formidable military machine the world had ever seen. The disaster of 1870 showed France the necessity for discarding the inefficient system that at Gravelotte and Sedan had nullified the bravery and devotion of the French soldier. The long and costly struggle with the South African Boers resulted in many needed reforms in the British service. But the significance of military defeat was never more clearly understood and turned to greater advantage than by the Russians in the decade following the Manchurian War.

Without wasting time in weak excuses and vain regrets the Russian High Command im-

mediately set to work to remedy the defects that had been responsible for disaster in the Far East. Under the leadership of General Soukhomlinoff, the minister of war, and of the Grand Duke Nicholas, the commander-in-chief, the fighting machine of the Czar was reorganized along modern scientific lines. The artillery arm was improved and enlarged; the infantry soldier was thoroughly trained in marksmanship and skirmish combat; the antiquated system of cavalry tactics, beloved by the Cossacks, was modified. New field service regulations were adopted. A great general staff was organized on the German model. Numerous schools for the training of officers were opened, including an aviation school at Sebastopol. High-born incompetents were removed from important commands and their places taken by able professional soldiers like Russky, Alexeieff, and Brusiloff.

In 1914 the Russian regular army comprised approximately 1,000,000 men, supported by a trained reserve arranged in yearly classes of about 400,000 each. The total personnel numbered almost 4,000,000. Officers and men were hardy, brave, and well-disciplined, and

were imbued with a passionate love for the "Little Father" and Holy Russia. To supplement the regulars and reserves there could be drawn great levies of recruits from a population of 170,000,000. At first glance it would seem that Russia was admirably prepared for the coming conflict.

But the army was fatally weak in two important respects—the services of supply and of transport.

Since Russia was primarily an agricultural country the factories of the Muscovite Empire were relatively few in number and small in size. Moreover, Russian manufacturing methods were notoriously inefficient, and the plants could not be adjusted readily to the production of war material in large volume. The government-owned arsenals and factories—in many of which graft was rampant—were utterly incapable of producing the arms and munitions necessary in carrying on a protracted war with a first class power.

Equally weak was the transportation system. Compared with the vast network of wide, metal-covered highways that stretched over western Europe the Russian roads appear like country trails. Little progress had been made in the construction of military railways. As early as 1900, General Kuropatkin, then war minister, had pointed out in his report to the Czar the necessity for improvements in military communications. No action was taken until 1913, when the army reorganization bill of that year went into effect. This scheme provided for an excellent system of strategic railroads along the German and Austrian borders, but at the outbreak of the war there had been completed only five lines leading to the west, and four to the southwest frontier. Opposed to these were seventeen German and eight Austrian lines.

It was the lack of proper facilities of supply and transportation that in the end spelled the doom of the Russian army.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

The almost unbroken series of defeats suffered by the Austro-Hungarians on the Serbian and Russian fronts in the opening months of the war was responsible for much harsh criticism of the army of the Dual Monarchy.

Some of this criticism was justified; much of it was unwarranted.

At the outbreak of the war Austria-Hungary had about 1,250,000 troops at her disposal. The German system on which the army was modeled was modified to conform to the peculiar nature of the government. Thus there was an Imperial army, an Austrian reserve, and a Hungarian reserve. In addition to these forces there was an unnumbered levy-in-mass. In the event of a long



General Russky

war some 4,000,000 men could be marshaled under the Hapsburg banner.

The Austro-Hungarian soldier was well-trained and, as a rule, loyal and obedient to his superiors. The officers were better educated and possessed more initiative than their Prussian rivals. Moreover, they were on terms of more friendly relationship with their men, and were entirely free from that arrogance that makes the German officer so universally disliked.

In 1914, with the single exception of the aerial service, every branch of the army was in a high state of efficiency. The artillery arm, in particular, was remarkably well-developed, and contained large numbers of the

4.1-inch howitzers that were to render invaluable service on the Italian and Russian fronts. The infantry was armed with the famous Mannlicher rifle, one of the best military rifles ever invented.

But the Austro-Hungarian army suffered from two great disadvantages. In the first place, it was the victim of the bureau system of government which, by its red tape and involved methods of procedure, strangled administrative services such as the quartermas-

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT

In the years immediately preceding the European War it was frequently stated that topographical considerations were no longer to be reckoned as important in warfare. It was argued that the range of modern artillery, the effect of high explosives, and the development of the science of engineering would render the physical features of the ground of but little account. On every fighting front the falsity



An Austrian Supply Train at the Foot of the Carpathian Mountains During Mid-Winter

ter and commissary departments. Secondly, the army, like the Empire, was not unified racially. Slav troops could not be relied upon to fight the Russians; regiments from the Tyrol would not make war against their Italian kinsmen. These conditions seriously affected the problems of mobilization and reinforcements, and constantly hampered operations throughout the course of the struggle.

[For the German Military Establishment, see chapter on "The Western Front" in this volume.]

of this view was quickly demonstrated. Hence, in a survey of the Russian theater, it is necessary to note carefully the terrain, because the strategic plans of the combatants were based chiefly upon topographical considerations.

A glance at the map shows that Russian Poland is a great salient which juts out far to the west into enemy territory. In the heart of it stands Warsaw, the capital, which, protected by strong defensive works, was the chief point of the Polish triangle. To the north of this salient is the German prov-



General Map of the Russian-German Frontier in 1914

ince of East Prussia; to the south the Austrian province of Galicia. Poland itself is a great windswept plain, some 200 by 250 miles in extent, with the Vistula River running northward through its center. The Vistula is a broad, unfordable stream, and forms one of the most formidable military obstacles in Europe. There are no natural barriers to an enemy's advance on the western Polish frontier.

Eastern Poland is well-defended by nature. Near the center of the east border are the Pripet marshes, sometimes called the marshes

thian Mountains and the East Prussian lake region. Both of these were to prove of the highest importance in the campaigns of 1914 and 1915.

The Carpathian range, consisting of a vast system of parallel ridges and valleys some sixty miles wide, curves eastward and southward in a gigantic arc. The center of the arc is notched by half a dozen passes at an average height of 1,500 feet, while to the right and left numerous rivers flow north and southeast. Galicia is merely a flattened terrace of the Carpathian foothills.



© Underwood and Underwood.

German First Line Trenches in Poland

of Pinsk, on account of the city of Pinsk, located in this area. These marshes consist of a wilderness of swamps and bogs covering 30,000 square miles, and are absolutely impassable except along certain constructed causeways. North of the Pripet marshes the swamps continue to a certain extent as far as the coast—however, there are numerous good crossings in the valleys of the Niemen and Narew rivers.


The southern boundary of Poland is unprotected, the Carpathians being the first natural line of defense to the Austro-Hungarian provinces.

On the Teutonic side of the border the two chief topographical features are the Carpa-

In East Prussia is a region that presents almost as many difficulties to an invading army as does the mighty barrier that protects the Hungarian plains. The Mazurian Lakes district is an endless maze of swamps, bogs, and ponds, dotted with irregular areas of barren sandy soil. A great part of this gloomy waste is covered with forests, and roads and bridges are few in number. Here it was that the first great battle of the war on the eastern front took place.

DEFENSIVE WORKS

The rival powers of Eastern Europe had strengthened the defenses provided by nature with numerous fortifications.



Map to Illustrate Scene of the Russian Invasion of East Prussia, August, 1914

For many years Russia had considered the chain of the Pripet marshes as her line of resistance in case of an attack from the west. In accordance with this plan she had fortified the river crossings to the north of the marshes, and the towns of Lutsk, Dubno, and Rovno to the south. After the formation of the Dual Entente the Russians were persuaded by their French allies to construct the Polish triangle. At the south point of the triangle was the fortress of Ivangorod, at the east Brest-Litovsk, and to the north Warsaw, with its outlying fortress of Novo-Georgievsk. This position, though not as strong as the famous Italian Quadrilateral, was one of the great defensive works of Europe.

The Teutonic fortifications were as fol-

lows: Germany had the Silesian fortified towns of Breslau and Glogau on the Oder, Posen on the Warthe, and a great line of forts extending along the lower Vistula, the chief of which were Danzig and Thorn. On the Baltic coast was the great fortress of Königsberg, the second strongest place in the German Empire. In Galicia the Austrians had the fortified city of Cracow and the great entrenched camp of Przemyśl.

STRATEGIC PLANS

With the topographic features of the Eastern theater and the defensive works of the belligerents in mind, let us consider briefly the general strategic plan of the Russians. The basic element of their strategy was a thrust at

Berlin through the eastern German provinces. At first thought it would be natural to assume that they would move through Posen and West Prussia. This is the shortest route into central Germany, and the terrain presents few serious military obstacles. Moreover, the march would be through friendly country, since Posen and West Prussia are inhabited largely by Poles who hate their German masters and sympathize with their Slav kinsmen. However, it would manifestly be impossible for the Czar's armies to follow this route until their flanks were safeguarded.



General Rennenkampf

To advance into the interior of Germany and leave a large enemy force in East Prussia and another in Galicia would be the acme of military folly. From the entrenched camps of Königsberg and Przemyśl as bases, the Central allies could operate against the Russian line of communications, and, with their communications once cut, disaster to the Russians would be swift and certain. Hence the first task that confronted the Grand Duke Nicholas was the conquest and occupation of East Prussia and Galicia.

The general strategic plan of the Central Powers involved an invasion of Poland from the northwest and south before the Russian

armies could be mobilized. Austria was to furnish the greater part of the forces necessary for this movement, as most of the German troops, with the exception of the regular garrisons, would be engaged on the French and Belgian fronts. The Teutonic allies further proposed to defeat the partly-mobilized Russian field armies in the vicinity of Warsaw, capture that city, and hold the territory west of the Pripet marshes. No great invasion of Russia proper was contemplated; for, since the ill-fated attempts of Charles XII. and Napoleon, the military penetration to any considerable extent of the Czar's vast dominion had been regarded by military men everywhere as a fantastic dream.

INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA

The number of German troops near the Polish frontier on August 1, 1914, cannot be accurately determined. In East Prussia there were three regular corps and two reserve corps. Along the Posen border were a number of reserve corps and several cavalry divisions. The total number was probably half a million, of whom almost half were first-line troops. For the moment, these troops were to act as a containing force; that is, they were to oppose any attempt of the Russians to invade the German border provinces, rather than to assume the offensive themselves. Their rôle was a purely passive one.

At the outbreak of the war Russia had fifteen army corps in Poland, although not all the units were at full strength. It was planned to mobilize back of the Polish triangle and, from the shelter of this defensive system, send out successive armies to meet Germans and Austrians. The Central Powers counted confidently on the slowness of Russian mobilization, hence their surprise at the appearance near the East Prussian frontier, early in August, of two Slav armies, each a quarter of a million strong. The first of these was the Army of the Niemen, based on Vilna; the other was the Army of the Narew, based on Warsaw.

General Rennenkampf, commanding the Army of the Niemen, had an excellent military reputation. His work at Mukden—where he commanded a division—had called forth warm praise from Kuropatkin. In East Prussia he

was opposed by Gen. von François, an officer of Huguenot descent.

The first Russian raiding force crossed the East Prussian frontier near Memel, on the Baltic coast, on August 3. Four days later the Army of the Niemen passed the border in the vicinity of Suwalki. The German advanced posts fell back without offering any determined resistance, destroying roads and bridges to delay the Russian advance.

RENNENKAMPF'S CAMPAIGN

Rennenkampf's mission was to clear the enemy out of the northern part of East Prussia and capture Königsberg. Once across the border, he moved northwest, intending to follow the line of the main railway connecting Petrograd and Berlin. The town of Insterburg, the junction of this railroad and the line running south from Tilsit, was obviously the most important strategic position in the vicinity. To protect Insterburg von François took up an entrenched position ten miles to the east at Gumbinnen. Here, on August 16, he was attacked by Rennenkampf. The battle lasted four days, but at length the numerical superiority of the Russians began to tell. Late in the afternoon of the 24th a fierce bayonet charge broke von François' center and the Germans retreated in confusion, abandoning much of their equipment. Von François made no further attempt at resistance, but retreated hastily to Königsberg. Insterburg was entered by Rennenkampf on the 24th, Tilsit—where Alexander I and Napoleon once planned to partition Europe—was occupied, and the Cossacks were pushed forward to the environs of Königsberg. Thus far the Army of the Niemen had been completely successful.

Let us now turn to the Army of the Narrew. This force crossed the frontier near Mlava and moved north. Its mission was to cut the railway lines west of the Mazurian Lake district, and effect a junction with the Army of the Niemen, preparatory to a combined movement to the west. At first glance its task seemed easy.

The commander of the army was General Samsonoff, an officer who had gained distinction as a cavalry leader in Turkestan and Manchuria. He was immensely popular with

his soldiers, but it seems probable that he was lacking in some of the necessary qualities of a general officer.

Samsonoff's troops were spread over a wide front extending from Johannisburg to Soldau. The latter place, an important railway junction, was captured without difficulty. In the meantime the German corps stationed at Allenstein, supported by several reserve divisions, was engaged in constructing a defensive



General Samsonoff

position near Frankenau. On August 20 it was attacked by Samsonoff's right wing. After a two days' battle the Germans, finding that their right flank had been turned, retreated in great disorder, their left towards the southwest and the remainder towards Königsberg.

Alenstein was occupied, and it appeared likely that in a few days Samsonoff would join hands with Rennenkampf, Königsberg would be invested, and the Russians in undisputed possession of East Prussia.

THE TANNENBERG CAMPAIGN

The German government viewed the rapid advance of the Russians with astonishment and alarm. The Great General Staff had predicted that the enemy's mobilization would occupy from three to five weeks. Instead, by the middle of August, two large Russian armies, brushing aside all opposition, had penetrated to the heart of East Prussia. Important railway junctions had been captured, Königsberg was isolated from the east and



The Czar and the Grand Duke Nicholas

south, and the Kaiser's hunting lodge was the headquarters for a Cossack patrol. "The bear that walks like a man" was not walking; he was striding in seven-league boots.

Political and military considerations alike demanded the swift expulsion of the Muscovite invaders. East Prussia was the very stronghold of Junkerdom, and every aristocrat in the empire regarded the violation of its sacred soil as a personal affront. Moreover, thousands of fugitives, haunted by vague traditions of the semi-barbaric hordes that had overrun the country during the wars of Frederick the Great, were now hurrying

across the Vistula, and, by their lurid—and unfounded—reports of the depredations of the Cossacks, were spreading consternation throughout all the eastern provinces.

The military situation was no less serious. If all East Prussia fell into the hands of the Russians the Grand Duke Nicholas would have accomplished the first half of his plan of clearing his flanks, preparatory to a great drive on Berlin. Likewise, the occupation of this strategically important province would give the Russians a bastion from which to operate against the left flank of any German force moving toward the Posen frontier.

HINDENBURG TO THE RESCUE

At this crisis the German military authorities called upon the one man who was best fitted to snatch victory from defeat. This was General von Hindenburg, a retired officer almost seventy years old. Hindenburg had, at different times, been in command of the army corps stationed at Königsberg and Allenstein, and, while on this duty, he had become convinced of the strategic value of the Mazurian lakes region. He conducted many maneuvers over this district and, as the result of months of personal investigation following his retirement, he became obsessed with the military possibilities of the terrain. By his comrades he was regarded as a "crank," but his hobby was to prove of the greatest value to his country. Although both Ludendorff and Mackensen later proved themselves to be far more brilliant commanders than Hindenburg, the latter possessed the fundamental soldierly virtues of untiring industry, dogged obstinacy, and singleness of purpose to a high degree.

SAMSONOFF'S RASHNESS

On August 22 Hindenburg received his appointment as commander of the forces on the Eastern front. While he was speeding across Germany on his way to the war zone the opponent that he was first to encounter, General Samsonoff, had come to a momentous decision. The bravery and rashness of the commander of the Army of the Narew reminds the military student of the Confederate General Hood and the Federal General Custer. Samsonoff was elated over his victory at

Allenstein and believed that there was no enemy force in his front capable of resistance. Instead of holding the ground he had gained and protecting Rennenkampf's flank while the latter reduced Königsberg, he resolved to follow a bolder and far more dangerous course. He now pressed on from Allenstein through the western part of the lake district, planning to seize the crossings of the Vistula and cap-



General Von Hindenburg

Almost 70 years old in 1914, he emerged from private life, and as Commander of the German Army against the Russians, snatched victory from defeat by crushing the enemy at Tannenberg.

ture the fortress of Graudenz. The difficulties of a march through this region are described by Prof. Johnson in his excellent work, *Topography and Strategy in the War*, as follows:

"To an invading army the morainic country of East Prussia would seem to oppose almost insuperable obstacles. The forces would of necessity divide into a number of columns, each threading its way painfully along the narrow isthmuses of dry land and between the rolling hills. Hostile forces would contest the passage of each defile, and from the forested

hills hostile artillery would pour its fire on the advancing columns. Compelled to deploy on a battle line, the troops would find their way blocked by ponds and marshes. Some of the ponds have sandy bottoms and to ford them is easy; but the same troops attempting to cross a similar body of water might find themselves trapped in a bottom of clay. Many of the marshes are firm enough for the passage of men, but others are treacherous bogs. The lines of communication behind the advancing armies would be few and difficult, and the opportunity for a successful retreat in case a superior foe was encountered would be comparatively slight."

Into this labyrinth the Army of the Narew plunged.


Hindenburg reached Marienburg, sixty miles northwest of Allenstein, on August 23, and immediately began to collect every available German soldier between Danzig and the Posen frontier. He planned to destroy the Army of the Narew first, and then turn on the Army of the Niemen. The excellent system of railroads at his disposal made the concentration of the troops and their transportation to the fighting area a matter of only a few hours. His total force consisted of about 150,000 men.

HINDENBURG TRAPS THE RUSSIANS

Hindenburg was now to reap the fruits of his years of study of the lake region. By August 26 his army was in position on a line running roughly from Allenstein to Soldau. The narrow causeways that threaded the maze of ponds and bogs and led up to his front were rendered impassable by pits, trenches, and log breastworks. Artillery was placed so that fire could be brought to bear upon every open space of solid ground. The position was practically impregnable.

But the German line was not chosen for defensive purposes only. To the rear and around the left ran a railway line, while on the right were the only two good roads in that vicinity. These facilities would permit the rapid shifting of troops and would provide the means whereby an enveloping movement could be put into execution.

In studying the decisive conflict that occurred in the dreary depths of the Mazurian



From Nelson's History.

The Battle of Tannenberg

Which marked the beginning of the Russian downfall.

swamps in the last days of August, 1914, one is at once struck with its similarity to the famous victory won by Hannibal at Cannæ in 216 B. C. The plan of the great Carthaginian captain was startling in its simplicity and effectiveness. The troops holding the center of his line fell back, but without breaking their formation, in the face of the Roman attacks. Meantime, Hannibal extended his flanks until they overlapped the Roman army.

Then the jaws of the giant pincers were closed and the Roman legions, unable to advance or retreat, and surrounded by foes, were destroyed. This was the classic plan followed by Hindenburg.

Samsonoff seems to have been unaware that a hostile army was in his immediate vicinity. He advanced on a broad front. His columns were widely separated and coöperation between them was impossible. Horses and men were jammed closely together on the narrow causeways as the army moved forward into the trap.

On the 26th hot fighting took place in the neighborhood of Hohenstein, near the center of the German line. The Germans promptly fell back to their prepared positions. Here, on the following day, they were so hotly pressed by the Russians that, had it not been for their superior artillery and defensive works, the line would have been completely broken.

While the Russians were hurling themselves at the German center near Hohenstein, Hindenburg suddenly attacked and captured Soldau, on the Russian left. This accomplished the double purpose of cutting off the Russian main line of retreat and of convincing Samsonoff that the Germans intended to press the attack on his left. Acting on this theory the Russian commander succeeded, after prodigious difficulty, in reinforcing what he believed to be the threatened flank. He next proceeded to launch a counter-attack at Soldau, hoping to

regain the road, but was unable to dislodge the Germans.

The activity along the Russian center and left suited Hindenburg's purpose admirably. While Samsonoff's attention was riveted on Soldau his opponent was moving every available man and gun around the opposite end of the line. The railroad and the two highways previously mentioned enabled him to execute this maneuver with great dispatch, and



© Brown Bros.

Grand Duke Nicholas

The uncle of the Czar, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during the early stages of the war, and later Commander in the Caucasus.

the forests of birch and pine effectually screened the movement. By the evening of the 27th the right flank of the unsuspecting Russians was enveloped.

At last Samsonoff realized that he was trapped, and gallantly did he struggle to extricate himself. The German line now formed a gigantic half-moon, and the horns were endeavoring to join. The only exit from the

deadly crescent was the road running east from Passenheim through Ortelsburg. For two days the Russians battled desperately for Passenheim, but, unable to withstand the effect of Hindenburg's cleverly posted artillery, they were gradually forced back toward the southeast. The following day saw the bulk of Samsonoff's forces shut up in a pathless, watery wilderness.

"The Russian batteries," says John Buchan, "as they retired found their guns sinking to the axle trees. Horses struggled in vain through the bogs, and as the circle closed in on the beaten army whole regiments were driven into the lakes and drowned in the water or choked in the bottomless mires."

On August 31, the last day of the battle, General Samsonoff was killed by a shell. Several other general officers were either slain or captured. Of the five corps of the Army of the Narew that were engaged only one complete corps and a portion of another succeeded in escaping eastward by way of the

Ortelsburg defile. They left behind them 30,000 dead and wounded and 90,000 prisoners. The total German loss was probably around 20,000.

Hindenburg had vindicated his theory: his victory was complete. The Army of the Narew had ceased to exist. Tannenberg—so-called by the Germans because of an ancient battle fought in the neighborhood between the Poles and the Teutonic knights—was the only battle of the war, with the single exception of Allenby's victory in the Jordan valley, in which an entire army was destroyed.

II

FIRST GERMAN INVASION OF POLAND

Hindenburg's Furious but Futile Blows at Warsaw—Brilliant Victories of the Russians in Galicia—Fall of Lemberg and Przemyśl

HINDENBURG wasted no time in celebrating his victory over the Army of the Narew. Collecting his forces, he moved a part of his force northeast along the Allenstein-Insterburg railway and sent the remainder south of the lake region, hoping to cut Rennenkampf's line of communication. But the commander of the Army of the Niemen, having learned of Samsonoff's defeat, promptly halted his advance on Königsberg and began a withdrawal along the main railroad running eastward to the Niemen. Hindenburg's southern column destroyed a Russian force at Lysk, but failed to cut off Rennenkampf's retreat. He thereupon followed close on the heels of the Russians. Numerous rearguard actions occurred, the most important taking place at Gumbinnen, the scene of Rennenkampf's victory over von François. But there was no serious interference with the retrograde movement, and the Russian general wisely determined to fall back behind the Niemen, where, in addition to having a strong barrier between himself and the enemy, he would be certain to receive reinforcements.

The honors showered upon Hindenburg as a result of Tannenberg—he had been appointed

field marshal and generalissimo of the armies in the east—seem to have inspired him with a confidence that was not justified by the facts. Having been reinforced by two corps and several smaller units from the interior of Germany, he now rashly decided to invade Poland and capture Vilna. His forces were wholly inadequate for such a movement. He would be compelled to operate far from his bases and over a difficult terrain. And even should he be able to pass the formidable barrier of the Niemen his action could not serve to lessen the Russian pressure in Galicia as long as the Narew forts and the Polish triangle were intact. The failure to recognize East Prussia as a self-contained area goes far to cloud the military reputation of the victor of Tannenberg.

At the end of the second week in September Hindenburg crossed the Russian frontier. His army moved on a broad front—his left toward Kovno, his center on Suwalki, and his right—and strongest—flank in the direction of Grodno. Suwalki, the capital of the government of that name, was captured. A week later the Germans, having encountered no serious resistance, reached the Niemen at three



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Kaiser and General Von Einem

On this occasion they were at Vouziers, France. Von Einem commanded in the Argonne forest (1918) and opposite Verdun during 1915.

points between the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno. A strong force was detached to besiege Ossowetz, an outlying fortress southwest of Grodno. The army of the Niemen had crossed the stream in safety and, by the time Hindenburg's artillery and trains arrived, it had been reinforced from Vilna and was oc-

cupying prepared positions along the eastern bank.

From the 25th to the 28th of September Hindenburg strove in vain to pass the river. The Niemen is a broad, unfordable stream, and the Russians had taken care to remove all boats to their side of the river. The Ger-

man commander attempted, by a rain of shells, to dislodge the Russians from their deep trenches on the eastern bank; but his efforts accomplished nothing, while Rennenkampf's howitzers worked havoc among the exposed German masses. When his last pontoon bridge, constructed under cover of night, had been blown to pieces by the Russian gunners, Hindenburg gave the order to retreat.

In the meantime the siege of Ossowetz had been going badly. This fortress, situated on the bank of the Bobr river, is surrounded on all sides by swampy ground, and it was with difficulty that the German siege batteries could be placed in position. When this was finally accomplished it was found that the recoil from firing drove the guns into the marshy soil so that many of them had to be abandoned. The investing force was ordered to withdraw along the railway to the northwest and join the right wing of the army.

BATTLE OF AUGUSTOVO

Between Suwalki—towards which point the German center was retreating—and the Bobr valley lies a tract of country known as the forests of Augustovo. The topography of this district is almost exactly similar to that of the Mazurian lakes district. But whereas Hindenburg was familiar with every foot of the latter region he was unacquainted with the Augustovo forests. Rennenkampf determined to take advantage of Hindenburg's unfavorable position and his ignorance of the terrain to attempt to cut off the German right and center.

Hardly had the invaders turned their faces toward the German border before the Russian general was across the Niemen and attacking vigorously with his right and center, while his left started on a forced march down the Bobr valley. The mission of the latter force was to turn the German right flank and cut it off from Suwalki. Progress was slow on account of the difficult terrain, but on October 1 the flanking column had reached Augustovo and captured the town.

Hindenburg, himself a master of this species of warfare, realized to the full the dangers of his position. He saw that the Russians must be held in Augustovo at all costs until his imperiled right could make its escape by

way of the railroad to Suwalki. For two days, October 1-3, the battle raged while the retreating army recklessly abandoned guns, wagons and impedimenta of all kinds in its haste to escape from what promised to be another Tannenberg.

But the determined stand in the Augustovo woods saved the Germans from disaster. By October 9 Hindenburg had succeeded in extricating the bulk of his forces and, having hastily evacuated Suwalki, he fell back across the border to a prepared defensive line in the lake region.

In addition to practically all his artillery and transport he had lost in killed, wounded and prisoners some 60,000 men, and he had narrowly escaped the fate of Samsonoff.

The Russian pursuit was held up at the entrenched Mazurian lakes line.

THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA

It will be remembered that the invasion of East Prussia was only one phase of the Grand Duke's strategy. Galicia must also be cleared of the enemy before any general advance into Germany could be undertaken. In the early weeks of the war the operations of the Russians in the Austrian province were as successful as they were disastrous in East Prussia.

The Austrians did not wait for their territory to be invaded. We have seen that their strategic plan involved an invasion of Russian Poland and the defeat of the partly-mobilized Russian armies there. They believed that such a course would not only give them a tactical advantage but that, by alarming the Russians, it would preclude any invasion of the vulnerable southeastern portion of Galicia by Slav forces coming from the Ukraine.

The Austrian army of invasion, 300,000 strong, marched north from its base at Przemyśl and crossed the Polish frontier on August 10. It was commanded by General Dankl (Dankyl), whose mission was to seize the railway running between Lublin and Cholm (Chelm) and, if possible, to interrupt the communications east of the Polish triangle. Such a move, if successful, would seriously interfere with the Russian mobilization.

The second Austrian army, under the command of General von Auffenberg, was based

on Lemberg. Its duty was to protect Dankl's right flank and guard eastern Galicia. It is obvious that the value of this army in the execution of the Austrian strategic plan would depend largely upon its proximity to the first army and its ability to support that army in case of need.

A third, or reserve, army under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, was to operate on Dankl's left in that part of Poland lying west of the Vistula.

of the Czar. He was an able strategist and a commander of the first rank. His military reputation, established during the war of 1877, had been enhanced by his services against Japan. To his energy and professional zeal were largely due the reorganization and improvement of the Russian army.

The Grand Duke was ably seconded by his chief subordinates. General Brusiloff had gained an enviable reputation in the war with Turkey. General Russky had been the chief



© Underwood and Underwood.

A Remarkable Photograph


The scene is a German trench on the Russian front at the instant when a platoon of sharpshooters are facing a Russian volley which has put three of their number out of action.

To meet the Austrian menace three Russian armies took the field. Dankl was faced by the partly-mobilized Army of the Bug, based on Brest-Litovsk, under the command of General Ewerts. The second army, led by General Russky, moved from its fortress bases at Lutsk and Dubno against Auffenberg's left. A third, under General Brusiloff, marched from Kiev against Auffenberg's right.

It seems appropriate to mention at this time the most prominent of the leaders who were soon to add increased luster to the Russian arms. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholasévitch, the commander-in-chief, was an uncle

of staff of the 2nd Manchurian Army, and was known throughout Europe for his work at the Imperial War Academy. General Dmitrieff, second in command to Russky, was a Bulgarian by birth, and the popular hero of the First Balkan War. He was the leader of the victorious Bulgarian army at Kirk-Kilissé, and commanded the left wing at Lule Burgas. He had recently accepted a commission as general in the Russian army. He was to prove a valuable acquisition to the Czar's forces.

Dankl's army met with but slight resistance in the first stages of its advance. The Army



Map to Illustrate the Russian Invasion of Galicia and the Fall of Lemberg

of the Bug was not yet strong enough to withstand the Austrian pressure, nor did it comport with the Grand Duke's strategy for Everts to resist too strenuously. The Russian generalissimo had laid his plans with consummate skill. Dankl was to be drawn as far as possible from his base, thus widening the gap between his army and that of Auffenberg. Then, at the proper moment, Russky was to be hurled into the breach between the two Austrian columns. Not knowing that he was being lured into a position from which it would be difficult to extricate himself, Dankl pressed on to within eleven miles of Lublin. Here his advance was halted by the news that two Russian armies had invaded eastern Galicia. We will now follow the operations in that sector.

RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN EASTERN GALICIA

Russky crossed the border on Sept. 17, moving against Auffenberg's center and left. Five days later he captured Brody, brushing aside the enemy detachments that attempted to dispute his advance. While his left and center hurled themselves fiercely at Auffenberg his right moved due west with the design of turning the Austrian left flank, thereby completing the separation of the two Austrian armies.

While these events had been taking place Brusiloff, at the south end of the line, had been hotly engaged along the Sereth river. After a three days' battle he captured Tarnopol on the 27th and, a short time later, his right joined hands with Russky's left. The

fall of Tarnopol forced Auffenberg to give up the line of the Sereth and draw his right back toward Lemberg.

The battle line was now in the form of a great arc, some 200 miles long, stretching from west of the Vistula to the Gnila Lipa.

After establishing communication with Russky, Brusiloff moved swiftly to the southeast and captured Halicz, at the junction of the Dniester and the Gnila Lipa. Then, while Russky's left under Dimitrieff was attacking the Austrian front along the upper

should be driven together disaster was certain to follow. Sheltered by their trenches and wire entanglements the outnumbered Austrians fought desperately but in vain. Dimitrieff broke their front and carried the Gnila Lipa line while, by the evening of the second day, their left appeared on the verge of collapsing under Russky's attacks. On the morning of the 3rd Auffenberg, knowing he was hopelessly beaten, ordered the evacuation of Lemberg and a withdrawal to the west.

As soon as the Austrians began their retreat



The City of Lemberg, Captured by the Russians, September, 1914

Gnila Lipa, Brusiloff wheeled north toward Lemberg, hoping to strike Auffenberg's rear. At the same time Russky's right wing had fought its way across the upper Bug and was working around Auffenberg's left. Thus the Russians were endeavoring to envelop both of Auffenberg's flanks.

THE FALL OF LEMBERG

The battle of Lemberg lasted from the 1st to the 3rd of September. The Austrian entrenched line was seventy miles long, much of it of great natural strength. But under pressure from Russky on the north and Brusiloff on the south it was rapidly acquiring the shape of a huge horseshoe, and if the ends

the Cossacks flung themselves upon the defeated foe. In vain did Auffenberg place his Slav troops in the rear; the Russian howitzers flung their shells over the heads of the rear-guard and into the midst of the fleeing columns. The retreat degenerated into a rout, and thousands of prisoners were taken.

The operations that culminated in the fall of Lemberg form a strategic study that cannot fail to delight every student of campaigns. The turning movements on both flanks were executed with splendid accuracy, and were perfectly coördinated with the frontal attack. Incidentally, it may be noted that Russky's maneuver in interposing himself between the two separated Austrian armies was an exact

counterpart of General Foch's brilliant action that brought victory at the Marne.

After the battle of Lemberg Brusiloff's center and right followed the retreating Austrians along the railway leading to Przemyśl, while his left wing seized the eastern Carpathian passes and occupied Czernowitz, the



© Underwood and Underwood.

General Soukhomlinoff
The Russian Minister of War.

capital of the crown land of Bukovina. At the same time Russky and Dmitrieff moved northwest to reinforce the Army of the Bug.

The forces of both Dankl and Ewerts had been greatly increased during the operations about Lemberg. The army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand on the extreme western end of the line had been strengthened by two Austrian corps from the Serbian border and

by a German reserve corps from Breslau. A part of this army was now transferred to Dankl's right and there consolidated with those units of Auffenberg's army that had fled north from Lemberg. The right of the Army of the Bug also had been reinforced by a new army under General Ivanoff, from the mobilization depot of Brest-Litovsk. Ivanoff took command of the combined forces.

Upon hearing of the fall of Lemberg Dankl realized the danger of his position. Instead of beating a retreat he decided to attack the Army of the Bug in his immediate front, destroy it, and strike Russky, on his way to join Ivanoff, in the flank. The plan was daringly conceived and, since the Austrians were superior in numbers at this part of the front, it promised to be successful.

The Austrian line was now in the shape of a rough capital "L" turned backward, with the longer side facing north, and the shorter leg east. The left, under the Archduke, rested on the Vistula at Opole; the center, under Dankl, ran east along the Lublin-Cholm railway and, bending to the south of Cholm, extended to Tomasoff. Here it was "refused," or bent back, and ran from Ravaruska to Grodek. A gap existed between Dankl's and Auffenberg's armies.

THE BATTLE FOR RAVARUSKA

On September 4th the battle began with a thrust at the Russian center. The attack failed, and Ivanoff immediately took the offensive. He followed the time-honored—and usually successful—plan of feinting at one flank to distract attention from the main attack elsewhere. For four days (Sept. 6-10) the battle raged along the entire line from the Vistula to the upper Dniester. Although the attack on the left at Opole was intended chiefly as a feint, yet the Archduke was driven back by a frontal assault and fled southward to the San. Meanwhile the center of the line was fighting desperately to hold off Ivanoff's assaults and could give no aid to the right, at Ravaruska, against which the main attack under Russky and Dmitrieff was launched. On the last day of the battle the Ravaruska position was smashed in from the front and taken in the flank at the same time. From its peculiar shape the whole Austrian



Austrian Cavalry Entering a Polish Village as Conquerors

army was now in imminent danger: the forces of Russky and Dmitrieff were in a position to fling themselves from the rear into the angle of the "L." Seeing their peril, the Austrians fled in disorder, the defeated right to Przemyśl and Jaroslav and the rest toward Cracow.

THE SIEGE OF PRZEMYSL

Within less than a fortnight after Ravaruska Ivanoff was in possession of Jaroslav—an important fortress on the San—and Dmitrieff was thundering at the gates of Przemyśl.

The latter was a first-class fortress and held a garrison of nearly 100,000 men. Its great natural strength had been augmented by an elaborate system of defensive works. Dmitrieff, being without an adequate siege train, wisely decided to starve the garrison into submission. Following the fall of Jaroslav the beaten remnants of Dankl and Auffenberg, after having made a vain attempt to hold the line of the San, fell back to the line of the Dunajec (Donajetz), eighty miles east of Cracow.

The end of September found the Austrian armies almost completely disorganized. They had suffered an uninterrupted series of disastrous defeats. Only the western part of Galicia remained in their hands. Brusiloff had captured the passes of the eastern Carpathians and penetrated a short distance into Hungary. Przemyśl was invested and its speedy surrender seemed certain. Ivanoff was across the San and pushing swiftly westward towards Cracow—the last Galician stronghold. Then suddenly from the north came tidings that forced Ivanoff to halt his advance. Hindenburg had launched his first drive at Warsaw, and a German success there would imperil all the Russian troops in Galicia. Let us now turn to the Polish sector.

FIRST ASSAULT ON WARSAW—OCTOBER, 1914

The spectacular sweep of the Russians through Galicia aroused the keenest apprehension among the military leaders of the Central Powers. The close of September found Ivanoff a week's march from Cracow, from which strategic center the Slavs could either march on Vienna or move through Silesia on Berlin. Obviously, it behooved the Teutonic allies to attempt some major operation that would relieve the pressure in Galicia and, if possible, compensate them for the Russian successes in the south. Hindenburg's thrust at Warsaw was the Austro-German's answer to the problem.

Hitherto, in our survey of the fighting, our attention has been directed to the two flanks—East Prussia and Galicia—of the Eastern battle front. Actually the whole line was just under a thousand miles in length—the longest battle line in history—and extended from the Carpathians to the Baltic. It ran,

roughly speaking, from Przemyśl down the San to its confluence with the Vistula, along the latter stream through Warsaw to Novo-Georgievsk, then north through the eastern edge of the Mazurian lake district to the coast. Thus, its direction was almost due north and south. During the first two months of the war the only fighting in western Poland consisted of minor engagements between Cossack detachments and the Posen garrisons. It was from this direction—200 miles to the west of Warsaw—that Hindenburg moved to the attack.

HINDENBURG AGAIN IN COMMAND

The new German field marshal had been relieved of his East Prussian command by General von Morgen; he now assumed control of all German and Austrian troops in the eastern theater. The total forces at his disposal must have numbered almost two and a half million men. Thus, his numbers were greater than those of the Grand Duke Nicholas, for although the man-power of Russia was almost unlimited and fresh levies were arriving daily at the mobilization points behind the Polish triangle, the necessary equipment was lacking. It is doubtful if at this time Russia had more than two million men in the field.

The gist of Hindenburg's plan was a concentration of the bulk of his forces along the middle Vistula and a thrust across the river to the south of the Polish triangle. The point selected was the narrows at Josefow. There is a railhead just west of this place at Ostrowiec that would make easy the concentration of troops. On the other hand, there are no railroads nearer than thirty-five miles on the east bank of the river and but few wagon roads; hence it would be a difficult undertaking for the Russians to reinforce the threatened point. Hindenburg further planned to advance from Josefow, cut the Kiev railroad at Lublin, and thereby force the Grand Duke to evacuate Warsaw and retreat to the north-east.

The plan was well-conceived and, against a less able opponent than the Grand Duke, it might have succeeded. But the latter, informed by his scouts of the general German movement, accurately divined his enemy's pur-

pose. Refusing to fritter away his strength in the plains of western Poland, he immediately ordered all his forces, except a screen of light cavalry, to fall back behind the Vistula and the San. Warsaw was to be defended by a field army stationed in prepared positions west of the city. When the German attack had spent its force Nicholas proposed to attack with his right and force the left center of

early in October. The troops proceeded slowly, much time being spent in the construction of roads, causeways, and supply depots. A fortnight later the main force was facing the Russian positions along the Vistula from Novo Georgievsk to south of Josefow. Its northern flank was protected by the East Prussian army, and its southern end by the Austrians.



The Women's Battalion of Death

Under instructors from the Russian Guards, and in the uniform of the Russian soldiers, they qualified for every kind of military service.

the enemy down into the swamps of the Pilitza, a stream flowing into the Vistula between Warsaw and Ivangorod.

The order to retire to the line of the San in the south forced Ivanoff to fall back some 50 miles to conform to the movement of the Russian center. He was followed by the reorganized and reinforced armies of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and Auffenberg. The siege of Przemyśl was raised, and Jaroslav occupied, as the Austrians pushed forward toward the San. But the chief interest centers about Warsaw.

Hindenburg's forward movement started

THE BATTLE FOR WARSAW

The attack on the Warsaw positions (October 16th) was made by five army corps, led by Hindenburg in person. During the first days of the fighting the outcome was doubtful. The Germans strove madly to break through the defenses west of the city before their outnumbered adversaries could bring up reinforcements; the Russians clung to their trenches with equal determination, aided by several batteries of heavy guns, manned by Japanese gunners, that had arrived from the Far East. Within the city itself, the Polish population,

which had shown signs of panic at the beginning of the attack, became infected with the warlike spirit of the defenders. An observer writes:

"Each regiment that passes through on its way to the front receives a perfect ovation from the people. Women run along beside the soldiers handing them food and cigarettes, while they are cheered to the echo at every street corner. It is hard to believe that all this ardor that one sees is coming from Poles,

was facing east and west instead of north and south and was being flung back from the Vistula to the southwest.

It must not be forgotten that the frontal assault on Warsaw was only one of the two chief features of the German field marshal's plan. In case of failure before the Polish capital he had counted confidently on the piercing movement at Josefow.

Under cover of a feint attack on Ivangorod a large German force crossed the Vistula at



Warsaw, the Capital of Poland, the River Vistula in the Background

and that the recipients of it are the soldiers of the Czar."

GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS THE VICTOR

On the 18th the hard-pressed defenders were reinforced by a veteran Siberian corps and the struggle became more equal. For another day the fight continued, then the tired Russians awoke to the fact that the Germans were retreating. The reason soon became apparent. The Grand Duke had hurled his right across the Vistula under the protection of the fortress of Novo Georgievsk and was driving back Hindenburg's left center. The delayed advance of the German left assured the success of this brilliant counterstroke. Within a few hours the German left center

Josefow without opposition and advanced toward the Lublin railway. But at a village south of Nova Alexandra they found themselves surrounded in a swampy district by a large Russian force under Russky—who had been transferred from his command in Galicia—and were completely destroyed (October 21st). Then the Russians in turn crossed the river and began driving back the invaders through the strip of forest country that lies between the Vistula and the Polish plain. Through this wooded zone and across the flat fields to the west the Germans were pressed relentlessly backward. Ever and again they turned with great courage to face their opponents and strove heroically to delay the pursuit that they could not halt.

These operations south of the Pilitza were duplicated on the other side of the stream. The whole German line fell back beyond the Polish frontier to the general line running from Posen to Cracow.

The gains made by the Austrians in Galicia, as a result of the Russian withdrawal to the San, were quickly lost. Following the German retirement in Poland Ivanoff again moved forward, recaptured Jaroslav, and again invested Przemyśl.

RUSSIAN BLOW AT CRACOW

The Grand Duke now gave Hindenburg an advantage of which the German field marshal was quick to avail himself. Cracow was the magnet that drew Nicholas irresistibly westward, just as Warsaw was the will-o'-the-wisp that danced mockingly before his opponent's eyes. The Russian generalissimo determined to press on to the Galician stronghold and capture it before winter brought operations to a halt. Such a movement could be successful only in case Hindenburg's legions in Posen were prevented from going to the aid of the Austrians. Hence the Grand Duke proposed to send an army through western Poland to keep the Germans engaged while both Ivanoff and Dmitrieff advanced on Cracow.

It is obvious that such a movement would require the abandonment of the defensive positions along the San and the Vistula from which the Russians had beaten back all attacks, and would involve a march, with inferior numbers, across the devastated southwestern plains of Poland. Thus the extended and unprotected Russian line would be peculiarly vulnerable to a counter-attack by a German army of maneuver, and if the line were once pierced the consequences might be disastrous.

Under cover of a diversion created by an attack on the Mazurian Lakes positions far to the north, the southern armies slowly fought their way towards Cracow. Brusiloff, on the extreme left flank, occupied the Uzsok, Lupkow, and Dukla passes and, by the end of the first week of December, his Cossacks were within a dozen miles of Cracow.

Realizing that the pressure to which the Grand Duke was being subjected at this time

in Poland was without effect on the Russian advance in the south, Hindenburg hastily formed two armies for the defense of Cracow. One of these advanced along the Carpathian foothills and attacked Ivanoff's left. The other came from the Hungarian side of the mountains and strove to hurl Brusiloff from the passes.

Dmitrieff—commanding Ivanoff's left—fought a drawn battle before Cracow but, finding his communications threatened, fell back to the Dunajec. A few days later the



General Ivanoff

Commander-in-chief of the Russian forces on the southwestern front.

second Austrian army carried the Dukla pass and thus forced a further withdrawal, this time to the line of the Nida.

Soon the Austrians were threatening to drive Brusiloff from the Lupkow and Uzsok passes and it seemed that the Russian left would be forced again to retreat eastward when the arrival of reinforcements changed the situation. Counter-attacking fiercely, the Russians regained the approaches to the three passes before Christmas and succeeded in cutting off and capturing a force of the enemy near the foot of the Dukla.

Winter now put a stop to further troop movements in this sector. The Russian left

remained in its positions along the Nida and lower Dunajec; the Austrian flag still flew over the citadel of Cracow.

HINDENBURG'S SECOND ATTACK ON WARSAW —NOVEMBER, 1914

But during November and December of 1914 the chief interest centers in the north about the operations that resulted directly from the Russian thrust at Cracow. Hindenburg was not long in divining the Grand Duke's plan and, with the assistance of his

would be in German hands. The command of this striking force, some 800,000 strong, was given to General von Mackensen, probably the most brilliant of all the German generals.

It will have been noted that Hindenburg always availed himself to the utmost of the railways at his disposal. The German railway system was one of his greatest assets, and he utilized it with exemplary skill. It was the railroad running southeast from Thorn that rendered his thrust easy in the present case, for failure was sure to result if the Grand



A German Heavy Howitzer in Action Outside of Lodz

able chief of staff, Ludendorff, he immediately began preparations for a counter-blow. The German commander knew that the Russians would make no serious attempt against the fortified Mazurian lakes line, and he believed that the Austrians about Cracow, who had been reinforced by German troops, could hold their own in the face of Ivanoff's assaults. He planned, therefore, to concentrate a strong striking force which would move from the direction of Thorn against the extended Russian right center. The Slav line was to be smashed by a sudden blow between the Warta and the lower Vistula and, before the Grand Duke could bring up supports from the roadless region to the south, Warsaw

Duke could bring up reinforcements before the break occurred. With irresistible force Mackensen threw himself upon Russky—who commanded the Russian right center—and pushed on towards Lodz, his first objective.

MACKENSEN'S BLOW

Mackensen possessed the great initial advantage of surprise. Autumn on the Polish plains is a season of dense fogs and it is probable that the Russian information service was poor—at any rate, the German concentration seems to have been unknown to the Grand Duke before the actual attack was made. Caught off his guard and unable to withstand

Mackensen's sledge-hammer blows, Russky fell back towards the line of the Bzura.

The banks of the Bzura are low and marshy, and at many points the stream is impassable. Just north of Lodz it is crossed by a great causeway, and against this causeway Mackensen, under cover of attacks both to the right and left, hurled a strong force of infantry and artillery. After heavy losses the crossing was forced and the Russian line split into two parts. Into the gap thus made the German troops poured, and for a brief period the Russian position was desperate. But supports arrived in the nick of time and the breach was closed. The Russian line was once more intact, but a deep German wedge was driven into it just north of Lodz.

And now Mackensen, in his turn, narrowly escaped disaster. A salient, or wedge, driven into an enemy's line must be extended to right and left, otherwise the holding troops will be subjected to fire from three sides. The Lodz salient was about 15 miles deep by 8 miles in width, and against the two German corps occupying it the Russians dashed themselves with headlong bravery. The two corps, fighting with splendid courage, were practically annihilated, but not before Mackensen had succeeded in broadening the base of the wedge and securing his position. Shortly afterwards the Germans entered Lodz (November 27th).

Hindenburg now concluded that he would be able to break the Russian line east of Lodz. Following an unsuccessful sortie by the East Prussian force, he undertook a movement against the Russian wing south of the Vistula, near Iłowo. The Grand Duke immediately withdrew his forces behind the lower Bzura and the Rawka, thus putting a strong barrier to his front and at the same time improving his communications, since he could now be supplied both by the Vistula and by the two railway lines running west from Warsaw. Along this line the second battle of Warsaw was fought.

WARSAW AGAIN ATTACKED

The conflict for the city lasted from the middle of December until Christmas day. Hindenburg, elated by his initial successes in the campaign, had promised Warsaw as a Christmas gift to the German emperor, and

he strove manfully to keep his word. But against the Russian trenches, with the bogs and marshes of the Bzura in their front, the German could accomplish nothing. "In Poland," says Napoleon, "I discovered a fifth element—mud." The German field marshal may well have repeated those words of the great emperor.

By Christmas the German effort had spent itself. Warsaw was safe for the present and both armies, worn and exhausted, settled down to face one another in their muddy trenches.

THIRD ASSAULT ON WARSAW—FEBRUARY, 1915

During January the fighting on the Eastern front was limited chiefly to trench operations of the type so familiar at this time in Flanders and Northern France. The latter part of the month saw increased activity on the extreme north and south ends of the Russian line. The Grand Duke had neither the guns nor the men for any serious attempts on the German flanks; he acted solely in response to requests from the Allies in the west that he keep the German troops on his front engaged, and thus prevent their transfer to the lines in France.

Hindenburg was not to be deceived by these feints in East Prussia and Galicia. He had no desire to send any of his forces across Germany to the assistance of his colleagues in the west, but he did have a burning ambition to effect the capture of Warsaw. He reasoned that the Russian center, never too strong, must have been weakened to enable the Grand Duke Nicholas to conduct the operations on his flanks. Hence he determined to make one more bid for the Polish capital by a frontal attack. The city that he had designed to present to his Imperial Master on Christmas would serve admirably as a birthday gift.

Mackensen—who had pierced the Russian line at Lodz and narrowly escaped disaster there—was in command of the movement. This general, having no desire to repeat his narrow wedge performance, concentrated his forces on a seven mile front opposite Bolimof, 40 miles west of Warsaw. The troops at his disposal numbered about 140,000, thus giving him a strength of ten men per yard.

MACKENSEN FAILS BEFORE WARSAW

After a violent artillery preparation Mackensen made his attack on February 1st. His infantry, formed in dense masses from ten to twenty men deep, advanced under the screen of a terrific snowstorm. Like a tidal wave the Germans struck the Russian positions east of the Rawka river and overran them. After hard fighting the second and third line trenches were occupied and the victorious assailants pressed forward for a distance of five miles along the Warsaw railway.

drive and making full use of his strategic railways, he hastily concentrated nine army corps—300,000 men—in East Prussia, and hurled them against the four Russian corps holding that sector in a smashing flank attack. His plan was identical with the one he had attempted in the autumn in the same region—to force the defensive line of the Niemen and cut the Warsaw-Petrograd railroad.

Through the ice and snow of the eastern edge of the lake region the Russians hastily retreated in an attempt to elude the hordes threatening their destruction. East Prussia



Russian Cossacks Charging the German Trenches

But the Russian line was merely bent and dislocated; it had not been broken. The arrival of reinforcements from Warsaw on Feb. 4th, in the midst of the driving blizzard, turned the tide. In the face of a furious counter-attack the Germans rapidly gave ground and, by the 8th, they were once more back in the Rawka trenches. The loss of 20,000 men was the penalty paid by Mackensen for his failure.

OFFENSIVE IN EAST PRUSSIA

But Hindenburg was nothing if not stubborn. Foreseeing the fate of Mackensen's

was quickly cleared. One Russian corps—30,000 strong—was cut off and annihilated in the forests north of Suwalki; the others, shattered and broken, succeeded in reaching the line of the Niemen and the Bobr. For a second time Hindenburg laid siege to Ostrowetz. This time his heavy artillery was provided with caterpillar wheels which enabled it to cross the marshy ground surrounding the fortress, but the flat treeless country rendered concealment impossible, and the Russian gunners experienced little difficulty in silencing the German batteries.

By the first of March the Grand Duke's counter-offensive had developed and soon the

whole Teuton line began to fall back. One German corps that had forced its way over the Niemen hurriedly recrossed the river; the investment of Ossowetz was abandoned. During the second week of March there was much fighting in the Augustovo region in which the Germans, who were now outnumbered, lost heavily. By the middle of the month Hinden-

promptness. The weight of the East Prussian attack was suddenly shifted to the west and a sudden stroke aimed at Przasnysz, a town some 50 miles north of Warsaw. He hoped that by the force and unexpectedness of the assault he would succeed in crossing the Narew river. Then he would cut the railway between Warsaw and the Russian capital at



© Underwood and Underwood.

A German Machine-Gun Battery Entrenched

A striking photograph taken on the East Prussian front, showing a platoon operating five machine-guns, supported by riflemen.

burg's left center had withdrawn to a line just within the Russian frontier.

ANOTHER ATTACK ON WARSAW

Both the blow at the Rawka line and the drive on the Niemen had failed, but Hindenburg's repertoire was not yet exhausted. He rightly judged that the Russian forces northwest of Warsaw had been heavily drawn upon to reinforce the weakly-defended positions along the Bobr and the Niemen. He acted upon this assumption with his customary

some point south of the Narew. In this way he would gain the objective he had failed to attain by the attack from East Prussia—the encirclement of Warsaw.

The attack began on February 22nd and two days later Przasnysz was in German hands. In spite of the fact that they were greatly outnumbered the Russians in this sector made an orderly retreat, contesting every foot of the ground. One Russian division held a ridge southwest of Przasnysz for 36 hours against the attacks of three and a half divisions. This heroic defense was not in vain.

The Grand Duke, apprised of the danger threatening the Narew line, hurried up reinforcements to the imperiled sector. Many of these supports were recruits whom it had been impossible to equip except with grenades and bayonets, and hence they could be of use only in hand-to-hand fighting. These raw levies dashed gallantly at the advancing Germans. A terrible struggle ensued, but in the end the invaders gave way. Przasnysz was recaptured on the 27th and, on the following day, the Germans were in full retreat towards the East Prussian frontier. They left 10,000 prisoners in the hands of the victorious Russians.

Thus ended the third drive on Warsaw. By it Hindenburg had cleared the soil of East Prussia and established the northern end of his line in Russian territory, but Warsaw itself seemed as far beyond his reach as ever.

STRUGGLE FOR THE CARPATHIAN PASSES

Once more the scene shifts to the southern end of the Russian battle line. We left Brusiloff striving to regain the passes of the Carpathians; by the beginning of the new year he had succeeded to such an extent that it seemed probable that in the near future a great Muscovite flood would pour out through the Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok defiles into the Hungarian plains. At the same time a single Russian division had overrun Bukovina, and General Selivanoff was drawing his lines ever closer about the fortress of Przemyśl.

The Bukovina operations were chiefly important because of their effect on the political situation. Rumania had hitherto maintained her neutrality in spite of tempting offers from each of the groups of belligerents. The Russian occupation of Bukovina and the threat against Transylvania might serve to align Rumania with the Entente Allies, for the inhabitants of these two provinces were of Rumanian blood and their eventual incorporation into the mother country had long been looked forward to by the statesmen of the little Danubian kingdom. Should the treaty of peace find Russia in possession of Bukovina and Transylvania she would be loathe to give them up; hence Rumania must hurry if she were to share in the glory of wresting the coveted districts from the Austrians. Natur-

ally it behooved Austria to take such steps as would prevent another nation from joining the ranks of her enemies.

Moved by the Rumanian threat as well as by the menace to Hungary, the Austrians determined to forestall their enemies by a vigorous offensive. For this purpose three armies took the field from Hungary under the command of the Archduke Eugene.


ANOTHER AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

The movement began in the latter part of January. The first, or western, army, General Boehm-Ermolli, marched against the three passes of the central Carpathians for the purpose of relieving Przemyśl. The second army, composed of Austro-German troops under General von Linsingen, operated farther to the east, its objective being Lemberg. The third Austro-German army, General von Pflanzer, was directed to drive the Russians from Bukovina.

The operations of the Archduke's armies resulted in dismal failure, although von Pflanzer was at first completely successful against the Russians—who were not more than 30,000 strong—in Bukovina. During February he cleared the invaders from the province and, moving to the north, captured the important junction city of Stanislaw, 70 miles from Lemberg. But his advance was merely temporary. Early in March strong Russian reinforcements arrived and Pflanzer, forced to evacuate Stanislaw, was pressed back to the Czernowitz-Kolomea line. His momentary threat at the Russian communications was thus removed.

Von Linsingen, moving through the passes east of the Uzsok, met with a signal check. Although the Russians did not hold the crests of the range they occupied the Galician foothills into which the passes debouch. The defile along which Linsingen's main column moved was dominated by a ridge held by the Russians. Here, during the last days of February and the opening of March, a terrible conflict took place. Icy winds swept down the valleys and blizzards were of frequent occurrence. The Russians, being a hardier race and more accustomed to the cold, were better able to withstand the rigors of the winter than were their opponents, but both sides

Map to Illustrate the Struggle for the Carpathian Passes and the Capture of Przemyśl.



suffered severely. On the rocky spurs and in the glens between the snow was stained crimson with the blood of the slain. Linsingen's utmost efforts could not force the Galician exits of the passes.

Equally great was Boehm-Ermolli's failure to the west. For two months he fought, under

Przemysl. For months the Austrian commander had held out in the face of hunger and the enemy's attacks, hoping for the relief that never came. After a last unsuccessful sortie General von Kusmanek, having destroyed the greater part of his munitions, surrendered the fortress. In addition to over 100,000 prison-



© Underwood and Underwood.

German Staff Officers Observing a Bombardment

The battery at this spot was engaged in a duel with the Russian batteries in Poland at the moment when this picture was taken.

the most terrible weather conditions, in a vain endeavor to secure the debouchments of the three great central passes. At the end of the third week in March Brusiloff's right wing still held the Dukla and the northern exit from the Lupkow.

FALL OF PRZEMYSL

The failure of the Archduke's plan was emphasized, on March 22nd, by the fall of

ers, the Russians captured 1,000 guns, many of which, however, had been rendered useless. The Lemberg-Cracow railway was now cleared at last and Selivanoff's army of 100,000 was released for service with Brusiloff. The latter, thus strengthened, renewed the struggle for the passes. By the end of April he had command of the Dukla, Lupkow, and Rostok defiles and was fiercely attacking the Užsok. To retain this important gateway the Austrians resisted desperately.

The Germans' invention of poisonous gas clouds and gas shells, while originally intended to put troops out of action, was especially destructive in the case of horses, mules and dogs, of which hundreds of thousands were employed close behind the lines. It was therefore necessary to make a suitable mask for these animals, consisting of a bag which was drawn over the nose and mouth. The bag was treated with a chemical powder which had the property of neutralizing the dangerous gases before they reached the nostrils.

111—9

III

TEUTON ADVANCE IN 1915

Mackensen Breaks the Russian Line on the Dunajec—Przemysl and Lemberg Recaptured—Warsaw Falls to Teutons—Grand Duke's Retreat

THE TEUTONS' NEW PLAN

STUBBORNNESS would seem to be the chief defect, as it is the principal virtue, of Hindenburg's character. Since the first days of the Russian invasion the Teuton generalissimo had held to the belief that the pressure against Austria could be relieved by threats directed against the Russians in Poland, or by local operations on the Grand Duke's left. At last he realized his mistake; the Russians persisted in treating Galicia as a self-contained area and the German field marshal saw that nothing less than a supreme effort would be sufficient to break the Muscovite hold on the Austrian province. He no sooner reached this conclusion than he began preparations for a mighty drive against Ivanoff's armies.

Hindenburg rejected the plan for a thrust through the Carpathian passes south of Przemysl in favor of a frontal assault on the five corps—200,000 men—of Dmitrieff entrenched along the Dunajec and the Biala. Such an attack would allow him to make full use of the immense amount of artillery that he had been collecting all winter and, in case the Dunajec line was broken, he would be able to cut off the retreat of Brusiloff's army, which was operating far up in the Carpathian defiles.

With wonderful speed and secrecy an immense Austro-German force, under the command of General von Mackensen, was massed east of Cracow between the Carpathians and the Vistula. The historian, Buchan, has given a vivid word picture of the concentration.

"Guns of every caliber came from everywhere on the Eastern and Western fronts and from Essen and Pilsen and Budapest, and in

one section alone of about twenty miles along the Biala over 1,000 pieces were placed in position. Train after train kept bringing material and pontoons, and all the supplies of the engineers; hospital stations and new depots for food and munitions were prepared close behind the front; a new telegraph network was established; great bands of cattle were driven up to their pens under cover of darkness. And then came the troops—from the East and West fronts, and new levies from Austria and Hungary and Germany—all silently getting into place in a great hive of energy from the Nida to the Carpathians. Meanwhile Dmitrieff, in the Dunajec lines half a mile off, inspected his trenches and conducted his minor attacks and counter-attacks without an inkling of what was brewing. German organization had put forth a supreme effort. The world had never seen a greater concentration of men and guns more swiftly or more silently achieved."

MACKENSEN'S THUNDERBOLT

Mackensen struck on May 1st along the 40 miles of front between Tarnow and Gorlice. He opened his attack by an artillery preparation of unprecedented magnitude. Dmitrieff's trenches along the Biala, caught in this irresistible tornado of fire, were literally swept out of existence. Of this unheard-of bombardment, more gigantic even than that of the British at Neuve Chapelle, an American correspondent, Washburn, has written:

"In two hours the enemy batteries fired, according to the Russian estimates, 700,000 shells, ranging from the field shrapnel up to the 12-inch high explosives. The Russians were not routed, as the Germans asserted, at all. They simply remained and died. The

few that tried to retire on supporting lines were caught in the open, where every object on the landscape had been ranged on exactly, long before, and thousands more were literally swept away. The first line of the Russian defense was so torn and swept by shell fire that observers say that it could not have been recognized as ever having been a line of defense at all."

THE RUSSIAN LINE BROKEN

This terrific bombardment accomplished its object: a gap 40 miles wide was blasted out of



General Radko Dmitrieff

the Russian line. On the following day Mackensen poured his massed infantry into the breach. One column passed the Dunajec north of Tarnow while others pushed their way across the Biala south of the town. Dmitrieff's remnants fell back to the Wisloka.

On the east bank of this little stream the Russians turned to face their pursuers. It was absolutely necessary that a stand should be made along this line until Brusiloff's right could withdraw from the Dukla pass. Ivanoff rushed down reinforcements from the north, among which was a Caucasian corps that was to win imperishable glory. These Caucasians, unawed by the numbers and guns of the enemy, boldly attacked with the bayonet. They lost 10,000 men, but, though reduced to a strength of 6,000, in hand-to-hand combat

they captured a heavy battery, took 7,000 prisoners, and killed thousands more. For five days the Russians, whose ammunition supply was almost completely exhausted, battled furiously, but at length Mackensen forced his way across the river at Jaslo and the defenders retreated to the Wislok. Their gallant stand had enabled the greater part of their comrades in the Dukla pass to extricate themselves and to fall back towards Przemysl.

After a day's stand along the Wislok the Russians, having lost heavily, again fell back, this time to the line of the San. Here more supports were brought up and when the Germans reached the river they found the 40-mile gap closed and the Russians awaiting their attack.

LEMBERG RECAPTURED BY TEUTONS

The battle of the San must be regarded as one of the major battles of the war, for upon its outcome depended not only the fate of Galicia but of a great part of Poland as well. The struggle lasted from May 15th to May 17th. On the latter day the Germans forced the crossings about Jaroslav and this advance made a further Russian withdrawal inevitable. The defenders of Przemysl clung tenaciously to their positions until June 2nd, thereby allowing the stores and guns of the fortress to be removed. On that day Mackensen entered the city.

Fortunately for the Russians, the Austro-German armies in the Carpathians had not moved with the speed and determination that had characterized Mackensen's advance. Boehm-Ermolli had failed to coöperate with Mackensen in cutting off the Russians in the Dukla Pass. Linsingen, however, captured Stryj on June 1st, and crossed the Dniester. Here he was caught in the flank by Brusiloff and forced back across the river with a loss of 15,000 prisoners. But this local success had no effect upon the general situation. Pflanzer, on the extreme right, captured Stanislau and forced the Russian left back to the frontier. Linsingen, with the support of his colleague, again advanced, recrossed the Dniester and moved north.

In the meantime Mackensen had moved northeast along the railway between Jaroslav and Ravaruska. On June 20th he captured

the last-named town, and thereby succeeded in turning the northern end of the Grodek line—a chain of lakes and creeks ten miles west of Lemberg behind which the Russians had planned to make a stand. The evacuation of this line rendered Lemberg untenable, and the Grand Duke Nicholas wisely declined to fight a general engagement for its possession in the face of overwhelming odds. The Austrians occupied the city on June 22nd and the Russians, under heavy pressure, continued their withdrawal toward their own borders. The Austro-German offensive had been crowned with success; even taking into account the fact that the Russians were decidedly inferior to their opponents in numbers, artillery, and munitions, Mackensen had achieved a magnificent triumph. Within the short space of two months the Russian armies had been repeatedly defeated and had been expelled from all but the extreme eastern portion of Galicia. The credit for this great victory must go to Mackensen, who had shown himself to be a commander of the first rank. For his brilliant services he received the rank of field marshal from the grateful German emperor.

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT

At first glance it would seem that the Teuton armies in the east would be content to rest for a time upon their laurels. Such was not the case. In spite of his brilliant achievements the German commander had failed to accomplish his main object—the destruction of the Russian field armies. Although the Czar's fighting machine had been beaten again and again, it yet remained a formidable military force and was standing grimly at bay in a strong defensive position. If left unmolested the Grand Duke would be certain to make a gigantic effort to refill his shattered ranks and to collect the necessary shells and stores to replenish his exhausted magazines. Then, from behind the shelter of the Polish Triangle he would issue forth to recover the ground lost in the spring and wreak vengeance upon his enemies. Knowing this, the Central Powers felt that their ultimate safety demanded the capture and retention of the Russian defensive system in Poland and the infliction of a crushing defeat upon the Slav armies. These



Field Marshal von Mackensen

were the considerations that lay back of the offensive that opened in July.

THE GERMANS PLAN TO END THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

The time was well chosen for the great drive that was intended to remove forever the Muscovite menace. Although the Grand Duke had managed to close the break in his line at the San and, since leaving that position, had executed an orderly and well-conducted retreat, his situation was precarious. Not only was he inferior in numerical strength to his opponents but the lack of railways and roads in the rear of his positions made the rapid shifting of troops impossible. His guns could not compare with those of the Germans,

either in number or in caliber; and there was a deplorable lack of ammunition for such artillery as the Russians actually possessed. The German soldiers were flushed by their many victories and were justly confident of the ability of their commanders.

The Grand Duke was not in ignorance of the Teutons' intentions. He knew that a powerful stroke was to be dealt in the vicinity of Warsaw and he made every effort to prepare for the approaching storm. But the shortage of munitions and supplies of all kinds and the obvious impossibility of equipping a sufficient number of men to hold his 900 miles of front in the face of the Austro-German attacks soon became apparent. The Russian generalissimo, confronted with the facts of the situation, was forced to choose one of two possible courses: either to concentrate all his available forces in front of Warsaw and risk everything in a final battle for possession of the city, or to retreat far to the east until a position could be reached behind which he could reorganize and refit his war-worn forces. Fortunately for Russia the Grand Duke, unaffected by sentimental considerations, chose the safer course. Acting upon the theory that captured territory may be reconquered while the destruction of the Russian armies would inevitably result in the downfall of the Czar's empire, he decided in favor of retreat. But Nicholas contemplated no such withdrawal as that of Kutusoff before Napoleon a century earlier; the retreat was to be a continuous rear-guard battle in which he hoped to make the Teutons pay dearly for every mile of ground gained.

Warsaw, with its three railway lines to the east, was obviously the key to the whole Russian defensive system in western Poland. The city stood at the apex formed by the railroads from Lublin and Petrograd. The main Russian line of retreat would naturally be east along the Brest-Litovsk line. Hence the threat against the Brest line that would result from either of the other lines being cut would necessitate the immediate evacuation of the city.


The terrific Battle of the Salients, as it has been called, began in the second week of July with a thrust by Mackensen at the Lublin-Cholm railroad southeast of the city. At the same time von Gallwitz began a furious at-

tack on the positions along the Narew, northeast of the capital. While both faces of the salient were thus being assailed, the Archduke Joseph, on Mackensen's right, threatened Lublin, and von Woysch, to the west, forced the Russians back on Ivangorod. To the north of Gallwitz two other Austro-German armies pressed the attack as far as Kovno, and a force from East Prussia moved on Riga.

THE FALL OF WARSAW

On July 28th the Vistula was crossed by Woysch between Ivangorod and Warsaw, and Mackensen cut the Lublin-Cholm railway. Knowing that the Teutons' next move would be directed against the Warsaw-Brest line—his only remaining avenue of escape—the Grand Duke ordered the evacuation of the Polish capital. This order had been expected for days past, and the Russian commander, thanks to his previous preparations, was able to remove his guns and stores before the troops were withdrawn from the salient. Having destroyed the Vistula bridges to delay pursuit the Russians finally abandoned the city on the night of August 4th. On the following day the Bavarians, under the command of Prince Leopold, entered Warsaw.

The next position east of Warsaw was the artificial defensive line formed by the fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, and Brest-Litovsk. Although the commander of the Novo Georgievsk forts refused to surrender and maintained a gallant defense for two weeks longer, the Russian center was forced back to this second line by the middle of August. That the retrograde movement was not attended by serious disaster was due largely to the defense of Ossowetz, west of the Narew, which prevented the enemy from cutting off the Russian right center. For two days the Grand Duke held stubbornly to his new positions, but on the 17th his left flank was turned by Mackensen and the fortress of Kovno, to the north, was surrendered. Within a fortnight Ossowetz and Brest-Litovsk fell, and only Grodno remained in Russian hands. The German tidal wave was still sweeping irresistibly forward. Austro-German news dispatches were filled with accounts of the Teutonic successes, and predictions were made that the Czar would soon seek to make peace with the victors.



Position of the Austro-German Armies on August 5, 1915
 This was immediately after the fall of Warsaw (August 4th) and the beginning of the great Russian retreat.

GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS REMOVED

What may be regarded as the third phase of the great Russian retreat now began. The Czar, on September 8th, assumed supreme direction of the Russian armies, with General Alexeieff, who had commanded the armies about Warsaw, as his chief of staff. The Grand Duke was ordered to take over the

fell, and this resulted in a further withdrawal of the Russian center. The Germans then began to exert heavy pressure on the northern flank. The extreme right was forced back towards Riga. Again, by the 10th, considerable German advances had been made to the south about Lutsck and Dubno. During all the September operations the Russians fought with extreme bravery. An excellent example



Warsaw Under the Conquerors

In the foreground in the left center is the then Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary. In the center, looking backward, is Prince Leopold of Bavaria. General von Woyrsch is at the Prince's left. Immediately after the fall of the Polish capital the Germans placed the city under martial law and took over its civil administration.

command in the Caucasus. Nicholas had never been popular with the Petrograd bureaucrats, and his enemies took advantage of the opening given them by his recent defeats to bring about his removal.

Hindenburg's aim was to force the line back until the center was entangled in the Pripet marshes, when he hoped to envelop the entire right wing. He did not delay in attempting the execution of his plan.

Early in September the fortress of Grodno

of their heroism, which likewise shows their almost utter lack of munitions, is told in connection with the rear guard actions of these terrible days. The infantry were often forced to stand at bay and attack in order to allow the artillery to withdraw to new positions. At such times the soldiers were formed in three ranks; the first armed with rifle and bayonet and six cartridges. The next line was unarmed, the men being directed to secure the rifles of their comrades who fell;

while the third rank was provided with stones and clubs. In this primitive fashion did the Russian infantrymen dispute the advance of Hindenburg's splendidly-equipped legions.

THE FALL OF VILNA

The most severe fighting took place about Vilna. The railway connections with this important town were similar to those of Warsaw. The Russians made a determined stand west of the city, and, by unwisely delaying their withdrawal until their line of retreat was almost cut, escaped disaster by a very narrow margin. The rail connections to the south and northeast had both been severed before the final withdrawal was, with great difficulty, effected. The holding battles fought on the two flanks to enable the troops west of the town to escape were among the most bril-

liant actions of the entire campaign, but the cost was terrible.

By the first of October the momentum of the Teuton avalanche had spent itself and the weary Slavs came to a definite halt.

The Germanic drive was one of the most striking military achievements of the entire war. By this spectacular sweep the Central Empires not only gained possession of almost the whole of the province of Poland, but inflicted losses upon their enemy running into the hundreds of thousands. Indeed, the Russian armies that had borne the brunt of the assault never fully recovered from Hindenburg's smashing blows.

At the end of the retreat the battle line ran from Riga, on the Baltic coast, along the Dwina river to Dvinsk, and thence almost due south through the Pripet marshes, Tarnopol, and the eastern fringe of Galicia.

IV

BRUSILOFF—AND AFTER

Russian Armies Smash Austrian Line, Threaten Lemberg, Almost Reach Kovel—The Russian Revolution of 1917

ACCORDING to the views of the Teuton military authorities the Russian armies had been so broken by Hindenburg's drive through Poland that any major offensive on their part, for a long time to come, would be impossible. The Austro-Germans were to be rudely awakened from their dream of fancied security.

General Alexeieff, in supreme control of all the Czar's forces—he relieved Ivanoff in April—devoted the winter of 1915 and the spring of 1916 to strenuous efforts to reorganize and refit the armies that had suffered so severely in the late campaign. Alexeieff had no intention of sitting quietly in his trenches; on the contrary, he proposed to take the field at the first opportunity in a mighty effort to retrieve Russia's losses. Warsaw and Vilna were to be avenged.

In January Ivanoff had made a demonstra-

tion against Czernowitz, the only gain from which was a strengthening of the Rumanians in their determination not to join forces with the Central Powers. Again, in March, at the height of the Verdun attack, an attempt was made on the northern end of the line to push the Germans back from the banks of the Dvina river, and at the same time activity increased on the extreme Russian left along the Dniester. Beyond slightly bettering their positions the Russians accomplished nothing in a tactical way by these moves; but, by preventing reinforcements being sent to the west, the effect was considerable on the operations about Verdun. But at best these demonstrations had been dictated by political considerations or for purposes of diversion; they were entirely different in their character and scope from the great blow that the Russian commander-in-chief was planning.

ALEXEIEFF ATTACKS

By the beginning of June Alexeieff was ready to give the word that would put his armies in motion. He concluded to strike with his left wing, a decision probably influenced by the more favorable nature of the terrain to the south and by the fact that these armies had suffered less from Hindenburg's drive. In such an advance the right of the attacking forces would be protected by the Pripet swamps, and their left would rest on the Carpathians. If he could penetrate a suf-

Frederick, and numbered about 800,000 men. The Archduke's group comprised five armies, approximately equal in size.

The offensive opened June 4th by a bombardment of the Austrian lines along the 250 miles of front between the Pripet and Pruth rivers. The artillery preparation was not the familiar intensive bombardment, but was a methodical shelling of certain sections of the enemy's wire entanglements for the purpose of opening gaps through which the Russian infantry could advance. As soon as the high explosive projectiles had accomplished



© Underwood and Underwood.

Austrian Trenches in a Wood Among the Carpathian Mountains

ficient depth to the west, he would be in a position to pivot his right wing upon the Pripet marshes and swing his left northward in a threat against the German communications.

The direction of the offensive was intrusted to General Brusiloff, under whose command were about 1,000,000 men, divided into four armies. On the right was the army of General Kaledin, with headquarters at Rovno; next came that of General Sakharoff, astride the Galician frontier; next that of Sherbacheff, along the Dniester; and, finally, Lechitsky's army, which reached to the Rumanian border.

The Austro-Germans along the front to be attacked were commanded by the Archduke

their object a shrapnel barrage was dropped behind the Austro-German trenches to prevent the escape of the defenders. Then Brusiloff loosed his infantry.

The Teutons, inferior in numbers and too confident of the strength of their defensive positions, were overwhelmed by the force and impetus of the Slav attack. In Volhynia, Kaledin, striking directly at Lutsk, smashed a wide gap in the Hungarian lines. Two days later (June 6th) his cavalry dashed into the city on the very heels of the Austrians, who were celebrating the birthday of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. A large number of guns and considerable supplies were captured following a sharp engagement.



General Brusiloff

Commander of the Russian Armies in the great offensive in the Spring of 1916. His brilliant victories inspired the hope that Russia had "come back," but in a few months the troops were utterly demoralized by Revolutionary propaganda.

BRUSILOFF'S GREAT VICTORY

Kaledin now dispatched a column north against Rozyshche, where the Rovno-Kovel-Warsaw railway crossed the Styr, and another south against Dubno, where the Rovno-Lemberg line crossed the river Ikva. Four days later both of these positions were in Russian hands. The northern column then fought its

cupied by the Bavarians west of Tarnopol, but Sherbacheff, commanding the Dniester army, had taken by storm the strong positions along the southeastern face of the Galician table-land—positions, for the most part, on the tops of cliffs with deep gorges in their front—and completed his triumph, on June 8th, by forcing his way across the Strypa. Lechitsky, at the extreme left of the line,



Oil Wells in Galicia

The capture of these and other wells by the Austro-German armies was of great economic importance at a time when the British blockade was beginning to be severely felt by the Central Powers.

way along the railroad to the Stokhod, and the second column pressed westward and crossed the Plashevka. At the last-named river the Russian infantry refused to wait for the stream to be bridged and plunged boldly into the water, with the result that, although one entire company was drowned, the advance was continued without delay. Within less than two weeks a wedge 50 miles deep and 90 miles wide at the base had been driven into the Austrian lines in Volhynia.

In the meantime, Sakharoff had been unable to make much impression on the positions oc-

after a swift advance through Bukovina, entered Czernowitz on June 17th.

The marvelous successes of the first two weeks of the drive came as a surprise to both friend and foe. For some months but little attention had been directed toward the Russian front; the world had come to believe the oft-repeated German statement that Russia was "out of the game." The sequel showed the falsity of this view. The great Slav nation had demonstrated its recuperative power, and Brusiloff had begun to take his revenge for the Dunajec. It is true that the Austro-

Germans had strengthened their other fronts at the expense of their lines in Russia, but the Archduke's forces possessed thousands of machine guns and enormous quantities of ammunition, and in acting on the defensive in their elaborately-constructed trenches their numerical inferiority was largely compensated for. An American observer has given us a description of the admirably organized positions which the Czar's soldiers took at the point of the bayonet.

"The trenches were very deep—ten or fifteen feet in places—with steps on which the soldiers might stand when firing. At frequent intervals were strongly-constructed redoubts for the machine guns. Many of these were made with steel, and some were of concrete construction. On the reverse side of the trench were innumerable winding exits to a rear line, perhaps averaging 30 or 40 feet from the front, in which many dugouts and bomb-proofs had been dug, and it was here, no doubt, that the inactive troops spent most of their time. . . . Such portions of the line as had not been damaged by the Russian guns impressed one greatly. For neatness and exactness of construction it might have been a model made by an expert engineer from the most approved military text-book on modern field fortifications. Advance saps leading to listening posts between the lines were very frequent, at intervals of about every 400 yards. The barbed wire was the most intricate that I have seen." (*The Russian Advance*, Washburn.)

Upon realizing the seriousness of the situation the Central Powers began with frantic haste to hurry reinforcements to Volhynia and Galicia. Aided by troops drawn from France and Italy, the Teutons began to offer a stronger resistance along the northern end of the threatened sector. But nothing seemed able to check Lechitsky's rapid advance in the south. During June and July he swept through Bukovina and turned west into Galicia, destroying such forces as attempted to dispute his progress.

Meanwhile the Volhynian advance had been resumed and within three days the Russians forced their way from the Styr to the Stokhod, 30 miles to the west. After fierce fighting they crossed the latter stream but did not succeed in taking Kovel, the important

railway junction that was one of their chief objectives.

THE RUSSIANS' LAST VICTORY

While this advance was taking place Sakharoff struck heavily at the Austrians southwest of Lutsk and drove them before him in disorderly rout. Brody fell July 28, and the Russians turned south against Bothmer's Bavarian army. The latter, caught between Sakharoff and Lechitsky—who was moving north and had captured Stanislau on the Austrian left flank—was forced back from the Strypa to the Zlota Lipa.

Bothmer's retreat was the high tide of the Russian advance. Reinforcements for the hard-pressed Teutons were arriving daily in large numbers and the force of the drive was gradually broken. The Russians claimed that they were forced to halt only because their supply of shells was exhausted and their artillery rendered unserviceable by constant use. However, the operations continued, on a lesser scale until winter, the most important incident being an attack in September by Sherbacheff in which he forced the Zlota Lipa line and bombarded Halicz. Many counter-attacks were made in this sector during the autumn, but without any important results. The Russians clung grimly to their gains.

Russia had "come back" with a vengeance. According to the Russian official figures, in ten weeks of fighting Brusiloff captured 358,000 men, 405 guns, and 1,326 machine guns. Moreover, this timely offensive served to relieve materially the pressure on Verdun and Italy, and it induced Rumania to join the Entente allies.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The unsuccessful offensive against the German positions about Dvinsk and Mitau, with which Alexeieff ushered in the new year, had just been brought to a halt when revolution broke in Petrograd in March, 1917. The Czar's government was overthrown and a republic established. Brusiloff, Lechitsky, and many other prominent generals immediately declared in favor of the new government and placed their services at its disposal. The world rejoiced at the thought that the Rus-

sian forces would no longer be at the mercy of corrupt officials and politicians, but would be able to command the support from behind the lines which they so well merited.

THE ARMY DEMORALIZED

This dream was speedily dissipated. The enthusiasts at the capital at once set to work in an effort to accomplish the impossible task of making the army an absolutely democratic institution. The infliction of the death penalty was prohibited; the saluting of officers was made optional; soldiers' councils were

a semblance of discipline and order. As a result of the Premier's activities the last Russian offensive was launched in July of 1917.

BRUSILOFF'S LAST OFFENSIVE

Brusiloff decided to strike on the Zlota Lipa and Dniester front. His objective was Lemberg.

The attack began with a thrust at the Austro-German positions along the upper Zlota Lipa. The Russians, whose morale was apparently good, sprang to the assault with their old-time vigor. A slight advance was made,



The Castle in Riga, Captured by the Germans in October, 1917

formed to approve all rules and regulations passed by the revolutionary government concerning the army; all orders given by officers had to be sanctioned by their subordinates before they could be carried out. As a result of these insane measures the discipline so necessary to military success was completely destroyed. In an incredibly short time the armies became hotbeds of insubordination and mutiny where the soldiers spent their time chiefly in debating social and economic questions and in fraternizing with the enemy.

At last the weak liberal government, aroused by the passionate appeals of Brusiloff and his associates and alarmed by the rapid disintegration of the armies, awoke to the peril of the military situation. Kerensky hurried to the lines in Galicia and, by his personal influence, succeeded in temporarily restoring

but the forward movement was halted at the main Austrian positions.

Brusiloff then switched his attack to the south of the Dniester in the vicinity of Stanislau with the object of driving a wedge between the Austrian and German lines. A gap was smashed in the enemy's front, the Russians dashed into the opening and, after heavy fighting, pushed their advance across the Lomnica river. At the same time an attack was made on the Dniester itself, with the result that the important town of Halicz was captured.

"Kerensky's Drive" had started most auspiciously. A wedge 20 miles wide and 10 miles deep had been driven into the Austrian lines, and many thousands of prisoners and an immense quantity of war material had been captured.

ANARCHY IN RUSSIAN ARMY

But the Russians' gains were to avail them nothing. The momentary enthusiasm engendered by Kerensky's eloquence vanished completely in the face of the Austro-German counter-attacks. Under the influence of extreme socialistic and pacifist agitators, several units mutinied and refused to fight. Consequently the entire Russian line in Galicia was forced to fall back. In certain sectors whole regiments defied their officers and, throwing away their arms, started in a disorderly march toward the Russian border. The only relieving scenes in this miserable drama were furnished by the efforts of the loyal troops to induce their mutinous comrades to make a stand against the advancing enemy. It is said that a battery of artillery abandoned its guns and, mounting the battery horses, spurred off to the rear. An infantry regiment, infuriated at the sight, opened fire upon the wretched deserters and slew them as they fled. Except in isolated cases, discipline disappeared.

The Austro-Germans followed on the heels of the retreating Russians and quickly occupied Tarnopol, Stanislaw, Czernowitz, and Kolomea. Galicia was now entirely free from invaders for the first time since the war began.

THE GERMANS TAKE RIGA

In September a German army of a quarter of a million men began a drive on Riga. They were opposed by not more than 60,000 troops, all that remained with the colors of the once splendid Russian armies of the north. Naturally, the Russian commander could offer little resistance, and the city was soon occupied. In October the islands which control the mouth of the Gulf of Riga were captured by a combined land and naval attack, and the way lay open for an advance on Petrograd. This movement was never attempted, due

probably to the pressing need for German troops on other fronts.

RUSSIA OUT OF THE WAR

With the advent of the Bolsheviki all fighting ceased. Munition plants were ordered to stop the manufacture of war material, and demobilization of the wreck of the army was begun. The leaders of the Bolsheviki signed an armistice with the Central Powers and, as far as Russia was concerned, the war was over.

The Russian army deserved a better fate than that which befell it as a result of the weakness of the Kerensky government and the treachery of the Bolsheviki. On the whole, German leadership and organization showed its superiority over Russian methods, but, man to man, the Russian soldier had repeatedly outfought Austrian and German, and the armies that won Lemberg and hurled back three great assaults on Warsaw were deserving of a place in the final scene of the lurid world drama that was hurrying to its close. In view of her complete collapse there is a tendency to underestimate the services rendered the Allied cause by Russia. But when we consider how often the Czar's army relieved the pressure in the west at the most critical times, it is easily seen that Russia contributed her full quota to the ultimate triumph.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The best accounts of the Russian Campaigns written in English are to be found in *Nelson's History of the War*, by John Buchan, and in *The London Times History of the War*. Interesting, but of less value, are *The Great War*, by Allan and Whitehead, and *The Elements of the Great War*, by Hilaire Belloc.

Among the books by war correspondents may be mentioned *Victory in Defeat*, *Field Notes from The Russian Front*, *The Russian Campaign*, April 15 to August, 1915, all by Stanley Washburn; *Day by Day with The Russian Army*, by Bernard Pares; *In The Russian Ranks*, by John Morse, and *The First Campaign in Russian Poland*, by Percy Standing.

How Lord Kitchener went to his death when the British cruiser *Hampshire* was sunk June 5, 1916, is told by seaman Rogerson, one of twelve survivors:

"When the explosion occurred Kitchener walked calmly from the Captain's cabin, went up the ladder and on to the quarterdeck. There I saw him walking quite collectedly, talking to two of the officers. All three were wearing khaki and had no overcoats on. Kitchener calmly watched the preparations for abandoning the ship which were going on in a steady and orderly way.

"I do not think Kitchener got into a boat. When I sprang to a raft he was still on the quarterdeck talking with the officers. From the little time that elapsed between my leaving the ship and her sinking, I feel certain Kitchener went down with her and was on deck at the time she sank."

THE SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS

BY MAJOR ROBERT G. GUYER
Corps of Engineers, United States Army

THE TRAGEDY OF A NATION

The Little Balkan Kingdom's Fight for Existence—Thrice Invaded by Austria and Finally Crushed, Then Forced Into Exile

AFTER her dramatic part in the opening events of the World War, Serbia lost her hold on the interest of the world. All attention was centered on the momentous events taking place on the Western and Eastern fronts. After the two lines in France had settled down into the deadlock of trench warfare, no raid or skirmish seemed too insignificant to be heralded in the headlines of the newspapers. The brief dispatches announcing the advance of the Teutons into Serbia were overlooked, and the reports of the typhus epidemic and the exile of the Serbs aroused only a brief and passing interest.

But the events in Serbia were by no means as prosaic and unimportant as this lack of publicity would imply. Serbia was struggling for her very life, fighting a fight in which to be the losers meant death and exile,—and Serbia lost. One of the most valiant and liberty-loving nations of Europe was wiped out of existence and abandoned to the horrors of invasion and occupation.

The opening of the World War found Serbia poorly prepared for the coming conflict. In the course of the Balkan Wars she had lost at least a tenth of her best fighting troops, and these losses had not been replaced. But at the news of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war the mountaineers hastened to the defense of their country. Thousands of Serbs returning from the United States helped to swell the number of recruits. It is probable that Serbia entered the conflict with at least 280,000 men in her army, not including the third reserve of 50,000 men, which could be used only in the gravest emergency.

A further weakness in the Serbian army lay in its lack of powerful artillery. Most of its cannon had seen strenuous service in the Balkan Wars and were, in consequence, in poor condition. With her enemy able to shoot farther, more accurately, and more rapidly, Serbia was handicapped from the very beginning.

But several things explain why Serbia with her comparatively small and poorly-equipped army was able to make such a stubborn resistance to the Austrians. In the first place, the Serbians had already fought two successful wars and they had triumphed so completely that it is no wonder that they thought themselves unconquerable and their leaders infallible. Then, again, the Serbian soldier was a seasoned veteran, and danger and bloodshed no longer caused him fear and horror. Finally, he was fighting to keep the invaders out of his country and to preserve his home and fireside.

Another factor gave the Serbian army great strength,—the method of recruiting. This system was purely territorial and resulted in greater cohesion among the troops. The men were from the same district in each unit, possibly from the same town, possibly even blood relations, so that when they stood shoulder to shoulder in the battle it was like the members of one great family fighting side by side. However, this system resulted in one disadvantage, that of double allegiance. Each soldier had a twofold patriotism, one for his district and one for his country. The danger lay in the fact that once a Serbian soldier's district or town was taken by the enemy, half



King Peter of Serbia

© Underwood and Underwood.

Peter Karageorgevitch, one of the oldest kings of Europe, belonged to one of the newest dynasties, for his great-grandfather was a swineherd. His character was a picturesque combination of primitive virtues and modern vices. He aroused his people to passionate enthusiasm.

his interest in the fight was gone. He still fought bravely but his incentive had been diminished.

SERBIA'S ABLE GENERAL

The Serbian army was fortunate in the possession of a competent and experienced commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Putnik. He was trained at the Military Academy of Belgrade and during his career served with distinction in every war in the Balkans. Because of his political sympathies he was forced to live in retirement for some time, during which he devoted himself exclusively to military studies. When King Peter ascended the throne he was recalled to active service and promoted to the grade of general. He was put at the head of the army when the first Balkan War broke out, and was raised in rank to *Voivode*, equivalent in other armies to Field Marshal. Possessing a most remarkable memory for topography, he was able, without leaving his room, to direct the movements of his troops with perfect knowledge of the country in which they were operating. His soldiers were devoted to him and had absolute confidence in his leadership and powers.

North of the Danube, preparing for the attack on Serbia, were the Austrian forces, which were practically unlimited in number. Moreover, they were fully equipped, and their armament was of the best, including artillery of much greater caliber and range than that of the Serbs. However, these forces were made up largely of people of the Slavic provinces, and while there may have been minor hatreds between these Slavic peoples, still they did not view with much enthusiasm this contemplated attack of people of the same nationality. Moreover, the Magyars in the Austrian army had no particular reason to hate the Serbians. Perhaps this condition had much to do with Austrian defeats.

TOPOGRAPHICAL FACTORS

The ground upon which Serb was to meet Austria was well known by each combatant, to the Serb because it was his native land, and to the Austrian because the Austrian army officers had mapped almost all of Serbia during the years before the great conflict.

To understand the coming campaigns it is

necessary to consider Serbia's location and frontiers, and the main topographic features of the country.

To the north of Serbia, across the Save River and the Danube, lies Hungary; to the south is Greece. Rumania and Bulgaria form the eastern boundary, while on the west, across the Drina River, is the Austrian province of Bosnia. South of Bosnia is Montenegro, with Albania to the south of that. The greater part of the country is mountainous and on the west the mountains form a great barrier.

"Through the mass of the Balkan Mountains rivers have cut two great trenches, which constitute the only important lines of communication in the region. One of these passageways or 'corridors' runs southeastward from Belgrade on the Danube to Constantinople on the Bosphorus and consists in a large part of the valleys of the Morava and the Maritza Rivers. The other connects Belgrade with the harbor of Salonika on the Ægean Sea and is formed by the Morava and the Vardar valleys. From Belgrade as far as Nish the Morava valley is common to both routes." (*Topography and Strategy in the War*, by Professor D. W. Johnston.)


This mountainous condition of the region and the very few natural routes from place to place have resulted in there being few passable roads. During the rains the highways are a sea of mud and the Serbs have the only means of transportation that will pass over them—ox-drawn wagons. Automobiles and horse-drawn vehicles are practically out of the question. The railroads are all single track, resulting in congestion and delayed shipments during times of emergency. Although these poor means of communication made the moving of the Serbian army from one front to another difficult, they operated most effectively in their favor when their enemies entered Serbian territory.

THE FIRST INVASION—JULY-AUGUST, 1914

Austria declared war on Serbia July 28, 1914, and if her army, on that day, had crossed the Danube, it would have been able to take Belgrade with practically no opposition. But she delayed and, when she was at last ready to move against Serbia, her foe was mobilized and ready for her.

Austria's ostensible purpose was to punish the Serbians, but her real purpose was to gain possession of the Morava-Vardar trench.

Austria's general staff realized the difficulties of crossing the Danube, and its general plan called for a main attack that should begin at another quarter. It will be remembered that the Austro-Serbian frontier is formed on the north by the Danube and the Save, and on the west by the Drina. These two smaller streams have many fords, especially in summer,



N. Pashitch

The Serbian Prime Minister who devoted himself manfully to secure his country's freedom.

and numerous islands in the channel form screens for preparing pontoon bridges and loading barges. To many of the principal fords Austria had built strategic railroads, as it was obvious that this was the part of the frontier that could best be crossed in an invasion of Serbia.

The Serbian general staff expected the advance of the Austrians to come from this direction; yet there were many other points where an attack in force might be made. Realizing this, it prepared a general plan that contemplated placing at each point a strong

enough force to hold or retard the enemy until reinforcements from other points could come up. As soon as the Austrians had reached Serbian soil, an attack in full force would be made upon them.

There were two main points, then, where Austria could make the attack; one, on the north near Belgrade, which had the advantage of offering the shortest route to the Morava-Vardar trench, but entailed the difficult crossing of the Danube; the other, on the west, which, while making a longer journey necessary, had the advantage of natural covering and easy crossings.

The Serbians prepared in anticipation of either event. Outposts were stationed along both lines, while the main army was held in rear ready to move when it became certain where the principal attack would be made. Resolutely the Serbs awaited the assault.

The Austrians commenced hostilities on the morning of July 29, 1914, by a heavy cannonading along the Danube front, in particular upon Belgrade. From an island opposite Belgrade a pontoon bridge was started and barges loaded with soldiers moved to the opposite shore where they were vigorously repulsed by the Serbians. But these demonstrations were only feints made in the hope of causing the Serbians to believe that this was the main attack so that they would rush their main army to this point. Field Marshal Putnik saw through this deception and waited for the real advance of the Austrians to be made.

On August 6th word was received at Serbian headquarters that great bodies of Austrian soldiers were moving through Bosnia toward the Save and the Drina. It was plain, then, that the attack was coming from the west.

The invasion covered a front of fully one hundred miles, and six strong columns of Austrians were driven into Serbia. In each case the crossing was accomplished by building pontoon bridges and loading barges with soldiers behind the islands in the channel of the river. Then a heavy bombardment would be made upon the Serbian defensive position and under cover of this the Austrians would move out from behind the islands and force their way to the opposite shore. The small Serbian forces were unable to repel these advances.


The principal crossings were made at Shabatz on the Save and at Losnitza on the Drina,

both on August 12th. At Losnitza the Austrians, after crossing the river, constructed a strong defensive position. Next they built a pontoon bridge and the main Austrian army came across.

The six columns of Austrians were moving so as to converge upon Valjevo, the terminus of a small single track railroad that joined the main line not far from the city. Once in pos-

Tzer Mountains, while on the south are the Iverak ridges. Moreover, the Tzer Mountains separated the Austrian force that had taken Shabatz from that which had effected a crossing at Losnitza.

The struggle then would consist of the attempt of the Austrians to take the heights on either side of the Jadar, thus opening the way to Valjevo and making possible a junction



The Austro-Serbian Frontier

session of Valjevo the Austrians would have an open door to the heart of Serbia,—the Morava Valley.

FAILURE OF AUSTRIAN PLANS

From Losnitza runs the Jadar River along a level valley which narrows as it approaches Valjevo. The Austrians planned to advance their main army up this valley to Valjevo, their first objective. But before an advance of this kind could take place, the complete possession of the ridges on each side of the Jadar was necessary. North of the Jadar rise the

with the force at Shabatz. The Serbians in turn would attempt with as small forces as possible to confine the Austrian force at Shabatz in the city and to hold their left flank, while the main army would be used to fight for the ridges. If they took the ridges they would drive a wedge in between the Austrian forces and expose their flanks.

And this is what the six days' battle beginning on August 14th consisted of. The Serbians, by forced marches, were able to assemble their main army and meet the Austrians advancing from Losnitza, and here upon the ridges occurred the most desperate

fighting. Another column of Austrians, having crossed the Drina farther south, threatened the Serbian left flank, and, at the same time, the Austrian force at Shabatz, forcing their way out of the city, endangered the Serbian right flank. But before either of these two dangers could materialize, the Serbians had driven the Austrians from the Tzer Mountains and the Iverak ridges. The re-

THE SECOND INVASION—SEPTEMBER, 1914

In September the Serbians took the offensive by joining Montenegro in an attack upon the Bosnian capital, Serajevo. This drove the Austrians to a fresh offensive and they massed three army corps on the Drina. On September 8th they attempted the crossing of the Drina and were at first successful, but when



© Underwood and Underwood.

King Nicholas of Montenegro and His Family

King Nicholas of the Black Mountain Land became a king without a country. This picture shows the Queen, the King, and Princess Xenia, seated (from left to right); standing (from right to left), Prince Danilo Alexander, the Premier of Montenegro, and (at the extreme left) Princess Jutta, wife of the Crown Prince.

treat of the Austrian center caused the falling back of the flanks and shortly the entire line was in full retreat. The Serbians pressed the advantage with vigor, causing the Austrians to turn and flee for the Drina. Great numbers were killed and captured, and thousands perished in attempting to re-cross the rivers. By the morning of August 24th Serbia was cleared of the Austrians, and the first campaign closed with a great victory for Serbia's army.

reinforcements came up the Serbians were able to drive them back across the river. The attack was resumed the next day and the Austrians secured a foothold on the Serbian side. On the 15th the Serbians made a great effort and drove back the Austrian center; but the right flank of the Austrians maintained its position, giving it the control of a bridgehead and the road from Liubovia to Valjevo. The losses sustained by the Austrians in these operations were heavy.

THE THIRD INVASION—OCTOBER, 1914

The third great Austrian offensive matured toward the end of October, 1914. Austria wished to punish Serbia for her two former humiliating defeats, but mostly she desired to secure control of the Morava-Vardar trench, with a view to establishing communications with Turkey.

Her plan of campaign was to advance through Valjevo to the western Morava and then down this valley to Nish, the temporary

defensive position. To have remained in the low lands and attempt the defense of Valjevo would have been unwise, for they would have been outflanked by the Austrians coming from the Drina on the west and by those coming from the Danube on the northeast. By the middle of November the whole Serbian army was on these ridges, the extreme left flank in position to defend the approaches to the western Morava from Bosnia.

Without opposition the Austrians had advanced from the Save and the Danube and



Austrian Prisoners En Route to Valjevo

capital of Serbia. This route was adopted rather than the more direct one by way of the Great Morava, because, at two places, the river narrows afforded an easy means of defense for the Serbians.

South of Valjevo is a semicircular ridge which forms a watershed between the Western Morava and the river Kolubara which runs from the hills near Valjevo to the Save at Obrenovatz. This main ridge is divided into two parts: on the west is Maljen ridge, on the east Rudnik ridge.

Before the wide advance of the Austrians, the Serbians could do nothing better than to fall back on this ridge and take up a strong

had taken up a position south of Valjevo facing the ridges.

After an unaccountable delay of two weeks, the Austrians, on December 1st, began their attack, which contemplated sweeping south-eastward with powerful wings and enclosing the Serbian army, while the Austrian center advanced directly upon the ridges. During the next two days they gained positions on the lower hills and the western ridge of Rudnik.

The situation of the Serbians was precarious, unless they took the initiative and struck a telling blow. Exhorted by King Peter, they were aroused to the highest degree of passionate enthusiasm and determination. On the

afternoon of December 3rd came the moment for the Serbians to strike. Sweeping down from the ridges, they engaged the Austrians in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle. All along the line the Serbians were successful; the Austrians began a retreat which soon turned into a flight. The left and the center escaped northward through Shabatz and Belgrade, but the right flank, caught in the hills, was annihilated. On December 15th, the Serbians retook Belgrade. The Austrians, defeated decisively in a third campaign, reached their territory with only a remnant of their great army.

Serbia had rendered the Allied cause an inestimable service, for she had kept busy a large part of the Austrian army, the loss of which had much to do with Austria's failure in the Russian campaign.

ARMED TRUCE

The Austrians had received such a whipping that for nearly a year they kept strictly to their own territory, giving the Serbians a much-needed chance to recuperate. But the Serbians were not yet at the end of their troubles, for an epidemic of typhus, which had broken out among the troops at Valjevo, began to spread throughout the whole country. The Serbian soldiers, exhausted by three years of warfare, easily fell victims to this scourge and perished by the thousands. The ravages were terrible in the villages and towns which were crowded with fugitives from the territory that had been invaded. Hundreds of men, women, and children dropped dead in the streets, entire families were wiped out, and the scenes of suffering and horror were heartrending.

SERBIA RAVAGED BY TYPHUS

The fever was the terrible variety known as the spotted typhus. As the Serbian sanitary organizations were unable to cope with the situation, appeals were made to the Allies. All responded with doctors, nurses, and money. Russia, especially, rendered great aid, sending her best doctors and nurses and erecting many hospitals. The fight against the plague was a slow one, but finally science and heroism prevailed. By the end of April, 1915,

the last traces of the epidemic were stamped out.

The Serbian army, greatly weakened by the ravages of the epidemic and the campaign just finished, began once more to recruit and train its forces and gather supplies and munitions, for the Serbs well knew that, at some time in the near future, their enemies would return to the attack. The two armies occupied the opposite banks of the boundary rivers, and,



© Underwood and Underwood.

Crowds in Athens Waiting to Hear News from the Serbian Front

although artillery and rifle fire were exchanged, no actual attempt was made by either side to cross the boundary. Thus they waited for the word which would launch the campaign that in the end was to make Serbia an exile from her own country.

THE FOURTH INVASION

As early as the spring of 1915 Germany and Austria began to mass troops in Hungary with the end in view of pushing Serbia out of the path to Constantinople. Besieged by the Allies as they were, the Central Powers were

becoming more and more in need of an outlet to neutral territories and to the sea. Constantinople must be reached; the Turks needed munitions while the Central Powers needed food.

Moreover, a successful campaign would have to be carried on this time to wipe out the stain of the first campaigns which had ended in such utter defeat for the Austrians. As the Austrian Slavic and Magyar troops had shown themselves ill-fitted for battle



King Ferdinand of Bulgaria

against the Serbians, it was planned this time to make the attack solely with seasoned German troops, leaving the Austrian soldiers only the duties of guarding the frontier and the conquered territory. The importance that the Central Powers placed on this campaign was shown by the fact that the famous Field Marshal von Mackensen was placed in command of the invading troops. Only a campaign of the greatest importance would be intrusted to a general of such marked ability and merit.

The Serbians saw that a fresh attack upon them was imminent. They felt that they could not single-handed cope with this new army

that was massing against them. They, therefore, appealed to the Allies for aid.

In their handling of this situation the Allies made their greatest diplomatic and military blunder of the war. Instead of understanding the conditions on the Balkan front and sending the much-needed military aid to the Serbians, the Russian, British and French governments replied that this aid could be obtained from Bulgaria. It was in vain that the Serbian statesmen and diplomats pointed out to the Allied governments that Bulgaria was their worst enemy, reminding them of the Second Balkan War, in which the Bulgarians had traitorously turned against them at the instigation of the Central Powers; and that Sofia was a strong center of Austro-German influence with the German-born king the agent of this influence.

All in vain. The Allies refused to listen and, turning to Bulgaria, tried to buy her aid for Serbia by offering to secure for her a coveted part of Rumania. The Bulgarians skilfully prolonged negotiations so as to give themselves time to mobilize their forces. Consternation reigned in Serbia. Another appeal was sent to the Allies, the mobilization of the Bulgarians being pointed out. But the Allies calmly replied that this mobilization simply meant that the Bulgarians were preparing to come to the aid of the threatened Serbians. The Serbians, in desperation, then asked permission to cross the frontier with their army and attack the Bulgarians before they completed their mobilization. In five days they could be at Sofia, and with the Bulgarian army out of the way, they could turn their full strength against the menace in the north. But the Allies met this request with the warning that, if the Serbians broke the peace of the Balkans, they would do so at their own peril. Thus leaving Serbia with an enemy at her front and at her rear, the Allies could now only look on while the Central Powers, aided by the Bulgarians, proceeded to strangle her and drive her from her home.

SERBIA'S TASK

The Serbian plan of defense was necessarily made simple by the circumstances. With 200,000 Germans and Austrians concentrated on her northern frontier and as many Bul-

garians massed on her eastern border, Serbia had only to choose on which of the two fronts to make the primary defense. Since she had more to fear from the Germans, the main Serbian army prepared to defend the northern boundary, while small forces only were sent to defend the Bulgarian frontier. This disposition was made under the assumption that Greece, Serbia's ally, would bear the brunt of the Bulgarian offensive. But at the last minute, when King Constantine of Greece repudiated the treaty and refused to order his army to the support of Serbia, Serbia had to weaken her northern defense by sending more troops to meet the Bulgarian advance.

The main objective of the Central Powers was to open the Morava-Maritza trench to Constantinople; and Bulgaria, coming to their assistance, very much simplified their plan. The German forces were to advance against Serbia and form a junction with the Bulgarians at Nish, the temporary capital of Serbia. The left flank of the Bulgarian army was to advance westward, occupy the Vardar valley and thus, by cutting off the Serbian communications with Salonika, isolate Serbia from any possible assistance from the Allies.

And so, as this campaign began, Serbia with her army of about 250,000 had to defend her northern frontier where the Germans and Austrians were massed against her, and her eastern boundary where 400,000 Bulgarians were making ready to advance against her main line of communications. Her task was indeed gigantic and her stubborn fight against such great odds must excite the deepest admiration.

THE CONQUEST OF SERBIA—FALL OF 1915

On October 6th, 1915, the Austro-German attack commenced. Heavy artillery fire prepared the way and protected the columns of infantry as they attempted to cross the river. The Serbians fought desperately and the crossings proved to be costly affairs to the invaders, but at five points below and above Belgrade the Teutons were successful. These places were all near the northern entrance to the Morava trench and located at the terminals of Hungarian railways. Attempts were also made to effect a crossing at Orsova, the only

other railhead on the Danube frontier, but this was not successful until the Serbians, threatened with envelopment, had withdrawn their defenders.

The northern frontier had at last been forced, but the advance of the Germans southward was by no means rapid, for the Serbians fought stubbornly. For a period of six weeks the rate of advance was about a mile a week. In spite of the invaders' superiority in numbers and artillery, it was slow work driving the Serbians from their positions. Before the Danube had been freed of the Serbians more than two weeks had elapsed. An Austrian force crossed the Drina on the northwestern frontier, but was unable to drive out the Serbians, and after ten days' fighting, had made no progress toward the head of the western Morava valley.

Meanwhile the Bulgarian Ally of the Germans moved westward through the mountain gaps, with the intention of capturing important points on the Nish-Salonika railroad. In less than two weeks this vital artery was cut in four places, including Uskub and Veles, which were defended by only small forces of Serbians. On the north, the right wing of the Bulgarian line directed its advance against Nish from both the southeast and the northeast. Progress was much slower here, but when Nish at last fell, the Serbians, fearing to be cut off by the Germans advancing southward and the Bulgarians advancing northward, withdrew southwestward from their position in the northeast corner of their country. On about November 13th, more than a month since the beginning of the campaign, the Central Powers possessed the entire Morava-Maritza trench, and the Morava-Vardar trench as far south as Veles. Their task now was to make this tenure secure by driving back to Salonika the Franco-British forces that too late had come to the aid of Serbia, and by pushing the Serbians across the mountains to the Adriatic.

A GREAT NATIONAL DEFEAT

Serbia was now completely cut off from any possible aid from the Allies. Moreover there was no way to get in supplies and munitions and her stock was rapidly becoming exhausted. Had there been open valleys westward so that supplies could have been sent from Italy, the

outcome of the Balkan campaign would have been very different. But such was not the case, and Serbia could only continue to use her diminishing supply of munitions to make the enemies' advance as costly as possible.

Thinking that it would make it much harder, if not impossible, for the Germans to bring up their heavy guns, thus lessening the rate of advance, the Serbians withdrew westward to the mountains, and took up a position running eastward along the crests south of the valley of the Western Morava, then southward along the ridge of the mountains west of the Morava-Vardar trench, and lastly southeastward across the Katchanik gorge. Thus the Serbian forces faced north, east, and southeast, with the mountain barrier and the Adriatic beyond at their back.

It soon became plain that the Katchanik gorge was the key to the Serbian position, for if the Bulgarians could break through at this point they could then turn northward and attack the rear of the Serbian line. Retreat would be converted into disaster. For the Bulgarians, in turn, the city of Veles was the key to Katchanik gorge, for if the Anglo-French forces could advance northward and capture it, the Bulgarian flank would be threatened, and then the Bulgarian forces attacking Katchanik gorge would have to be withdrawn.

The Bulgarians were well aware of the strategic value of Veles and concentrated a strong force in its vicinity. The English and French forces failed to reach Veles and the attacks against Katchanik gorge continued without interruption.

When Katchanik gorge could no longer be held the Serbian forces on the north and east moved southward to the Ipek basin, while the right flank withdrew to the Monastir basin. The remainder of the campaign consisted in driving the remnants of the Serbian army westward over the mountains into Albania, and in forcing the Anglo-French forces and the Serbs near Monastir back to Salonika.

The vulnerable part of the Anglo-French position was the single track railway running north from Salonika, and, in particular, the Iron Gate of the Vardar where the railroad must pass through by means of a tunnel at one point and a bridge at another. If the Bulgarians should be able to destroy the

bridge, the tunnel, or the narrow roadbed in the gorge, the Anglo-French forces would be caught in a trap. Additional troops were now sent south for the attack upon the Iron Gate of the Vardar, the pressure becoming so great that the Anglo-French forces were compelled to withdraw to Salonika. Outside this city they were able to repel the invaders, thus causing the Central Powers to close the campaign at the borders of Greece instead of at the Mediterranean.

THE RETREAT INTO ALBANIA

Meanwhile the movement of pushing the Serbian army westward progressed but slowly



The Effect of Firing on Cupolas

The top dotted line shows the line of flight of a siege howitzer shell, the exact range having been ascertained by the Germans before war was declared. The bottom dotted lines represent field gun fire, and show the shell glancing off the cupolas.

because of the difficult character of the country and the stubborn resistance of the Serbians. Soon, however, the retreat turned into a flight. The wreck of Marshal Putnik's army, together with thousands of Serb peasants, struggled over the Albanian Mountains toward the Adriatic. The hardships of this march were terrible. Whirling blizzards enveloped the fugitives as they staggered and fell along the ice-covered trails. Thousands and thousands perished of hunger and exposure.

"Probably not since the crossing of the Alps by Napoleon has such a military expedition been undertaken as the traversing of the Albanian mountains by the Headquarters Staff and the remains of the Serbian Army. But Napoleon made his march after long and

careful preparation, while the unfortunate Serbs began theirs when their army was in the last stages of destitution, without food, with uniforms in rags, and with utterly inadequate means of transportation. . . . We slowly climbed foot by foot to the snow-capped summit of the mountains. Up and up we went, thousands and thousands of feet. Every few hundred yards we came on bodies of men frozen or starved to death. . . ." (*Through the Serbian Campaign*, by Gordon Gordon-Smith.)

"Those who took the army route saw sights more terrible than those we saw. With us mainly it was pack-horses that we looked down upon, dashed to death at the foot of the precipices. The other route was full of human wreckage, with officers, soldiers, artillery, and horses jumbled together in the gorges below, and dead refugees lying on the slopes above." (*With Serbia Into Exile*, by Fortier Jones.)

Yet the marvel of the episode is not the number that perished in this terrible flight but the number that escaped and finally reached a haven of safety.

The first point on the Adriatic reached by the refugees was Scutari; but even here they were not left at peace, for Austrian troops were pushing south through Montenegro. So the flight was continued southward and the hardships were increased by attacking Albanian bands in Austrian pay. The Italian navy came to the aid of the Serbs and transported thousands to the island of Corfu, where in a short time were assembled the Serbian government and the Serbian army—all that was left of independent Serbia.

The tragedy of Belgium is known to everyone, but few know of the catastrophe and exile of courageous Serbia. Belgium's fate was inevitable, but the misfortunes that overtook Serbia are the more terrible and regrettable because they were unnecessary.

The Central Powers had established direct communications with Constantinople and thousands of tons of munitions and supplies were sent to the Turks. The immediate re-

sult of this was the abandonment by the Allies of the enterprise in the Dardanelles. Mr. Gordon Gordon-Smith states in his *Through the Serbian Campaign*: "But it is when we consider what would have happened if the Allies had listened to the councils of the Balkan Governments that the colossal nature of the errors committed becomes apparent. As far back as July, when the Austro-German menace first became apparent, the Serbian Government urged the Allies to send a quarter of a million men to the Danube front. If this had been done the Austro-German armies would have found themselves opposed by half a million men (250,000 Anglo-French troops and 250,000 Serbs). With such a guarantee Rumania would not have hesitated to move. This would have meant an additional 600,000 men at the disposal of the Allies, making a total of eleven hundred thousand bayonets at the Danube front. Under these circumstances M. Venizelos (the prime minister of Greece), who was then in power, would have forced King Constantine's hand and 300,000 Greeks would have swelled the forces of the Allies."

Opposed by such a force as this the Central Powers would not have been able to open up the Morava-Maritza trench to Constantinople, and, therefore, the Turks, deprived of munitions from Germany, would have been forced to give way to the English at the Dardanelles. Furthermore, with a million and a half men, the Allies could have advanced across the Danube, and, overcoming the Austrian army, would have so threatened Germany that peace would quickly have followed.

But if the Allies had only sent aid to Serbia at the proper time, thousands of innocent lives would have been saved and a valiant nation would not have been driven from her own fireside.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nelson's History of the War, by John Buchan; *London Times History of the War*; also *With Serbia into Exile*, by Paul Fortier Jones, and *Through the Serbian Campaign*, by Gordon Gordon-Smith.

THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Unsuccessful Allied Naval Attack—Battles of the Landings and Deadlock —Abortive Attacks of August, 1915—The Evacuation

By J. H. GRANT

Major, Infantry, United States Army

I

OBJECTS OF THE EXPEDITION

IN the spring of 1915 the Allies launched their long-expected attack against the Dardanelles. The motives behind this attack were both political and military. The political aspects of the situation were to be found in the Balkans where Bulgaria wavered on the brink of war. The hesitancy of this nation in entering the conflict was a cause for alarm in Paris and London, where the side on which Bulgaria would fight was a matter of conjecture. One moment this turbulent people favored the Allies, the next they leaned quite as distinctly toward the German Powers. It was hoped by the Entente statesmen that a sudden blow aimed at the heart of the Turkish Empire would help in bringing Bulgaria to a decision by convincing her of the Allied ability and determination to win at all costs. The shock of the fall of Constantinople would be felt at Sofia and that shock should have a salutary effect upon the vacillating King Ferdinand.

The military reasons dictating an attempt on Constantinople and the Dardanelles are to be found in the importance of that waterway to Russia. Odessa, on the Black Sea, is the great shipping point for southeastern Russia, the granary of Europe. From Odessa through the Dardanelles steamed the Muscovite ships bearing grain to the nations of western Europe, and, through these same straits, before the portentous days of 1914, passed the steamers of England and France, bearing munitions to the armies of the Czar. Thanks to the British fleet and the fertile fields of the western world, England and France might

make shift to get along without Russian grain, but the soldiers of the Grand Duke Nicholas were practically dependent for munitions upon the factories of their allies. Without these sinews of war, the claws of the Bear were drawn.

There were other ways of supplying Russia, it is true, but they, in times of need, were of little value. Vladivostok, on the Pacific, was far away, and was connected with European Russia by a single line of railroad. Archangel, in the north, was ice-bound several months of the year. Transshipment of supplies across the Scandinavian peninsula and the Baltic was impossible, for the Baltic was a German lake. The Mediterranean route via the Dardanelles was the only practical means of communication, and, when Turkey entered the war as Germany's ally, the *Dardanelles were closed*. This fact spelt inevitable ruin for Russia. With this nation out of the conflict, the road before the other Allies would be dark and doubtful. But if Russia could be kept in the field and her soldiers supplied, it was felt that her great potential strength in man-power must ultimately bring victory to the Allied cause.

Nor was the salvation of Russia the only thing to be accomplished from a military viewpoint. A blow aimed at the Turkish capital would immobilize a large part of the Ottoman Army, keeping troops in Constantinople who otherwise might be employed against England in Egypt, or Russia in the Caucasus. Enver and Talaat would see to it that this army was large, larger than needed, perhaps, for Constantinople was, to the Moslem, Turkey's Palladium. The capture of that city meant revolution in Turkey and the

downfall of Talaat, Enver, and the other rulers of the sons of Osman.

That there was much to be gained from the proposed attack even the most fatuous admitted. But as to the method thereof the wise men disagreed. Meanwhile, precious minutes skipped merrily off into eternity. At last the Navy was sent to the attack, and the sullen echoes of the thunderous guns of

the forts with their fire from a safe distance out at sea, the troops would land. Once landed, they would proceed with rifle and bayonet to capture the forts. Then the fleet could sail serenely on to Constantinople. It sounds absurdly simple, yet man, aided by nature, was to set insurmountable difficulties in the way.

THE COMBATANTS

Early in April, 1915, the Allied expedition began to assemble in Egypt, whence it was to be moved to the advance base at Mudros on the isle of Lemnos.

General Sir Ian Hamilton, the commander-in-chief, was a soldier who had served with distinction in South Africa and in several Indian border wars. However, this was his first important command, and the theater of operations, Gallipoli, was entirely unfamiliar to him.

Never was a general officer given a more heterogeneous force with which to accomplish so difficult a task. Unity of organization was not only lacking, but was practically impossible. French territorials, Senegalese, English regulars, English volunteers and the men of the "Younger Nations," who were to win glory under the name of "Anzacs," were all grouped together and called an army. The total strength of the force designed to "see the Navy through" amounted to about 120,000 officers and men, or not quite three complete Army corps.

Of these troops, a British division, the French territorials, and one brigade of the Royal Naval Division were men who had had the benefits of long training in times of peace. All the others, comprising more than half the command, had enlisted but a few months before. From a military standpoint their category was that of the recruit. Such was the composition and training of the force that was to attempt a task which might well have daunted the flower of a veteran army.

MEAGRENESS OF BRITISH FORCES


Pertinently the question arises, why so small a force for so important an undertaking? Two men knew the answer to that perplexing question: Sir John French and Marshal Joffre. The former protested against the sending of



General Sir Ian Hamilton
Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

the fleet proclaimed to the world, a fact long proven, that a fleet of itself cannot destroy up-to-date land fortifications. Two thousand men and three battleships were the cost of this lesson. Shot and shell had left every modern fort practically unscathed and still ready for instant action. Then and then only was a land expedition decided upon.

The expeditionary force was sent out for but one purpose, to second the attack of the fleet. While the big battleships smothered



The South End of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Dardanelles

Showing the beaches where the British landed in a vain effort to capture the impregnable Turkish positions. The figures indicate elevations. See also color map of Gallipoli in Vol. IV.

British troops needed on the Western front to any other place, while Joffre justly refused to weaken his battle line in France by a single division for use on a subsidiary operation. At the moment no more troops were available, and time pressed for swift action. Half-measures in this case, thought Downing Street, were better than no measures at all.

Meanwhile the Turk, forewarned by the naval bombardment in March, was mustering his forces for the protection of his capital. Nominally, the Ottoman military establishment was based on universal conscription, but actually only the Mussulman population was drawn upon. Nor in practice could all Moslems within the empire be counted upon to fill up the cadres, for the Arabs were more often opposed to, than incorporated in, the army. The conscript served for twenty years, nine of which were in the first line (Nizam), nine in the active reserve, and two in the territorial militia.

THE TURKISH RESOURCES

The unit was the army corps, composed of three divisions of ten battalions each, with the necessary complement of artillery, engineer and sanitary troops. In time of peace there were fourteen such Army Corps grouped at strategic points within the empire, four in Europe and ten in Asia Minor. The total peace strength of the army was about a quarter million officers and men. If equipment could be provided this force could be expanded in time of war to approximately 800,000 men.

The artillery was for the most part out of date, though, early in 1914, both Germany and Austria reinforced that arm by several heavy batteries.

Enver Bey, "who fancied himself a combination of Napoleon and Frederick the Great," commanded the army. The German Military Mission in charge of the reorganization of the Ottoman forces was fulfilling all the functions of a General Staff. At the head of the Mission were Generals Liman von Sanders and Marshal von der Goltz.

The Turkish foot soldier had for many years enjoyed a high reputation as a first-class fighting man, particularly on the defensive. Cool, courageous, of excellent phys-

ique, he had in the past, under a series of brilliant officers, achieved many notable victories in spite of a rudimentary transport and commissariat. Inspired by love for Islam and the Padishah, he had been invincible. But more recently his fame had suffered a certain eclipse. Badly led, poorly armed and cared for, his morale had been severely shaken. The German mind is unlike the Oriental, even in methods of ferocity, and the German system of military training was ill-suited to the Turkish nature. To say that the efforts of General von Sanders and Marshal von der Goltz were without fruit is perhaps too much, but certainly the grafting of German on Turk was unlike the parent tree. The machine created lacked precision for one thing; for another it lacked motive, for Mohammedanism and the Padishah were inconspicuous in the aspirations of the Committee of Union and Progress.

At the outbreak of hostilities about six of the Turkish Army Corps, expanded to full war strength, were concentrated on the shores of the Sea of Marmora. This force numbered between 250,000 and 300,000 men. These were the troops (or such a portion of them as might be necessary) who were to defend Gallipoli and Constantinople from the Allied attack.

THE TOPOGRAPHY

The theater of operations for the combined naval and land attack comprised the peninsula of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. Of old, this rocky bit of land and these narrow straits had been the setting of momentous events. Here the Occident and the Orient come nearest to meeting and here the armies of the east passed over to essay the conquest of the west or else the soldiers of the west crossed to the conquest of the east. These straits and this peninsula witnessed the first great conflict of European and Asiatic when the Grecian myriads under Agamemnon landed to attack "windy Ilium" and the Trojan folk. Here, too, at a later date, came that mighty monarch Xerxes, King of Persia, and over this narrow strip of waters he built the famous bridge of boats which was to carry his army across to the conquest of the stubborn Greeks. And here finally, but a scant century and a half after Xerxes, came Alexander

the Great, moving east to the subjugation of the world.

Now, once more, Gallipoli and the Dardanelles were to become the place of conflict between the west and the east. In order to understand rightly the difficulties faced by one set of combatants and the facilities for defense found by the other, it is necessary to view for a moment this historic ground.

GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

The peninsula of Gallipoli is a long finger of hilly land stretching out from southeastern Europe. On one side it is bounded by the *Ægean* Sea, on the other by the Dardanelles. At its base it is four or five miles broad, gradually tapering until just south of Bulair it narrows to a scant three miles. From this point it broadens in a westerly direction until it attains its maximum width of twelve miles, twenty-three miles south of Bulair. From the widest point it again tapers off to a narrow neck beyond which is the final blunt tongue of the peninsula at Capes Helles and Tekke.

Viewed from the sea, Gallipoli seems to be a mass of gently-rolling hills rising from the shore. Closer inspection, however, reveals the fact that there is practically *no* shore, the seemingly gentle hills rising with cliff-like abruptness from the very waves. Only here and there is this forbidding shore-line of hill and cliff broken by a ravine or gully created by the winter rains in their rush to the sea. Generally these indentations are moon-shaped, offering a short stretch of beach varying from 50 to 250 yards in extent. The depth of the beach in an inland direction varies from 9 to 50 yards, then the hill slope begins. With the exception of places such as these, Gallipoli offers no landing place below Bulair, well to the north on the western side.

The interior of the peninsula is rough and hilly, the elevations extending from 400 feet to well above 900. All these hills are cut by gulches and ravines and are covered with a scrubby underbrush of thorn. All told, the terrain is admirably suited to defense, for the obstacles in the way of an attacking force are many.

Roads are few and poor, winding their tortuous way along the side of the hills in a hap-

hazard fashion from village to village. There are few springs and no streams on the peninsula.

THE BACKBONE OF THE DEFENSE

From a tactical and strategical standpoint, three features of the topography are to be particularly noted, namely, the Achi Baba



Constantinople, from the Galata Bridge
Looking toward Stamboul

ridge, the heights of Sari Bair, and the elevation of Pasha Dagh. The bastion of Achi Baba occupies a ridge which is a little over 400 feet high and which runs squarely across the toe of the peninsula. Sari Bair, fronting Gaba Tepe, rises to nearly 900 feet and covers the approaches at Gaba Tepe. The Pasha Dagh eminence, dominating the other two, is the key point to Constantinople. These three heights form roughly a blunt salient whose apex is at Maidos on the Dardanelles.

Near the apex, too, is the keypoint, Pasha Dagh.

These three positions formed the backbone of the defensive system. All were strongly fortified with trenches, dugouts and gun emplacements. Barbed wire was skilfully concealed in the foreground. Nor were these the only points where men had taken advantage of nature: each hill that commanded a stretch of

II

BATTLE OF THE LANDING

ON the 24th of April the troopships, with their convoy, set sail for Gallipoli. From the decks of a battleship General Hamilton had, some weeks before, made a hasty survey of the scene of operations and decided upon



Turkish Infantry Ready to Leave for the Dardanelles

These troops had been trained by Germans and were largely German-led, the Turkish Army for some years before the war having been virtually under the command of Generals von Sanders and von der Goltz.

beach, each gully that sloped toward a flank, each cliff that frowned down on a landing place, had been fortified. A machine-gun nest cut into the cliff side, a few rifle pits in the gully, a line of trenches on the hill top—these made a landing an undertaking of the greatest difficulty. A landing! General Liman von Sanders, under whose direction the fortifications were constructed, was pleased to think such a thing impossible.

(For a bird's-eye view of the Gallipoli peninsula, with its general topographical features boldly outlined, see color map in Vol. IV.)

his course of action. At that time, too, the sites for the various landings were selected.

In making this choice, and in formulating his plans, two facts influenced his decision. First, the place chosen for landings must be large enough to permit the debarkation of a large command; second, these sites must lend themselves to the accomplishment of the task at hand, namely, the capture of the forts at Maidos on the Dardanelles. A glance at the map will show that General Hamilton had but little choice if he were to effect a landing on that inhospitable shore.

HAMILTON'S PLANS

Various critics, wise and otherwise, have suggested that a landing to the north of Bulair would have been less costly in life and more productive in results. However, to a soldier on a task such as General Hamilton's, a landing north of Bulair in no way commends itself. In the first place, if the troops debarked at some such point, they would be unable to advance against the Maidos forts because of the strong Turkish intrenchments at Bulair, intrenchments on which several thousand Turks had worked for over a month. Tactically and strategically such a movement would be a gigantic piece of folly, because, while the Ottoman forces at Bulair engaged the enemy, another Moslem army might advance down the peninsula from Constantinople. In such a case the invaders must hastily retreat or inevitably be ground to destruction.

Kum Kale, near ancient Troy on the Asiatic shore, advocated by some as a landing place, was open to the same objections. The Maidos forts dominated that shore and a small army moving north from that point was sure to be destroyed. It would be easy for the Turks to send a large force from their capital to operate against the allied front and right, while, by means of the Dardanelles, another detachment could attack their left and line of communications, thus entrapping the invader.

Having eliminated all other possible landing sites, but one feasible region remained, somewhere on the peninsula itself, south of Suvla Cape. This region was selected by General Hamilton for the beginning of operations.

THE LANDING

Here, in the dim light of the false dawn on April 25th, 1915, came the transports, accompanied by the battle fleet, to attempt one of the world's finest feats of arms.

The commanding general's plans called for seven landings, five at the southern extremity of Gallipoli, one at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore, and one at Gaba Tepe. The troops set ashore at Kum Kale were to clear that ground of Turkish forces, then to re-embark for Gallipoli where the main attack was to

be made. This task was assigned to the French division under General D'Amade.

The attack on Gallipoli was to be convergent in nature; the Australian Corps, landing at Gaba Tepe, was to move inland while troops of the 29th Division moved up the peninsula. Eventually these forces were to join hands in the attack on the Kilid Bahr plateau. The winning of that plateau was the essential point of the entire campaign, for once the table-land was held, heavy guns could be mounted there which would speedily knock the channel forts into so many cocked hats.

In order to appreciate properly the difficulties to be overcome on that weird misty morning something must be said of the landing places at the southern extremity of Gallipoli.



© Underwood and Underwood.

A Landing Party of Australians at Gallipoli

oli. Here five beaches, designated as S, V, W, X, and Y, had been selected. Beach Y is on the Gulf of Saros, about three miles southwest of Krithia, while S is on Morto Bay. V, W and X lie between beach S and beach Y in the order named. All are narrow strips of land, in no case averaging more than 300 yards in width. At S, X, Y, and at Gaba Tepe, the cliffs rise quite abruptly from the shore, but at W and V small ravines, filled with scrubby thorn, lead off to the interior. These two beaches were to be the scenes of the hardest fighting, for here the Turks were able, by planting machine guns in the cliffs on each side of the ravines, to bring a withering convergent fire upon the attackers.

Such were the plans, such the dispositions, and such the difficulties which faced the Allied force on the dawning of this eventful day. Little of grand tactics and less of strategy would enter into that fight; it was merely a

question of getting ashore and holding the ground won.

A STRUGGLE FOR LIFE

On the cliffs of the peninsula the sons of Osman awaited their enemies. Their plan of action could be no other than that of an active defensive, for such the very ground demanded and at such fighting the Turk was best. Every advantage had been taken of nature. Machine guns had been cunningly planted in the cliffs, intrenchments had been thrown up which commanded the beaches, and batteries had been planted which could sweep the shore line with their fire. Everything was as ready as it could be, and confidently the Turks waited the expected attack.

At 5 a. m. the lighters and tenders carrying the troops were swinging in toward the shore. At this moment, too, the battleships covering the landing began their bombardment. Standing well out at sea the gigantic *Queen Elizabeth* and her consorts smothered the Turkish positions with shrapnel and high explosive. For a few minutes the Ottoman shore batteries replied, then relapsed into silence. Now the troops clambered from the boats into the sea and advanced to the attack with cold steel.

BRAVO, ANZACS!

By seven that morning the Australian troops, in the face of a withering fire, had scaled the cliffs just north of Gaba Tepe. Their losses were terrific, but the heights were gained; a feat which deserves to rank with Wolfe's achievement at the heights of Quebec. At beaches S, Y and X the landing progressed smoothly. Protected by the guns of the fleet (in some cases the ships were close inshore), the troops won a footing. By seven o'clock the cliff line had been won at all of these points.

But at beaches W and V there was another tale to tell at that hour. At beach W the shore was wired and mined almost to the water's edge, and hidden machine guns enfiladed the landing place. Troops landed at the right and left extremities of the beach made some headway but the men of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who made the frontal attack, suffered severely.

Beach V, however, was the scene of the bloodiest fight. Here, as at W, was a stretch of sand, a ravine, and flanking cliffs. Here, too, the Turks had spent the most labor on fortifications. Wire extended under the sea and numerous mines promised to make of the beach an inferno. At this beach the Allies tried a curious expedient. A tramp steamship, the *River Clyde*, with great doorways cut on the level of her between-decks and platforms built below them for the troops to run out on, was grounded near the north end of the beach. It was planned to beach the vessel near the shore, then to sweep the lighters which she towed into position, so as to make a bridge of boats between ship and shore. Two thousand men of the Hampshire and Munster Fusiliers were then to pour across this extemporized bridge from the *River Clyde*. The fate of the occupants of this modern Trojan Horse was far different from their predecessors of antiquity. Masefield gives the following graphic description of this landing:

THE CLYDE'S ADVENTURE

"She (the *River Clyde*) took the ground rather to the right of the little beach, some 400 yards from the ruins of Sedd-el-Bahr Castle, before the Turks had opened fire, but almost as she grounded, when picket boats with their tows were ahead of her, only twenty or thirty yards from the beach, every rifle and machine gun in the castle, the town above it, and in the curved, low, strongly-trenched hill along the bay, began a murderous fire upon ship and boats. There was no question of their missing. They had their target on the front and both flanks at ranges between 100 and 300 yards in clear daylight, thirty boats bunched together and crammed with men, and a good big ship. The first outbreak of fire made the bay as white as a rapid, for the Turks fired not less than ten thousand shots a minute for the first few minutes of attack. Those not killed in the boats at the first discharge jumped overboard to wade or swim ashore; many were killed in the water, many, who were wounded, were swept away and drowned; others trying to swim in the fierce current, were drowned by the weight of their equipment; but some

reached the shore, and these instantly doubled out to cut the wire entanglements, and were killed, or dashed for the coves of a bank of sand or raised beach which runs along the curve of the bay."

There this scattered handful who had somehow come unscathed through hell clung throughout the day.

When darkness fell on that eventful Sabbath the impossible had been accomplished. The expeditionary force was landed, but

them. On the evening of this day the French troops, who had landed on the Asiatic side, joined the force at beach S. With the exception of slight skirmishes with the Turks at Kum Kale, then again on the Trojan plain, no fighting took place there.

On the 27th, all the beaches were in good working order, and on that day the Allies advanced determinedly, the Turks contesting each inch of ground. That night the position of the expeditionary force on the peninsula



© Macmillan.

An Anzac Soldier at Gallipoli Bringing a Wounded Comrade to Hospital

its position was perilous. The cliff line was barely gained and barely held.

This same evening the landing at beach Y was abandoned in the face of a strong counter-attack by superior numbers. But at almost the same time the landing at beach V was accomplished.

THE MIRACLE ACCOMPLISHED

The morning of the 26th found the Turks counter-attacking all along the line from Gaba Tepe to Morto Bay. Stubbornly the British resisted; then, late in the afternoon, when more troops had been landed, they counter-attacked in turn and drove the Turks before

extended from Eski Hissarlik on the straits to a point on the Gulf of Saros about two miles north of Cape Tekke. Since this position was regarded as too crowded for the army, an advance was ordered on the next day. The main objective of the attack was Krithia, a strong point in the Turkish lines below Achi Baba. The attack started with a rush, but finally slowed up and collapsed in places, due to Turkish counter-attacks. Some of the ground gained, however, was held. The Allied line now ran from three miles northwest of Cape Tekke to two miles north of Eski Hissarlik. The apex of the peninsula was firmly held.

Meanwhile, the Australians at Gaba Tepe had gradually enlarged their holdings. The position occupied by this corps on the 28th was roughly semi-circular in form, the center of the arc being about three miles east of Anzac Cove. The flanks rested on the sea. In spite of heroic efforts these troops were unable to advance sufficiently far in a south-eastern direction to join hands with those at the apex of the peninsula.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Bags of Sand as a Protection

A barrier used by Australian soldiers in Gallipoli and in the Dardanelles.

So ended the battle of the landing, a feat of arms which surely will rank high among the great achievements of human endurance and human courage.

III

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI

AFTER the first attack on Krithia the troops at Gallipoli settled down to the deadly monotony of trench warfare. The problem of landing was solved; the problem of capturing the Narrows forts remained. The possible solutions of this problem were, as far as tactics were concerned, reduced to a minimum. Anything like an enveloping attack or the encirclement of a flank was out of the ques-

tion, for the opponents face each other in unbroken lines from the Ægean Sea to the Straits. The flanks of both were secure. Such a situation permitted of but one kind of offensive action, namely, a frontal attack of the most costly kind.

The parts of the Allied Army, that at Gaba Tepe and that at Southern Gallipoli, were each at the foot of a natural ramp, or staircase, at the top of which was the Turk. The bastion of Achi Baba crowned the height of the southern way, while Pasha Dag dominated that up which the Australians must mount. The capture of either of these positions would insure success, for either would be an entering wedge on the Sari Bair plateau.

During May, June and July the history of this campaign consists of the successive attempts made to capture Achi Baba and its outpost, Krithia.

THE ATTACK ON THE HEIGHTS

Between May 6th and June 4th two attacks were made on these positions. The first attack, May 6th-9th, was made along the entire front and netted a gain of about 1,000 yards, from flank to flank. But the objectives, Krithia and Achi Baba, were not gained. The second attack, launched June 4th, also failed to reach these key-points. This time the Turkish flanks held firm and the Allied gain was limited to the center, where the attack penetrated to a depth of some 400 yards on a three-mile front.

As a result of this battle the Allied line was now semi-circular in shape, the center projecting toward Krithia. The danger in the salient thus formed was quickly recognized and the operations during the month of July were made in the hope of straightening out the line. By the end of July the salient had been considerably reduced, but the cost of this reduction had been frightful.

FEARFUL LOSSES

It was at this time that the need for reinforcements was felt the most. Continuous fighting had depleted the ranks of the expeditionary force and success, once at least almost within the Allied grasp, was denied, due to a lack of sufficient troops to finish what was well begun. Particularly was this true of

the last attack on Krithia and of the attacks on the flanks.

During the time that the forces in the South were flinging themselves like so many human battering rams at the Turkish lines before Achi Baba, the Anzac (Gaba Tepe) Sector was far from quiet. Here a constant war of attrition, a war of "nibbling," took place. While the accomplishments of Australian troops were limited during these torpid months to purely local operations at various parts of their own sector, they yet served in a useful capacity. The Turks, fearing an attack against their right flank from this sector, kept a large force concentrated here in observation. The Australians and New Zealanders, by local attacks, managed thus to immobilize a large part of the Turkish Army which otherwise might have been concentrated at Krithia.

By the end of July the Allied high command recognized the complete stalemate and set about devising new plans whereby it might be broken. From early in May until late in July the requests for high explosives and men had been numerous. Now both were on their way, and both were to be used against a new objective.

THE NEW LANDING AND THE LAST ATTACK

Of all plans considered by the Allied staff, an attack by the new troops in the Anzac Sector gave the greatest promise of success. Here, it was believed, the element of surprise might be introduced into the situation, for the Turks knew nothing of the fifty thousand men coming from the west. Could these troops be landed under cover of darkness and be concealed, as they came, by companies, battalions and brigades, they might be the means of wresting victory from the Turks. To use them in an assault on the lines before Krithia was regarded as a senseless waste, for those lines, by constant labor, had been made practically impregnable.

The details of the completed plan called for holding attacks by the troops at Cape Helles and by the troops on the right of the Anzac position. At the same time a feint at a new landing was to be made near Bulair.* While these blows held the enemy's attention, the

* Bulair and Suvla Bay are well to the north on the west side of the peninsula.

troops occupying the left of the Anzac line and a new force to be landed at Suvla Bay were to thrust forward in a southeastern direction at the extreme Turkish right. The ultimate goal of this force was the Narrows,



Where the Fighting was Hottest

A section of the trenches dug by the Anzacs into the cliffs on Gallipoli.

to win the ridges which guarded the way to Constantinople. (See color map, Vol. IV.)

THE ALLIES CHANGE THEIR TACTICS

To comprehend the Allied change in strategy or grand tactics it is necessary to note carefully at this time the Turkish position and dispositions. At the end of July the Ottoman troops held a line shaped roughly like

the letter L. The horizontal part of the letter faced the troops at Cape Helles, the vertical part the Anzac position. The upper portion of the vertical line bent slightly to the east in order to rest the extreme flank on the highest ground. Koja Chemen Tepe,

narrow dried-up water courses might be followed, two of which lead to Chunuk and two to Koja Chemen. North of Koja the land slopes abruptly into a little valley, then rises only to slope again into a smaller valley. The southern valley must be crossed by troops



© Underwood and Underwood.

Heroes of Gallipoli

Tending the Australian wounded in a small boat and bringing them back to the battleships in the Dardanelles.

on the extreme north, and Chunuk Bair, just south of the former, were the two hills which dominated this part of the terrain. Chunuk Bair, while lower than Koja, is to be carefully noted, for it formed the extreme right of the Turkish prepared positions. A succession of rough hills, descending as they approached the sea, guarded these key-points. If one would avoid the climb over these hills four

moving from Suvla on Koja Chemen. The entrance to this valley is guarded by three rough peaks arranged at the vertices of a triangle. The most northern vertex is known as Scimitar Hill, the highest and most southern as Ismail Oglu Tepe, while the most western, opposite southern Suvla, is known as Yilghin Burnu, or Chocolate Hill. All these positions were lightly held by the Turks.

Troops coming from Suvla must carry the triangle before they could advance to help in the assault on Koja Chemen and Chunuk.

The plan of attack as outlined was not without its merits, but its success hinged on two factors, surprise and elaborately painstaking staff work. If the Turks became aware that the Allies were concentrating on their right they would speedily concentrate in such numbers as to make success impossible. It would be no easy task to effect the landing and concealment of additional troops at Anzac. It would be even more difficult to time the landing at Suvla, for the troops for this expedition were coming from different points. Synchronization and coördination were as essential to success as surprise.

ANOTHER BRILLIANT FEAT OF ARMS

The landing of reinforcements at Anzac, and their concealment until the hour of attack, will always rank as one of the highest achievements in military history. To the British Navy belongs the credit of landing them; to those stalwart young giants from the Dominions belongs the credit of concealing them. All day in the trenches and all night digging new bomb proofs, such was the work of the Australian Corps for three days before the new troops came. These troops were landed and concealed without the Turks' knowledge and, when August 6th arrived, they were ready to play their part.

Punctually on the morning of the 6th of August, 1915, this last great battle of the campaign commenced with an attack on Krithia by the 29th Division. Such was the intensity and ferocity of the assault that the Turks, believing it the main attack, hurried their reserves south. Also, at this time, the troops on the right of the Anzac Sector began their attack.

THE ATTACK ON KRITHIA

Simultaneously, with the launching of the holding attacks, the troops assigned to the main attack, assembled in four columns under cover of darkness on the 6th and moved forward up the water courses to the assault. The two columns on the right of this line were hurled against Chunuk Bair, the two on the left against Koja Chemen Tepe. By mid-

day on the 7th the outlying positions had been won and the troops were pressing on to the capture of the heights. All that day and far into the night they pressed the attack. At the dawning of the 8th Chunuk Bair was won; not only won, but held, though at a frightful cost. At four o'clock that fateful afternoon the New Zealand regiment holding that height "had dwindled to three officers and fifty men."

THE LANDING AT SUVLA

Meanwhile, what had happened to the force landing at Suvla? In the face of a rather scattering opposition the landing here had been accomplished on the 7th. Troops were promptly sent northward to drive back any Turkish detachments found in those hills, but there was an almost inexcusable delay in advancing on Scimitar Hill, Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe. Late that afternoon Chocolate Hill was captured. Scimitar Hill was abandoned by the Turks earlier in the day. But on the 8th Ismail Oglu Tepe was still in the enemy's possession. Moreover, the Turks, realizing their right flank was in danger, hurried reinforcements to the point. The troops from Suvla, swinging in on the extreme hostile right, were to join hands with the left Anzac columns and press on to victory.

But it was written otherwise—the troops from Suvla were never to arrive. Not until the 9th did they attack and carry Ismail—then it was too late, for the Turks, heavily reinforced, counter-attacked and drove them back to Chocolate Hill. The battle on the left was lost and the main blow in the center was to have no help from Suvla.

Nevertheless, the main blow was given. Three columns were formed on the morning of the 9th, two with instructions to complete the clearing of Chunuk, one to capture the peak of Koja Chemen. Chunuk was cleared by the troops assigned to that task, but the third column, which was to have supported the other two, got lost in the gloom preceding the dawn. Just as this body moved forward in support the Turks counter-attacked and drove the remnants of the New Zealanders and men of the 13th Division from all but the southwestern half of Chunuk. There, through the rest of the day, they held on, and there,

on the morning of the 10th, most of them died when the followers of the Crescent, 15,000 strong, attacked Chunuk and swept all before them. Down the slopes the British were driven, fighting in little groups, holding each bit of hardly-won trench to the death, forming and reforming their depleted ranks, as they met the Turkish wave with



Vice Admiral Carden

One of the commanders of the Allied fleet in the Dardanelles.

charge after charge. Then the guns of the fleet opened up, blowing thousands of Turks into fragments, and the counter-attack stopped. The last mad fling was ended; the blood of Britain's best had not been sufficient to win to Constantinople through these chasms of death.

IV

THE GALLIPOLI EXPEDITION WITHDRAWN

AFTER the failure of August the campaign at Gallipoli languished. The result of the fruitless attempts of the 10th had practically convinced certain eminent civilian

strategists that the expedition was going to be quite barren of material fruits. Already there was talk abroad of an evacuation of the peninsula.


In the early days of the winter months General Monro succeeded General Hamilton. After a careful study of the situation the new commander decided that the complete withdrawal of the expedition was the only wise course to follow.

The reasons prompting such a decision were not hard to find, each day of winter weather being in itself a sufficient cause. During the summer the troops had been baked by the heat, tormented by flies and parched by thirst; but now, in the bitter days of early November, many a wish went up for a return of the torrid August weather. A flurry of snow followed by a few days of freezing cold caused the death of two hundred men from exposure. Due to the cramped position and limited facilities, adequate housing for the troops was out of the question. Moreover, the question of supply presented an ever-increasing difficulty. All supplies had to be landed from lighters, for there were no docks, and none could be built. At this season of the year the eastern Ægean is swept by constant gales which often last for weeks at a time. In the event of such a storm the troops at Gallipoli must go hungry, because no small boat could approach the shores during the angry weather.

AN EVACUATION ADVISED

There was another reason which urged a speedy withdrawal. The road from Berlin to Constantinople was now open and the Turks were beginning to receive supplies in the shape of huge howitzers and heavy batteries from the factories of Essen and Skoda. By November the first of these huge guns began to arrive. To oppose them the Allies had nothing but the guns of the fleet and, in time of storm, their support was lacking because the fleet must stand well out to sea.

Having considered these facts, General Monro reported to the War Office, advising the evacuation of Gallipoli. Hard though it was to British pride to abandon the attempt, the War Office at last reluctantly assented and the Commanding General drew up his plans for the retirement.



The Super-Dreadnought *Queen Elizabeth*

↳ Underwood and Underwood.

One of the most modern and most powerful vessels of Britain's fighting fleet. She bombarded the Turkish positions at a range of 12 miles, hurling 16-inch shells across the Gallipoli peninsula to the far side of the Dardanelles. (See also Vol. IV.)

Of all problems presented to a staff or a commander in the field the question of a re-embarkation in the face of an undefeated foe is probably the most difficult. History is replete with examples of successful disembarkations, but the examples of successful re-embarkations are woefully few. In the past, troops retiring in such a fashion have always suf-

zed, and Cape Helles, must be removed. The success or failure of this enterprise depended upon two things: the whim of the elements and the ignorance of the Turks as to what was taking place. If the winter gales furrowed the seas a re-embarkation was impossible; if the soldiers of Enver suspected such a move, it was bound to be costly.



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

From South Africa to Gallipoli

Departure of a Cape Town regiment to join in the ill-fated British attempt to force the Dardanelles and capture Constantinople. In this disastrous campaign the British casualties were over 125,000; most of the troops employed were Colonials.

fered heavily, their losses in killed, wounded and prisoners, as well as in material, varying from one-fifth to one-third of the whole. Also, such a withdrawal generally necessitates the fighting of constant rearguard actions to cover the embarkation of the remaining troops.

A DIFFICULT TASK

A retirement at Gallipoli was fraught with unusual difficulties, for not one force with its impedimenta but three, located at Suvla, An-

The plan adopted called for successive withdrawals, first of the troops at Suvla and Anzac, later of those at Helles. Ten days were first allotted for the removal of the guns and material, then the men were to re-embark. In order that the Turks might not become suspicious of what was taking place, all movements of supplies, guns, and men were to be made under the cover of darkness. Positions were to be prepared which were to be occupied by selected battalions whose duty it was to cover the others while they were set aboard

ship. These battalions were to be removed last.

THE EVACUATION BEGUN

Late in November the evacuation began. In the ten nights set aside for the shipment of guns and baggage many men were also moved, so that by early December the lines at Suvla and Anzac had been appreciably thinned. Night after night batteries rumbled down to the shore to the waiting ships which crept quietly away with their cargoes before dawn. Dummy guns replaced the pieces withdrawn, and empty boxes piled on the shore still indicated to the Turks the landing of supplies. Each day the battleships shelled the Turkish positions and each day the scant remainder of the once numerous field batteries fired a few shots, with the result that the Turk believed that his foe was still before him in force. Daily the forces dwindled, until on the 18th of December, 1915, the last battery rumbled down to the beach for shipment. Only a few battalions held the line that day, and, on the 19th, the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla was completed when the last body of troops filed down to the sea and were rowed out to the waiting ships. The total casualties suffered by the British at this retirement were one man, slightly wounded.

A SUCCESSFUL WITHDRAWAL

The evacuation of Cape Helles proceeded in the same fashion. Luck, which had so persistently broken against the Allies, now favored them. On their departure, at least, fortune smiled. Fair weather was a prime requisite to success and fair weather continued while each night the transports carried away portions of the army. By day trench raids and minor attacks lulled the Turk into the belief that here at least his foe was not slipping away from him. On the night of January 8th-9th, 1916, the time set for the withdrawal of the balance of the forces, a hostile submarine was reported off the beaches. But again fortune favored, for a thirty-five mile gale sprang up which made operations by an underseas craft hopeless. By taking advantage of their several landing

beaches, the British managed to avoid the roughest seas and so the embarkation continued. On January 9th the last of the heroic 29th Division went aboard ship and the evacuation of Gallipoli was complete. Only the graves of the dead and the bones of the unburied, hidden in rocky glen and ravine, remained behind as mute testimonials to abandoned hopes and as mighty proofs of the valor of two great nations.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE

Before ever it started the campaign was foredoomed to failure, but of all failures it was one of the most glorious. The blame for this tragedy of wasted efforts rests not with the soldiers and commanders in the field, for they did all that was humanly possible—rather, the responsibility rests on those higher up who instigated the attempt. Divided counsel prevailed from the start, for the expedition was neither military nor naval, but a sort of amphibious combination of both, with neither supreme. Gallipoli was not the only route to Constantinople, but it was the only route where Army and Navy could act together.

The doubtful wisdom of such a policy of joint action is amply proven by the bitter fruits it bore. A large army, not three small army corps, acting from a base in southeastern Europe, would probably have achieved the desired goal, but the efforts of a small force could only be wasted. Where the means are not fitted to the end failure comes of necessity; so it was at Gallipoli. England was the poorer by over 125,000 casualties in killed and wounded alone, but the world was the richer in heroism by the deaths of her sons.

(For a detailed account of the naval operations of the Dardanelles Campaign, see Vol. IV.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gallipoli, by John Masefield; *Trenching at Gallipoli*, by John Gallishaw; *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, by Henry Morgenthau; *Inside Constantinople during the Dardanelles Expedition*, by Louis Einstein; *Turkey and the War*, by V. Jabotivsky; *The Straits Impregnable*, by S. de Laghe; *With the Twenty-Ninth Division in Gallipoli*, by O. Creighton.

THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

First Moves—Battle of Ctesiphon and Surrender of Townshend at Kut-el-Amara—Sir Stanley Maude's Campaign—Capture of Bagdad

BY WILLIS McDONALD CHAPIN

Captain, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army


ALTHOUGH the campaigns in Mesopotamia formed but a small part of the intricate moves and counter-moves of the World War, they, nevertheless, were of great importance in breaking down the German attempt at world-dominion. To understand how a few relatively insignificant engagements in a desert country far from the main theater of action could have any vital influence on the outcome of the war, we must keep before our minds the German territorial ambitions in the Middle East and their effect on the dominant power of that part of the world—Great Britain.

BERLIN TO BAGDAD

Under the influence of the "Drang nach Osten," Germany by 1914 was well on the high road to the extension of her political influence, along with her famous Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad, from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf, thus making a wide strip of territory under German control directly through the center of the British Empire. To Great Britain, knowing as she did the German hopes of expansion in the East, this meant that Egypt, the route to the East through the Suez Canal, and India, were in danger from German aggression. When Turkey entered the war as an ally of the Central Powers, thus bringing under German control the territory extending down to the Persian Gulf, this danger became imminent and immediate action was necessary to prevent the possible invasion of India. The most effective point at which to apply the pressure to drive Germany back once for all to a safe distance from the English possessions was Mesopotamia.

THE TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

The river valleys of Mesopotamia furnished a difficult country in which to campaign, even for the seasoned Indian troops who formed a large part of the British force. The ancient glories of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys disappeared centuries ago with the falling into decay of the irrigation systems, and the thriving cities of Biblical times are now for the most part only ruins half buried under the drifting dunes of the desert. The native population, a conglomeration of Arabs, Turks, and Persians, are primitive and unprogressive, ground down by centuries of Turkish oppression. With the exception of those who live in the cities such as Bagdad, Kurna, and Basra, they lead a nomad life, wandering aimlessly with their herds and existing on what little food the soil gives them without cultivation. While nominally under Turkish rule when the British came, their allegiance was one of force rather than of loyalty. Accordingly, they were ready to welcome the British if for no other reason than for the sake of a change from the Turks. Beyond the immediate borders of the rivers with their shady groves of date palms, the country stretches away as far as the eye can reach into level, trackless wastes, shimmering in the white-hot glare of the summer sun and worn smooth by the swirling sand storms. Imagine the necessity for arduous, unceasing labor in a temperature ranging from 110 to 130 degrees, amid black clouds of stinging sand-flies and mosquitoes, and the conditions under which the British forces labored in the summers can be understood. The sand-flies, moreover, carried "sand-fly fever," which is much like the influenza in its debilitating ef-



Map of the British Campaign for the Relief of Kut and the Capture of Baghdad

fects. In the winters it rains a cold penetrating drizzle, which makes its way through all protection. Small wonder that the British officers were advised to equip themselves with "one uniform for an English summer, one for an English winter, and one for Hades." In the summer the roads, if they can be called such, are hub-deep with sand; in the winter they are morasses of mud. In either case they are next to impassable for the wagon trains of an army and the British were, in consequence, forced to depend for the most part upon transportation by the rivers, a proceeding insecure at best because of the shallow water and the treacherously shifting sandbars. To sum up, the British were confronted with the situation of fighting not only the

Turks, but the physiographic features of the country as well.

A WELL-DEFINED CAMPAIGN INAUGURATED

The fighting during the entire campaign took place along well-defined lines. The Mesopotamian front constituted the center of the activities in Asia Minor, the flanks being in Egypt and Armenia. The purpose of the Turks, in accordance with the German plan, was to throw the weight of their forces against Persia, driving back the small Russian and English forces there, threatening not only to raise Persia against the Allies, but to disturb Afghanistan and India, if possible. Opposed to this was the plan of campaign of the Eng-

lish. They did not want to spread out their forces, on account of the difficulties of supply, but planned to assume the offensive and strike a hard blow in the direction of Bagdad, the center from which all the Turkish forces were operating. As was proved by the outcome, the English had the better strategic plan, for, by the successful carrying out of their attempt, they struck the Turk in a vital spot and not only caused his retirement from Mesopotamia but forced his withdrawal on the adjoining fronts, thus driving him into a position from which he could menace neither Egypt nor India.

Bearing in mind, then, the political significance of the operations in Mesopotamia, the difficulties with which the British were forced to contend, and the general lines on which they planned to act, let us now follow them through the actual fighting from the first landing at Fao in November, 1914, until the triumphant entry into Bagdad in March, 1917.

The campaign divides itself naturally into three periods. First, we have the period from the landing at Fao, at the head of the Persian Gulf, to the taking of Kut-el-Amara by the British in the latter part of 1915; then comes the siege and taking of Kut by the Turks in the spring of 1916, and lastly we have the victorious British in Bagdad. Each of these periods has its special features and its special points of interest.

FAO TO KUT-EL-AMARA

The British acted quickly in their plan of protecting their vast interests in the East. On the seventh of November, 1914, a landing was made at Fao, at the head of the Persian Gulf, and the curtain went up on the first act of the Mesopotamian "show." True, it was only a side-show of the conflict raging in Europe, but, like many another side-show, it provided almost as many objects of interest as the spectacle under the big tent.

The small force, consisting of only a few thousand men under Sir Arthur Barrett, was made up of British troops from India—men seasoned to the climate. Their immediate purpose was the protection of the properties of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, an English concern which had exploited the rich oil

fields around Abadan. Their orders were to take active measures against the enemy but they were limited by the instructions from London that "a safe game must be played in Mesopotamia," for, at that time, there were no reinforcements available to send them.

Accordingly, the British commander, meeting but little resistance on the part of the Turks, forced them rapidly back up the river, and, by early December, was in possession of the towns of Basra and Kurna. During this advance, the British wounded were frequently killed by the Turks, who had been told by their German masters that no quarter could be expected from the British. This violation of the laws of war, which lasted but a short time, was their only offense in this line. No cities were devastated, no civilians molested, no poison gas was used, no hospitals were bombed. It must be said in justice to the Turks, that, in spite of their German military teachers, they lived up to all the conditions of civilized warfare. At Kurna the city was quickly turned into an intrenched camp and the invading force settled down to await reinforcements. Up to this point the operations had been singularly easy, the lines of supply had worked smoothly, and the Turks had retreated without giving any great resistance.

THE BRITISH PRESS ON

By the beginning of 1915, more troops had come from India and the advance was recommenced. The British, eager to "carry on" and elated by their successes, were consistently victorious, the Turks being forced steadily up the Tigris valley. Throughout the spring, small engagements, resulting favorably for the British, were frequent. One of these, the battle of Shaiba in April, presents an occurrence of interest. During the thick of the fighting, in which the Turks were getting the best of it, the Turkish forces suddenly ceased their firing and fled in rapid retreat. For some time the British could not understand this unusual maneuver, but they finally found out from prisoners that a pack train, approaching the English lines from the rear, had been so distorted by a mirage that it appeared to the Turks as a great body of reinforcements. They believed themselves to be fighting against enormous odds and, accord-

ingly, beat their retreat. Similar peculiar effects of mirage occurred frequently. In one instance the advancing Turks seemed to the British on the ground to be marching directly across a beautiful lake. On the airmen, however, the mirage had no effect, since, from their great height, they looked vertically down upon the ground instead of horizontally through the rising heat waves.

ened. Accordingly in June, a successful expedition was sent against these marauding bands and their base, Nasarie, on the Euphrates, was captured.

A 300-MILE ADVANCE

This success removed the danger of the continuity of the lines of supply being broken and allowed the British to proceed. By the



A Native Bazaar in Kut-el-Amara

The British force in Mesopotamia was composed chiefly of native troops from India. The figures in the photo are those of officers' servants who accompanied the expedition.

By the latter part of May the Turks had been pursued up the Tigris to Amara, which is some 75 miles north of Kurna. All the spring the British left flank had been annoyed by small bands of Turks and Arabs. The Turks realized that the British were dependent on supplies brought up the river and that, if they could interfere with this means of supply, the British would be considerably weak-

end of September Kut-el-Amara was in British hands and the Turks had thus been driven back about 300 miles from Basra. Moreover, all of the good roads into Persia passed through Kut and hence were out of Turkish hands.

At this time arose the question as to where the dividing line came between "active measures against the enemy" and "a safe game."

Should the British remain in Kut-el-Amara on the defensive against the Turks, or should they continue their offensive and forge on to Bagdad? To Gen. Nixon, in command, fell the duty of making the decision. He decided—unwisely—to continue and thereby fell into the error that turned his campaign into a tragedy. The slender line of supply, already extended to its utmost by reaching to Kut, was unable to stand the strain of further



Indian Sepoys Cleaning Bombs

lengthening. The operations around Kut demonstrated once more the truth of Napoleon's inexorable axiom that "an army travels on its stomach."

When Gen. Nixon decided on a further advance into the enemy's country he did so with the consent of the War Office, which gave its sanction on condition that Gen. Nixon felt confident. He was naturally very confident. The Turks were on the run and he believed fully in the ability of his troops to press the advantage which they had already obtained.

NIXON'S GREAT MISTAKE

Once the decision had been made to continue the advance no time was lost in pressing the Turks in their retreat. The rapidity of the pursuit had already taken the head of the British column far beyond Kut and the services of supply were straining to their utmost to fulfill their functions. The Turks finally outdistanced the British, leaving behind them quantities of stores and materials of war which they had been unable to carry, and took up a position at Ctesiphon, where in an effort to stop the British, they dug themselves in. The Turkish situation was difficult, as Ctesiphon was only 18 miles from Bagdad. The retreat, however, gave the Turks an advantage which must not be underestimated. They were continually drawing nearer their base of supplies and the transportation to them of food, ammunition and reinforcements was becoming increasingly easy.

18 MILES FROM BAGDAD

The British, not to be stopped when so near their goal, prepared at once to take the intrenched position at Ctesiphon. The attack started against a terrific fire from the Turks, who had been reinforced from Bagdad. Nevertheless, the first-line trenches were taken and the advance to the second line two miles away was started. Part only of the second line was taken, and disorder grew in the British ranks under the annihilating fire of the Turks. Little by little the British were forced back to the captured first-line trenches, to which they managed to cling with a precarious hold. The victorious British advance had come to a halt in the shadow of the famous arch of Ctesiphon. Orders were given to get the wounded "out of it," for things were indeed looking badly. The casualties were heavy and were constantly increasing, while the means for caring for them were utterly inadequate. The boats on the river, which had been supplying the force, were the only means of clearance for the wounded and they were crowded to their utmost capacity. Three times the Turks made desperate attacks on the British, not only forcing them out of the captured trenches, but driving them back in increasing disorder on Kut.

THE RETREAT TO KUT

In Kut all was confusion. The medical staff was straining every nerve to get ready for the 3,000 wounded who were coming down the river. There were hospital accommodations for about a quarter of that number. The prisoners too were beginning to arrive in considerable numbers, adding to the congestion. Then came the report that everyone and everything not of use in a siege should be sent out of Kut, which only added to the confusion, as every man was already overtaxed to his capacity. The wounded

left for the slow and arduous trip to Kurna and Basra, packed so closely into the boats that they could scarcely move. On the 3rd of December General Townshend and his force reached the town after fighting an almost continuous rear-guard action against the pursuing Turks and made ready to hold the town at all costs.

Almost on their heels were the Turks, and by December 7, 1915, the town was completely surrounded, all chance of escape, as well as of relief, being temporarily, at least, cut off. The only approach was by river and this avenue was well guarded by the Turks. At first the Turks merely demanded Townshend's surrender; next they bombarded the town and, finally, celebrated Christmas day by a terrific assault in which their losses were over a thousand men. All of these moves failed, and the Turks became convinced that Townshend was determined to stay in Kut until the relieving forces should arrive to help him.

THE SIEGE OF KUT

Day after day, and week after week, the siege dragged on. The rainy season started, and it rained until Kut and the surrounding country became a veritable quagmire. With the rain came the cold and the necessity for



Kut-el-Amara, Scene of the Siege

Here, on the banks of the Tigris, 8,070 British and Indian troops, on the verge of starvation, surrendered to the Turks after a siege of almost five months.

fires. Strange to say, the lack of fuel proved to be one of the greatest privations of the siege, for the cold was damp and penetrating. Had the force been properly clothed and fed, it would have affected them less, but their uniforms were worn and the food supply was limited. The food which was already in the city on their entrance was the only supply upon which the British could draw, and it soon began to run low. Replenishment was attempted by aeroplanes, but they could carry only small bales. Accordingly, the British counted on holding out on the scanty stock, hoping against hope that a relief expedition would be able to get through to them before the food was gone. As attempt after attempt to aid them failed, the situation became more and more grave. In January the rations were reduced by one-half and horses were eaten for food. Slowly but surely the garrison was coming face to face with starvation. The relief expeditions were making but slow progress and the hopes in the hearts of the gallant garrison slowly declined. Finally the little force passed beyond the limits of human endurance and, on April 29, 1916, Gen. Townshend surrendered his command and the city into the hands of the Turks.

The fall of Kut and the loss of Gen. Townshend's force did not mean the end of the



General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude

He was called "England's new Kitchener," because the successful Bagdad campaign of this "Man of Mesopotamia" resembled Kitchener's Nile campaign. He died suddenly at the end of 1917.

campaign by any means. In addition to the military necessity of again forcing the Turks back, the British felt that they had a defeat to revenge. Long before the actual fall of Kut, when the relief expeditions were trying in vain to reach the besieged city, the feeling was universal that whatever the fate of Kut, the slogan of the next move of the campaign would be "On to Bagdad!"

LESSONS FROM THE TRAGEDY

No sooner had the British received their check at Ctesiphon than they came to a realization of what was necessary if they were to push the campaign to a successful conclusion. By far the greatest necessity was a reorganization and enlargement of the services of transport and supply, for it was this service which had demonstrated most conclusively that it was utterly insufficient for the demands made upon it. The desperate situation at Kut, however, did not permit of any long delays and it was decided to send out a relief expedition at once in spite of the deficiencies. Accordingly, in the early days of January, 1916, Gen. Aylmer started with the first attempt to relieve Kut. He was confronted with the problem of forcing his way through the six strongly intrenched positions which the Turks had established below Kut. Three times he attempted by frontal attack to force his way through the lines, but made less headway each time. By January 25, his impetus was gone and the expedition came to a halt far from Kut.

In the meantime the reorganization was proceeding, and in February, 1916, the second attempt was made. This time, profiting by the lessons taught by the failure of the frontal attacks of the first attempt, a turning movement was attempted in an effort to force the Turks out by getting around their flank and attacking them from the side. The force

was well under way on its march across country when heavy rains set in, turning the region into an impassable swamp and necessitating the abandonment of the enterprise. So far little had been gained, although the British were somewhat nearer to Kut.

Undiscouraged, the British launched the third attempt the last of March, and were rewarded by greater success, for they were able to take the fourth Turkish position, and were now only 20 miles by river from Kut. The reports from Gen. Townshend in the city showed only too plainly that he could hold out but a short while longer, and this spurred the British on in their fourth and last attempt. At Sanniyat the Turks held a strong line extending from a marsh on one flank to the Tigris on the other, thus completely barring the British advance. In vain this line was attacked; every assault was beaten back with heavy losses. To add to the difficulties the river rose until the ground the British occupied was in imminent danger of being deeply flooded. The advance on land being halted, an attempt was made to run by with the river gunboats, but without success. By this time, the last of April had come, and the starving garrison in Kut had reached the limit of its endurance. Kut fell when the helpless relieving force was within hearing distance of its guns.

Thus ended the first phase of the campaign which was eventually to carry the British into Bagdad. The fall of Kut was a loss, but it pointed out in characters as plain as the writing on the wall what was necessary before the work could go on. The reorganization of transportation had already begun and was progressing. Now it was decided to put this important service in shape for its task, then to use it at its full strength for the final push, which was to put the campaign through.

REORGANIZATION AFTER DEFEAT

In actual results, the whole campaign had been so far a failure. The Royal Commission that held the inquiry over the failure found that the responsibility lay with all concerned "according to their relative and respective positions." Sir John Nixon was held most responsible because of his over-confident optimism. Gen. Townshend alone, who had ad-

vised against the advance from Kut, stood above blame. His action was merely the obeying of orders. The failure, however, was not without its redeeming features, for it had indicated in a most forceful way the proper direction for improvement—namely, the complete reorganization of the services of transportation and supply.

The first step in this reorganization was the transfer of the direction of the operations from the Indian Office to the London War Office. That in itself did not insure victory, but it made it much more nearly certain. To Gen. Sir Stanley Maude fell the task of carrying out the orders of the War Office. He was a man of wide experience, having been with the expedition which attempted the rescue of Gordon at Khartum, in 1885, and with the British in South Africa during the Boer War. Moreover, he had seen service in France and at the Dardanelles. He was a man of proved judgment and seemed to be the one who could be best depended upon to get results. With his arrival at Mesopotamia came the instructions from London, "Cut out the mistakes. Go slow but go sure."

From that time on a feeling of hope was in the air. His first efforts were naturally directed to the all-important task of "getting ready." Basra, the old base, was enlarged. The lines of railroad leading up the valleys were pushed rapidly ahead, and by the end of 1916 three lines were in running order reaching from Basra to the extreme front. Nothing which could possibly aid a steady and victorious advance was left undone.

THE ADVANCE ON BAGDAD

The situation had not changed from a military point of view. The Turks were still at Sanniyat, just south of Kut, keeping a firm hold on the Tigris, with their lines of communication running back up the river to Bagdad. The English were opposed to them, their lines of supply going back to the improved base at Basra. The object of the British was still to force the Turks back to a safe distance from any British possessions, thus relieving all danger of a Turkish—which meant German—invasion of the British possessions in the East.

When all was ready, the advance com-

menced against the positions at Sanniyat. These positions had been improved during the lull in the operations and the Turks stationed there were confident in their ability to keep them, having already beaten off four British attacks. Nothing daunted, Gen. Maude proceeded with the painstaking, deliberate skill that characterized all his campaigns. He realized fully that his campaign would not be a brilliant dash, but that it would be a long, hard fight, and he was fully prepared for every emergency that might occur. He realized also that on the ultimate success of his

a series of horse-shoe bends. Running from Kut southward is the river Hai. Off to the east of Kut lay the actual trenches of the Turks, on the north bank of the river.

Gen. Maude, upon looking over the situation, saw at once that a frontal attack against the excellent trenches would be useless and would gain him nothing but casualties. Accordingly he conceived a plan whereby he could outmaneuver the Turks and place them in a position from which they could not extricate themselves. While Gen. Cobbe kept the Turks busy at the eastern end of the line, a



A View Over the City of Bagdad

Bagdad, famed city of the Caliphs, was captured by the British on March 11, 1917, thereby ending the German scheme of dominion from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf.

operations depended the success of the British forces in Palestine and the Russian army in Persia. The Turks, too, realized the importance of the situation and pinned all their faith on the lines at Sanniyat. These lines were as nearly impregnable as modern military science could make them and the Turks felt assured that the British would never be able to break through.

THE BATTLE OF SANNIYAT

The lines at Sanniyat are of such importance that their general features should be known. The Tigris, in the vicinity of Kut, runs in a general east and west direction in

cavalry force was sent out to the westward to cross the Hai, proceed northward and attack the lines of communication leading to Bagdad. Then when this force had crossed the Tigris some distance west of Kut and was behind the Turks, he could begin his operations in earnest. The Turks would be caught in the jaws of an enormous pair of pincers, with the British, full of revengeful feelings for Townshend's defeat, applying the pressure.


All went as planned, not, however, without many casualties. The Turkish resistance, which had appeared so formidable, soon turned into a retreat. From a retreat, it became a rout. Then the British got in their greatest

work; the artillery pounded the fleeing rabble, and the aeroplanes, flying low, mowed down dozens with machine-gun fire. Even the river gun boats had their innings, for they could shoot into the flanks of the disorganized columns.

There was no discussion now as to where the advance would stop. Bagdad was almost in sight and the retreating Turks had already evacuated the city. By the night of March

the population put on its holiday attire and thronged the streets, cheering a welcome to the "Tommies," for they knew that law and order would promptly be restored.

At last the British were in Bagdad—that city of Oriental mystery, of Haroun-al-Raschid and Sindbad the Sailor. The campaign was finished and the long story of hardship and privations, extending from November, 1914, to March, 1917, was over. The re-



Where General Maude, Hero of Bagdad, was Buried

"Tell them that I can't come . . . to-day. They must just carry on." These were the last words of the general who had to quit his army in the hour of victory.

10, 1917, no enemy lay between the British and Bagdad.

MAUDE TAKES THE CITY OF THE CALIPHS

In the city itself the civil population was anxiously awaiting the entry of the victors. The Turks, who had had control of the city and had ruled it with a heavy hand, were gone. With the restraint removed, the reaction was intense. Marauding bands of Arabs were looting the city and endangering the inhabitants. Accordingly, when the first British troops entered the city on March 11, 1917,

verses had been overcome, and Townshend and Kut had been avenged. With the British flag flying over the minarets of Bagdad and the Turks driven far to the north, the work was done, and well done. The German dream of a vast empire from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf was effectually shattered for all time.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following books are suggested for detailed accounts of the Mesopotamian Campaign: *The London Times History of the War*, Parts 29, 123, 139, 154, 164; *The War in the Cradle of the World*, by Eleanor Franklin Egan; *To Bagdad with the British*, by Arthur Tillotson Clark; *In Mesopotamia*, by Martin Swayne; *The International Military Digest*, 1914-1917.

EGYPT AND PALESTINE

Turkish Operations Against the Suez Canal—Attacks by the Senussi in Western Egypt—Allenby's Great Victory in Palestine

BY ALBERT W. DRAVES

Captain, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army

GERMAN AMBITIONS IN TURKEY

THE outbreak of the war caused great apprehension among the British in Egypt, due, not to any fears of invasion, but to the dangers of sedition. German propagandists were busy attempting to arouse the moribund Nationalists of Egypt and to create a general anti-British feeling among the Effendi classes. Turkey, so near a neighbor to the Suez Canal, was clearly in sympathy with the Central Powers, and, directly to the west, the tribesmen of Cyrenaica had been goaded on by Turks and Germans to resist Italian control in Libya. In August, 1914, the dormant Nationalists emerged from their retirement and talked openly of the fall of the British Empire before the rise of German power. The Khedive, Abbas, who was anti-British, was fortunately away at Constantinople, and an uprising lacked the necessary leadership, but propaganda spread far and wide. German victories were proclaimed and magnified, and unrest was noticed among the natives.

It was known that the Germans would attempt to disturb the rule in Egypt if they could, for their search for inroads to cause rebellion in British dominions was latent. Germany would seek to have the British Territorials used elsewhere than on the Western front, doubling England's task and undermining her power. Moreover, Germany had long been trying to gain a road to India, one to offset England's water route through the Suez Canal. The ancient European-Asian road from Constantinople to Aleppo in Syria would solve the difficulties, for that road forked at Aleppo, one branch running into Mesopotamia, the other toward the Mediterranean and Egypt.

THE "YOUNG TURK" DANGER

The dangers of Egypt lay in the Young Turk party in Turkey which was guided by German sympathizers. The possibilities of an alliance between Turkey and the Central Powers were great, for Turkey had long been caressed by the Kaiser's hand, her army and secret service were "made in Germany" and her desires for extension of power were planned in Berlin. The disturbances in Libya among the Senussi tribesmen were led by Turkish and German agents, with a view of uniting the Mohammedans under "Emperor William, son of Charlemagne, Allah's Envoy, Islam's Protector."

When the Ottoman Empire cast in her lot with the Central Powers in November, 1914, no surprise was felt. Enver Pasha and the Young Turks had been seeking an opportunity for such an action, and there could be no better time to point the way to the east for Germany than when the Marne had closed the door to her in the west. Turkey's possible moves were feared in Egypt, but it was hoped that the enormous task of holding the Dardanelles, the road into Mesopotamia, the Caucasus front and Arabia would prove sufficient to keep the Turks from rushing to the Suez Canal.

The fears of the British in Egypt were lightened considerably when the internment of aliens and the Nationalist mischief-makers began, and troops poured from India into Egypt. The Marne victory quieted the German boastings and 30,000 Australian and New Zealand troops impressed the populace with British control. On November 21, 1914, Basra, on the Persian Gulf, was occupied by British troops, drawing Turkish troops to Mesopotamia.

tamia; the Russians occupied the Caucasus and engaged the Turks in the East, and the Balkan States required their wonted watching.

THE SUEZ THREATENED

But Turkey was planning to aim a blow at English trade by cutting off the Canal route to India. The Suez Canal was a great source of wealth and protection to England, for it controlled the shortest way to the Eastern British possessions, and the ready lanes of the enormous British commerce. A blow

creased the water defense about twenty miles, reducing the entire line to be held to about sixty miles. Naval patrols took over the duty of guarding the Bitter Lakes, through which the Canal runs, and the additional water areas in the north. A few defense posts were built to cover ferries and other crossings, but, in the main, all defense was situated on the west bank of the Canal. British security was increased greatly when, in December, Egypt was proclaimed a British protectorate, displacing the anti-British Khedive and silencing the Nationalists.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Turkish Artillery En Route to the Attack on the Suez Canal

at the Canal meant dire distress to the Allies, for, at this time, colonial troops and great quantities of provisions were being sent to the Western front and to the Dardanelles by way of the Canal.

Preparations for the defense of the Suez Canal were begun early in November. The arid Sinai desert, to the east of the Canal, was a natural protection, for it was believed that no substantial body could cross that waste without first constructing water lines and transport communications. General Maxwell, who was in command of the defense of the Canal, reduced the line to be held by British troops by cutting the Canal banks in several places, thus flooding portions of the desert east of the north end of the Canal. This in-

TURKISH ATTACK ON SUEZ CANAL—JANUARY, 1915

In January, 1915, intelligence reports intimated enemy preparations in Syria, with outposts at Khan Yunus and Auja, the latter the terminal of the railroad from Aleppo. In the middle of the month, the enemy had established advanced posts at El Arish and Kos-saima, both on Egyptian ground. The British strengthened their forces at the Canal Zone, bringing forward Indian regulars, Imperial Service troops, New Zealand and Australian regiments. The *Swiftsure*, *Ocean*, *Minerva* and *Clio* took stations in the Canal and two French warships assisted at Port Said, the northern end of the Canal.

In late January, 1915, the enemy, under Djemal Pasha, began to advance, approaching to within a few miles of the Canal. Many feint attacks, outpost skirmishes and attempts to cross the Canal occurred. In the north, the route from Kantara on the Canal to El Arish was cut by bodies of Turks who entrenched about five miles east of Kantara, but their attacks lacked success. In the south, skirmishes at El Kubri were attempted. Other bodies appeared at various places along the Canal to spread out the English defense while the Turkish main body of about 15,000 men attacked the Canal between Toussum and Serapeum. This proved a disastrous fail-



McBey in *The Desert Campaigns* (Putnam).

A Listening Post in the Desert

Indian Lancers lying on the sand all night; while three watch one sleeps.

ure and practically ended the expedition, although numerous small encounters of little importance were reported in the months following.

The Gallipoli campaign seems to have required all available Turkish forces, hence no second serious attack was made on the Canal during 1915. During the hot, trying months of 1915 Major-General Wilson took over the command of the Canal defense and under him constant shifts of troops were made, many of the best brigades on the Canal being sent to the Dardanelles. The Mesopotamian campaign drew many more forces from Egypt; and Aden, the British port at the south end of the Red Sea, required small expeditions. The training of replacements

was a strenuous occupation, for the campaigns in Egypt required a longer training than for anywhere else.

The Gallipoli campaign, which began in February, the landing in April, the Salonika occupation, the Russian advance on Teheran, Hamadan and Kashan, kept large Turkish forces engaged, but later in the year the German successes, the entry of Bulgaria into the war, victories of the Central Powers at Nish, Prizrend, the British retreat from Ctesiphon in Mesopotamia, and the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Gallipoli caused great anxiety in Egypt. Serapeum had proved that the Turks could cross the Sinai Desert in force, with an ample water supply, railroad communications, and large caliber guns.

OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EGYPT

British vigilance in Egypt, however, was to be attracted to an unforeseen front. Whereas an attack from the Syrian front was expected, an attack from the west—from the direction of Tripoli—was not anticipated. In November, 1915, the announcement that the British had to withdraw their garrisons in western Egypt was startling. Shortly afterward, a considerable force of Arabs, Turks and Berbers, under Sidi Ahmed, the head of the Senussi league of Moslems, invaded Egypt from Cyrenaica, the eastern portion of Libya. Thousands of Egyptian Bedouin joined the Senussi, the total force being estimated at not less than 30,000. These troops were supplied with machine guns, pom-poms and a few field pieces and were led by Gaafer Pasha, a Turk with a Prussian military training. Gaafer, with a number of Turkish and German officers, directed the entire operations against Egypt.

On November 5, 1915, the British auxiliary cruiser *Tara* was torpedoed in the Mediterranean off Sollum, an Egyptian port about ten miles from the Libyan frontier. The next day German submarines shelled the port itself, sinking the cruiser *Abbas*, and the *Nur-el-Bahr*. On November 7th, a transport was sunk, and snipers of the Senussi occupied Barrani, a town on the sea, about fifty miles east of the frontier. These sudden occurrences announced the opening of a new campaign.



Perspective Map of the British Campaigns in Palestine and Mesopotamia

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI

General Wallace, in command of the western operations in Egypt, collected his force in December at Merso Matruh, about ninety miles east of Barrani on the Mediterranean. A small engagement occurred at Wadi Shaifa, near Merso Matruh, where the Senussi were repulsed temporarily. By Christmas, however, about 5,000 of the Senussi had concentrated about Medwa, ten miles south of Matruh, under Gaafer. Minor engagements ensued in which the enemy was driven westward toward Halazin, some 25 miles southwest of Matruh. On January 22, 1916, an attack was made on the Senussi which drove them back about three miles with a loss of 700 men. The battle was fought under the worst conditions possible, slippery mud and rain preventing a rout of the Senussi.

On February 9, 1916, Major-General Peyton assumed command of the western Egyptian campaign. His plans were to march directly against Sollum in order to control the northern areas and force the Senussi to operate only in the sandy Libyan Desert to the south. General Lukin, in command of the advance, began his march for Barrani immediately. The enemy was in force at Agagia, fourteen miles southeast of Barrani, which General Lukin thought he was strong enough to attack. Before he had got his forces in position, Gaafer, who had anticipated the move, attacked. The British forces moved quickly, and, in the battle on February 25th, 1916, routed the Senussi with a loss of 200 men. The British followed their success and occupied with little opposition the towns of Sidi Barrani and Sollum, which had been held by the Senussi for the past three months.

The effect of the campaign was that, in slightly over three weeks, General Peyton's force had cleared the northern part of Egypt from the Senussi and had severely damaged the influence of Sayed Ahmed as spiritual leader of the Moslem fraternity. This move in the coastal areas had prevented threatened rebellion in the Nile region.

In order to put an end completely to the power of Sayed Ahmed, it was advisable to drive him from three important oases in the Libyan Desert whither he and his forces had fled. His army was very much attenuated,

due to disease and lack of rations, thanks to the strict control of the coast by the British. In October, 1916, preparations were made at Kharga, an oasis in the Desert. Here supplies were accumulated as a base for the advance by armored cars to Siwa, the most important of the oases occupied by Sayed Ahmed. In February, 1917, light and armored motor cars made a dash for Siwa, entering the locality on the 5th of the month. The Senussi had been unwelcome guests and the 800 remaining were easily forced into the desert, miles from any shelter or supplies. Girba, another oasis, was taken a few days later, settling the campaign in the west. The attempts of the Sudanese tribesmen to coöperate with the Senussi had been thwarted in May, 1916, when Colonel Kelley defeated about 3,000 of the forces of Ali Dinar, the Imam of Darfour, at ElTasher. The conflict quieted further attempts of the tribesmen of Egypt to overcome British rule.

OPERATIONS TO THE EASTWARD

During this time, the operations in the east had been gaining in importance. During the early part of 1916, reports had been received by the British that the Turks were preparing for another advance against the Canal. New levies of Turkish troops had been raised in Asia Minor, a railroad had been constructed into the Sinai Desert, and a water line run from the many Roman wells along the coast. At the very earliest, these attacks could be made in the spring of the year. General Murray took command of the defenses of the Canal and, with his army refilled by men from the Dardanelles, he was able to make the Canal formidable. A surprise was encountered when in April a Turkish aeroplane bombarded Kantara on the Canal and a force of 200 Turks attacked Dueidar, a town about ten miles east of Kantara. On April 23, reinforcements sent by the British routed the Turks at Dueidar, but 5,000 Turks had advanced against Katia the same day, driving out the British garrison which retired toward Dueidar. British reserve regiments rushed forward and repulsed the Turks advancing from Katia. The British followed this success by extending their railroad as far as Romani, about twenty miles east of Dueidar. Turkish aeroplanes dropped bombs continually upon

the road, but failed to stop the admirable work of the Engineers and the native Labor Battalions. To divert the Turks, the British bombarded El Arish on the Mediterranean, employing aeroplanes whenever possible.

THE BATTLE OF EL ARISH

In July and August, 1916, the Turks massed an army of 14,000 men at El Arish. On August 4th, they attacked a British position near Romani; the battle there was the most important one fought on Egyptian territory. Meeting the enemy in advanced positions, the British settled once and for all the



McBey in *The Desert Campaigns* (Putnam).

Desert Signs

"On the horizon a tiny film of smoke arises and disappears. The bush-trained eyes wait focused. It does not again appear. Bedouins perhaps. Possibly only a mirage."

Turkish attempts to destroy the Suez waterway. The British had the situation well in hand, and, supported by the naval forces, developed a momentary retreat so as to draw the Turks from their fortified lines. The real British thrust was in the form of a counter-attack, which was so successful that, besides taking 3,000 Turkish prisoners, it drove the main body back toward Syria for fifteen miles. The British cavalry followed the Turkish army, doing what damage it could, suffering a little in advancing to the border. British airplanes again began to bombard El Arish, and infantry followed up to Maghdaba, some twenty-three miles south of El Arish, where a minor engagement was fought. On December 22, 1916, the British advance attacked the strongly-intrenched Turks near El Arish,

who, after stout resistance, gave way, permitting the English to capture the city with about 1,000 prisoners.


The campaign in 1916 drove the Turks from Egypt and removed all danger to Great Britain's way to India, which was described by the Kaiser as the "jugular vein of the British Empire." The determination of the British to clear Egypt of the Turks arose from the criticism of Lord Kitchener, who, on visiting the defenses of the Canal in 1915, said: "Are you defending the Canal or is the Canal defending you?" This summed up the situation so well that a decision was made to prevent damage to the Canal by keeping the Turks from Egyptian soil. After the battle of Romani, the war zone followed the retreating Turks. Henceforth the war was to be fought on Turkish soil.

THE BRITISH TAKE THE OFFENSIVE

After defeating the Turks at Maghdaba, the British pursued them to Rafa, where the Turkish main body was decisively defeated. Cavalry advances were made from El Arish to Rafa to join the pursuing English units, and after the rout at Rafa on January 9th, pushed on to Khan Yunus, about ten miles from Rafa and the Egyptian border. The English had learned many lessons from the Turks and advanced cautiously. Railroads were built to follow the advance closely, keeping up a constant supply of provisions, munitions and water. The advanced cavalry returned therefore from Khan Yunus in order to await the extension of the railroad from El Arish. Early in March, the English advance column, consisting mostly of New Zealand and Australian troops, crossed the Palestine Border. The Holy Land became a new theater of war, a land holy to Jew and Mohammedan, as well as Christian. A modern Crusade had started, in which crusaders from every part of the British Empire were to expel the infidels.

THE ATTACK ON PALESTINE

On March 26th and 27th, the advancing British columns encountered a body of Turks numbering 20,000 at Gaza, on the Mediterranean, about thirty-five miles from Rafa.



Map of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian Desert and the Approach to Jerusalem

The Turks were overwhelmingly defeated with a loss of about 8,000 men, but covered their retreat so well that British progress was very slow. Another attack on the Turks was made on April 16, north of Gaza, on a six-mile front. British warships assisted in the battle, but the Turks were not driven from the Gaza sector. The Turkish trenches were subjected to heavy artillery fire and frequent trench raids were made, but, upon the approach of the hot weather, the armies practically rested. On July 19th, British cavalry operating further to the east fought an engage-

ment with two regiments of Turkish cavalry, driving them back within the ancient city of Beersheba. Advances were made northward to within twenty miles of Jerusalem, but in general the line of advance remained at Gaza.

ALLENBY'S CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM

In June, 1917, General Allenby assumed command of the operations in Palestine, relieving General Murray. General Allenby had had command of the cavalry division at Mons in 1914 and his wide cavalry experience was to be of great advantage in the

advance into Syria. The cavalry brigades to the east of Gaza moved northward during October, 1917, capturing Beersheba on the 31st. After a night march, the infantry sent forward attacked the Turkish positions in the early morning from the west and southwest. The mounted troops circled the city and attacked from the east. The Turks made a determined resistance, but fell back that evening, the British taking about 1,800 prisoners and nine guns.

On November 1st, the main forces of General Allenby attacked the strong defenses of Gaza, both from the west and southwest.

Sea. Their first halt was along the northern branch of the Wadi Sukereir, which move was taken in order to protect Hebron, about twenty miles south of Jerusalem. This line was forced on November 13th and the move northward continued. The two armies of General Allenby had joined so that the British line was continuous from the coast to the Dead Sea, but the divisions to the east were comparatively weaker than the coastal army and did not progress so rapidly. General Allenby's plan was to advance on Jerusalem from all sides, taking the city without damaging the holy places.



© Central News.

A Native Market in the Holy Land

The front was about 5,000 yards long and covered the Turkish fortifications. Pressure was continued until November 6th, when the Turks were forced to retire and leave Gaza. The British forces pressed in pursuit of the Turks as far as Wadi Hessi, a few miles north of Gaza. In the meantime, the Beersheba forces of the British worked north and northwest of the city, so that, when Gaza fell, both parts of the invading army were about on a line. Beersheba is about twenty-five miles southeast of Gaza and forty miles south of Jerusalem.

ALLENBY'S ADVANCE

The Turks now began a hasty retreat on a line between the Mediterranean and the Dead

On November 17th, New Zealand and Australian troops moved north along the coast, taking Jaffa without opposition. This capture was important, for Jaffa is the port of Jerusalem, and is connected with the interior by good roads and the Mediterranean Railroad. The British now had cut off Turkish supplies from the sea and from the railroad. Two days later, the British advanced on Jerusalem, capturing Kuryet-el-Enab, six miles west of Jerusalem, and Beit Likja, five miles northwest. Turkish retreat to the west now was entirely cut off, for the British line extended north of the roads from Jaffa. A few days later, Bitur, six miles southwest of Jerusalem, was taken, while the western army pushed up to within three miles from the city.



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Surrender of Jerusalem

On the morning of Dec. 11, 1917, the British forces entered the Holy City. This picture shows the Mayor of Jerusalem (with cane and cigarette) meeting the first British outpost.

The main road to the north was still in the hands of the Turks and also the high ground directly surrounding the city.

The main body suspended operations for a few days in order to allow the eastern army, which had been held up south of Hebron, to start northward with reinforcements. Hebron was overcome quickly by direct assault, and pushing on rapidly through Bethlehem, the Allied force closed in on Jerusalem from south and east. The coast army in the meantime had been maneuvering north of the city, so as to ensure the cutting of a line of retreat for the main Turkish forces. On December 8th, the British attacked Jerusalem from the south and west. The Turkish garrison resisted as best they could, but, outnumbered and with their line of retreat held by the British, they had little chance for success and surrendered the city, which they had held continuously since 1244 A. D. The attack was made without artillery, in order to avoid destruction to the city and its surroundings, so rich in historic interest.

THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM

On the 11th of December, 1917, the British forces entered Jerusalem, reclaiming it for Christianity. This ended a Mohammedan rule which had lasted, with intermissions, nearly thirteen centuries. Since King David, nearly three thousand years ago, captured Jerusalem and made it his capital, it has been a coveted prize, sought by nations not for a military advantage, but for its sanctity to three of the world's greatest religions. Repeatedly besieged, captured, recaptured, Jerusalem has been ruled by many of the great nations of the world—the Israelites, Egyptians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Assyrians, Romans, Saracens, Crusaders, Turks. Its capture in the past had nearly always meant the destruction of buildings and the wholesale slaughter of its population. General Allenby, in his rôle of a modern Crusader, upheld none of the barbarity of former times, molesting nothing.

The Turks who remained after the fall of Jerusalem were not in sufficient numbers to attempt serious attacks against the British. Splitting up into small bands, carrying on guerrilla warfare, sniping outposts, attacking

patrols, and in general making as much trouble for the British as possible, the Turks resisted wherever they could. The hilly country around Jerusalem, cut by numerous ravines and small streams, was well-adapted to tactics of that nature. The British decided to gain more favorable ground, and began extending their lines northward. By the end of December, they had reached a line about ten miles north of Jerusalem. Small advances and the capture of hill crests straightened the English line during January, 1918.

FALKENHAYN OUTGENERALED


Reports had been received that General Falkenhayn, a German officer who had carried on several campaigns in Europe, was concentrating forces at Aleppo, whence an expedition was to be launched against Mesopotamia. General Allenby planned to divert this force if possible by advancing northward. It was learned that many Germans had been sent to Asia to oppose the British, and to prop the Turkish armies, which were dwindling through desertions, discontent, and objection to German officers. At the same time, the revolt against Turkey in Arabia had gained in importance, so that the British had an ally near at hand. The Turkish forces had been holding the Hedjaz Railroad east of the Dead Sea, which had been a threatening Turkish communication toward Palestine. In January, an Arab force destroyed several miles of the railroad, retiring soon afterwards into the Desert.

THE CAPTURE OF JERICHO

During February, 1918, the British made many brilliant attacks on the Turkish forces west of the Dead Sea, finally clearing the territory by attacks on the 19th, 20th and 21st of the month. The battle front was about twelve miles in length east and northeast of Jerusalem. Turkish resistance was stubborn, but did not prevent a gradual British advance. After the country west of the Dead Sea was cleared of the enemy, Jericho was attacked on February 21st. Jericho, the ancient walled city, is about fourteen miles north of Jerusalem; its loss by the Turks caused them to retreat behind the Jordan

River. The opposing lines were established along the banks of the rivers Jordan and Wadi Auja. By the British capture of Jericho and the clearing of the Jerusalem territory, the Turks were deprived of their only means of communication in the region. The quick shifting of Turkish forces had been made over roads running north and south, and certain east and west highways which netted

places. Preparations were made for a determined offensive by the British forces, and on March 22nd attacks on both sides of the river were made. By the 24th of the month the advance had reached a point about ten miles from the Jordan. The fighting east of the crossings occurred in a mountainous, rugged country, in which German and Turkish troops resisted every English move. The ob-



Map Illustrating General Allenby's Advance Through Palestine

The British force captured from the Turks and took formal possession of many of the places held in sacred reverence by millions of Christians.

the entire locality. When driven to the east of the Jordan, the Turks lost their important crossings and many concrete bridges which had been constructed by German engineers since 1914. At the same time, the Arabs continued their raids on the Hedjaz Railroad, harassing the Turks south of Jerusalem.

BRITISH CROSS THE JORDAN

During March, 1918, the British made small advances, crossing the Jordan in several

places. Preparations were made for a determined offensive by the British forces, and on March 22nd attacks on both sides of the river were made. By the 24th of the month the advance had reached a point about ten miles from the Jordan. The fighting east of the crossings occurred in a mountainous, rugged country, in which German and Turkish troops resisted every English move. The ob-

jective of the advance was Amman, about twenty-five miles east of the Jordan. Cavalry detachments rode east to the Hedjaz Railroad, destroying several miles of track, which endangered the supply of the 39th Turkish division, which had been investing Aden since 1915. The Arabs had control of the railroad in El Hedjaz, which isolated the south Turkish forces entirely.

point about thirty miles north of Jerusalem. The objective of the move northward was Aleppo, the important Turkish base, from which the railroad from Constantinople divided for provisioning the armies in Syria and in Mesopotamia.

THE TURKISH LINES BROKEN

In April, the British forces east of the Jordan were withdrawn, for German and Turk-


plished his plans, for the Falkenhayn concentration at Aleppo had been drawn from advancing into Mesopotamia and Arabia. The Arabs had continued their raids against the railroad to the south, capturing garrisons, stations, destroying track, and blowing up bridges. The line of communications of the Turks to the south had been definitely cut.

Although small attacks were made on the British during June, July and August, in general, no real campaign could be carried on, due to the torrid and scorching summer months. On July 13th, a strong force of Turks and Germans attempted to cross the Jordan, but a counter-attack by the Anzacs repulsed the enemy to the east bank of the river again.

In September, 1918, General Allenby reopened the campaign, determined to use his cavalry as much as possible. During the night of September 18th, British troops advanced along the Jerusalem-Nablus road, cutting all roads leading southeast from Nablus. The next day, the entire British line attacked from Rafat to the Mediterranean. The Turks were driven back for about five miles, a portion of the British turning eastward to oppose the remaining Turkish lines. By evening, the English forces had occupied the railroad junction at Tul Keram.

THE WHOLE TURKISH ARMY TAKEN

The strip of territory along the Mediterranean occupied by the British was about 180 miles wide, so that advance had to be made carefully. As soon as the Rafat line had been pierced by the British infantry, their cavalry spread out along the railroads south of Nazareth, cutting off large portions of the Turkish main body. The main cavalry continued along the coast for about fifty miles, then turned eastward, stopping further lines of retreat for the enemy's main body. On September 21, these flying columns had taken Nazareth and had occupied the country southeast of the Sea of Galilee. The Turks had no means of escape except to cross the Jordan eastward. The cavalry, working southward, and the infantry, pressing northward along the Jordan, soon closed this exit. After capturing a number of crossings, the English closed in on the Turks, who were entirely



The Advance on Aleppo

The capture by Allenby cut the Turkish line of communications, ending a most spectacular campaign.

ish attacks indicated an offensive in force. In May, the Turks made a bold attempt to re-establish the Hedjaz Railroad. A large body of Turkish and German troops launched attacks against the British at Es-Salt, which, for three days, were repulsed, but eventually the British forces yielded and retreated to the west bank of the Jordan, holding only a few bridgeheads. General Allenby had accom-

surrounded. Small bodies did escape, but in all about 48,000 men surrendered to General Allenby.

The minor Turkish forces to the east of the Jordan were soon to be destroyed. On September 19, Arabs had cut off these bodies from retiring to Damascus. The railroads had been cut in so many places that communication was impossible. The Turks at Es-Salt fell back to Amman, but pursuing British cavalry soon drove them from Amman south along the Hedjaz Railroad. In the mean-

Sea of Galilee. British cavalry and armored cars moved along the Hedjaz Railroad, followed by the infantry, and on the 30th the cavalry had occupied the hills overlooking Damascus from the south. On October 1st, General Allenby occupied the city, capturing the garrison of 7,000 men. The occupation of the city was jointly made by the British and Arabs under King Hasein, who willingly joined the English forces to drive the Turk out of the Holy Land. Thus an advance of 160 miles had been made from Jerusalem, and



A Scene in Beersheba

This ancient city of sacred memory, held for centuries by the Turks, was captured by British cavalry in 1917.

time, the main Arab army of the King of Hedjaz had seized Ma'an and started northward. The position of the Fourth Turkish Army was, therefore, hopeless. Near Amman, on September 29th, 10,000 Turks were captured. From that time on, the British could devote their attentions to the north.

DAMASCUS FALLS BEFORE ALLENBY

North of the British positions were small bodies of Turks, but these did not oppose General Allenby. By the 23rd of September, Haifa and Acre, both on the Mediterranean, had been occupied. By the end of September, the English held positions north of the

of over 90 miles from the starting point of the 1918 fall campaign.

VON SANDERS BARELY ESCAPES CAPTURE


By October 10th, the Beirut-Damascus railroad had been crossed and Beirut taken by French naval and military forces. General Allenby immediately established a new base at Beirut, thus shortening his line of supply from the south. When, a few days later, Tripoli and Homs were occupied, the railroad from those places gave the British forces increased strength for a dash on Aleppo. General Allenby lost no time in consolidating his lines and pushing his cavalry forward. On

October 25th, mounted troops and armored cars reached Aleppo and occupied the city. Although the German general, von Sanders, had had an army of 12,000 in the city, still he decided to retreat rather than give battle to the Juggernaut sweep of the Allenby armies.

The capture of Aleppo was the crowning success of the entire campaign, for it gave

inspired with confidence in their leader and with a reliance which made the invaders endure the sufferings of suffocating heat, arid deserts, and blinding sandstorms. The success evolved from the dynamic personality of General Allenby surely places him among the great military leaders of the war.

The sudden suspension of hostilities on November 11, 1918, ended the campaign in



Merchant Vessels Coaling at Port Said

the British control of the important railroad junction where the Constantinople railroad branched to Bagdad. The possession of this junction cut the line of communications of the Turks operating in Mesopotamia, and isolated the remaining forces which opposed the English.

The wonderful achievements of the campaign were due entirely to General Allenby, whose army, composed of units from almost every part of the Empire, were welded into a homogeneous fighting force. New Zealanders, Australians, Scots, Londoners, South Africans, Indians, Egyptians and Arabs were

Asia. The maintenance of quiet in Egypt, the protection of the Suez Canal, the freeing of Arabia, the capture of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, and the Aleppo advance all were parts of the world-wide campaigns against the Central Powers which culminated in the destruction of militarism and in the long-expected if long-postponed victory for the Allied Powers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Desert Campaigns, by W. T. Massey; *The National Geographic Magazine*, October, 1918, article "An Old Jewel in the Proper Setting," by Charles W. Whitehair.

THE SALONIKA CAMPAIGN

Ineffectual Attempts to Aid Serbia—Deadlock in Salonika—Venizelos and Constantine—Capture of Monastir—Bulgarian Collapse

BY H. C. HOLDRIDGE
Captain, Cavalry, United States Army

OF all the campaigns of the Great War the campaign of Salonika has undoubtedly called forth most criticism. Those who objected to the operations of the Allies in Greece based their objections principally on the fact that the troops used in Greece were wasting their efforts in a direction from which no decisive results could be expected. Their presence was badly needed on the Western front, and it was on the Western front alone—according to these critics—that the final decision of the war would be made. While the early operations of the campaign justified such an attitude to a certain extent, there were certain considerations relative to the Balkan situation that made such a campaign advisable. Most of the considerations were political—which was another cause for criticism by military men—but, nevertheless, they were of extreme importance.

When a campaign based on Greece was under consideration in Paris, Bulgaria had not yet joined the Central Powers. The Allies had cause to believe that if the enemy forces who were driving Serbia to the south, could be defeated, Bulgaria might be induced to cast in her lot with the Allies. Unfortunately for the Allied cause, the decision to launch such a campaign came too late to bring about the desired result, for Bulgaria had entered the war before the campaign was well under way.

A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

Another political feature of importance was the relation between Serbia and the Allies. Serbia had been pressed back by the Austrian forces and was almost on the point of collapse. She had hoped for, and expected,

Allied support in the critical situation. The Allies were under moral obligations not to disappoint her hopes. Moreover, it would have injured their own position had they done so, for Serbia, without support, would be unable to continue the struggle and, succumbing to the enemy attacks, would be lost to the Allies.

In this same connection it must be remembered that the Balkan question was of the greatest significance, and was, in fact, the issue that had brought on the war. Germany and Austria had been endeavoring to extend their control throughout the Balkans and into Asia Minor. If they lost the war on the Western front, and still maintained control in the Near East, the war would be a success from their standpoint. However, if the Allies could carry through a successful campaign in this region, the hold of the Central Powers would be broken, and no matter what the result on other fronts might be, the Teutonic dream of an empire in the East would be forever shattered.

There were two military results to be gained by a campaign originating at Salonika. First, Serbia was in need of supplies, reinforcements, and a possible line of retreat, should retreat become necessary. The control of the railroad from Salonika to Nish would enable the Allies to provide all three requirements. Second, if the Allied forces were of sufficient strength they might be able to cut the railroad joining Turkey with the Central Powers, and thereby isolate her and make her downfall certain, since Turkey could not carry on any important operations without munitions and supplies from her allies.

The campaign once decided upon, troops were ordered to Salonika from the Gallipoli

peninsula, and from France. Their arrival upon Greek soil brought up a critical diplomatic situation. By a treaty with Serbia, Greece was bound to assist Serbia if she were attacked by Bulgaria, and it might, therefore, be expected that the Allies of Serbia would be welcomed on Greek territory. Since Bulgaria had not yet entered the war, Greece was still neutral. The Greek Premier, M. Venizelos, entered a formal protest against the action of the Allied governments, but at heart he was known to be strongly in favor



M. Venizelos, the Greek Premier

His sympathies were with the Allies, and in 1916 he set up a revolutionary government which the Allies recognized.

of the Allies and to wish to render them every assistance possible. The same was not true, however, of King Constantine; since Constantine though of Danish blood was related by marriage to the ruling house of Germany, it was hardly to be expected that he would favor Germany's enemies. On October 5, after a disagreement with M. Venizelos over the question of the extent of Greek mobilization preparatory to coming to the assistance of Serbia, the King forced the resignation of the Premier. Thereafter the government of Constantine, although openly neutral, secretly supported the Central Powers and opposed the Allies. As King, he continued his objection to

the occupation of Greek territory by armed forces of another nation until his downfall, but the majority of the Greek people were in sympathy with the Allied cause and favored supporting their treaty obligations with Serbia. The attitude of the King caused much embarrassment and anxiety to the Allied commanders when they arrived with their troops.

FIRST OPERATIONS

The first contingent of troops sent to Salonika arrived on Oct. 3, 1915. By the end of October three French divisions, under General Sarrail, and one British division, the 10th, under General Mahon, had disembarked. By the time of the opening of the campaign in the north the total Allied forces numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 men. In October, 1915, Bulgaria finally entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, and immediately crossed the Serbian border, taking in flank the Serbs who were struggling with the Austrians and Germans to the north. Since sufficient troops had now arrived to permit of allied operations it was decided to move to the support of Serbia at once. If immediate action were not taken it would be too late to be of any use. Plans were made for rendering all the assistance possible to Serbia.

There were two possible plans for supporting that struggling nation. The first of these was to send forward detachments from the Allied army as fast as they arrived in Salonika, and feed these detachments into the Serb line as rapidly as possible. This was objected to because it would be impossible to send the entire force at once, and what forces were sent must be sent in small units, due to the poor communications between Salonika and Nish. These small detachments would be absorbed by the Serbs, they would lose their identity as French soldiers, would be under the command of Serbian officers, and would not be of sufficient numbers to make any difference in the final outcome of the struggle.

The plan was discarded for one better suited to conditions and to the forces at hand. This second plan was to control the railroad communications between Salonika and Nish up the Vardar River, form a junction with the Serbs, and secure their line of supply and retreat.



Underwood and Underwood.

Constantine, Former King of Greece

His father was a Dane, his mother a Russian, his wife a German, and he was the first prince of the dynasty to be born in Greece. His relationship to other reigning houses of Europe placed him in a most difficult position. Owing to the Queen's influence, he was accused of sympathizing with Germany, and while he tried to keep Greece neutral, the party of Venizelos proved in the end too strong for him. Under pressure from the Allies in 1917, he abdicated, the succession passing to his second son, Prince Alexander.

ADVANCE ALONG VARDAR

In accordance with the second plan, the advance up the Vardar was begun on October 14th. In a few days the French headquarters were established at Strumitza Station, and contact made with the Bulgar forces to the east. Tatarli and Kakali were taken and a line established from Dedeli to Lake Doiran. This line was later taken over by the British 10th Division, which was given the task of

therefore, pushed forward as rapidly as possible, but were too late. On Oct. 9, Uskub was taken by the Bulgars and, on Oct. 28, Veles fell into their hands. This success of the Bulgarian forces definitely separated the Serbs and the French, and destroyed all hope of the Serbs being able to withdraw into Salonika. The French were too weak to fight their way through, for they had only two divisions available, the third being used to guard the communications to Salonika.

The Serbs attempted to force their way through to the French (Nov. 4th to Nov. 8th), by attacking the Bulgarian forces from the Velika Planina and Mt. Jegovats, but failed because they were worn out with fighting and could not overcome the superior forces sent against them. On November 12, their disastrous retreat across Albania was begun.

Having failed to join forces with the Serbs to the north, the French determined to make an effort to relieve the 5,000 Serbs who had been driven into the Babuna Pass to the west of the Vardar, and who were now being pressed back by the Bulgarian left wing which was advancing on



Map to Illustrate the Operations on the Salonika Front

holding the right flank of the Allied forces. The first battalions arrived to take over the sector on October 26th.

THE GREAT SERBIAN RETREAT

While the right flank of the advance was being secured, the left wing was advancing to the north. The French took the defile of Demir-Kapu and moved to Krivolak on the 20th. Upon arriving at Krivolak it was seen that the Serbian forces were on the point of being cut off from their support coming from the south. All possible haste was necessary if the rapidly-advancing Bulgars were to be prevented from taking the railroad between the Serbs and the French. The French,

Monastir. The heights of Kara Hodjali had been secured by the French on Oct. 20, and this position now protected their flank when they turned to the west. From Nov. 5 to Nov. 19 successive attempts were made to force the Bulgars from their position of Mt. Archangel, but the defenses stood firm. Realizing the impossibility of relieving the Serbs with their limited forces, the French prepared to retire to the Greek border. This retirement was taken up in successive stages until a position was reached along the Boyemia River, where the French connected with the British. They were unable to remain here, however, because the enemy was now attacking the 10th Division and the British were forced to retire. This

retirement would expose the French communications and threaten to cut them from their base. Furthermore, the Bulgarians had now reached Monastir and a flank attack from that direction was possible. The French and British, therefore, retired to the south by parallel routes, and, by December 12, were all back across the Greek border. Their mission had not been accomplished because the campaign had not been determined upon until

Serbs. Now, however, it was decided to maintain a hold on the Balkans by continuing the occupation of Salonika, and, if occasion offered, to take up again offensive operations. Accordingly, troops continued to be sent to Salonika to reinforce those already there.

Immediately upon their return to Greek soil, the Allied forces set about constructing a defensive position around Salonika. They were fortunate in being able to continue this



Withdrawal of the Greek Troops from Salonika, December, 1915

too late, they had had insufficient forces to cope with the superior forces of their adversaries, and the difficulties of communications in that rough country and the hostile attitude of the Greek government had made free and rapid action impossible.

NEW PHASE OF CAMPAIGN

With the retirement of the Allied forces across the Greek frontier the campaign of Salonika assumed an entirely different character. The original purpose of the campaign had been primarily to render assistance to the

work without interruption, for the Bulgars, who had forced them to the south, stopped their pursuit at the Greek frontier. For a time it was feared that they might continue their pursuit of the Allies across the Greek border, and had they done so they would probably have been able to defeat the entire Allied force. Because the Bulgars themselves were worn out by the recent fighting, and because it was feared by Germany that Greece might enter the war against her should Greece be violated, orders were issued preventing such violation of territory.

The construction of the defenses of Salonika

engaged the attention of the Allies for the first four months of 1916. Since their total forces were still under 200,000, it was necessary to hold the shortest line possible, and they were, therefore, unable to occupy either of the two circles of mountains north of Salonika. The line chosen for defense rested in the west



King Constantine and Prince (now King) Alexander

on the Vardar River, which was easily defended because of the marshy region near its mouth. From Topshin, on the Vardar, it ran eastward to Lakes Langhaza and Beshik, and thence to the Gulf of Orfano. These bodies of water were natural obstacles and were easily defended. In addition to these main defenses it was expected that the Greek forces at Fort Rupel and at other frontier posts would prevent any Bulgarian invasion down

the Struma, and that those at Florina would prevent them from advancing from the northwest. The work on this intrenched camp of Salonika was hurried forward with all speed. Trenches were dug, roads were built, railroads made their appearance, telephone and telegraph systems were installed, and, by the beginning of summer, the defenses of Salonika were considered to be exceptionally strong.

UNSETTLED POLITICAL CONDITIONS

While the troops were busy with their intrenchments and the improvement of communications, the political conditions in Greece had been changing as well. Even while the Allied retirement was taking place the Greek government had hampered the Allies and had objected to their retiring to Greek soil, and the Greek forces were assuming a threatening attitude toward them. The Allied governments had presented a note to Constantine demanding a change of attitude and instituting a partial blockade of the Greek coast. The Greeks finally agreed to the Allied occupation of Salonika and withdrew all Greek troops from there except one division. It must be remembered that the Allies had justification for such measures because, with the entrance of Bulgaria into the war, Greece was bound by her treaty with Serbia to take part against Bulgaria, and, instead of opposing the Allies, Greece should actually have been fighting with them.

Even after the above agreements had been reached, matters continued in a very unsatisfactory state. Following an air raid on Salonika by German planes, General Sarrail arrested the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish consuls, who still carried on their work in Salonika, and took possession of their consulates. It was found that these consulates had been the centers of enemy propaganda and intrigue, and had even contained stores of enemy arms and ammunition. This action by General Sarrail was followed by the forced occupation, by Allied troops, of the Greek fort of Karaburnu, at the entrance to the harbor of Salonika. The Greek government protested against these acts, but was given little consideration, for its hostile attitude gave the Allies no choice if their own safety was to be secured.

On May 26th, the Allies were startled to learn that the Bulgars had advanced down the Struma River, taken the Greek fortress of Rupel, and caused the Greek garrison to withdraw to Demir-hissar. This fort was situated on the Struma River and controlled a defile at that point. Its seizure by the Bulgars would allow them to operate against the Allies from eastern Bulgaria, and would permit of supplies being sent to them down the Struma. At the same time it cut the Allies from their line of advance into Bulgarian territory from the southeast, when they finally started an offensive. When it was discovered that this occupation had been made by a previous agreement with Greece, General Sarrail immediately proclaimed martial law in Salonika and took over the police force and the service of communication. He allowed the Greeks to continue only their administrative government of the city.

THE VENIZELOS REVOLT

The occupation of Greek territory by the Bulgarians had an effect other than that concerning the relations with the Allied forces. Soon after Fort Rupel had been taken the Bulgarians entered Demir-hissar and Kavala as well, and, in the west, they moved down to Florina and Banitza. Immediately a cry of protest was heard from the Greek people. No matter what their attitude might be toward the Allies they were unwilling to allow Bulgaria, the hereditary enemy of Greece, to desecrate Greek territory. This protest was especially violent in Salonika, where, in August, 1916, it took the form of the "Salonika Revolution." A Committee of National Defense was organized, and all allegiance to the Athens government rejected. The movement spread rapidly among the Venizelist element of the population, and gathered strength as time went on. With the control of Salonika by the revolutionary government, which was naturally favorable to the Allies, the control of the political situation was very much simplified for the Allied commanders.

In the meanwhile, minor military operations had taken place all along the front. Cavalry patrols had encountered enemy patrols and skirmishes between them had followed. In addition to these, artillery duels

were frequent, and air raids by German aircraft, with reprisals by Allied planes, caused a great deal of uneasiness, especially among the civilian population. Reinforcements continued to arrive. In May the resurrected and reconstructed Serb army, numbering about 100,000 men, was transported from Corfu to Salonika, and took a position on the extreme left of the line, near Florina. Here it had several brushes with the enemy, but no action of importance took place for some months.



General Sarrail, Commander of the French Troops at Salonika

In July, 1916, two Russian brigades also arrived and were started on a period of intensive training. In August a strong Italian division was added to the command of General Sarrail, and at once took a position near the center of the line, with the British on its right and the French on its left.

FIGHTING IN THE SUMMER OF 1916

By the middle of the summer of 1916 the Allied forces were in sufficient strength to make offensive operations possible. The possibilities of such operations were always kept in view, and a favorable opportunity for an

attack upon the Bulgarians now presented itself. Rumania was now apparently about to enter the conflict on the side of the Allies, but her resolution to take the fatal step was weakening. A successful offensive against the Bulgarians would impress her with the hopelessness of their position, and her determination would be strengthened. General Sarraïl, therefore, planned a combined attack on the center and left of the enemy line. It began in the latter part of August.

This attack was never carried through. The Central Powers realized, as well as the Allies, that Rumanian support was important and that Rumania might still be induced to join them if pressure were brought to bear upon her. Realizing the motive of the Allied attack, they attempted to forestall it by an offensive of their own. Their offensive was launched on the left of the Allied line, which was now held by the Serbs. The line at this part of the defenses was near the Greek frontier, and the territory between the opposing forces was held by Greek troops. On the morning of August 17th, the Greeks quietly withdrew, leaving the field clear for the Bulgarian forces. The same day the enemy occupied Florina, and, after heavy fighting on the 18th and 19th, took Banitza. The Serbs were gradually forced back and, by the 20th, had their backs against Lake Ostrovo.

BULGARIANS TAKE THE OFFENSIVE

Their position here was weak. An attack on their left flank, if successful, would give the Bulgarians control of the Serb communications with Salonika, and the Serbs would be separated from their reinforcements, which were now being rushed to their assistance. Such an enemy attack was not made and French and Russian troops were able to arrive in time to prevent any further Bulgarian advances. On the 22nd five separate attacks were made on the Allied positions, and all were failures. The enemy offensive had been checked.

In the meanwhile the British and French troops north of Salonika had not been idle. Their operations from the 10th to the 17th of August had been held up because of the enemy counter-offensive, but thereafter a holding attack was made all along the line from the Gulf of Orfano to the Vardar River.

This attack was uniformly successful and was of great value since it detained enemy forces that might have been sent to the west to be used with effect against the left of the line.

On the 15th of September a counter-thrust against the enemy at Lake Ostrovo was begun, and the Allied forces began to push him back toward Florina. Sufficient reinforcements had arrived to enable the Allies to advance steadily. On the 16th Gornichevo was retaken, and on the 17th a heavy attack was made on the Florina-Rosna line. With the successful conclusion of the attack on the 18th the Allied forces entered Florina. On the same day the Serbs occupied the heights of Kaymakchalan which commanded the territory to the east of Monastir.

The Allies now determined to push on to Monastir itself, but the capture of that city was certain to be a difficult undertaking. It was protected on the east by mountains situated between two loops of the Cerna River, and the river itself was a difficult obstacle to cross. Monastir was likewise protected on the west by another series of mountains, and, on the south, by several parallel streams, branches of the Cerna, running through low ground, making intrenchments difficult of construction since they became flooded during the rainy season.

The capture of Monastir would have been almost impossible had not another element been introduced into the situation at this time. An Italian expeditionary force had been operating from Avlona, on the Adriatic. This force pushed on into the interior, and, on October 25th, gained contact with the Allied left wing. It now commanded the hills to the west of Monastir. From this position it was able to exert great pressure on the enemy right flank, and played no small part in forcing the final enemy retirement.

FALL OF MONASTIR

The attack from the south of Monastir had been held up until the attack from the east had developed. It was impossible to move forward from the south until the Serbs had advanced far enough to the west to bring pressure on the enemy right flank. Therefore, the Serbs, after the capture of the heights of Kaymakchalan, pushed on to the west in the



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

A Greek Camp in a Moslem Cemetery

This ancient burial ground near Salomika was occupied for military purposes during the Greek mobilization. There is a numerous Moslem population in Greece as well as in the countries of its northern neighbors, but the incident pictured above shows that there was no love between Christians and Mohammedans.

face of vigorous opposition. After they had succeeded in crossing the Cerna, a general "push" was begun from the east, south, and west. As a result of this drive the Serbs gained a position so near to Monastir that they threatened to cut off the enemy troops opposing the Allies in the south. The pressure that they brought to bear on the enemy flanks and on his communications was too great to be resisted. On November 19th, 1916, the Bulgarians withdrew from the town. Monastir was immediately occupied by the

Bulgars in 1915 had been the cause of great rejoicing in Bulgaria. By its loss in 1916, as a result of the campaign just described, Bulgarian hopes were crushed and Bulgarian determination to continue the fight weakened. Moreover, the Serbs were again on their own territory, from which they had been driven by the Bulgarian invasion, and were encouraged in their belief that the Bulgarians would finally be driven back across their own border and Serbia again be delivered to her own people.



© Underwood and Underwood.

On the Salonika Front

An Indian transport crossing a sandbag bridge built by British engineers over flooded ground.

Allied forces, and the Serbs were again on their own soil.

A GREAT VICTORY WON

The importance of the recapture of Monastir by the Allies cannot be overestimated. The entire campaign had shown that the Allied forces were able to cope successfully with the combined forces of the Germans, Austrians, and Bulgars, and was an illustration of the fact that there was still a great amount of fighting power left in the Serbs in spite of their previous disasters. Its political effect, however, was of most importance. For years the Bulgarians had coveted Monastir. When it had been given to Serbia by the treaty following the first Balkan war, Bulgaria, who had desired it herself, was so dissatisfied that she had again taken up arms, in the second Balkan war, to obtain it. Its capture by the

With the capture of Monastir by the Allies, operations died down all along the front, for winter had come on with its rain, mud, and cold, and any movements of importance were impossible. The chief matter of interest was the political situation. King Constantine still continued his hostile attitude, which was very exasperating to the Allied governments. Encouragement in this situation came in September, 1916, when Venizelos and his immediate followers retired to Crete and set up a revolutionary government headed by a triumvirate with Venizelos in control. This government was recognized by the Allies in January, 1917, and at once set about raising an army to come to the assistance of the Allies. Further active opposition by the Greek Royalists, in which a number of French and British sailors were killed, taxed the patience of the Allies to the breaking-point. As a result Allied forces took control of Thessaly,



Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria

© Underwood and Underwood.

He fled to Vienna after signing an armistice in September, 1918, on terms laid down by the Allies. The defection of Bulgaria had a powerful influence on the waning fortunes of the Central Powers.

and the Greek government there was set aside.

OFFENSIVE OF 1918

In the spring of 1917 the situation remained practically unchanged. Two offensives were begun, one by the British, and one by the French, but only local successes resulted. Even these small operations soon ceased, due to the heat of the summer. From the summer of 1917 to the end of the summer of 1918 the situation was a deadlock, relieved only by air raids and local skirmishes. Everyone in Europe had forgotten, apparently, that there was such a thing as a Macedonian front, and the critics of the expedition felt that their opposition had been well taken. Suddenly surprising news was received from Salonika.

The army that for so long had appeared dead had come to life with far-reaching effect. Within two weeks, from September 15th to September 29th, 1918, the Allies had attacked the enemy, had pierced his line, and had forced Bulgaria to surrender.

Conditions in the summer of 1918 warranted such a great Allied offensive. General Franchet d'Esperey, who had succeeded to the command of the Allied armies, now had under his command about 725,000 troops. Of these forces eight divisions were French, four British, six Serbian, ten Greek—after the fall of Constantine—and one Italian. The Russians had disappeared after 1917. The Bulgars, on the other hand, had only about 400,000 men available since the German and Austrian forces that had been supporting Bulgaria had been withdrawn to the Western front, where their presence was badly needed. The Eleventh German Army still remained, but only the staff was German, all of the men being Bulgarians. In addition, the Central Powers were not expecting an offensive on this front. The situation had remained unchanged for so long that it was believed that the Allies themselves were willing to allow matters to rest as they were. Moreover, Bulgaria was tired of fighting and wanted peace. It was believed that the new ministry that had just come into power would welcome a defeat, since it would justify her withdrawal from her alliance. With a great superiority of forces, with no attack expected, and with favorable political conditions in Bul-

garia, a vigorous offensive held every promise of success.

THE NEW OFFENSIVE

General d'Esperey had two general plans of attack open to him. He might attack from the west of the Vardar River, which cut the Allied front into two parts. Any attack to the north from the west, however, must finally be held up by the oblique course of the Vardar, which was easily defended and difficult to cross. Moreover, the mountains between the Vardar and the Cerna were steep, rocky, and hard to scale. The chances of success from this direction were, therefore, limited by the nature of the terrain. A movement northward along the Struma, however, would be less difficult, since the territory would not present so many obstacles, and at the same time an advance from this part of the line would threaten Sofia, the Bulgarian capital.

D'ESPEREY'S STRATEGY

There were several things that induced General d'Esperey to decide upon the attack from the west, even though it was the more difficult of the two plans. In the first place the line of communications of the Bulgars followed the course of the Vardar to Uskub and there turned north toward Nish. The advance from the west would threaten to cut these communications and separate the Bulgars from their base and from their reinforcements. Again, it was known that the Bulgars were not expecting an attack between the Vardar and the Cerna, for that territory was considered so strong in its natural obstacles that no Allied attack was considered to hold any possibility of success. They had, therefore, thinned that part of their line and had turned their attention to the attack which they expected to come either from the direction of Monastir or from the vicinity of Lake Doiran. Acting upon the principle of doing the unexpected in order to surprise the enemy, General d'Esperey ordered the main attack to be launched in the angle between the Vardar and the Cerna, and combined with it secondary attacks at Monastir and Lake Doiran. At the same time, a general holding attack was to take place all along the line.

Early on the morning of September 15th,



Topographical Map of Southeastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula

the first troops, consisting of two French divisions and one Serbian division, went over the top, and the great offensive had begun. The first troops were followed later in the day by two more Serbian divisions, and on the sixteenth the Third Greek Army and the First Serbian Army also entered the fray. Fighting now became general along the front.

The Eleventh German Army was holding the sector between the Vardar and the Cerna, and here the fighting was most severe. The enemy had taken up a position at the summit of the cliffs which were so steep in places that it was impossible for the Serbs to walk up the slope. The Serbs, therefore, advanced to the attack with ladders, and all day long on the 17th, they climbed toward the enemy in the face of a heavy artillery barrage. As long as daylight lasted they were unable to gain the top but clung to the face of the rocks below the enemy lines. With the coming of darkness they resumed the advance, and after ten o'clock in the evening, gained their objectives.

Their control of the heights pierced the enemy line, and he was forced to retire. On the 18th, the Allied forces, with cavalry and airplanes, took up the pursuit, in the endeavor to precipitate a general retirement by cutting the flanking forces from their line of retreat. The main attack continued along the flanks which rested on the two rivers, and, by this time, the Allied forces in the Lake Doiran region and in the vicinity of Monastir were also actively engaged. The Italians on the heights north and east of Monastir also took part and prevented any enemy movements into Albania. The enemy was so closely pressed that his entire line began to break, and he began to retreat along a front 130 miles long, and, with the continued advance of the Allied forces, his retreat was rapidly developing into a rout. Large quantities of supplies, arms, and ammunitions were captured daily. Everything pointed to the fact that the enemy forces were demoralized.

By the 22nd of September the pursuing forces in the center had reached the line of the Vardar from Demir-Kapu to Gradsko, and with the crossing of the river on the 23rd, the Bulgarian army was cut into two segments. The pursuit now developed into a race for Uskub, the Allies attempting to cut off the retreat of the enemy forces in the west,

and the enemy trying to secure his line of retreat, which passed through that town. The Allies won, for in a daring raid the French cavalry reached Uskub on the 28th, and cut the enemy from his only hope of retreat. Those forces in the east were able to withdraw across the border into Bulgarian territory, but the Eleventh German Army, in the west, was not so fortunate. With retreat through Uskub made possible because of Allied occupation, with the Italians holding the passes into Albania, and with strong Allied forces pressing forward from the south and east, all hope was lost. On September 30th the entire Eleventh German Army of over 66,000 men surrendered to the French.

THE BULGARIANS SURRENDER

On the previous day, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, urged on by his cabinet and by the wishes of his people, consented to an unconditional surrender to the Allies. Bulgarian troops began to evacuate Serbia, and Bulgaria was out of the fight. Although early appeals by the Bulgarians for German assistance had been unavailing, the Central Powers, now that it was too late, began to rush troops to strategic points in Serbia and Bulgaria. These forces were unable to withstand the blows of the Allied troops which had continued to move northward, and, on October 13th, they were forced to evacuate Nish. By the control of this city, the Allies were able to cut the famous railroad from Berlin to Bagdad. Turkey as well as Bulgaria was now separated from the Central Powers, and their hold on the Balkan Peninsula was completely broken.

Thus, after three years, the Allies had gained their end. The defeat of Bulgaria and the cutting off of Turkey marked the beginning of the end for the Central Powers, and their failure in the east was a forewarning of what was soon to occur in the west. After the defeat in the Balkans, the spirit of the German people began to break, and the operations in the Near East played no small part in the final dissolution of the German war machine. The Salonika expedition had received its justification.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Serbian Front in Macedonia, by E. P. Stebbing; *Campaigning in the Balkans*, by Harold Lake.

THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN

The Balkan Kingdom's Initial Successes Are Turned into Defeat by the Strategy of Mackensen and Falkenhayn and the Apathy of Russia

BY MAJOR CHARLES A. KING, JR.
Infantry, United States Army

THE great European conflict had been in progress for two years before Rumania decided to enter the struggle. Although the majority of the inhabitants of the little Danubian kingdom were in sympathy with the Entente Allies, the government at Bucharest succeeded, despite great pressure from both groups of belligerents, in maintaining an attitude of neutrality until the late summer of 1916. During this time the Rumanian people had profited greatly from the sales of grain, meat and oil to both the Teutonic and Allied powers.

Rumania's final decision was influenced primarily by her desire to secure the Hungarian province of Transylvania, where dwelt a million and a half people of her own race. It was well known that the Dual Empire would never consent willingly to the separation of Transylvania from Hungary; hence it seemed to Rumanians that in the Entente alone must rest their hopes of national and racial unity. In the second place, the conquest of Serbia and the consequent territorial aggrandizement of Bulgaria were regarded as constituting a grave menace to the future security of Rumania. Moreover, in August, 1916, the position of the Allies seemed favorable. The Somme offensive had been attended by considerable success, the Verdun attacks had been shattered, and the Italian advance on Gorizia and the western rim of the Carso plateau was slowly beating down the resistance of the Austrians. At Dorna Watra, near at hand, the left flank of the rejuvenated Russian armies of Brusiloff were resting upon their great sweep through Volhynia, Galicia, and Bukowina, preparatory, it was thought, to an advance into the Hungarian plain. Indeed, it appears certain that the Allies agreed that an

offensive by the Rumanians would be supported on the north by a Russian advance, while to the south, General Sarrail would simultaneously begin a forward movement from Salonika in order to divert the attention of Bulgaria. As the sequel showed, neither of these offensives materialized and Rumania was left to her fate.

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE RUMANIAN THEATER

Rumania is well-defended by nature. To the east she is protected by the Pruth River and the Black Sea, to the north and west by the Transylvanian Alps, and to the south by the Danube. The only opening in the natural ramparts is a space of about 100 miles in width which forms the southern frontier of the province of Dobrudja. The defenses to the east may be neglected for the purposes of our discussion.

The Transylvanian Alps are a continuation of the Carpathian range, and have an average breadth of 50 miles. Nine passes of military value pierce this rocky barrier. These defiles may be considered as forming three separate groups, the "northern," the "central," and the "western" passes. Through most of the passes streams run down hill into Rumania. Thus the slope of the land from the west tends to facilitate the movement of armies coming from the Hungarian side of the border.

The Danube is an obstacle of great military value. The stream is over half a mile in width and very deep, but its crossing by an invading force is particularly difficult on account of the chain of bayous, swamps, and bogs that parallels its course. In the face of a defending army adequately supplied with



Map to Illustrate the Rumanian Invasion of Transylvania Through the Passes of the Carpathians

artillery and munitions the passage of the river would be impossible.

The southern boundary of Rumania, the "Achilles heel" of King Ferdinand's kingdom, is absolutely unprotected. It is simply an arbitrary line established for political reasons and without relation to any topographic feature. The Dobrudja itself is a flat marshy plain, cut across its center by the vital Constantza-Cernavoda-Bucharest railway.

The two chief provinces of Rumania, Moldavia and Wallachia, have been likened to the open jaws of a pair of gigantic nut crackers. As we shall see, the Rumanian general staff

determined to launch armies from each of these jaws and crush Transylvania as in a vise.

Finally, it must be remembered that the boundary of Rumania is almost 800 miles long—a truly formidable length of front to be defended by an army of a little over a half million of men.

THE RUMANIAN ARMY

The Rumanian military establishment comprised, approximately, half a million of men. The forces were disposed in four armies. The rank and file were of fair fighting quality, but

the various units were poorly trained and ill-equipped. There were but few munitions plants in Rumania and, although the government had endeavored to secure supplies from abroad, her neighbors required the entire output of their factories for their own use. The artillery arm, in particular, was weak,

Due to her geographical situation Rumania was in a position to coöperate either with Brusiloff in an offensive against Hungary, or with Sarraill in an advance into Bulgaria. A strategic plan devised in accordance with the latter movement was favored by the Allies, for a successful offensive against Bulgaria



General Averescu

Rumania's ablest military leader.

and the supply of shells wholly inadequate for an extended campaign.

Rumania was to pay dearly for the lack of trained personnel and for her deplorable lack of war *matériel* of all kinds.

STRATEGIC PLANS OF THE COMBATANTS

Considerations both of strategy and politics figured in the Rumanian plan of campaign.

would result not only in the crushing of that country but, by severing the communications between Turkey and the Germanic Powers, would lead eventually to the defeat of the Turks and the consequent opening of the Dardanelles. Such a plan, however, had serious drawbacks. Two great obstacles—the Danube and the Balkan mountains—would bar the way of the invaders, and while the Rumanian armies were forcing these barriers the long

border line of Moldavia would be practically undefended and the country open to an invasion from the northwest.

On the other hand, a successful advance with the bulk of the army through the mountain passes to the west would give the Rumanians immediate possession of coveted Transylvania, and, if pushed forward to the central Maros valley, would allow a considerable shortening of their lines. In addition to a shorter front, a position along the Maros would allow the Rumanian armies to make

mitted to an offensive which, at first glance, would seem inexcusably rash.

The Germanic plan called for the protection of the Orient railway and Constantinople, and the destruction of the Rumanian army. It was proposed to accomplish the first of the desired ends by safeguarding Nish—the objective of any movement against the railroad. As for the second, a swift thrust up into the Dobrudja would anticipate any advance of the Russians towards Varna and would result in the seizure of the main Rumanian supply



On the Banks of the Danube, Rumania's Southern Boundary

use of the excellent Austro-Hungarian railway which runs along the east bank of the Maros, thus making possible the uninterrupted arrival of supplies and the rapid shifting of troops. It will be noted that in Rumania proper the only lateral railway is some fifty miles from the Transylvania border. Moreover, it was believed that the promised offensive from Salonika would neutralize the Bulgarian army to such an extent that a small force would be able to hold successfully the crossings of the Danube.

With these considerations in mind it is easy to see why the Rumanian armies were com-

mitted to an offensive which, at first glance, would seem inexcusably rash. The Germanic plan called for the protection of the Orient railway and Constantinople, and the destruction of the Rumanian army. It was proposed to accomplish the first of the desired ends by safeguarding Nish—the objective of any movement against the railroad. As for the second, a swift thrust up into the Dobrudja would anticipate any advance of the Russians towards Varna and would result in the seizure of the main Rumanian supply

mitted to an offensive which, at first glance, would seem inexcusably rash. The Germanic plan called for the protection of the Orient railway and Constantinople, and the destruction of the Rumanian army. It was proposed to accomplish the first of the desired ends by safeguarding Nish—the objective of any movement against the railroad. As for the second, a swift thrust up into the Dobrudja would anticipate any advance of the Russians towards Varna and would result in the seizure of the main Rumanian supply

INVASION OF TRANSYLVANIA

Once Rumania had made her decision she showed no hesitancy in attempting to carry

out her strategic plan. Upon the very day that war was declared she threw her partly-mobilized army across the Hungarian frontier, intending to crush Transylvania between the forces advancing from the two parts of her jaw-like border—Moldavia and Wallachia. The actual invasion was made by three armies, the Fourth, the Second, and the First. The principal lines of advance were through the passes along which the railroads entered Transylvania in the vicinity of Csik Szereda, Kronstadt, and Hermannstadt.

The Fourth Army, operating from Moldavia, moved through the Gyimes and neighboring passes and, in less than a fortnight, penetrated to the valleys of the upper Maros and the upper Alt (Aluta). The important railroad traversing the Alt valley some 18 miles from the border was cut in four places. During the whole of September the Fourth Army continued its advance, reaching points 50 miles west of the border while its right flank, supported by Russians, reached Bistritz.

Simultaneously with the advance from Moldavia the Rumanian Second and First Armies rushed over the frontier from Wallachia. The Second Army followed the Oytoz (Oitoz) and Torzburg passes, overran the uplands beyond the divide, and captured Kronstadt. Brushing aside all opposition, it continued to advance and took Fogaras, 50 miles from the border. The First Army penetrated the mountains through Red Tower Pass and the adjacent defiles. Its left wing passed the Iron Gates of the Danube, captured Orsova, and moved northward a short distance beyond.

Without much resistance a broken line was reached in mid-September which marked the farthest advance of the Rumanian offensive. It ran, roughly, some 50 miles within Hungarian territory. In spite of the fact that the Rumanians had met with no serious resistance the forward movement had been slow, due to the division of the armies into small widely-separated columns. This disposition of the troops in so rough a country made co-operation between the columns impossible, and led later to the defeat of the armies one by one.

During the advance into Transylvania a small force had crossed into Serbia, operating southward toward Nish. This detachment

was soon halted and the Orient railway was never again menaced.

Up to this time the advance of the Rumanians had been successful, although they had failed to reach their principal objective, the central valley of the Maros. This they were destined never to attain, for from now on disaster after disaster fell upon them.

THE BULGARIAN OFFENSIVE IN DOBRUDJA

With the first rush of the Rumanians into Transylvania, Germany began to gather herself for her spring upon her enemy. Field Marshal von Mackensen seems to have been in Bulgaria commanding all Turko-German-Bulgarian forces in that region. General von Falkenhayn was assigned to take in hand the assault from the north.

There now began a period of separate campaigns, a prelude to the formation of the combined concentric action which later crushed Rumania. In order to forestall the Russian aid to Rumania, which was to come from the north down through Dobrudja, and the Allied aid which was planned to come up from the south out of Macedonia, Mackensen moved swiftly into Dobrudja, at the same time causing the main Bulgarian armies to attack Sarraïl with great vigor on both his flanks. The Macedonian demonstration prevented any forward movement by Sarraïl, and released great numbers of Bulgarian troops and guns for action against Rumania.

On September 2, six days after the declaration of war, Mackensen started three Bulgarian columns over the 100-mile Bulgarian frontier into Dobrudja. The right wing took all sea ports as far as Mangalia within eight days. The central column advanced to Silistria, which it reached in seven days. The western column stormed the fortified town of Tutrakan (Turtukai) (30 miles west of Silistria) on September 6th, capturing 25,000 Rumanians and 100 heavy guns. By the middle of September the invaders had reached a line about 50 miles north of the frontier and 10 miles south of the Constanza-Cernavoda railway. Here they were temporarily held up on a previously-prepared line by four Rumanian divisions, five Russian divisions (three of which were cavalry), and some Serbian units.



Underwood and Underwood.

Rumania's King Decorating His Troops

Ferdinand succeeded to the throne soon after the World War began, and in spite of strong pro-German influences kept his little kingdom neutral until 1916, when, expecting Russia's support, Rumania declared war on the Teutonic powers, only to be swiftly crushed. The victory of the Allies in 1918 rescued the country from German vassalage.

Mackensen spent the next month (until October 19) in gathering sufficient men and guns to make his advance irresistible.

About October 2, the Rumanians attempted a surprise attack on Mackensen's rear. A column of about 15,000 men crossed the Danube on pontoon bridges between Silistria and Tutrakan. But the effort was premature and badly handled. The bridges were destroyed by Austrian monitors, and nearly the entire force was destroyed or captured.

Mackensen had achieved the first aim of the

Army (south of Hermannstadt) entered into hot fighting with the Ninth German Army. Falkenhayn held back his main forces until an Alpine division under von Delmensingen had stolen around the left wing of their enemy to cut their line of retreat through Red Tower Pass. The envelopment was accomplished in four days, and when Falkenhayn attacked from the north with his main forces, the First Rumanian Army was practically destroyed.

This disaster uncovered the Second Ru-



A Public Square in Hermannstadt

This city in Transylvania was seized by the Rumanians during their first advance.

German plan, the protection of the Orient Railway and of Constantinople.

RUMANIAN COLLAPSE IN TRANSYLVANIA

The second phase of the campaign began when General von Falkenhayn led a German army, reinforced by Austro-Hungarian troops, against the invaders of Transylvania. The Germans extended along the front as far as Predeal Pass, the Austrians being on their left.

Falkenhayn first struck at Hatzeg, recaptured Petroseny with its valuable iron mines, and drove the Rumanians into the Vulcan Pass (September 19-23).

In the following week the First Rumanian

Army and compelled it to evacuate Kronstadt. Confusion spread among the other troops further west and a general retreat to the frontier began.

By October 16 Transylvania had been cleared, and fighting was taking place in the difficult terrain of the various passes. The point of greatest pressure seems to have been at the Vulcan Pass.

Rumanian defeat in Transylvania was due to an absolute lack of coöperation between the different Rumanian armies and the inexplicable failure of the Russian armies to move. Some light is thrown on the Russian situation by D. W. Johnston in his discussion of the campaign:

"The solution of this mystery is probably to be found in events disclosed by the Russian revolution. Russia was, for reasons of geographical position, the power upon which Rumania necessarily depended for aid. The Russian army was probably still loyal, but the Russian government was honeycombed with spies and traitors. Trainloads of shells consigned to the army were deflected to Vladivostok and other remote points by pro-German officials high in authority. Much needed supplies accumulated at remote depots in enormous quantities, under orders designed to render the Russian army and her ally helpless before the German assault. The great Russian retreat and the crushing of Rumania must be charged, not to the brilliant military genius of a von Hindenburg, a von Mackensen, or a von Falkenhayn, but to the treacherous pro-German government which worked untiringly to reduce its heroic armies to a state of defenselessness."

THE ADVANCE IN DOBRUDJA

At the moment Falkenhayn was battling for the passes along the northern border, Mackensen, who had completed his preparations, lunged for the Cernavoda-Constanza railway.

His thrust began October 19th and on the fourth day Bulgarian cavalry entered Constanza. Aided by his heavy artillery he smashed through the center at Medjidia with such force that the whole line westward to the Danube gave way, the Russo-Rumanian army abandoning the entire railroad and the city of Cernavoda. Russia now sent one of her ablest generals, Sakharoff, with reinforcements to stiffen the defense. But the railroad was already lost and all Sakharoff could do was to reorganize the broken army which had fled into the northern Dobrudja.

Mackensen now entrenched his main forces near the railway and awaited the moment to join Falkenhayn's part of the ring which was to close upon Rumania. An advance guard maintained contact with the enemy about 45 miles to the north. This advance guard fell back to a line 10 miles north of the railroad, in November, to take part in more important operations across the Danube.

These four days of fighting, executed in

torrential rains, yielded about 7,000 prisoners, Constanza, Cernavoda, and the railway, with great quantities of supplies. This railway was of great military value, as it connected the only sea port of importance in Dobrudja with the capital. Moreover, it crossed the only bridge across the Danube along the entire Rumanian border. This



King Ferdinand of Rumania

bridge—a structure eleven miles long—was destroyed by the retreating Rumanians.

THE WALLACHIAN CAMPAIGN

While Mackensen was winning victories in Dobrudja the main weight of the Germanic attack was concentrated against the Rumanian forces in the west. Falkenhayn forced the Vulcan Pass and poured his troops through the defile and into the Wallachian foothills. Sweeping down the Jiul valley the German field marshal encountered the Rumanians at Tirgu-julij—20 miles south of the Vulcan Pass. In a terrible battle lasting for two days he overwhelmed his opponents and pushed on to the line of the Orsova railway. The western third of Wallachia was thus put in German hands.

But Falkenhayn's swift stroke affected

other forces than those in his immediate front. The Rumanians holding the Iron Gates, finding themselves cut off from the rest of the army, hastily evacuated Orsova and escaped to the mountains. Eventually they surrendered themselves on the Alt, after an ineffectual attempt to rejoin the main Rumanian forces.

During this time Mackensen had not been idle. A number of German and Bulgarian cavalry divisions, covered by a German motor-boat fleet, effected a crossing of the Danube



Field Marshal von Mackensen

One of Germany's most brilliant soldiers, at the head of an Austro-German Army he crushed the Rumanians in the Dobrudja.

and established connection with Falkenhayn's advance cavalry. The main body of the waiting Danube Army, after making demonstrations at several points in order to deceive the Rumanians, now crossed the Danube at three places. On November 25th Mackensen reached Alexandria and moved northeast. This was the transitional phase from separate marching to combined striking—an application of von Moltke's favorite principle.

The united armies of Falkenhayn and Mackensen now formed a vast curve. The closed dragnet was ready to be drawn through

all western Wallachia. Mackensen assumed supreme control of the operations.

The Rumanian commander, General Averescu, strove desperately to rally his disorganized forces behind the Alt river. He faced about, 90 miles from Bucharest, in an attempt to hold the Alt line against his pursuers.

But the circle contracted with ever-increasing pressure. Falkenhayn's other forces were now pouring down through all the northern passes and the Rumanians in the north were cut off from the capital. At the same time Mackensen was coming up swiftly from the south. So, with both flanks crumpling and his rear menaced, Averescu abandoned the Alt, giving up one position after another, and fell back to his last line of defense before Bucharest—the Arges river.

THE CAPTURE OF BUCHAREST

The line of the Arges formed a poor defensive screen for the capital. The river is small and, in its lower course, lies close to the city. Moreover, its southeasterly direction makes easy the outflanking of the defenders by an enemy moving east. None of the streams running parallel to the Arges has the military advantage of swampy banks and adjacent bogs.

Mackensen now divided his forces into three groups—the northern under Falkenhayn, the western under von Delmensingen, and the southern under von Koesch. He then began to subject the Rumanians to a crushing pressure from the front, left, and right. As a result, they were gradually forced back until the only railway that remained in their hands was the Bucharest-Ploechti-Buzeu line.

In order to cut this line, Falkenhayn detached a strong force with orders to move directly on Ploechti. If that important railway center could be taken in time, its fall might result in the separation of the two wings of the Rumanian army in their withdrawal from Bucharest. However, Ploechti held out until the day the capital was evacuated. On December 6th the Germans entered both cities.

Although Bucharest was considered one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, being defended by thirty-six forts of concrete and steel, no serious attempt to defend the capital

itself was made. The Rumanians not only wished to save their chief city from a bombardment by Mackensen's heavy howitzers, but they wisely decided that their garrisons could render better service in the open than in attempting to hold the doomed capital. The Rumanian government had moved to Jassy late in November.

After the evacuation of Bucharest the Rumanian forces retreated to the northeast. It now became necessary for the army to pivot on its right wing in order to allow the left wing, near the Danube, to swing through an arc and reach a more favorable position. The right wing held bravely in the face of fierce German attacks until this difficult maneuver was accomplished. The Rumanians then continued their withdrawal, fighting numerous delaying actions along the courses of the Jalomitza and Buzeu rivers, until they reached the Sereth-Putna line.

In the meantime, the Bulgarians had driven Sakharoff's Russo-Rumanian force into the extreme northwestern corner of Dobrudja. Here Sakharoff joined hands with the forces along the Putna.

Mackensen's campaign had been a wonderful success. Within four months after the declaration of war Rumania had lost two-thirds of her effective troops and the provinces of Dobrudja and Wallachia with their rich oil and grain fields. As one writer has said, "The economic results of Mackensen's campaign were as important as its strategy was brilliant."

THE FINAL OPERATIONS

The Germanic armies arrived before the Sereth-Putna line early in January, 1917. Their first move was an attempt to force the swampy line of the Putna north of Focsani. A few troops, under cover of a fog, reached the north bank but were quickly forced to recross the stream. Within a short time another attempt was made near Galatz. Had this attempt been successful it would have resulted in turning the defender's left flank. Braila and Vadeni were captured after heavy fighting but the crossing of the river could not be effected. The defenders now made a counter attack and a Russian force recaptured Vadeni. At this time the troops facing the

Austro-Germans were mostly Russians, a great many of the shattered Rumanian units having been withdrawn until they could be reorganized. However, the Russians came too late to save their allies.

Shortly after the middle of January a strong attack was launched at the town of Fundeni, on the lower Putna. The utmost efforts were in vain. The end of the month found the in-



General Erich von Falkenhayn

Former German Minister of War, he led the German Army against the Rumanians in Transylvania, decisively defeating them.

vaders still struggling to cross the marshy obstacle that barred their advance.

The final attempt of the Teutons was made against the other end of the line. The point selected for attack was the Oituz (Oitoz) pass, high up in the Moldavian hills. It was planned to throw a large German force through the Oituz and the neighboring defiles and make a dash for the central Moldavian railway, the vital supply artery upon which the whole Rumanian line depended. In the dead of winter, carrying food and ammunition on their backs, the Germans mustered for the attack. But the defensive strength of the nar-

row valleys was too great. Although some advances were made the assailants were unable to reach the railroad. The attempt was a failure.

The defensive line of the northern Transylvanian Alps and the Sereth-Putna marshes could not be forced by the Teutons, and beyond its shelter the Russo-Rumanians did not dare venture. Along this line the opposing forces remained deadlocked until the Russian collapse forced upon Rumania an inglorious peace.

The Rumanian campaign forms a most interesting military study. Mackensen's strategy was perfect and its execution faultless. Even though the Sereth-Putna line was never forced, all the objects of the campaign were accomplished. Rumania was completely crushed and its resources were added to the spoils of Belgium and Serbia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nelson's History of the War, by John Buchan; *the New York Times History of the War*; *Rumania's Sacrifice*, by Gogu Negulesco, (Century Co.)

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS

By E. A. EVERTS

Captain, United States Army, Retired

I

FIRST MOVES—THE TRENTINO


Problems Confronting the Belligerents on the Italian Front—Opening Italian Attacks—Austrian Counter-offensive of 1916

THE ITALIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

THE army of Italy, under the law of 1910, was built up on a system of compulsory service, after the Prussian pattern. Much practical experience was gained by the extensive operations in Tripoli, where, at the outbreak of the European war, one-third of all the Italian regiments were stationed. But any large expenditure for military purposes was too great for the little debt-ridden country to bear and estimates of the War Ministry and General Staff always suffered curtailment at the hands of the Finance Department and the deputies belonging to the Radical Party. However, all work done was efficient and the Italian who completed his training was a good soldier. Like every European peasant type, he was willing, obedient, fairly intelligent, and moderate in food and drink. Under proper leadership he proved himself courageous, self-sacrificing and capable of enthusiasm.

The European struggle so aroused the people to military needs that liberal and enthusiastic provision was given the War Ministry and troops and material were rapidly made ready. When war was declared against Austria, many lessons had been learned and Italy was able to put 700,000 well-trained and equipped men in the first line.

The infantry was armed with the Mannlicher-Carcano magazine rifle, which has a continuous danger space of 750 yards, considerably longer than any other European rifle. The Italian cavalry, armed with a carbine of the same type, was well-mounted and known for its fine horsemanship and dash. Guns and howitzers of medium and heavy caliber were being manufactured. For use in mountain warfare there were over forty batteries of mountain artillery especially efficient in men, mules, and guns. The field artillery had nearly completed the replacement of its 75 millimeter rapid fire Krupps by the



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

The War in the Alps—Italians Digging a Trench at 9000 Feet

"No other battlefield of the whole war approached the difficulties of the Italian front. Trenches had to be blasted from solid rock or manufactured from concrete. Ropes, climbing irons, ladders and rock drills helped the Alpini to scale the stone precipices, while snow shoes, skis, alpenstocks and ice-axes made progress possible over the glassy surface of snowfield and glacier."

famous French Deport gun. The Italians incorporated several improvements on this Deport "75," and claimed to have rendered the famous piece superior to that used by the French on the Western front. The Italian aviation corps had been one of the first to

use aeroplanes in warfare and had had experience in Tripoli. In theory and mechanical development, the corps was already equal to the best. During the winter of 1914, it was considerably enlarged in both personnel and machines.

Three famous bodies of troops, destined to play gallant and conspicuous parts in the war, deserve to be specially mentioned. The Alpini, probably the finest mountain troops in the world, were charged with the defense of the passes and roads in the Alps. Picked men of magnificent physique and proved courage, their aggressive work in the mountain gorges and crags was the wedge of every attack and the bulwark of every defense. Equally well-known was the other *corps d'élite*, the Bersaglieri or sharpshooters, who correspond to the German Jaegers or French Chasseurs. Originally organized in 1850 by Victor Emmanuel, these men, with their picturesque headgear adorned with the distinctive badge and full plume of cock's-feathers, always rendered distinguished service. The Carabinieri, or country constabulary, included only men who were able, careful, and absolutely trustworthy and honest. Gendarmerie during peace time, when war is declared they automatically become the military police and are exclusively employed in the immediate rear of the fighting line, watching for deserters, looking after prisoners, carrying despatches and directing traffic. The value of such a body of trained men to guide and control the intricate functioning of transportation and supply in modern war cannot be overestimated.

The network of railroads was put under a well-planned and thoroughly efficient Department of Transport whose chief was attached to the Military General Staff. When war was declared, mobilization was carried out without suspending the ordinary passenger and freight traffic and, from a total war strength of 3,400,000 men, Italy quickly launched her first line armies of nearly a million soldiers at the mountain-rimmed borders where the Hapsburg eagles perched.

GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY


The most casual glance at the topography of the Italian theater of war will make clear why the Italian armies did not overcome the obstacles of the Trentino or sweep across the Isonzo, capture Trieste, and strike into Austria. Well-nigh insurmountable natural obstacles block every path of Italian advance.

Starting at the Forcala, 10,000 feet high, where the Italian, Swiss and Austrian bor-

ders meet, practically the whole frontier lies in the difficult mountainous country of the Alps. Only at the eastern extremity, in the vicinity of Gorizia, does the international boundary drop to the Friulian plain for a stretch of some thirty miles to the head of the Adriatic Sea at Belvedere. Even this open country is blocked east of the Isonzo by the high, abrupt plateaus which carry the Julian Alps down to the Dalmatian coast. Always dominated by the greater heights on the Austrian side, the line, from the Austrian Tyrol, loops around the Trentino, and follows the minor crests of the Dolomites and the Cadoric, Carnic and Julian Alps. The Austrian command of the gigantic "S" put Italy at the mercy of her enemy. Before contemplating an offensive, the Italian armies had to secure their own safety by winning this command and blocking the passes.

The Alps mountains consist of a complex system of folded and broken rock forms. Long ago glaciers chiseled the peaks into stone castles, gouged out huge river trenches, and sharpened the knife-edge ridges. Supplemented by the stream erosion, the system has finally been left as a fantastic jumble of box canyons, precipitous gorges, and inaccessible peaks hiding the hanging side valleys hundreds and thousands of feet above the river troughs. Threading abysmal depths and dizzy heights, through tunnels and over bridges, roads and railways must follow these troughs. Military progress must be slow and hazardous. The destruction of bridges and tunnels easily blocks any advance, while hostile artillery on the commanding peaks may fire in safety at the exposed enemy below.

The descent from the Austrian heights to the level Italian plain below is very abrupt. From the southern foothills the water washes the mountain débris to the plains of Lombardy and Piedmont. Through this alluvial deposit the rivers all flow in parallel lines south to the Po or southeast to the Adriatic. The rushing torrents of the mountains become slow-moving streams, meandering and weaving through countless sandbar islands until they lose themselves in the lagoons and marshes of the low-lying coast. This marshy coast strip, about twenty miles wide, offers great difficulty to troop movement, but between the marshes and the mountains a paral-



The Trentino and Cadore Fronts, the Western Theater of the Italian Campaigns

lel system of transverse rivers is the only obstacle to an easy advance over the flat plain.

From his eerie perch the gloating Austrian looked down on the level plain, where grove and orchard and vineyard made a rich setting for the many white-walled, red-roofed towns. On the old track of Hun and Goth, Frank

ITALIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

The Italian plan of campaign in its broadest scope consisted in an initial dash to secure the whole line of the frontier and block all the passes from the north while a main army drove east on the front from Pontebba to




Alpini, Famous as Mountain Fighters

and Lombard, he had but to surge down from his mountain fastnesses to loot the rich prize at his mercy. From his sun-bathed home, the Italian looked up at the threatening mountain passes, up to the ridges and flashing snow-clad peaks beyond. But the spectacle, one of titanic grandeur to the scenic eye of the tourist, had an ominous, despairing perspective to the topographic eye of the Italian military leaders.

the Adriatic. If this was successful, the war could be taken immediately to the entire border of Austria, all doors would be closed to a counter-invasion, and on the only front offering room to maneuver a modern army, the Italians, after securing Trieste and the Istrian peninsula, would reach the Styrian hills for the sweep to Vienna.

The theater of war is divided by nature into three distinct parts: the Trentino on the



● Underwood and Underwood.

A Battle as Seen from a Mountain Top

A distinguished group on the Italian front. In the group in the middle from left to right are: General Porro, General Cadorna, General Gouraud of the French Army, and the King of Italy.

west, the Isonzo on the east, and the region of the Cadoric and Carnic Alps in the center. This latter region never became the scene of extensive operations. Here only wagon roads cross the mountains and the difficulties of transport and supply are too great to handle successfully large bodies of troops. On the Austrian side a strategic railroad parallels the front, but no laterals up the hill valleys feed the frontier. Italy, on her side, has but little better railroad communications with this section. However, the possession of the passes by Austria always threatened her enemy and, once secured by Italy, they could only be retaken by laborious operations.

The salient of the Trentino was a wedge by which Austria could split through the Alpine bulwark and enter the heart of Italy at Verona. A campaign had to be undertaken to block this move and protect the rear of the eastern army. With the enemy at bay and held fast in the center and west, the main attack could safely be made on the Isonzo. Should an Austrian invasion take place from the east, the Italian armies, with a network of communicating railroads at their backs, could make successive stands behind the rivers crossing the Piedmont plains.

When war was declared, the main Austrian forces were engaged in Galicia. The initial Austrian plan contemplated nothing but a passive defense. From their Alpine heights, additionally strengthened by carefully-placed forts and gun emplacements, a thin line could beat back the vain efforts of the small Italian columns painfully toiling up the steep slopes. The Austrian line was like the top of a gigantic wall, from which the country in front was viewed as plainly as from a hovering aeroplane. The Italians had to win their way to the base of the wall and then scale the perilous face. The Austrians could contemptuously watch their efforts in safety and easily throw back whatever scaling ladders were mounted. Then, when von Mackensen in Galicia released their crack troops, they could swarm down, overwhelm the sorry bands of "mandolin players" and loot the rich prize spread out before their eyes.

Both plans were correct in principle. The Italians did seize the frontier where they held the Austrians and prevented their making of Italy a second Belgium or Rumania. The

Austrians did retire behind their fortresses on the heights where, with half as many Landsturm and Reserves, they grimly withstood the almost superhuman efforts of the Italians to force the rocky gateways to Trent and Trieste. For over two years the Alpine frontier, snaking its way from Switzerland to the Adriatic, approximated a fixed line of battle. Only in the Trentino and on the Isonzo did the line ebb and flow as a sardonic God of War alternately smiled and frowned at his Lilliputian followers frantically at grips in their Brobdingnagian surroundings.

THE TRENTINO THEATER OF WAR

The Trentino is bisected by the largest glacial trough leading southward from the Alps. Its flat floor from one to two miles wide contains the railroad and two fine wagon roads, which continue north, via the Brenner Pass, as the chief route to Germany. From the junction at Franzensfeste, a branch of both wagon road and railway down the valley of the Drave leads to Vienna and Trieste. Beside the important economic and strategic highway up the valley of the Adige from Verona, other routes converge on the fortified town of Trent and the outlying fortress of Rovereto twelve miles to the south. From Brescia on the west, troops may move by Lake Garda and the Sarca River as well as by Lake Idro and the Chiese River. From Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso on the east the broad Val Sugana, with a railroad of great strategic value, leads to the very outskirts of Trent. Besides these well-defined routes at the apex, numerous passes on the flanks may be used to threaten the whole line of the frontier.

The V-shaped sector of the Trentino is what is known to the military man as a salient. The army holding it has already driven a wedge far into enemy territory. From any central point, troops move on interior lines radiating directly to the frontier. Not only can weak points be strengthened quickly, but the progress of successful attacks can be continued by prompt reinforcement. The enemy on the outside must meet an attack by moving his reinforcements around the length of the peninsula. If forced to fall back he must retreat and be supplied on increasingly diver-



Italy Joins the Allies

gent lines. These are the strong features of a salient.

However, if the force on the outside of the salient outnumbers its opponents and has the initiative, conditions are changed. The former can attack in force anywhere along the line. While the enemy is heavily engaged at the apex, attacks high up on the flanks may take him in the rear and thus trap his whole force. This is the weakness of a salient.

The military plan of the Italian campaign, therefore, consisted in the attack and reduction of this salient. The particular method of doing this, the initial strategy which prescribed the first disposition and strength of the troops and the subsequent tactics employed after the troops were once engaged, was determined largely by the bold well-marked features of the terrain.

The main Italian advance was driven in force along the highways converging on Trent while small forces attacked the passes along both flanks.

It is hardly possible that the immediate conquest of the Trentino was looked for. General Cadorna knew the difficulties facing his troops, as he was as familiar with this mountainous region as von Hindenburg was with the East Prussian bogs. It must be remembered that the main operation of the Italian armies was the one to gain Trieste. General Cadorna's mission in the western theater was to seize and seal every gateway by which an Austrian invasion could menace the rear of the Isonzo army or destroy the chief industrial cities of Lombardy.

To do this he had to push forward into the enemy's territory at once and fortify the northern approaches. If the enemy was not in sufficient force, so much the better, he would then continue his advance for an early conquest of the whole province. In pursuance of this last idea, a strong attack through the upper Dolomites and Cadore was aimed at Franzensfeste in conjunction with the advance on Trent. The fall of the Pusterthal junction would cut off the whole Trentino salient and materially shorten the line to be held. Besides the military importance another feature added to the significance of the campaign. As a "lost province" with a population largely Italian, its occupation would be a shrewd political move calculated to satisfy

the Irredentists and raise the enthusiasm and morale of the people.

Austria had to follow the Italian initiative and oppose strongly the main attack on Trieste. In addition, her troops were so dangerously involved in the Carpathians that she could not mass a force for a swift offensive from her strategic salient. Her plan contemplated an indefinite defense. Then, when enough troops could be spared, a quick thrust would brush aside the discouraged enemy




General Cadorna at his Headquarters

vainly beating against the mountain ramparts and the heavily engaged Isonzo army could be taken in the rear.

FIRST ITALIAN OFFENSIVE—1915-16

War was declared at midnight May 23rd, 1915. The Alpini, supported by their mountain artillery, leapt forward at the passes. The cycle battalions of the Bersaglieri rolled swiftly up the steep mountain roads. Within twenty-four hours, from all sides of the salient, the fighting was carried into Austrian territory.




The Area of the Austrian Offensive in the Trentino, May-June, 1916

As soon as the enemy was encountered along the roads and paths, the advancing troops dismounted, swarmed up the hillsides and, under cover of rocks and trees, went forward like beaters to flush the game from its hiding place. Natives, both Austrian and Italian, on both sides of the boundary, aided both the attack and defense by directing hundreds of groups through the mountain labyrinths. Alpine clubs had been encouraged by both governments, and thousands of guides, familiar with every feature of the tortured landscape, reinforced both belligerents. Thousands of skirmishes took place. Small bodies, brought to bay, were skilfully encircled and trapped. Individual soldiers, with the strength and agility of the native chamois,

counted as never before in this game of stalking a wary prey. The account of all this fighting becomes a catalogue of countless engagements between small detachments, companies, and squads. Even single individuals met in solitary hand-to-hand struggles and, clutching at each other's throats, reeled from the dizzy heights to an unknown death below.

Everywhere the Italians won successes and, by May 26th, had secured the lower passes in the Dolomites, the passes on the west, and the ridge of Monte Baldo on the south. A flotilla of gunboats, manned by officers of the Royal Navy, appeared on Lake Garda as though by magic. Within a short time they had helped to back the Austrians under the guns of the fortresses of Riva. On May 29th



Underwood and Underwood.

General Cadorna Visits an Italian Outpost

The Italian Commander-in-Chief frequently visited advanced positions held by his troops in remote places in the mountains, personally exhorting them to stand firm. When the enemy's advance in the Trentino threatened to destroy his army, he issued the memorable order: "Remember that here we defend the soil of our country and the honor of our army. These positions are to be defended to the death."

the main infantry force captured the Austrian railroad center, Ala, where liberal rations of bread and rice distributed to the poor made more enthusiastic the "Viva Italia!" of the repatriated peasantry.

These advances were not as simple as their swiftness would seem to show. The Austrians held each position firmly enough to cause the Italians to deploy and advance cautiously, but they never allowed themselves to get seriously involved. As they withdrew their outposts, every conceivable obstacle was left to retard the enemy's advance. Roads were barricaded or blown up, bridges were destroyed, and mines, concealed on the hill-sides, were sprung to belch forth tons of rock and stone. Huge boulders masked with branches were lashed to the edge of a precipice and were dropped as the enemy filed along the path beneath. The attack in the Cadore had progressed until, on June 9th, the Italians took Falzarego pass and, with the advance up the Cordovale River in the Dolomites, threatened to cut the railroad. This attack was finally stopped by Austrian reinforcements, but it caused the enemy to abandon any hopes of a successful counter-attack in the south.

After the first dash which pushed back the Austrian outposts all along the line, the Italians encountered the artillery in the entrenched positions which the enemy had carefully prepared for years beforehand. Many innocent-looking Austrian hostilities were, curiously enough, so well-made and strategically placed that sand bags and machine guns converted them into enemy strong points. More powerful positions, mounting huge guns, supported the main line and the Italians had to wait for their own heavy artillery to be brought up. August found the Austrian main defenses still intact, but their defenders had lost the passes and were securely held by superior forces preparing to invest them.

DIFFICULTIES OF THE TERRAIN

For months the front remained at a stalemate, while the Italians consolidated their gains, strengthened and fortified their own positions, brought up supplies, and savagely clawed at the harassed enemy in a slow heart-breaking advance, peak by peak and ridge by

ridge. What their work entailed can only be approximately described. No other battlefield of the whole war approached the difficulties of the Italian front. Trenches had to be blasted from solid rock or manufactured from concrete. Ropes, climbing irons, ladders, and rock drills helped the Alpini to scale the stone precipices, while snow shoes, skis, alpenstocks and ice-axes made progress possible over the glassy surface of snowfield and glacier. The results of some engagements in the dead of winter would be revealed in the spring when the hot sun would melt the snow and uncover to horrified eyes the grotesque corpses of friend and foe blotted out by a swirling blizzard of months before.

Transportation was a problem demanding the most constant ingenuity. To many inaccessible positions aerial railways stretched their spider web cables, along which supplies and ammunition were raised and the severely wounded lowered. Heavy guns were slowly and painfully dragged up by straining block and tackle operated by man-power. The old hill-paths along which the peasants scrambled with bundle and stick were cut out, graded and surfaced. Auto trucks with transverse cogs on their broad metal tires wound up the spirals of these new highways, bridged and trestled with steel. Sure-footed mules then took up the burden till it had to be passed on to the backs of middle-aged territorials who made the last stage.

The stream was swelled by convoys of women and girls, each one balancing a fifty-pound bundle of barbed wire. Soil had to be carried up in sand bags to form the breastworks, for flying rock splinters often proved more dangerous than shell or shrapnel. Tunnels had to be driven through the rock hills in order to take the enemy on the reverse slope. The concussions of the big guns started avalanches of snow and ice which overwhelmed men and guns. When a battery was thus buried the guns were always recovered. They could not be replaced, but there were plenty more men for cannoneers.

All this time the Italians were handicapped by the lack of heavy artillery, which took time to manufacture and transport up to its firing position. Gradually the early Italian preponderance of troops was reduced. The losses of men against the superior artillery and en-



The Isonzo Campaign

The area of the Austro-German-Italian Fighting in the Isonzo Campaign.

trenched positions of the enemy could not be risked, so General Cadorna had to resign himself to a safe but slow conquest of isolated points of command.

By the spring of 1916, the Italians had barely stepped over the border line. Riva, Rovereto, Trent, and Borgo still held out. As their line of defense had been tested and

busily preparing reserve troops and ammunition for his part. The pressure on the Isonzo front was embarrassing the Austrian high command. If Italy could be invaded or made to exhaust her reserves prematurely she could be eliminated as an aggressive combatant for some time in the future. Although the past fighting had proved it ill-adapted to troop



On the Isonzo Front

Austrian troops firing on an Italian outpost below them.

had held, the Austrians decided on a counter-offensive.

AUSTRIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

May-June, 1916

The Austrian counter-offensive was dictated for several reasons. As a result of the first general Allied war council (Paris, March 27-28, 1916) concerted attacks on all fronts were planned for the summer of 1916. Austria knew of this and was aware that Cadorna was

movements, the Trentino was chosen as the scene of the offensive for the following reasons: an Isonzo offensive, if successful, would only drive the Italian army back in its own territory, while the same drive from the Trentino might cut it off and capture it; the Italian line was a broken series of detached posts, thinly held, not carefully entrenched, and with no second-line position; portions of the line, because of their difficult positions, were poorly munitioned; and, most serious of all, the shortage of large artillery was still evident



Photo by L. Thompson.

On the Summit of Monte Nero


This mountain was one of the famous centers of attack on the Italian-Austrian front. Some of the most desperate mountain warfare was waged on and around it. The photograph shows Italian sharpshooters in the region of perpetual snows. The problem of supplying men with food and ammunition in such localities was a heavy one, and great ingenuity was displayed in hauling supplies up the mountains.

in spite of the importation of heavy howitzers from France.

That the weakness of this line was known and an Austrian offensive feared is shown by the fact that General Cadorna inspected the front and changed the army commander. It is probable, however, that the extent of the Austrian preparation was underestimated. But heavy reinforcements and enormous quantities of supplies were carried to the Adige positions. The process was slow, as only the single route was available and means for distributing supplies, even the necessary water,

who had assumed command, only succeeded in reforming his center on Monte Ciove, two miles south of Arsiero and ten miles within his own borders. From their positions the exulting Austrians looked over a gently-sloping plain with Venice and the Adriatic only sixty miles away.

The Austrian left wing struck south from the Val Sugana and reached Asiago May 28th. To the Italian troops south of Arsiero was issued the memorable order "Remember that here we defend the soil of our country and the honor of our army. These positions



The Valley of the Isonzo

Showing the mountains on the eastern side, from Monte Kuk to Monte San Gabriele.

had to be perfected for the whole advance. Over 300,000 men and 2,500 pieces of artillery, large and small, were quietly massed on a front of less than 30 miles wide from Rovereto to the Val Sugana.

After a terrific bombardment on May 14th, the Austrian infantry the next day advanced all along the line. The heaviest attack was in the center, where, supported by long range artillery, the infantry hammered its way through, and, by May 29th, was in the upper Posina Valley above Arsiero. The Italians retreated in confusion, abandoning most of their heavy guns and sacrificing strategic points without a struggle. General Cadorna,

are to be defended to the death." They were defended. The Austrian right wing from Rovereto, whose advance was necessary to protect the flank of the Austrian center, was unable to move forward as scheduled. On Monte Pasubio the Italians held (May 24-30) against odds of four to one and then suffered a deluge of heavy shell for three weeks. The Asiago flank also held, though the Austrians, on June 18th, flung 20,000 men against a two-mile front. The Austrian advance was checked.

As a result of a month's costly fighting the Austrians had caused the Italians considerable loss in men and heavy artillery, and the

latter could be ill-spared. They had conquered some territory and strengthened their position. But they had failed to divert the Isonzo offensive, and the transfer of men and material seriously weakened their Galician force. The value of Allied coöperation was now shown. On June 4th the Russians started to invade Bukovina and Galicia. So seriously did they threaten the Austrians that, almost at once, guns and troops had to be taken from the Trentino, and, within two weeks, the advance into Italy had been checked. The Russian drive probably averted an Italian débâcle.

Now was General Cadorna's chance. With a new army of 500,000 men, which had been collecting at Vicenza from the time the Aus-

trian drive started, he launched a vindictive counter-attack. By June 25th the Austrian retreat started. On June 27th the recapture of Arsiero and Asiago was announced. The Austrians did not quite abandon all the Italian territory they had won and their new position was so strong that the Italians made but little headway, though fierce fighting was kept up through July. The retirement was so skillfully planned that few prisoners and almost no guns were lost.

The Italians now transferred their excess troops and heavy artillery to the Isonzo front and action in the Trentino resumed its old character, with practically no change during the next sixteen months until the retreat to the Piave.

II

BLOWS AND COUNTERBLOWS

Italians Take Gorizia and Advance Toward Trieste—Teutons Break Through at Caporetto—Italian Retreat to Piave—Austrian Attack and Collapse

THE ISONZO THEATER OF WAR

THE eastern frontier between Austria and Italy, where the main Italian advance was driven, presented few features in common with the rest of the line. The stretch from Pontebba to Tolmino still kept the Alpine heights, but from Tolmino the boundary left the Julian Alps, dropped down the Judrio River, and struck southwest across the Friulian plain to the Adriatic. No natural obstacle was to be encountered until the Isonzo was reached. Here, however, Austria not only held the west bank, but was firmly entrenched on the Bainsizza and Carso plateaus on the east. These heights squat like huge castle walls with the treacherous Isonzo forming the moat. The important field base of Gorizia nestles between the moat and the wall, with a spur of the Julian Alps west of the river as an additional protection. An Austrian memorandum summed up the situation: "We have to retain possession of a ter-

rain fortified by nature. In front of us, a great water course; behind us a ridge from which we can shoot as from a ten-story building." To the natural advantages the Austrians had added carefully-placed guns and defensive works, so that the place was a veritable Gibraltar, blocking the way to Trieste. From Udine the advancing Italian armies could be supplied by roads and railways radiating to all points of the line. If they were successful, they could continue on these strategic lines as they fan-spoked into Austria. The key to the whole line is Gorizia and its protecting plateaus. Of these, the Carso is the most formidable. This mass is a flat-topped table-land from four to six miles broad. At no place far from the sea, its precipitous sides rise from four hundred to one thousand feet above the lowlands at its base. The sides are bare and rocky with only the lower slopes sparsely wooded. The windswept surface is hot, barren and dry, and its limestone formation is pitted with large

and small craters and subterranean caverns, which the Austrians had converted by galleries into a vast labyrinth. Nature and art provided an ideal site for concealing mortars, howitzers, machine guns, observation posts, and troop shelters. Electric systems were installed and water, pumped from below, was distributed by pipe lines. Even should the western end be won, a broad, deep trench, the Vallone, behind which the enemy could retire, cut off the rest of the plateau, and outlying, isolated hills provided a series of

ical process of mining and sapping. Intrenching tools were useless. Rock drill, sledge hammers, and dynamite gouged out trenches from solid rock or bored tunnels, that should open a few yards from the Austrian position. Earth had to be raised and packed into sand bag breastworks to protect from the flying rock splinters not only the soldiers, but the laborers. Meanwhile from the heights above, in perfect security, the Austrian guns showered a steel rain on the human ants undermining the walls in front of Trieste.



The Duke of Aosta
Commander of the Italian Third Army.

separate forts, which had to be reduced one by one.

While the Carso provided difficult problems, scarcely less simple was the task on the Julian Spur (Podgora and Monte Sabotino) and the Bainsizza plateau. On the former, surface conditions were so impossible that the almost inaccessible Monte Sabotino had to be secretly attempted by a tunnel more than a mile long. It was not until August, 1916, that it passed into Italian hands. A year after the fall of Monte Sabotino, the upper trough of the Isonzo had been crossed and the heights of the Bainsizza were slowly falling into Italian control.

The Italian task consisted in a slow method-


THE ISONZO FRONT—THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

The Isonzo front was chosen for the main Italian attack for many reasons. In the first place, it offered the only ground where operations could be carried on along a continuous front. If successful the way was open for the capture of Trieste, with its aircraft depots; the Austrian naval base at Pola; and then the heart of Austria-Hungary through Carniola. It is true that this front is only twenty to thirty miles wide, but the maximum effort could be exerted on it. The lateral communications were excellent; behind the invading army stretched an elaborate network of railways covering the whole Italian plain. Austria had a strategic road paralleling the line, but the laterals feeding it were not so numerous—her concentration for an offensive, therefore, had to be made at definite points, as Gorizia or Tarvis.

Other reasons counseled the Isonzo advance. The enemy might be strong enough to carry the war into Italian territory, in which case the low country west of the river would have to be abandoned, while the army took up its stand behind a river barrier, say the Tagliamento. A vigorous initiative would prevent the possibility of this loss. The triangle between the boundary and the Isonzo was Italian in character and sympathy. Its conquest would be a popular stroke. Political conditions in Austria-Hungary favored an advance once started. The heterogeneous elements of the Dual Monarchy, some of which were held in subjection against their will, would not offer a strong united front, would seek peace quicker, and might give more aid than opposition. Bulgaria and Rumania were still unsettled as to which side they would join. Since

January there had been a lull on the Serbian front and that little country was busily rehabilitating its forces. Lastly, Italy was concerned over her interest on the Dalmatian coast. Disturbances in Albania furnished her with an excuse to occupy Avlona before the close of 1914. Montenegrin and Serbian forces were invading Albania and the Italian

the main infantry force, under General Cadorna, rolled forward across the Friulian plain, through Udine, Palmanova, and San Giorgio. Amid the blossoming peach orchards and blooming rose hedges, the advance progressed, while the church bells chimed the exultation of all Italy. In the wake of the army, main roads, principal streets and mu-



© Underwood and Underwood.

British Forces in the Italian Trenches

The British had rushed reinforcements to their Allies in the south to stem the Austro-German advance. Note the machine-gun mounted on the trench parapet.

press was much concerned over the fate of the Dalmatian littoral.

The thrust to the east, therefore, protected against a possible large loss of territory, offered complete control of the Adriatic; and was certain of active coöperation from Serbia, with a possibility of gaining Rumania and Bulgaria as additional allies.

ITALIAN ADVANCE ON THE ISONZO

When war was declared and the covering troops had struck at the whole frontier line,

municipal buildings were renamed in Italian. On the Corada, between the Judrio and Isonzo, an Austrian post blocked the advance. Without waiting for heavy artillery, the Italians penned a herd of wild bulls in a hollow concealed from the enemy. When these were lashed to a frenzy of fear and rage by the noise of battle, they were loosed and driven up against the Austrian position. Ere the last animal dropped before the opposing rifle fire, the barbed wire entanglements had been breached and the greedy bayonets of the Italians charging through the gaps had cleared



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

A Road Along the Edge of a Tyrolian Abyss

Italian troops picking their way up a narrow road on the face of a precipice. The lake at the extreme left of the picture is 1,600 feet below the road which winds up a mountain 7,000 feet high. In some places trenches were maintained at 9,000 feet, and frequently the hostile lines were so close that the men could see one another's eyes as they peeped through loopholes.

the way. By May 25th, nearly all the towns and villages on a line from Caporetto to Belvedere had been captured. The little fishing village of Grado was entered and all the lagoons in back of it were secured as safe shelters for gunboats and monitors. By the end of May the Isonzo was reached but not crossed.

Although the Austrians withdrew from the

right bank of the Isonzo, their guns on the commanding cliffs covered the river with a murderous, plunging fire. The effects of a belated spring, melting the snow on the mountain tops, caused summer floods which further hampered the attempts to cross. Added to this, the dikes on the lower courses were broken by the Austrians and the surrounding lowland was inundated to a depth as great



A 200 Horse-power Italian Fighting Plane Equipped with Two Fiat Aeroplane Guns

as six feet. Strong bridges had to be built to support the heavy artillery. Pontoon bridges, swept away or shot to pieces, were feverishly renewed time after time. In their eagerness many soldiers plunged in and attempted to swim across. Here and there a foothold was secured and the Austrian first line near the river was occupied. Somehow, some way, with a valor that history can only faintly attempt to portray, additional contingents secured their hold. The fight now centered on Monfalcone, the third most important port of the Dual Empire, where shipyards contained war vessels under construction. On June 9th an Italian light cruiser squadron bombarded the port and also shattered the batteries at Duino. The Austrians collected a strong force above Duino to repel what appeared to be preparations for a landing party.

They were completely misled. The bombardment was only a feint. The real attack came from the northwest. The Bersaglieri cyclist corps, with light machine guns, and the fast-marching light infantry came straight across the Isonzo, broke through the Austrian line at the river, and advanced in a swift running fight through the villages around the delta. The Austrians retreated and set fire to the pine-clad lower slopes. The impetuous rush of the invaders could not be checked, and, in the glare of the burning forests, the town of Monfalcone was entered.

A high limestone bluff north of the town still commanded the streets. Up the wall swarmed the Italians, dragging their light mountain guns. The Austrians were forced to retire with their howitzers, and Monfalcone remained secure in Italian hands with its shipyards and their contents unharmed. The invaders lost about a hundred men; the Austrians over twenty times as many. As Gradisca was taken on June 9th, the whole lower Isonzo was now under Italian control.

On the north, Monte Nero was captured. From here twelve-inch shells could be dropped into Tolmino and Tarvis. The forts of Malborghetto were captured and the Pontebba pass was blocked. Heavy Austrian attacks through the Carnic Alps, based on Mauthen, attempted to take the Italian main army in rear while it was busy on the Isonzo. These attempts were driven back and the passes were blocked. Plava was captured and enveloping

attacks were started without success on Gorizia.

The first phase of the Italian advance now ended. The main Austrian defenses still held out, but the Italian army had been tested in making attacks and meeting counter-attacks. All danger of a flank movement from the north had been removed and the advance east could be resumed when the key position of Gorizia had been reduced. The Italians claimed to have suffered losses of only 25,000 men against four times that many by the Austrians. Artillery and supplies were accumulating, the armies were daily growing larger, and an increasing number of Austrians were deflected from the other theaters.

THE SECOND ISONZO PHASE

In the fall of 1915, the Italians settled down for a methodical advance on Gorizia. The Allied war council (Paris, March 27-28, 1916) planned a number of simultaneous offensives on all fronts for the summer of 1916. As Italy was contemplating her part of the programme, the Austrians tried to anticipate her efforts by a thrust in the Trentino (already described). The Italian defense and a powerful Russian attack in Galicia both combined to halt the Austrians on June 18th. By August 1st the Italian supplies, transferred or diverted to the Trentino front, were all again in place on the Isonzo.

On August 4th the Italians opened fire on the whole front and a feint attack was made in the Monfalcone region. Two days later the main attack was launched on an eight-mile front opposite Gorizia. The Austrian trenches were pulverized by a nine-hour bombardment, mines were sprung, and from tunnel mouth and deep rock trench the Italians sprang from the ground within a few yards of the astonished Austrians. The heights west of the Isonzo (Monte Sabotino and Monte Podgora) were carried the first day. South of Gorizia, Monte San Michele fell. This was the key to Gorizia. The Austrians, demoralized to some extent by the suddenness of the attack, nevertheless held out to the bitter end in their grottoes and galleries. The brave defenders put up such a stubborn fight in some of the caverns, that the Italian victors presented arms when their foes finally surren-



Pounding Out Victory on the Piave

One of the heavy Italian guns that helped to check the Austrian offensive.

© Central News Photo Service.

dered. On August 9th, King Victor Emmanuel and the Duke of Aosta (commander of the Isonzo front) were triumphantly escorted by the Italian infantry into Gorizia. The enemy retired to the Carso upland, leaving behind 19,000 prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, and much other booty.

Heavy assaults were continued on the Carso plateau and the heights east of Gorizia during September, October, and November. Several thousand more Austrian prisoners were taken, and the Italian positions were firmly entrenched, but progress was slow and the road to Trieste was still closed.

THE THIRD PHASE

In spite of an unusually severe winter, the Italians kept up a feverish activity. The air force discovered that the Austrians were preparing another Trentino offensive which had to be countered. However, the preparation for a last smashing advance on the Carso was carefully continued. The Italian plan contemplated a tremendous artillery bombardment from Tolmino to the sea which would leave the enemy in doubt where to expect the main attack. The decisive thrust would then be made to the north of Gorizia and on the Carso plateau.

The late spring delayed the opening of the offensive. On May 12th heavy artillery fire deluged the front from Tolmino to the sea. Two days later the infantry advanced. Initial successes were won north of Monte Santo on the Bainsizza plateau and the Isonzo was crossed higher up. In spite of a stubborn resistance, these gains were consolidated and the whole ridge east of the Isonzo and above Anhovo was held by May 22nd. On the same day, the Trentino diversion, started May 19th, was checked. On May 23d, after a heavy artillery preparation, the advance on the southern edge of the Carso was taken up. Fleets of low-flying aeroplanes aided the infantry, while huge British and Italian monitors bombarded the Austrian trenches from the sea. The enemy resistance was always very stubborn, but progress was slowly made until the line rested eleven miles from Trieste.

On June 1st the Austrians threw in great reinforcements of men and guns, released by the Russian collapse and revolution. The

Italians were compelled to retire somewhat, but General Cadorna commenced an offensive in the Trentino which compelled the Austrians to give up their advance in the south.

The spring campaign closed with the Italians firmly entrenched and holding most of their gains. During July and August the tide of battle surged back and forth. Just above Anhovo the Italians accomplished a great engineering feat by diverting the Isonzo from its bed, building bridges across the shallow stream that was left, and then rediverting the water to its regular channel. The work was done at night, undetected by the enemy. On August 18th the Italians crossed their bridges and a general advance compelled the Austrians to retire to the eastern edge of the Bainsizza plateau. Great quantities of provisions, stores, and prisoners fell into the hands of the Italians. Further south an attempt to surround the Hermada mountains, in the center of the Carso plateau, and to advance up the Vippacco Valley achieved only local successes.

The Italian armies, whose casualties in these last attacks had been very heavy, were resting up for a final attempt when the sudden Austro-German drive on the northern extremity of their battle-line at Caporetto compelled them to retreat and lose the fruit of two years' labor.

THE ITALIAN RETREAT OF 1917

Before detailing the account of the Caporetto disaster, certain events preceding it must be described. The brilliant successes of the Italian armies by midsummer, 1917, had been strategically important but not decisive. Accordingly, General Cadorna appealed to his allies for such men and guns as they could spare in order to clinch the victory so near his hand. Sixteen British batteries were sent at once and some French batteries were promised in the near future. The Allies were committed to heavy campaigns on what they considered the true center of the war, and simply could not run the risk of further weakening themselves. The criticism that they were jealous of Italy's increasing advance; that they did not view cordially the prestige and strength that would be hers by a crowning success; and that their lack of co-operation was a stupid strategic blunder was, of course, absolutely unfounded. Later



Perspective Map of the Italian Front

events in Flanders proved the soundness of their policy.

The Italians had to be left to their own resources and they bravely stuck to their task in the grueling, bloody encounters on the Carso and Bainsizza heights. By the end of September the Italians had suffered 155,000 casualties; new drafts had to recruit up their veteran army; and their weakness in artillery still continued with no immediate prospect of improvement. General Cadorna dared not risk a new campaign until these conditions had been corrected. He accordingly notified the Allies that his main operations were ended. Thinking that the Italians could hold and that their front would relapse to a stalemate, they acquiesced in his decision. Eleven of the sixteen British batteries were withdrawn and the French guns en route were countermanded.

It is probable that the Italians, and, even more, their allies, failed to realize fully the potential possibilities offered to their enemy by the Russian collapse. But the Central Powers analyzed the situation at first hand and made good use of their opportunity. The Italian success had caused Austria to issue urgent appeals for help to Germany. The German high command responded by no half measures. Profiting by the peace on the Russian front, Ludendorff was remaking his armies and perfecting them in a new system of war. During the summer months this system was meticulously taught and methodically tested in a huge training camp far from any Allied observation. The German commander, von Bülow, was called from the west to take charge of a new army of six German and seven Austrian divisions. Equipped for a campaign in hilly country, with half its artillery replaced by mountain guns, the new force was secretly moved to the Austrian front for a first trial of the new maneuver tactics. The German General Staff took over the whole direction of operations. Rumors of the intended operations did reach the Allies but they were interpreted to mean an expected offensive in the Trentino.

ITALIAN ARMY DEMORALIZED

Success was not left to military preparation only. Fraternizing was encouraged between the Austrian and Italian soldiers. A vast

programme of secret propaganda flooded Italy. Pacifist doctrines, specially directed among the ignorant peasantry and radical Socialists, were opposed by no repressive measures and soon worked havoc with Italian morale. Delegates of the Russian Soviet roamed at will and strikes broke out in the industrial centers, especially Turin. Something like mutiny broke out among the soldiers sent to quell the riots and disorder. The disgraced troops were dispatched to the eastern front and, by some appalling mischance, were stationed on the Tolmino sector. By autumn the insidious propaganda had poisoned a large part of the civilian population and affected a much larger part of the troops than the military authorities imagined. Sick of blood and sacrifice, the war-weary nerves of Italy were strained to the breaking-point.

The Austrians had never thought it possible to start an offensive except from some base like Gorizia or Trent, where good road and railway communications were found. The German High Command had a bolder conception. They planned to strike between Plezzo and Tolmino, a totally unexpected quarter, hitherto regarded as impracticable for operations. The strategy of the campaign was sound. That front was held by unseasoned territorials of poor morale. The seasoned veterans were on the lower Isonzo, were striking to the southeast, and could be taken in rear and forced to retire. They might possibly be cut off and trapped.

On October 21st, 1917, the Plezzo-Tolmino front and the northern edge of the Bainsizza plateau were deluged by heavy artillery. The Italian guns were outnumbered and out-ranged. With little difficulty the Austro-German forces pierced the line and crossed to the left bank of the Isonzo. Cowardice on the part of the troops opposing them was charged by General Cadorna. Events then followed in quick succession. From Caporetto the Teutons moved down the valleys of the Judrio and Natisone rivers. The Italian Army on the south was outflanked and compelled to retire, harassed by the Austrians. The withdrawal by the hastily-constructed bridges over the Isonzo became a rout. On the 28th, Cividale was taken, thus cutting communication with the Italian General Headquarters at Udine. Udine fell and, by

November 1st, the advance guards of the invaders were on the Tagliamento River.

The extent of the Italian retreat now jeopardized the army guarding the Carnic frontier. This force had to beat a hasty retreat down the upper reaches of the Tagliamento and Piave rivers. Valiant rearguard actions, especially by the cavalry, checked the Teutonic steam-roller for a temporary hold on the Tagliamento. The Teutons at this stage claimed 180,000 prisoners and 1,500 guns. Crossing on their pontoon bridges, they again surged forward and rolled the Italians back to the line of the Livenza, where they claimed a total of 250,000 prisoners and 2,300 guns.

The Livenza was held long enough to prepare the defenses of the Piave, which had been the training camp for recruits and was already protected by trenches and fortifications. Great preparations were also rushed to prepare the line of the Adige. This would give a strong line from the mountains to the Adriatic. Its sea end was not so open to the flanking movement, which had caused the abandonment of the former lines. However, this last line was not occupied. The Piave line held; General Diaz succeeded General Cadorna as head of the Italian army; and the much-needed reinforcements of British and French infantry and artillery arrived in increasing numbers.

ITALIANS HOLD ON ASIAGO PLATEAU

Continued attempts by the Teutons to cross the lower Piave were seldom successful and were immediately thrown back. A large area between the river mouth and Venice was flooded and the Allied monitors from the Carso shore continually shelled the southern end of the Austro-German line. Failing to cross the lower Piave, the Teuton armies struck on the Asiago plateau. Here the Italians grimly held the heights between the upper Brenta and the Piave. Massed attacks comparable only to those of the German Crown Prince at Verdun were hurled against them for three weeks. Though forced to give a little ground the Italians held.

During the first week of December another fierce attempt was made by the Austro-Germans a little farther west. The Italians were poorly prepared and were forced back until,

by December 20th, the invaders were within four miles of the Venetian plain—and victory. With the fate of their whole country in the balance, the desperate Italians counter-attacked and succeeded in holding. At the end of the year, the final outcome was in doubt, but the prospects looked brighter when the effects of the Allied reinforcements were felt, as Monte Tomba, with over 1,000 prisoners, was captured by the French infantry supported by British artillery.

During January the Allies made successful raids and continued capturing prisoners. The unusually open winter was now broken by severe storms, which handicapped the enemy's efforts, and, by the end of January, the campaign practically reached its close. As a decision could not be hoped for, the German divisions were gradually removed and the line turned over to the Austrians. The German High Command, satisfied with the efficacy of its new tactics, turned its attention to more vital fields.

The result of the campaign was a severe blow to the Allied cause. The Austro-Germans took 300,000 prisoners, 2,700 guns and 4,000 square miles of territory. Their line threatened the rich industrial section of Italy with its munition factories. The Teutons' gain was used as a basis for their winter peace negotiations. Italy lost half her artillery and military stores and compelled France and Great Britain to detach two armies from the Western front.

THE STAND ON THE PIAVE—THE END

The spectacular effect of the big drive ending on the Piave completely dwarfs the subsequent operations between Italy and Austria-Hungary. The battle front at the beginning of 1918 stayed the same until the end of October. The section from the Swiss border to the head of Lake Garda, at the fortress of Riva, remained as it was established in the spring of 1915. The line then cut across to Ala and from there led through Arsiero to Asiago. From there it stretched east to the Piave and followed that river down to the sea.

Until May all activity on both sides was confined to aeroplanes, artillery, and raiding parties. The Austrians entrenched on the

Piave and fortified the Livenza and Tagliamento in their rear. In May the snow began to melt and activity was noted behind the Austrian lines. Germany greatly desired to have her ally conduct a big offensive in order to create a diversion from her own activities in France and Belgium. The Italians prepared for it. By utilizing her waterfalls to generate electricity, Italy was enabled to turn out huge quantities of material, especially artillery. Her military establishment was so increased that she was enabled to send several divisions to France, and the authority of General Foch was extended to the Italian front. Foreshadowing the disturbed political conditions of Austria, several thousand Jugo-Slavs deserted to the Italian side, where they were re-formed and organized to fight against their former masters.

By the middle of June the Austrians were ready for their offensive. 7,500 guns and approximately 1,000,000 men were on the 100 miles of front to be attacked. The Italians, with their old British and French comrades, were considerably stronger. On June 15th the attack opened all along the line with special assaults on the Asiago plateau, the coastal region, and one or two other selected points. Success on either flank would, of course, render the whole line untenable.

The Austrians succeeded in crossing the river at several points which they held successfully against strong counter-attacks. But before they could extend their advance to provide sufficient maneuver room, the weather turned against them. Heavy rains in the mountains raised the Piave to the flood stage, thus sweeping away most of the bridges over which the necessary reinforcements could cross. Taking advantage of the enemy's predicament, the Allies succeeded in throwing the

Austrians back, and, by the 22nd, the west bank of the river was cleared. The confidence of the Italians was raised while the effect on the morale of the Austrian people, both military and civilian, must have been overwhelming.

A period of raids and artillery duels now commenced with the advantage always on the side of the Allies. The German general von Bülow, who directed the drive from the Isonzo, again took command of the Austro-Hungarian forces. On July 27th a regiment of infantry arrived on the line to represent the United States.

Early in October, Austria gave evidence of her internal stress and sent a note to President Wilson requesting an armistice. On October 24th an Allied offensive was started in the Asiago region which quickly spread to the whole length of the line. Italians, British, French, and Americans all united in an irresistible advance. By the end of the month the Piave had been crossed, Austrian resistance started to break down, and a general retreat had begun. The signing of the armistice a few days later was all that saved the Austro-Hungarian armies from complete annihilation on the field of their triumphant invasion of a few months before.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Italy in the War, by Sidney Low, best of all accounts; *Six Months On the Italian Front*, by Julius M. Price; *Italy at War*, by Alexander Powell; "The Singing Soldier," by Lewis R. Freeman, in *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1917; "The Italian Reverse," by Julius M. Price, in *Fortnightly Review*, Dec. 1, 1917; "The Italian Front: In the Trenches," by Herbert Vivian, in *Living Age*, April 15, 1916; *The New International Year Book*, for 1914 to 1918 inclusive, under WAR OF THE NATIONS, etc.; *Topography and Strategy in the War*, by D. W. Johnston; *New York Times Current History of the European War*; *Nelson's History of the War*; *Scenes from Italy's War*, by Sir George Trevelyan.

The greatest junk piles in existence were those that were heaped up on the battlefields of Europe. All kinds of metals, iron, steel, copper, lead, bronze and nickel, were salvaged by each army, it being recognized that all this wreckage due to destruction of life and property had a considerable value. Every army employed a large force of laborers, "official rag-pickers" they were called, who worked zealously immediately behind the lines of all the battlefronts to reclaim such of this enormous mass of débris that was worth keeping.

AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

By H. C. HOLDRIDGE
Captain, Cavalry, United States Army

Complete Success of Allies' Operations Against Germans in Togoland, the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa

GERMANY'S efforts for a "place in the sun" had met with the greatest success in Africa. On the Dark Continent she had gained four large colonies—Togoland, the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa. Each of these contained many thousands of square miles, so large as to make Germany herself appear small by comparison.

At the outbreak of the European War, fighting for the control of these territories started in all four colonies. The Allies were determined that the end of hostilities should find them the masters of all Germany's overseas dominions. Thus they would be in a position to speak with authority concerning the final disposition of these territories, and the statesmen at London and Paris felt that, if Germany could be deprived of her African possessions at the peace conference, her hopes of a vast empire on that continent would be shattered.

The operations in Africa were of an entirely different nature from those on the battlefields of Europe. In Europe, hundreds of thousands of men were engaged at one time in great battles; in Africa the forces on either side were at most only a few thousand, and the larger part of these forces, especially of the German organizations, were natives. The fights were not battles at all, but merely skirmishes and raids, and the casualties were few in number.

The principal enemies of both the Allies and the Germans were the climate and the country. Heavy tropical rains, severe, cutting sand storms, dense jungles, and arid deserts, all contributed toward obstructing the movements of the armies.

Roads were few in all the colonies, and

those few were of a poor quality. In many cases it was necessary to transport supplies by means of bearers, and with every mile of advance into the interior the problem became more difficult.

FIGHTING IN THE TROPICS

The soldier in equatorial or southern Africa was obliged to contend against many things that were undreamed of by his brother in Europe. The British "Tommy" in Flanders considered himself fairly familiar with rain, but the storms of his experience were as nothing compared to the terrific floods endured by "Tommy" in Africa. Moreover, it was no uncommon thing for sentinels on outpost duty to be driven from their posts by the lion or the hippopotamus. General Smuts himself, on one occasion, was unable to join his command because darkness had set in and he and his party were forced to sit up all night in their motor car, shooting their firearms to drive off the lions and other wild beasts prowling about the jungles. In German Southwest Africa, during the advance northward along the railroad, troops were held up a great while because of the severe sandstorms on the desert, across which the railroad ran. Although the track might be clear in the morning, by the afternoon it would be covered to a depth of four feet by the drifting grains of sand, and all traffic would be suspended until it could be cleared. Fortunately, the British soldiers were more or less familiar with this kind of campaigning, for, during the colonial expansion of Great Britain, they had had opportunities to fight under all conditions. They were to have need of all their experience before the completion of their African fighting.



A Fight for a Broken Bridge in the Cameroons—One of the Far Flung Battlefields of the World War

ALLIES HAD THE ADVANTAGE

Conditions favored the Allied forces from the beginning. The Germans were cut off from all reinforcements or assistance of any kind, and were thrown entirely upon their own resources. The German fleet was shut up in German waters and could give no aid. The Allies, on the other hand, could continue sending reinforcements indefinitely until superiority in numbers was gained, and the ships of the Allied fleet were available to cooperate

CAMPAIGN IN TOGOLAND

Since the campaigns in each of the colonies were independent of all others, they may be treated separately. Military activities started first in Togoland. Here the problem was most simple. Since it was the smallest of the colonies and was situated between enemy possessions, Nigeria and Dahomey, with the enemy fleet threatening from the south, its garrison of only 3,000 men could not hope to offer effective resistance. Two Allied col-



© Brown Bros.

British Territorials Invading German East Africa

with the land forces. Supplies were limited only by the difficulties of transportation. Under such circumstances the only possible plan for the German commanders to follow was to create as much of a diversion as possible and, by greater activity, hold superior Allied forces in Africa, and prevent them from taking part in the fighting on any of the European fronts. The Allied plan was to invade each of the colonies, round up and defeat all enemy forces, and capture the enemy stations. The success of these undertakings was a foregone conclusion, and it was achieved without excessive loss of life and without material setback.

umns, the British from the east and the French from the west, entered the country, and, in a few weeks—from the beginning of August to August 27, 1914—gained control of the entire interior. In the early days of August the city of Lome on the coast was ordered to surrender, and did so without a struggle. With the success of the land forces, this colony became a part of Allied territory.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAMEROONS

The reduction of the Cameroons was not so simple. Here the distances were so great that

the question of the transportation of supplies prevented any considerable advance into the interior until communications had been arranged for. Three attempts were made in August, 1914, however, when columns entered the colony from Nigeria and from the west coast. All three met with small success, for the Germans, by counter-attacking, won back everything that the French and British forces had taken from them. For some time thereafter the Allies turned their attention to blockading the coast and gaining control of the coastal towns. In this they were successful, and, by the end of June, 1915, the German forces were shut up in the interior, and the few German gunboats along the coast had been seized and destroyed, or converted to Allied use.

As soon as the question of the transportation of supplies had been arranged, the Allies started on the final operations in this colony. When the coastal towns had been captured, the Germans moved their capital into the interior, to Yaunde. It was now arranged that a series of French and British columns should move on the new capital from all directions, starting from the coast, from Nigeria, and from French Congo, and, in their advance, brush together all scattered forces of the enemy and drive them in toward the capital. Operations started in July and August, 1915, and were uniformly successful. After numerous skirmishes with the enemy, the Allies forced their way toward Yaunde, and, on January 1, 1916, received the surrender of the place. When, on February 18th, the garrison of Mora, in the north, that heretofore had resisted all attacks, surrendered, the last German forces were either prisoners of war or had been driven from the colony. A country of 191,000 square miles, with a population of 4,500,000, passed from German control.

CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

The situation with reference to German Southwest Africa differed from that in any of the other colonies. The advance against the other colonies had been made by British troops, moving from British possessions. The Union of South Africa, however, which bordered this German colony, was self-governing, and, since it had not yet declared war on Germany, no operations based on South Africa could take place. In a short time, under the leadership of General Botha, the people of the colony saw the danger to themselves if Germany won the war, and the parliament of the country was induced to declare war against German Southwest Africa. General Botha was placed in command of the forces, and he at once called for 7,000 volunteers. These forces, together with those already organized, and including the police units, slightly outnumbered the Germans, who were 10,000 strong.

Conditions, on the whole, were more favorable for the enemy here than elsewhere. It was hoped that the Boers of South Africa would revolt against the British and aid the



Courtesy of the Outlook.

Germany's Lost African Colonies

Germans, and some slight support was actually received from this source. Moreover, the capital of the colony was located at Windhoek, and even though the stations on the coast were taken by the British, the capital would still be safe. Furthermore, the threat of insurrection in the Union of South Africa

British sent a landing party ashore at Luderitz Bay and captured it. Using this place as a base, raiding parties moved against the Germans to the east. On one occasion the treachery of Col. Maritz, who commanded one of these parties, brought destruction to his command. Thereafter, he cast in his lot with the



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Surrender of General De Wet to General Botha

The famous Boer War hero, Christian De Wet, who had not become reconciled to British dominion in South Africa, led a revolt of the Dutch in 1914, some 10,000 of whom went over to the Germans. General Botha, himself of Dutch extraction, was Premier at the time and leader of the Unionists or loyal party. He promptly put down the rebellion and brought about De Wet's surrender.

prevented concerted action against the Germans for a time.

Hostilities were started by the Germans themselves, when on August 20th, 1914, they attacked some of the outlying British stations along the southern border. In September they occupied Raman's Drift, but were surprised by a British force and the entire German command was captured. Other skirmishes followed all along the border. The

Germans, and was in command of German forces operating to the south.

By January, 1915, the British had succeeded in gaining control of all the points of entry into the German Colony. The forces of General Botha were thoroughly organized by this time, and plans were made for advancing into the interior. It was decided to divide the army into two parts. One part, under the command of General Botha, was

to move on Windhoek from Swakopmund, using the railroad at that point for the purpose. The other part was to be divided into three columns, one to move north from Warmbad, one east from Luderitz Bay, and one west from Bechuanaland. The three columns were then to unite and move northward to aid General Botha in capturing Windhoek.

The plan was carried to a successful conclusion. The advance started in February, and, by pushing the enemy forces before them, the columns in the south were able to unite

THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA

The campaign in German East Africa was most unsatisfactory of all from the Allied point of view, for here the Germans resisted longer than they did in any of the other colonies. In the beginning the British were inferior in number to the Germans, and the Uganda Railroad, in British East Africa, presented to the Germans a strategical point of attack.

The British opened the campaign by attacking the capital of the colony, Dar-es-



A Scene in the Uluguru Mountains in German East Africa

by April 24th. They then closed in on Windhoek, and, with the coöperation of General Botha, who had already arrived, forced the town to surrender on the 12th of May. All that now remained to be done was to "round up" the scattered enemy forces that had retired in the direction of Grootfontein. Sending part of his forces home, General Botha moved to the north against Grootfontein, and on July 9, 1915, forced the last German forces remaining in the colony to surrender unconditionally. General Botha received the thanks of Parliament for his "remarkable campaign," which gave Britain new territory half as large again as the German Empire.

Salam, on August 13, 1914, and capturing the town. Operations then shifted to the south, where the Germans attempted to drive the British from Karonga, on Lake Nyassa, and Abercorn, on Lake Tanganyika.

Both attacks failed, and the enemy then turned his attention to the north. Here he delivered a total of seven attacks on British positions along the Uganda Railroad and in the vicinity of the lakes, with varying success. He then started a combined land and naval attack on Mombasa, the capital of British East Africa, but was unable to accomplish his purpose, due to the fact that the German cruiser, the *Königsberg*, which was to aid

the land forces, was prevented from taking part by the British fleet.

Affairs now rested for some time, neither



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

General Jan C. Smuts

An iron-handed soldier who possesses an unusually spiritual nature. He and General Botha led the British forces in South Africa to victory.

side being able to gain any advantage. The British occupied the period by blockading the coast and operating against several towns on the lakes in the west with a number of

gunboats that they had on those bodies of water. Although the colonies were thoroughly blockaded, the German forces were far from beaten. Reinforcements were needed by the Allies, and these were provided, through the energy of General Smuts, by the Union of South Africa. Forces that had been raised in that country were brought from France to aid against the Germans in Africa.

All through the years 1915, 1916, and 1917 the activities continued. Now that their forces had been strengthened, the British were able to advance into the interior. Aid was given them by the Portuguese on the south and the Belgians on the west. The combined pressure of these land forces and of the warships on the lakes and on the sea was too great to be resisted indefinitely. The Germans retired gradually toward the southeastern corner of the colony, resisting strongly as they retreated. Finally, in the month of November, 1917, the last enemy forces were driven across the border into Portuguese East Africa, and this colony also fell under Allied control. By the operations in the German African colonies as outlined above their occupation and control by the Allies was effected.

Since success had crowned the efforts of the Allies on all of the fronts in Europe by the time the German colonies had been subjugated, the Allies were in a position to dictate the disposition of those colonies at the peace table, and their purpose had been accomplished.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

By far the best treatment of the African Campaigns is to be found in Nelson's *History of the War*, Vols. III, VI and XIII.

SOLDIERING IN MESOPOTAMIA

What it meant to be a soldier in the Mesopotamian desert was told in a letter from Lieut. R. E. Smith, formerly a Canadian Baptist missionary. Writing from "Right up at the front in sight of Kut," he said: "You cannot exaggerate in describing things here. Every day since I came a tempestuous gale has blown out of the north. They call it the shamal, and it carries with it blinding clouds of dust. The third day I was here it began at 7:30 a. m. and kept it up till 6 p. m. Often it was impossible to see the tent in front of mine—about ten yards away. My hair turned white and became clogged with gray clay. I picked chunks of clay out of my nose. My hands and face and lips became caked with it. I breathed it at every breath. My ears filled up. My papers, cot, table, and everything in the room took on a thick layer. Our meals were half sand. The streams of perspiration made channels in the dust upon my face and no fireman coming out of a bad fire at home could have looked worse than I did when the day was over. The temperature was 113. . . . Yesterday's official report gave the average temperature at 2 p. m. for the week at 113.9, and the maximum at 117 degrees in the observation tent. Fortunately the nights are clear and cool."

THE SIEGE OF TSING TAU

Japanese Operations Against the Stronghold Seized by Germany from China and Developed as a German Colony

BY MAJOR J. H. GRANT
Infantry, United States Army

THE British entry into the war was the signal for the spread of the conflagration to the Far East, where Japan had only been waiting the action of her western colleague before making her declaration. Upon the refusal of Germany to turn over her Asiatic possessions to Japan for restoration to China, the Island Empire began to assemble a force for the reduction of the one German stronghold in the East,—Tsing Tau, on the Chinese coast.

For operations against this base Japan organized a siege force consisting of an infantry division reinforced by three brigades, detachments of cavalry, engineers, and signal troops, and a train of siege artillery made up of 140 heavy guns. Six of these pieces were 11-inch howitzers, guns far heavier than any the defense could muster. The total strength of the force was about 22,000 officers and men. General Kamio was given the command.

For the defense of Tsing Tau, the governor, Naval Captain Meyer-Waldeck, had a garrison of about 5,000 marines dispersed in the circle of forts which surrounds the city.

The city of Tsing Tau—the Japanese objective—is located on the Tsing Tau peninsula. The western side of this small tongue of land is washed by the waters of Kiauchau bay, the eastern by the Yellow Sea. North-east of the town are several low hills stretching across the base of the peninsula and descending into a marshy coastal plain subject to constant flooding. West from Tsing Tau, through the marsh land, runs the railroad whose other terminus is at Kiauchau. This railway line forms one of the best lines of advance for an army moving from the west.

Tsing Tau itself, stolen from China in the

latter part of the 19th century, was the only point in the Far East that Germany had adequately fortified. The Teutonic engineers had been unsparing in their efforts to make this easternmost stepping stone to "a place in the sun" impregnable. The city and its environs formed a large entrenched camp in which the latest devices in the way of fortifications had been installed. Twenty-three forts of concrete and steel protected the city. Nineteen of these stretched in three lines west of the town, the other four were toward the seaward side near the extremity of the peninsula.

Five thousand men in steel forts might be difficult to overcome, especially when urged by no less a personage than the German Emperor himself "to fight to the last breath within their bodies." Hence the Japanese staff made all preparations for a lengthy siege.

The plan of attack decided upon called for a landing at the northern base of the peninsula from which the troops were to advance inland, cutting the railroad and extending their line across the base of the narrow tongue of land. Having completely cut off the city from the north, the force was to move toward the forts and commence the siege.

Operations began on the 27th of August, 1914, when the Japanese occupied several small islands off the coast to be used as bases for mine sweeping. By the 2nd of September the sea was clear of these menaces and the troops were landed at the northern edge of the peninsula the same day. For almost a fortnight any further advance was delayed by heavy rains. On the 13th the forward movement was resumed and did not stop until the outer defenses of the German stronghold had been reached.



Map to Illustrate the Siege and Capture of Tsing Tau (Kiauchau)

From the 27th of September events moved with startling rapidity. On the 28th a small force of British under Brigadier General Barnardiston which had landed at Lao-shan on the 23rd, joined the expedition just after the Japanese had successfully stormed Prince Heinrich Hill, a position which dominated the inner circle of forts.

Two days later the Germans counter-attacked to regain the lost territory, but so spiritless was their effort and so wasteful were they of their shells that General Kamio came to the conclusion that no long resistance was intended. Accordingly, he changed his plans, deciding to make a determined assault as soon

as his guns should be in position rather than continue regular siege methods.

TSING TAU SURRENDERS

On the 31st of October the heavy guns were all in position and, after having given the non-combatants an opportunity to leave the city, the general bombardment began. By the 1st of November all but one of the forts had been put out of action and the Japanese were pushing down the peninsula. During the next five days the infantry advanced through the inner works up to the last line of redoubts and trenches defending the city. The morn-

ing of the 7th was set for the final attack. This attack was never made, for when the sun rose that day, white flags were hoisted on the central forts. Tsing Tau had surrendered.

ladder which was to help the Kaiser mount to empire in the East. Seized from China as compensation for the murder of two missionaries in 1897, Tsing Tau represented, during the years Germany owned it, an im-



The Wireless Station of Tsing Tau Wrecked by Japanese Artillery

Japanese and German representatives met the same day, and that evening Meyer-Waldeck signed the capitulation. On the morning of the 10th the Germans turned over Tsing Tau to General Kamio.

In this fashion was broken the step of the

mense outlay in money. Seventy-six days after war was declared the work of these years was brought to nought. Like Maubeuge, Namur, and Liège, fate, in the shape of the "heavies," had made of the forts of Tsing Tau a heap of smashed and twisted ruins.

BASEBALL IN LONDON, JULY 4, 1917

The American Army played the Navy a game of baseball in London, on July 4, 1917, in the presence of 40,000 spectators, including the King. "It was a revelation of America at play," said the London *Times* writer, "and the afternoon was as strenuous as a pillow-fight in a dormitory. . . . As all London ought to know by this time, it is one of the fastest and most exciting methods of getting breathless, ever invented. It calls for great skill, and its rewards are salaries beyond the dreams of avarice. The dignity of cricket it disowns; the tremulous tumult of football is as the recreation of well-mannered mice by comparison to it. The players live on springs, possessing the activity of a high-grade machine. They think by lightning, and field, catch, and throw with the certainty of a stop-watch. As if the chaff of the spectators were not sufficient for them, they chivy one another. The pitcher can grin diabolically, if he be a good pitcher; and his comrades are thereby reassured and the striker daunted. The catcher is padded like an armchair, and must be able to take punishment with the calm of a prize-fighter.

"All these qualities were superbly displayed in this match. We should not care to say which was the better side, because, frankly, we do not know. But the navy won by two to one, and appeared to deserve its victory.

CAUCASUS AND ARMENIA

Utter Failure of Invasion Led by Turks Under Enver Pasha—Grand Duke Nicholas's Brilliant Campaign—Fall of Erzerum and Trebizond

BY MAJOR CHARLES A. KING, JR.
Infantry, United States Army

THE entrance of Turkey into the war furnished Russia with a new enemy. Once more the age-long struggle between Ottoman and Slav was renewed, but this time the Turkish troops marched at the behest of foreigners about whom they knew little and cared less. The powerful "Young Turk" party, headed by Enver Pasha, was completely dominated by Berlin. Hence, when Germany desired a diversion on the Russian flank to draw troops from the Polish and Galician fronts she turned to her Moslem friends. The Porte responded by throwing down the gauntlet to the Allies.

The most important fighting between Turk and Russian took place in Transcaucasia, a region in which, from the time of Cyrus to that of Shamil, the bitterest of conflicts had been waged. The whole district is a great broken plateau which slopes northward to the Caucasus range. The average altitude of the upland is about 5,000 feet, and the hills rise as high again.

The main railway in these parts runs from Batum on the Black Sea to Baku on the Caspian. Another line runs from Tiflis past the fortress of Kars to a terminus at Sarikamish, fifteen miles from the Turkish frontier. There is no railway on the Turkish side of the border, and the few roads are little better than rocky trails. Even in summer campaigning in this rough region is difficult; in winter it is next to impossible. But German strategy called for an offensive in Transcaucasia, and the Turk must perform or obey.

DEFEAT OF ENVER


Enver Pasha, assisted by a German staff, directed in person the operations of the Turkish forces. He concentrated three army corps

—the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh—at the fortress of Erzerum about the middle of October, 1914, for a blow at the Russians. An Arab division and two divisions of the First Corps were later added to his forces, so that the total Turkish strength was about 150,000. The Russian commander, General Voronzoff, had probably 100,000 men at his disposal.

Enver's strategic plan was ambitious in the extreme, since it called for the envelopment and destruction of the entire Russian army opposed to him. The Eleventh Corps in front of Erzerum was to occupy the attention of the Russians, while the Ninth and Tenth Corps encircled their right flank and cut them off from Kars. The First Corps was to advance from Trebizond at the same time against Ardahan, northwest of Kars. It was believed that no Russian soldier would escape from the trap.

Obviously, Enver's plan was excellent; but its accomplishment was made impossible by the rough terrain and the severe weather conditions. The flanking movement was made according to schedule, but the Turkish armies were so exhausted by their forced marches over the snowbound mountain trails that the Russians were able to defeat them in detail. On New Year's Day, 1915, the Tenth Corps, which had reached the Kars railway, was driven back into the hills. The left flank of the Ninth Corps at Sarikamish was exposed by this withdrawal so that the Russians were enabled to surround and destroy the entire corps.

Meanwhile, the First Corps had struggled through the snow drifts to Ardahan. Here it was attacked on January 3rd and driven back in disorderly rout. As soon as the flanking forces were disposed of, the Russians turned



Map to Illustrate the Campaigns in the Caucasus and Armenia

on the Eleventh Corps and forced it back on Erzerum January 17th.

Thus Enver's brilliant scheme ended in failure. The Turkish losses during the campaign were not less than 50,000 men.

Following the defeat of Enver the Russians moved forward. On May 23, 1915, they occupied Van, 150 miles southeast of Erzerum.



Enver Pasha
The Turkish Minister of War.

During this period numerous minor engagements took place in northwestern Persia. The operations, on the whole, resulted favorably for the Russians.

CAPTURE OF ERZERUM

In September, 1915, the Grand Duke Nicholas was transferred from the Polish to the Caucasus front. With his customary energy he immediately began to prepare for an offen-

sive against the Turks in the following spring. His object was to force the Ottoman armies out of Turkish Armenia and open the way either for a march along the coast to Constantinople or for a junction with the British near Bagdad.

The Russian commander was compelled to move before his preparations were fully completed. In January, 1916, the Allied forces abandoned their costly attempt to win Constantinople by way of Gallipoli, and evacuated that peninsula. This withdrawal released almost a quarter of a million Turks for service in Asia Minor, and it behooved Nicholas to strike before these troops could join their comrades in Armenia. Accordingly, he ordered an immediate advance.

General Yudenitch, the actual commander of the movement, advanced in three columns. His forces numbered about 180,000. Through passes blocked by snow and avalanches, with the thermometer registering from 20 to 40 degrees below zero, the Russians moved to the attack. The Turks, some 150,000 strong, were taken by surprise and completely routed. The northern Russian column cut off one entire Turkish corps and sent it fleeing northward. The southern column isolated two divisions from the main army. The central column crushed three Turkish divisions at Kuprikeui, January 16th-18th, and forced the line of the Araxes river in the midst of a blinding snowstorm. All along the front the Turks fled in wild disorder, constantly harassed by pursuing Cossacks. The roads leading to Erzerum were blocked by discarded equipment, abandoned guns, and half-frozen stragglers.

Erzerum, reputed to be the strongest fortress in Asiatic Turkey, was Yudenitch's immediate objective. The city was doomed as soon as the Araxes was forced, for the Russians were then able to concentrate their forces for a joint advance against the demoralized defenders. The hopes of the Turks centered on a strongly fortified ridge east of the city, but Yudenitch was able to place heavy guns on the supposedly inaccessible peaks to the north, thereby flanking the ridge and allowing it to be carried by storm. No attempt was made to hold the old-fashioned forts which formed the inner defensive circle. The Turkish commander, Ahmed Fevzi, and his

German staff hastily evacuated the city on February 16th, 1916, abandoning over 300 guns and a great quantity of military stores. Only some 12,000 men were captured, although the Turkish losses during the entire campaign were estimated at 60,000.

The successful drive on Erzerum did not open the way to either Bagdad or Constanti-

The brief lull in operations that now ensued was followed, in July, by a vigorous Russian advance west of Erzerum. A number of towns and villages were captured, and, on July 25th, the important strategic center of Erzingan was occupied.

Erzingan was the last place of importance taken by the Russians in Asia Minor. The



The Russians Assaulting the Turks at Erzerum

nople, but it was an exceedingly brilliant feat of arms.

LATER OPERATIONS

The Grand Duke's advance did not end with the fall of Erzerum. His right swept along the Black Sea coast during the spring and captured the important port of Trebizond on April 18th. His center, in the face of strong resistance, moved ahead slowly through the country just west of Erzerum. On February 18th his southern wing reached Mush, and on March 2nd it took Bitlis, west of Lake Van.

fall and winter of 1916 were devoted chiefly to minor cavalry operations, and the revolution of 1917, with the consequent demoralization of the Russian armies, put a definite stop to further fighting by Russians in Asia as well as in Europe. It seems probable that, if political conditions had not interfered, the Grand Duke's campaign against the Turks would have proved as successful as its strategy was brilliant.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Excellent brief accounts of the operations in the Caucasus may be found in *Nelson's History of the War*, Vols. V and XIII, and in the *London Times History of the War*.

Zeppelin L-49, which, after a raid over England flew to France and was pursued and engaged by a French battleplane, descended to the ground for repairs. A retired French soldier was near the spot and covered the German commander with a shotgun, forcing him to surrender. The airship was not materially damaged.

RUSSIA IN AUGUST, 1914

The Nation United as Never Before—Prohibition of Vodka Accepted Without Complaint

RUSSIA got into the war with energy and promptness. For a long time no signs appeared of the disintegration that was eventually to deliver the realm of the Czar to chaos. His subjects rallied to their country's flag with true patriotic ardor and for a while it looked as if the "Russian steam roller" would sweep westward crushing Germans and Austrians as it went.

A good picture of Russia in those stirring early days was drawn by an English observer, who wrote:

"Russia soon found that it was easier to mobilize her millions than to arm and equip them and place them in the battle line. All the perplexities and obscurities of the early months of the Russian campaign turned upon the difficulty of converting mobilized men into efficient combatants, clothed in uniforms, furnished with rifles and ammunition, and ready to fight.

"The actual mobilization was a magnificent piece of organization. From the farthest confines of the Russian Empire came interminable train-loads of men eager to give their lives for the Czar. Mr. Stephen Graham related how he was in a village in the Altai Mountains, in the very heart of Asia, when the mobilization order arrived. The men knew nothing of the troubles of Europe, and had not even been told against whom the Czar had gone to war. They saddled their ponies and rode off cheerfully, never questioning the call. The cities in the rear of the line of conflict became choked with men, but it was long before they were all able to march forth as fighting units.

"The supply of clothing, of arms, and above all of ammunition, was insufficient for the countless hosts which had been gathered. The factories of Russia worked without ceasing. The Allies did their best to supply deficiencies, so long as there was any chance of getting supplies into the country. Japan sent great quantities of warlike stores. Huge purchases

were made from neutrals. Yet it was a very long time before Russia was able to overcome her manifold needs; and the lack of material, and not the fighting qualities of her troops, was the chief explanation of such reverses as she occasionally encountered in the earlier stages of the campaign. She had to fight on an incredibly long front. Her actual fighting line was at some points dangerously thin. She was particularly short of big gun ammunition, a difficulty which soon hampered all the combatants alike. A shortage of the means of waging war lay at the back of all her movements, and the knowledge gnawed at the hearts of her commanders. In course of time these obstacles were to a great degree overcome, and it was calculated that by April, 1915, she would be very near her maximum strength.

RUSSIA UNIFIED

"The war brought a solidarity to the Russian nation such as it had never known before. Never had Russia been so united. There were strikes in progress at Petrograd and in other cities when the hour of conflict came. Civil discontent was rife, and anxious observers believed that the country was on the verge of another internal upheaval. It was indeed, but not in the form which the vigilant watchers in Berlin had predicted. They had taken due note of the surface symptoms which were plainly visible, and believed that the war would find Russia rent asunder by disorder. They failed to understand the psychology of the Russian people, just as they failed to understand every other nation around them. The strikes at Petrograd vanished in a night, and the Cossacks who had been brought into the city to preserve order in the Nevsky Prospekt and the other main thoroughfares found themselves acclaimed by the populace. One of them was heard to say to a comrade: 'Is it possible that these people are cheering us, or am I dreaming?' The Germans and Austrians had imagined that the Russian crowds would demonstrate against the war, and clamour for peace



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

All That Is Left of the Greatest Oil Field of Europe

When the Russians were forced to abandon Galicia they destroyed the oil fields to prevent the Germans and Austrians from utilizing their resources. The fate of the great Boryslaw district is here shown. Two-thirds of the capital invested in it was French and English.

at any price. When the fateful day came immense throngs were kneeling in front of the Winter Palace, and chanting the majestic and solemn strains of the Russian National Anthem. For the first time for a century a Czar of Russia looked out upon a Russian Empire one and indivisible, animated by a common purpose, stung from indifference into an eager desire to face a common foe. In the Russo-Japanese War some of the Russian troops had to be driven into the troop trains at the point of the bayonet. In August, 1914, the Russian regiments marched forth gladly, fired by a burn-

ing desire to take up the burden of a war which appealed more strongly to the people than any campaign in which Russia had ever engaged.

PROHIBITION OF VODKA

"One of the first fruits of the moral change which Russia underwent was the entire and ruthless prohibition of the liquor traffic. The Czar's imperative order was accepted without a murmur, and was regarded as a symbol of the transformation which the country had undergone. It cost the Russian Exchequer a

revenue of £68,000,000, but Ministers were speedily heard declaring that it was worth the price because of the increased efficiency it produced. Cheap vodka had been the bane of the populace. The ravages of drink in Russia cannot be compared with the consequences of liquor consumption in the United Kingdom, be-

quantities drunk both impoverished and debilitated masses of the people. At first the Czar's decree only applied during mobilization, but it was extended for the duration of the war.

"The result was magical. From the Baltic to the Pacific not a public-house was open, and the order was rigidly enforced to the letter. It



Photo by L. Kirtland.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

Russian Reserves Marching Up to the Trenches

cause in Russia the effects went considerably deeper. Really good vodka, drunk in small quantities, was not a particularly pernicious beverage. A tiny glass or two, taken with a dish of fresh caviare of a delicacy unobtainable outside Russia, had been said to be 'as acceptable as strawberries and cream.'

"The cheap spirits more widely consumed in Russia were of very different quality, and the

was accepted patiently and without complaint by the entire population. 'The result was,' wrote an observer, 'that the army and the people were serious and sober when they faced the task imposed upon them. Rioting and dissipation were things of the past, both at the front and in the capital.' Such was the grave and earnest mood in which Russia braced herself for her tremendous task."

It was a black week which opened for Germany on Sunday, August 23, 1914. The Russians were invading East Prussia, the civil population was in flight, pouring into Königsberg and Danzig; peasants with carts packed with their belongings trudged the country roads by the thousand. None of these fugitives had seen the Russians; they were fleeing from sheer terror of the Cossack, still regarded as a pitiless and reckless marauder, as in the Seven Years' War and in Napoleon's day. The mayor of Insterburg publicly rebuked the fugitives, charging them with cowardice. So little secure did the Germans feel, even on the lines of the Vistula, that the sluices at Elbing were opened and the country flooded.

COLLAPSE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Revolting Scenes Among the Troops Due to Revolutionary Propaganda and Soldiers' Committees

GENERAL DENIKINE, destined to become famous later as an anti-Bolshevik leader, made a report on July 28, 1917, a week after the failure of the last Russian offensive against the Teutons, in which he painted in gloomy colors the disintegration of the Russian Army following the revolution of the spring of 1917. The ravages of revolutionary propaganda and the wholesale desertions which it caused finally reached such a pitch that the Army, which under Grand Duke Nicholas, Russky and Brusiloff, had won brilliant victories, practically ceased to exist as an organized force.

Denikine's report appeared in the *Paris Temps*. The portions reproduced below are from a translation of parts of the report printed in the *Current History Magazine*:

"It is with profound emotion and a consciousness of my heavy responsibility that I have written this report. I ask your indulgence. I was wont to speak frankly and fearlessly in the presence of the autocratic Czar, and my words will be of the same kind in the presence of the revolutionary autocracy.

"When called to the command I found the troops in a state of complete disorganization. This fact seemed all the more strange because neither the accounts that had reached the headquarters of the General Staff nor my own observations had led me to expect so desolating a situation. It is easy to explain this fact: As long as the soldiers merely had to maintain a passive attitude they gave way to no important excesses. But when the moment arrived for them to do their duty, when they were ordered to prepare for attack, then the animal instinct spoke and the veil was lifted.

"There were as many as ten divisions that did not take their positions for departure, as ordered. An enormous turmoil arose among the officers of all ranks, the committees, the agitators. There were endless requests, conversations, persuasions. To take even the least de-

cisive measure it was necessary before all to diminish the number of troops in revolt. Almost a whole month passed in this way. Only a part of the divisions obeyed the order to go into battle. In particular, the 2d Corps, from the Caucasus, and the 160th Infantry Division revolted. Many detachments lost not only their former appearance, but even all human semblance. I shall never forget the hour I passed in the 703d Regiment.

"In certain regiments there were from eight to ten stilleries of alcohol! Drunkenness, gambling, assault and battery, pillage, sometimes murder. . . . I decided to send the 2d Caucasian Corps to the rear, with the exception of the 51st Infantry Division, and to reorganize it as well as the 160th, thus depriving myself from the outset of a force of about 130,000 bayonets. In the sector with the Caucasian Infantry Corps were placed the 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions, considered the best on the front. The 29th moved into position as ordered, but the next day almost two and a half regiments returned to the rear. The 28th Division wished to deploy a regiment into the vacant position, but the regiment decided without appeal not to occupy it.

KERENSKY'S VISIT

"Everything possible was done to influence them. The Commander-in-Chief [Brusiloff] himself came, and after discussions with the committees and delegates of the two corps went away with the impression that the soldiers were good, but that the officers were frightened, and had lost their heads. It was not the truth. The officers in this incredibly painful situation had done all that they could.

"The Commander-in-Chief is not aware that the meeting of the 1st Siberian Corps, which welcomed his address with enthusiasm, was prolonged after his departure. Other orators came, who demanded that the soldiers should not listen to 'the old bourgeois,' (pardon me, but that is the word used) and loaded his name

with gross insults. These speeches were saluted with frantic applause.

"The Minister of War, M. Kerensky, in the course of a tour of inspection, made an inspiring appeal to glory, and received a triumphal welcome from the 28th Infantry Division; but on his return he met the deputation from one of two regiments in this division which had taken a resolution, a half hour after the orator's departure, not to attack. Still more touching was the spectacle of the 28th Infantry Division, which burst into the wildest enthusiasm at the moment when the red flag was

were really of some use. But the very institution, from the fact that it involves two powers, that it creates friction, that it is an unsolicited and baneful interference, cannot fail to be a cause of decomposition in the army.

EVIL WROUGHT BY COMMITTEES

"The committees are another cause of demoralization. I do not deny the remarkable work of many which are doing their duty with all their might. Many of their members especially were precious for their superb example



Erzerum

This famous city, the capital of Armenia, was evacuated by the Turks and their German Staff in February, 1916, when the Russians, led by the Grand Duke Nicholas, swept down from the Caucasus and destroyed the Turkish army.

returned to the commander of the regiment from Poti, who received it kneeling. By the mouths of three orators and by repeated cries the men of the regiment vowed that they would die for their country. On the first day of the attack, without even going into their trenches, this regiment made a half-turn and went six or seven miles to the rear of the battle line.

"Among the factors which should have sustained the morale of the troops, but which in reality led them into complete demoralization, were the political commissaries and the soldiers' committees. Perhaps there were among the commissaries a few 'black swans,' who, without meddling in what did not concern them,

of heroic death. But I affirm that their usefulness has not compensated, save in a minor degree, for the enormous evil caused by the committees to army discipline by reason of their oligarchy, of their division of power, their hostile interference in war affairs, and the discredit they throw on authority. I could give hundreds of examples of their work of disorganization and weakening of authority, but I will limit myself to the most characteristic:

"On June 8th a committee at the front decided not to attack; then it changed and pronounced for an attack. On June 1st the committee of the 2d Army decided not to attack, and on June 20th changed its decision. The So-

viet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates at Minsk, by a vote of 123 to 79, refused to authorize an attack. All the committees of the 169th Infantry Division voted for lack of confidence in the Provisional Government and a belief that they considered an attack on the enemy to be 'treason to the revolution.' The campaign against authority expressed itself in a whole series of dismissals of commanding officers, acts in which, in the majority of cases, the committees took part. At the very beginning of the military operations a corps commander, a chief of the General Staff, and the head of a division intrusted with an important attack had to abandon their commands. In this manner about sixty officers from commanders of army corps to heads of regiments were deposed.

"It is difficult to estimate all the evil done by the committees. There is no longer any firm discipline. If a consoling decision is made by a majority vote it amounts to nothing. The Bolsheviks, hiding behind their privilege as members of the committee, are everywhere sowing trouble and revolt. In brief—oligarchy and prolixity! In place of support for authority, discredit. The military leader, hampered, elevated, then cast down, discredited on all sides, is expected, nevertheless, to be powerful and to conduct the troops vigorously to battle.

"Such was the material preparation that preceded the operations. The deployment was not finished, but the pressure on the Southwest front made immediate succor necessary. The enemy had already deprived my front of three or four divisions. I decided to attack with the remaining troops who seemed faithful to their duty.

"For three days the artillery thundered against the enemy trenches, tore them up frightfully, inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, and pounded out a road for our infantry. Almost all the first zone was carried. Our chain of troops reached the enemy batteries. The breach seemed about to be enlarged: it was the long expected victory at last."

DESERTIONS BY WHOLESALE

Instead of victory, however, it was defeat. The General continues:

"After this reverse the dwindling of man power increased, and at nightfall took on enormous proportions. The soldiers, weary, unnerved, unaccustomed to the roar of cannon after months of rest, of inaction, of fraternization, of meetings, abandoned the trenches en masse, throwing away their rifles and machine guns,

and flowed in a torrent toward the rear. The cowardice and indiscipline of some reached such a pitch that several of our generals asked that no more artillery be fired, for fear that the noise of our own cannon would cause a panic among our soldiers. . . .

"From the tone of all the reports of the generals one might conclude that the mental condition of the troops defied analysis. . . . I called together the army commanders and asked these questions: 'Will our armies be able to resist a serious German attack, with enemy re-



Gen. Kuropatkin

Commander of the Northern Armies of Russia.

serves?' Answer: 'No.' 'Can our armies sustain an organized attack of the Germans if the enemy forces remain the same as now?' Two commanders answered in vague, conditional terms; the head of the 10th Army categorically. The general verdict was: 'We no longer have any infantry.' I will make the statement stronger, and say: 'We no longer have any Army, and it is necessary to create one at any price.'

"Under Paragraph 6 of the 'Declaration of the Soldier's Rights,' it is prescribed that all printed matter, without exception, shall be forwarded to the person addressed. This deluges the whole Army with incendiary Bolshevik literature, and upon this literature the spirit of

the Army is fed. It is evident that official funds, the funds of the people and of the Military Bureau at Moscow, have been invested in this vicious propaganda sent to the front.

"From March 24th to May 1st there arrived 7,972 Copies of the *Pravda*, 2,000 copies of the *Soldatskaia Pravda*, 30,375 copies of the *Sozial Demokrate*, etc. From May 1st to June 11th there arrived 61,525 copies of the *Soldatskaia Pravda*, 32,711 of the *Sozial Demokrate*, 6,999 of the *Pravda*. These papers were spread through the companies by individual soldiers.

"Under Paragraph 14 no one is to be pun-

plunging into military life, has said: 'I could not have imagined what martyrs your officers are; I bow before them.' Yes; in the darkest hours of the Czarist epoch the satellites and police did not employ, for those they deemed criminal, the tortures, the jeers inflicted to-day by the somber mass, guided by the revolutionary rabble, upon officers who are giving their lives for their country.

"They are insulted at every turn, they are struck, yes, struck. But they do not complain; they are moved by shame, mortal shame. And more than one, in private, sheds tears over his



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

A Field Mass on the Russian Front

Each priest carried with him on active service a little wooden box in which were kept the vessels and vestments for celebrating mass according to the ritual of the Orthodox Greek Church.

ished without trial. Certainly this right belongs to the private soldiers alone, for the officers continue to be denied it. What has happened? The high military tribunal, paralyzed by democratization, proposes to limit its activities to the most important cases, such as treason. The officers have lost all disciplinary authority. The disciplinary tribunals have not been elected, either through indifference or through boycott. In short, justice has been excluded from the Army. All these legislative measures have annihilated authority and discipline, brought contempt upon the officers, deprived them of all confidence, all consideration.

"The officers' corps: it is very painful to me to speak of this, and I will be brief. Sokoloff,

misfortune. It is not strange that to escape such a situation many officers seek death on the battlefield. What epic calm and tragic resonance vibrate through this passage from an account of the battle: 'In vain did the officers, marching in advance, try to rally their men. At that moment a white flag appears on Redoubt 3. Then fifteen officers, with a little group of soldiers, marched forward alone. Their fate is unknown. They were not seen again.'—(Report of the 38th Army Corps.)

"Peace to the ashes of those heroes, and may their blood be upon the heads of those who caused their death, whether voluntarily or involuntarily! The army is in ruins. Heroic measures are necessary."

THE "RIVER OF STEEL"

A Realistic Word-Picture of the March of the German Legions Through Brussels in August, 1914

THAT day in August, 1914, when the German Army marched into Brussels was one of the landmarks of the war—it was, in fact, a landmark of history—the day the German military steam-roller in all its might and fierceness took formal possession of Belgium and settled down to the business of using neutral territory as the base from which its campaign against the Allies was to be launched. For three days and nights the German hosts were on the march. Among the

war correspondents who were in the Belgian capital at the time was Richard Harding Davis. On the day of the German Army's entrance he wrote for the *New York Tribune* the memorable despatch which follows:

"The entrance of the German Army into Brussels has lost the human quality. It was lost as soon as the three soldiers who led the Army bicycled into the Boulevard du Régent and asked the way to the Gare du Nord. When they passed, the human note passed with them.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Brussels, the Capital of Belgium

The magnificent Palace of Justice, which is one of the finest buildings in Europe. The beautiful city was occupied by the Germans in September, 1914, when it was surrendered without resistance in order to save its buildings from bombardment.

"What came after them, and twenty-four hours later is still coming, is not men marching, but a force of nature like a tidal wave, an avalanche or a river flooding its banks. At this minute it is rolling through Brussels as the swollen waters of the Conemaugh Valley swept through Johnstown.

"At the sight of the first few regiments of the enemy we were thrilled with interest. Af-

moved under a cloak of invisibility. Only after the most numerous and severe tests, with all materials and combinations of color that give forth no color, could this gray have been discovered. That it was selected to clothe and disguise the German when he fights is typical of the German Staff in striving for efficiency to leave nothing to chance, to neglect no detail.

UNIFORMS SUGGEST FOG

"After you have seen this service uniform under conditions entirely opposite you are convinced that for the German soldier it is his strongest weapon. Even the most expert marksman cannot hit the target unless he can see. It is a gray-green, not the blue-gray of our Confederates. It is the gray of the hour just before daybreak, the gray of unpolished steel, of mist among green trees.

"I saw it first in the Grand Place in front of the Hôtel de Ville. It was impossible to tell if in that noble square there was a regiment or a brigade. You saw only a fog that melted into the stones, blended with the ancient house fronts, that shifted and drifted, but left you nothing at which you could point.

"Later, as the army passed below my window, under the trees of the Botanical Park, it merged and was lost against the green leaves. It is no exaggeration to say that at a hundred yards you can see the horses on which the Uhlans ride, but cannot see the men who ride them.

"If I appear to overemphasize this disguising uniform it is because of all the details of the German outfit it appealed to me as one of the most remarkable. The other day, when I was with the rear guard of the French Dragoons and Cuirassiers and they threw out pickets, we could distinguish them against the yellow wheat or green gorse at half a mile, while these men passing in the street, when they have reached the next crossing, become merged into the gray of the paving stones and the earth swallows them. In comparison the yellow khaki of our own American Army is about as invisible as the flag of Spain.

"Yesterday Major General von Jarotzky, the German Military Governor of Brussels, assured Burgomaster Max that the German Army would not occupy the city, but would pass through it. It is still passing. I have followed in campaigns six armies, but excepting not even our own, the Japanese or the British, I have not seen one so thoroughly equipped. I am not speaking of the fighting qualities of any army, only of the equipment and organization. The German Army moved into this city as smoothly



M. Max

Burgomaster of Brussels.

ter they had passed for three hours in one unbroken steel-gray column we were bored. But when hour after hour passed and there was no halt, no breathing time, no open spaces in the ranks, the thing became uncanny, inhuman. You returned to watch it, fascinated. It held the mystery and menace of fog rolling toward you across the sea.

"The gray of the uniforms worn by both officers and men helped this air of mystery. Only the sharpest eye could detect among the thousands that passed the slightest difference. All

and as compactly as an Empire State Express. There were no halts, no open places, no stragglers.

GERMANS SING ON MARCH

"This army has been on active service three weeks, and so far there is not apparently a chin-strap or a horseshoe missing. It came in with the smoke pouring from cookstoves on wheels, and in an hour had set up postoffice wagons, from which mounted messengers galloped along the line of column distributing letters and at which soldiers posted picture post cards.

"The infantry came in in files of five, two hundred men to each company; the lancers in columns of four, with not a pennant missing. The quick-firing guns and field pieces were one hour at a time in passing, each gun with its caisson and ammunition wagon taking twenty seconds in which to pass.

"The men of the infantry sang 'Fatherland, My Fatherland.' Between each line of song they took three steps. At times two thousand men were singing together in absolute rhythm

and beat. When the melody gave way the silence was broken only by the stamp of iron-shod boots, and then again the song rose. When the singing ceased the bands played marches. They were followed by the rumbles of siege guns, the creaking of wheels and of chains clanking against the cobble-stones and the sharp bell-like voices of the bugles.

"For seven hours the army passed in such solid column that not once might a taxicab or trolley car pass through the city. Like a river of steel it flowed, gray and ghostlike. Then, as dusk came and as thousands of horses' hoofs and thousands of iron boots continued to tramp forward, they struck tiny sparks from the stones, but the horses and men who beat out the sparks were invisible.

"At midnight pack wagons and siege guns were still passing. At seven this morning I was awakened by the tramp of men and bands playing jauntily. Whether they marched all day or not I do not know; but for twenty-six hours the gray army rumbled with the mystery of fog and the pertinacity of a steam roller."

IN BURNING LOUVAIN

Richard Harding Davis' Vivid Picture of the Terrible Scenes During Germany's Exhibition of "Frightfulness" in the Belgian City

A SHUDDER ran through the civilized world when the news came that the Germans had put the torch to the beautiful Belgian city of Louvain, with its priceless treasures of architecture and learning. One of those who helped give people beyond the frontiers of Belgium a vivid idea of what the Germans had done in Louvain was Richard Harding Davis, the well-known American writer and war correspondent, who was in the city while the flames were still licking up its buildings. Below is a portion of the dispatch* which he sent describing the terrible scenes in Louvain. It was afterwards incorporated in his book *With the Allies*:

"At seven o'clock in the evening we arrived at what for six hundred years had been the city of Louvain. The Germans were burning

it, and to hide their work kept us locked in the railroad carriages. But the story was written against the sky, was told to us by German soldiers incoherent with excesses; and we could read it in the faces of women and children being led to concentration camps and of citizens on their way to be shot.

"The day before the Germans had sentenced Louvain to become a wilderness, and with German system and love of thoroughness they left Louvain an empty, blackened shell. The reason for this appeal to the torch and the execution of non-combatants, as given to Mr. Whitlock and myself on the morning I left Brussels by General von Lutwitz, the military governor, was this: The day before, while the German military commander of the troops in Louvain was at the Hôtel de Ville talking to the burgomaster, a son of the burgomaster, with an automatic pistol, shot the chief of staff and German staff surgeons.

"Lutwitz claimed this was the signal for the

* By permission. From *With the Allies*. Copyright, 1916. Charles Scribner's Sons.

civil guard, in civilian clothes on the roofs, to fire upon the German soldiers in the open square below. He also said the Belgians had quick-firing guns, brought from Antwerp. As for a week the Germans had occupied Louvain and closely guarded all approaches, the story that there was any gun-running is absurd.

"Fifty Germans were killed and wounded," said Lutwitz, 'and for that Louvain must be



© Brown Bros.

The Wolf and the Lamb

A cartoon by Signor Sachetti, the famous Italian artist.

[The allusion is to Germany's proposal to helpless Belgium to sacrifice her honor and allow the German armies to occupy the country.]

wiped out—so!' In pantomime with his fist he swept the papers across his table.

"The Hôtel de Ville," he added, 'was a beautiful building; it is a pity it must be destroyed.'

"Were he telling us his soldiers had destroyed a kitchen-garden, his tone could not have expressed less regret.

"Ten days before I had been in Louvain, when it was occupied by Belgian troops and King Albert and his staff. The city dates from the eleventh century, and the population was forty-two thousand. The citizens were brew-

ers, lace-makers, and manufacturers of ornaments for churches. The university once was the most celebrated in European cities and was the headquarters of the Jesuits.

"In the Louvain College many priests now in America have been educated, and ten days before, over the great yellow walls of the college, I had seen hanging two American flags. I had found the city clean, sleepy and pretty, with narrow twisting streets and smart shops and cafés. Set in flower gardens were the houses, with red roofs, green shutters and white walls.

"Over those that faced south had been trained pear-trees, their branches heavy with fruit, spread out against the walls like branches of candelabra. The town hall was an example of Gothic architecture in detail and design more celebrated even than the town hall of Bruges or Brussels. It was five hundred years old and lately had been repaired with taste and at great cost.

"Opposite was the church of St. Pierre, dating from the fifteenth century, a very noble building, with many chapels filled with carvings of the time of the Renaissance in wood, stone and iron. In the university were one hundred and fifty thousand volumes. . . .

GERMAN VANDALISM

"On the night of the 27th these buildings were empty, exploded cartridges. Statues, pictures, carvings, parchments, archives—all these were gone.

"No one defends the sniper. But because ignorant Mexicans, when their city was invaded, fired upon our sailors, we did not destroy Vera Cruz. Even had we bombarded Vera Cruz, money could have restored that city. Money can never restore Louvain. Great architects and artists, dead these six hundred years, made it beautiful, and their handiwork belonged to the world. With torch and dynamite the Germans turned those masterpieces into ashes, and all the Kaiser's horses and all his men cannot bring them back again.

"When our troop train reached Louvain, the entire heart of the city was destroyed, and the fire had reached the Boulevard Tirlemont, which faces the railroad station. The night was windless, and the sparks rose in steady, leisurely pillars, falling back into the furnace from which they sprang. In their work the soldiers were moving from the heart of the city to the outskirts, street by street, from house to house.

"In each building they began at the first



Bravo, Belgium!

From Punch, Aug. 12, 1914.

(A celebrated *Punch* cartoon which pictured little Belgium as a modern David defying the German Goliath.)



© Underwood and Underwood.

What War Meant to the Peasant Women of Beleaguered France

floor and, when that was burning steadily, passed to the one next. There were no exceptions—whether it was a store, chapel, or private residence, it was destroyed. The occupants had been warned to go, and in each deserted shop or house the furniture was piled, the torch was stuck under it, and into the air went the savings of years, souvenirs of children, of parents, heirlooms that had passed from generation to generation.

"The people had time only to fill a pillow case and fly. Some were not so fortunate, and by thousands, like flocks of sheep, they were rounded up and marched through the night to concentration camps. We were not allowed to speak to any citizen of Louvain, but the Germans crowded the windows of the train, boastful, gloating, eager to interpret."

AN ORGY OF DESTRUCTION

From his train Davis could plainly see much of what went on during the German

orgy of destruction in Louvain, of which he gives these vivid glimpses:

"In the two hours during which the train circled the burning city war was before us in its most hateful aspect.

"In other wars I have watched men on one hilltop, without haste, without heat, fire at men on another hill, and in consequence on both sides good men were wasted. But in those fights there were no women or children, and the shells struck only vacant stretches of veldt or uninhabited mountain sides.

"At Louvain it was war upon the defenseless, war upon churches, colleges, shops of milliners and lace-makers; war brought to the bedside and the fireside; against women harvesting in the fields, against children in wooden shoes at play in the streets.

"At Louvain that night the Germans were like men after an orgy.

"There were fifty English prisoners, erect and soldierly. In the ocean of gray the little patch of khaki looked pitifully lonely, but they

regarded the men who had outnumbered but not defeated them with calm uncurious eyes. In one way I was glad to see them there. Later they will bear witness. They will tell how the enemy makes a wilderness and calls it war. . . .

"Outside the station in the public square the people of Louvain passed in an unending procession, women bareheaded, weeping, men carrying the children asleep on their shoulders, all hemmed in by the shadowy army of gray wolves. Once they were halted, and among them were marched a line of men. These were on their way to be shot. And, better to point the moral, an officer halted both processions, and, climbing to a cart, explained why the men were to die. He warned others not to bring down upon themselves a like vengeance.

"As those being led to spend the night in the fields looked across to those marked for death

they saw old friends, neighbors of long standing, men of their own household. The officer bellowing at them from the cart was illuminated by the headlights of an automobile. He looked like an actor in a spotlight on a darkened stage.

"It was all like a scene upon the stage, unreal, inhuman. You felt it could not be true. You felt that the curtain of fire, purring and crackling and sending up hot sparks to meet the kind, calm stars, was only a painted backdrop that the reports of rifles from the dark ruins came from blank cartridges, and that these trembling shopkeepers and peasants ringed in bayonets would not in a few minutes really die, but they themselves and their homes would be restored to their wives and children.

"You felt it as only a nightmare, cruel and uncivilized. And then you remembered that the German Emperor has told us what it is. It is his Holy War."

THE RETREAT FROM MONS

The Extraordinary Feat of the British Army—Harassed by Vast Enemy Forces, It Fell Back, Fighting, Without the Semblance of a Rout

ONE of the most remarkable military feats of the war, or any war, was the British retreat from Mons to the Marne. Only the traditional courage of the Briton saved Sir John French's little army from annihilation. Beset on every side by overwhelming enemy forces, his men fought a succession of rear-guard actions with indomitable grit until at last, worn and decimated but still an army, they reached the river bank where they were to turn and drive the Germans back in one of the world's greatest battles.

Countless stories have been written of that superb march. Sir John French himself has told of it, as have scores of others, war correspondents and soldiers. Here is a description, written by John Buchan, an English historian, which gives a clear picture of what the British soldiers went through on those terrible summer days of 1914. In *Nelson's History of the War*, Buchan says:

"The long retreat from the Belgian frontier was at an end. The last days had been hard

and critical, the afternoons a blaze of heat, the nights chilly and often wet. There was no rest, for each day's march was continued late, and the incessant retirement might well have broken the spirit of the best of troops. But the men went through it all with fortitude, even with gaiety, and their only anxiety was to know when they would at length be allowed to stand and take order with the enemy. An officer, in his impressions of the Army during these final days of the southward march, tells us something of the talk of the men.

ADMIRABLE SPIRIT OF BRITISH SOLDIER

"'Hang it all, sir,' one man said to me; 'if we can do thirty miles a day, without food and sleep, in a retreat, we could do fifty in an advance.' Constantly the question I was asked was, 'When are they going to let us halt and have another go at them?' or, 'How soon do you think it will be before they let us turn and get a bit of our own back?' or, 'I suppose it's a trap we're leading them Germans into. We're the bait, so to speak, and the French all this time are getting in behind them.' It was fine




How Germany Tried to Win the War in 60 Days

The map illustrates how in August, 1914, five German armies spread like an open fan across Belgium and Northern France. The objective was Paris, which they expected to capture before the British and French could oppose them in force. The black line on the west shows the extreme limits reached by the German patrols.

to listen to and watch them—ragged, footsore, bearded, dirty, and unkempt, gaunt-eyed from lack of sleep, but upheld by that invincible spirit which is the glory of the race.

"In order to realize the full achievement of the British force, we must remember the temperament of the soldier. He was entering on a war against what public opinion agreed was the most formidable army in the world. Partly, it is true, the legend of German invincibility had been weakened by the stand of Belgium; but, as our soldiers understood that tale, it had

been fortress work rather than battles in the field. In such a campaign as the present an initial success, however small, works wonders with the spirit of an Army. But there had been no success. The men had gone straight from the train, or from a long march, into action, and almost every hour of every day they had been retreating. Often they were given the chance of measuring themselves in close combat against their adversaries, and on these occasions they held their own; but still the retreat went on, and it was difficult to avoid the feeling that,



From a Lithograph by Walter Hale.

Arras—"When the Enemy Comes"

Time was when the little market in the Petite Place was held beneath the shadow of the tower of the Hôtel de Ville, the highest and most beautiful Gothic tower in northern France. In the belfry at the top was "La Joyeuse," a great bell, destroyed by German fire. In 1915 almost half the tower remained, but later years of war left less and less of it.

even if their own battalion had stood fast, there must have been a defeat elsewhere in the line to explain this endless retirement.

"Such conditions are desperately trying to a soldier's nerves. The man who will support cheerfully any fatigue in a forward march will wilt and slacken when he is going backward. Remember, too, that, except for a few members of the Headquarters Staff, the officers and men knew nothing of the general situation. Had they learned of the fall of Namur it would have explained much, but few of them heard of it till a week later. They fell back in complete uncertainty as to what was happening, and could only suspect that the Germans were winning because they were the better army. Under such circumstances to have preserved complete discipline and faithfulness, nay, even to have retained humour and gaiety and unquenchable spirits, was an achievement more remarkable than the most signal victory. . . .

"For the British troops the ten days of the retreat had been like a moving picture seen through a haze of weariness and confusion. Blazing days among the coal heaps and grimy villages of Hainault, which reminded our north-countrymen of Lancashire and Durham; nights of aching travel on upland roads through the fields of beet and grain; dawns that broke over slow streams and grassy valleys upon eyes blind with lack of sleep; the cool beech woods of Compiègne; the orchards of Ourcq and Marne, now heavy with plum and cherry. And hour after hour the rattle of musketry and the roaring swell of the great shells, the hurried entrenchments and the long, deadly vigils, or the sudden happy chance of a blow back, when the bayonet took revenge for dusty miles and crippled bodies and lost comrades. On the evening of the 4th the van of the retreat saw from the slopes above the Grand Morin a land of coppice and pasture rolling southward to a broad valley, and far off the dusk of many trees. It was the forest of Fontainebleau and the vale of the Seine. The Allies had fallen back behind all but one of the four rivers which from north and east open the way to Paris. That night they were encamped along the very streams towards which a hundred years before Napoleon had retired before Schwarzenberg and Blücher."

ORDER PRESERVED THROUGHOUT

Soldiers know what it means to conduct a retreat and keep it from turning into a rout, a *sauf qui peut* when discipline is thrown to the winds and every man shifts for himself.

In the British retreat from Mons discipline held good and, what was more, British valor and endurance played true to form. Buchan continues his narrative of the great retreat with this tribute:

"We have the authority of Frederick the Great for saying that the most difficult of all the operations of war is a successful retreat. The retirement of the Allies from the Sambre to the Marne will live among the great retreats in history, and it would be a fascinating study to compare it with its predecessors from Xenophon's Ten Thousand downward. . . .

"Our retirement was a strategic retreat—that is, was undertaken under the pressure of strategic requirements, but not under the compulsion of a defeat. The rarity of such retirements is a proof of their difficulty. In modern history there are only three famous examples. The first is Sir John Moore's retreat from Astorga to Corunna, a march of 250 miles through wild mountains in a tempest of snow and rain, with Napoleon and 70,000 men at his heels. Moore fell back, as all the world knows, fighting constant rearguard actions, and losing heavily each day, chiefly from starvation and fatigue. But he preserved his Army intact, and on January 16th, 1809, could turn at Corunna and beat off his pursuers. That is the most perfect instance in British history, perhaps in any history.

"A second is Wellington's retreat into Portugal after his victory at Talavera. 'A pretty general,' wrote Cobbett, the eternal type of the ill-informed critic, 'who wins a victory one day, and finds he has to run away the next.'

"A third is the Russian retreat before the French in 1812, which lured Napoleon into the icy depths of the continent. That was a true strategic retirement, for the battle of Borodino was an accident, and Kutusov would never have fought it but for political pressure. Russia's success lay in drawing on the foe till winter, her ally, could destroy him.

"Other modern retreats have not been strategic but compulsory. Napoleon's in 1812, when Ney proved himself so great a rearguard fighter, was a retreat after failure. His retreat next year through South Germany was caused by the *débâcle* of Leipsic, as was the retirement through France in 1814 before Blücher and Schwarzenberg. Of the same type was Lee's brilliant performance after Gettysburg, when he led his Army through the passes of the hills into the Cumberland Valley, and then southwards to the Potomac, the Shenandoah, and Virginia.

"Sir John French in the days from Mons to the Marne had an easy country to traverse and perfect weather, as compared with what fell to the lot of Sir John Moore and Napoleon. His supplies did not fail, and his transport problem was not difficult. His special danger lay in the enormous masses behind him, moving at a speed

unknown before, and ever threatening to envelop his flanks. The pace, the comparatively small losses, and the excellent discipline and *moral* preserved in his troops were the distinguishing features of his achievement. When the time came to turn and strike, his men were as eager and confident as on the first day of battle."

THE SERBIAN RETREAT

Terrible Experiences of Soldiers and Civilians in the Flight Over the Mountains to Albania After the Teuton Conquest of Serbia

IN the Autumn of 1915 the world saw the flight of a nation—what was left of it—from its home. The Serbians, who had already suffered terribly on the battlefield and from hunger and pestilence, were doomed to further awful hardships. Following the victories of the Teutons and Bulgarians over the last Serbian Armies, which gave the Central Powers control over the little kingdom of Serbia, the heroic remnants of King Peter's army, together with thousands of civilians—men, women and children—decided that, rather than stay at their homes and submit to the invader, they would cross the bleak Albanian mountains and keep Serbia alive in exile.

This splendid resolve was carried out, though many of the heroic people who made it never lived to see Serbia restored and the invader driven from her soil. For weary weeks they dragged their way over the mountains, slipping through snow and ice, plunging to death in deep chasms, hungering and thirsting, dropping dead by the roadside from exhaustion. At last the remnants of the stricken people reached the Adriatic seacoast and their King, who had shared their suffering throughout the long march, went to Corfu, where he established the seat of his government and stuck unflinchingly to his post until Allied victory made it possible for him to return to his own capital.


AN ENTIRE NATION RETREATS

The passages below are from an account of the tragic retreat in the *London Times History of the War*:

"It must be remembered that it was not the mere retirement of an army. Merely as a retirement of an army, it was probably unique in that it was not one army which retired, but all the armed forces of a nation which withdrew completely from the soil of the country. And with those armies went the King and members of the Royal family, the government and all the civil *personnel* of the government, the foreign Legations and the doctors, nurses and staffs of the hospitals of the Allied peoples.

"Most terrible of all was the great mass of peasant refugees, villagers, peasants, and people of the towns who fled in sheer terror. Serbians are no strangers to 'frightfulness,' accustomed as they have been to warring with, and the outrages of, Turks and Bulgarians. But in no former war had more cold-blooded brutality been shown than that of the Austrians in such part of Serbia as they succeeded in overrunning in the preceding winter. All the world, moreover, knew what Germany had done in Belgium. Rather than face the Austro-German occupation, then, and expose their womenfolk to the treatment to which they were almost certain to be subjected if they fell into the invaders' hands, all the Serbian population which was not held by some unbreakable tie gathered together what little household goods it could and took to flight.

"A great proportion were physically unfit to face the difficulties of the road. Almost none had food enough to last him through the journey. It was not only the armies which retired, it was almost the nation which fled. And swelling the number of those who had to be fed upon the road, almost the most pitiable of all the great concourse of people, were some 20,000 Austrian prisoners who had been captured the year before. The road which the multitude



A Serbian Outpost on Guard

On the Nish-Salonika Railway, which connected the main Serbian army in the north with the Allied troops to the south, there were many Bulgarian attacks.

had to travel was always rough. For great part of its way it lay through and over rugged mountains, often by paths dangerous at any time; and these mountains were peopled by a population of hereditary enemies, largely brigands, who fell upon all small parties and robbed and murdered wherever they dared. The crowning burden was the fact that the weather was most bitter, heavy snow falling for many days, and the temperature in the mountains being

for the most part intensely cold. It seems as if no detail which could add to the horror of the march was omitted.

"All accounts agree in saying that until after the departure from Kralievo the *moral* of the Serbian Armies was well maintained. Each army had fallen back, however heavy its losses, before the terrible German artillery fire and under pressure of the exigencies of the general movement, in good order and without becoming dis-

organized. After leaving Kralievo the road was not at first extremely difficult, but the multitude of civilian refugees caused great congestion. Food was still obtainable, if not in any abundance; and the strain of the march had not yet begun to tell upon the less vigorous. At each stage hereafter, however—at Rashka and at Mitrovitsa—the conditions grew worse. The roads in places were deep in mud. Wagons broke down and cattle died. Some of the weaker persons fell out from fatigue, and hunger began

slow procession was, the army knew well, the King, traveling in an ox-cart. The army had no heavy guns, but throwing itself in the way of the advancing Bulgars on a line from Lipiane to Ferozevitch, it met them with the rifle and bayonet. For six days the battle continued, the Serbs not only holding the Bulgars, but driving them back some 10 or 12 miles in the direction of Katchanik. Only the failure of the ammunition for their rifles compelled them at last to give way and to follow the King and



© Underwood and Underwood.

After the Retreat from Belgrade

The awful tragedy endured by martyred Serbia in her single-handed struggle in face of overwhelming odds is vividly suggested by this photograph of some of her heroic dead who fell while defending the capital.

to make itself felt. When the historic plain of Kossovo was reached snow fell, the cold adding to the sufferings of the refugees, and many dropped by the roadside not to rise again. Here it was that the army made its last heroic stand.

THE SERBS' LAST STAND

"The Bulgarians from Uskub had pushed up the railway towards Prishtina, and threatened to cut the route to Prisrend and thence, by Albania, to safety. The road had to be kept open at all costs to allow the slow procession of the fugitives to get away; and among that

the people along the road which they had kept open. The Serbian losses from the enemy's artillery fire in this last forlorn stand were very heavy; and the army, now almost without ammunition, was hardly an army any longer."

THE MARCH OVER THE MOUNTAINS

Frenchmen who followed the retreat estimated that, at Prisrend, the column of refugees numbered 150,000. Many were absolutely destitute and the sufferings of all were terrible. From Prisrend the only road to safety lay over the grim mountains of Albania.

Scutari, across the mountain wall, 100 miles away, was the first haven of refuge. The heroic resolution was made to cross the mountains.

First, all automobiles, carriages, guns and stores were ordered destroyed; to get them over the mountains was impossible. Marshal Putnik, Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Armies, who had been ill for months, was placed in a chair and set out on the mountain journey. King Peter, who had come thus far in an ox-wagon, left it and started forward on foot, as did also the Crown Prince of Serbia.

A few Serbian troops managed to get to Ipek in Albania from Pristrend, by a road which made it possible for them to transport some batteries of mountain and field guns. But there was no question of doing that over the Albanian mountains.

The march began. "In the snow," says the history quoted before, "if there was any likelihood of a detached party missing the route it was always marked by corpses of those who had fallen out from parties in advance." A great many of the refugees perished in the mountains; many pack animals slipped down into the precipices.

TRAGEDY OF THE EXODUS

As if the sufferings already recounted were not enough, some of the Serbs, both soldiers and civilians, fell victims to the Albanian inhabitants of the mountains. These last seem to have made no attempt to harass the British or French contingents; but Serbian stragglers suffered severely at their hands, even such little baggage as the Headquarters Staff still had with it being pillaged.

"This flight of the Serbians from their country—the King, the Government, the Army and the people—will stand as one of the great tragic episodes in history. For many of those who took part in the dreadful exodus, the retreat lasted over two months. For those who started from the center of the country, as from Kraguevatz or Krushevatz, the time taken was from six to eight weeks. The journey was made in all cases under conditions of great hardship, from lack of food, from the physical difficulties of the latter part of the road and from the bitter weather. The Serbian Army, by the time that it had reached the sea coast, had lost about 120,000 men, or one half of its

original strength. The mortality among the civilian population will never be known, but it was very great. No words, no description, can heighten the dreadfulness of the catastrophe which had befallen the Serbian people. Hardly any country in any age has seen so terrible and utter a calamity.

"Even at the last, however, the gloom was lightened by a gleam of that fine spirit which the Serbian Armies had shown all through their bitter trial. It has been said that some of the troops had made their escape by way of Ipek through Montenegro. Others had endeavored to take the road by Monastir, but had been cut off by the Bulgarians advancing from the south-east and had been compelled to fall back into southern Albania. Broken, half famished and wasted as the Armies were as they arrived at Scutari, General Pavlovitch managed to rally a portion of them, and at once, without any rest for recuperation, columns pushed southwards and got in touch with the scattered bands that had been driven from the road to Monastir, and, putting new spirit into them, concentrated them at Elbasan, Tirana and Kavaia, where they could for the moment rest in comparative security. And when King Peter, old and worn by the hardships of the trail as he was, heard that soldiers of his were in difficulties to the southwards, he insisted on going with the relieving columns to their help.

SAFETY AT LAST

"Scutari, though a temporary haven of refuge, was by no means a place of permanent safety. It was necessary to get everybody, soldier and civilian alike, first, to the coast and, then, to some place beyond the reach of danger. The first thing was to push everybody on as fast as possible to San Giovanni di Medua, an Albanian port which the Montenegrins had seized. By request of the Serbian authorities, Admiral Troubridge, who had accompanied the Headquarters Staff throughout the retreat, took charge of Medua. As a port for embarkation purposes it was extremely dangerous, being too near the enemy's base and, as the torpedoing of several ships arriving with supplies of food or leaving with loads of refugees sufficiently showed, most unsafe as a point from which to attempt to despatch the whole Serbian Army.

"On January 11, 1916, the Austrians had captured Mount Lovtchen. On the 18th they occupied Antivari, which gave them command of Scutari Lake, and on the 19th, Dulcigno. Hostile aeroplanes were flying over Medua al-



© Central News Photo Service.

A Belgian Sentry

This grim figure on guard behind the sandbags was further protected from enemy snipers by the iron screen on his left. The screen was movable and could be changed to suit any angle of observation. The helmet worn by the sentinel was extra large so as to protect the head completely. Holes were pierced in front for the eyes to see through.

most daily, dropping bombs on the camps of refugees surrounding the place and at the shipping in the harbor. . . . By the advice of Admiral Troubridge no attempt was made to embark the Armies (some of which, as notably the 1st Army, which, having formed the rearguard in the retreat, was farther from the port, were still suffering severely for lack of provisions). The attempt from so inadequate a port so

near to the enemy would have been full of danger. The Armies therefore had to march by land yet one more stage southwards to Durazzo. . . . At Durazzo the work of transferring the Serbian Armies to a place of safety, chiefly to Corfu, and of there nursing them back to health and fighting strength, was taken over by the French, under General Mondesir, who had been sent out for the purpose."

THE "SIEGE OF FRANCE"

That Country and Not Germany Was the Beleaguered Fortress, in the Opinion of the German Novelist, Bernhard Kellermann

IN the Allied countries during the war there was constant talk of a besieged Germany, of the ring of iron drawn about the Central Powers which must eventually cause them to beg for peace. Yet at least one German saw it otherwise. Bernhard Kellermann, a well-known German novelist and war correspondent, wrote eloquently about the battles on the Western front as "the siege of France," professing to see the latter land in the rôle of a beleaguered garrison and Germany as the besieger. Here are portions of one of his dispatches to the *Berliner Tageblatt* describing fighting in the winter of 1915-16:

"And the siege continues! On this front, hundreds of miles long, our brave fellows lie in the trenches—by night, by day, and at this very moment as I write these words. Away up yonder in Flanders the water reaches to their knees. The pumps are kept steadily at work, but that does not help much. In spite of cement, beams, props, and wickerwork, trenches cave in here and there every day; and the toilsome task of piling up the sandbags must be begun again and again. When the men leave the trenches they have to wade through the water for half a mile or more. In the Champagne district they are white with lime and chalk; in the Argonne and the Vosges they are covered with mud to their very ears. Here, too, the pumps are hard at work to keep the water down.

"It snows; the wind roars; the rain falls in torrents. Then a change, and we are frozen by the cold. When the men leave the trenches for a spell of rest away from the firing line

they have to support themselves on sticks and crutches, for the water and the frost have played havoc with their weary limbs. No army of earlier times could have brought to its task such a store of energy. Even Napoleon himself would hardly have ventured to make such claims on his veterans. The stubborn will of our warriors has doubled, quintupled itself. The very blood is ankle-deep—the blood of the enemy, and often also, alas! of their own comrades as well—and their brows are worthy of the laurel.

ON GUARD FROM THE SEA TO THE SWISS BORDER

"In mud and water, between rows of rain-sodden and bullet-ridden sandbags, stands the soldier on guard—on guard in the narrow labyrinth of trenches, behind walls of sandbags, behind the shreds and tatters of walls that have been shelled over and over again; behind tangled tree stumps, arranged criss-cross fashion. On guard from the Belgian coast, where the cruel Winter sea hurls its waves against the bleak shore, all the way down to the Swiss border, where the mountains stretch up to the Alps. As I write, a hundred thousand men on this line are employed on guard duty alone. There they stand, five or ten paces from one another, their rifles at their shoulders, and keep watch. Behind row and row of sandbags the machine guns lie in wait day and night. The gunners lie or squat in the damp soil, awaiting the signal to rush to their posts and throw their lives to the hazard, as they have been doing for the last seventeen months. The water drips from their caps. They are silent; their eyes turn toward the Fatherland. There they

lie in their little dugout of loam or chalk, their boots and overcoats thick with mud; and they try to sleep and to think of nothing. The guard calls, and they start to their feet. They drink their portion of soup, while the water trickles in between the sandbags and the downpour of rain soaks them to the very skin.

DEATH'S "GOOD HARVEST"

"Here lie two or three crooked spikes, there a coil of wire choked with mud; two or three bundles of clothes are scattered about, half sunken in the earth; a dead body or two, which have lain just outside the trenches for weeks and cannot be buried—and over yonder, perhaps 30, 50, or 100 yards away, the enemy. That is all they see; that is their world. Between the wire entanglements, stretching over a distance of hundreds of miles, between the two opposing lines of trenches, lies thick the girdle of dead. Nothing, either by day or by night, springs from this lifeless strip of land, still as the grave. Platoons, companies, battalions, and whole regiments have sunk into this girdle of dead—hundreds of thousands of strong men, summoned once upon a time to live and to carry forward the work of humanity. Death and his cursed lieutenants (who avoid this lifeless zone!) have reaped a good harvest this year.

"The rats swarm out of the shattered villages; the ravens cry greedily. War is merciless. And nobody who is not actually there has any right to express horror. For, by heaven! it is not much to ask that these who

rest in security shall know the whole truth about conditions at the front. A dead man is dead; and there are many things in this war worse than being dead.

"And Death, Death is everywhere. As long as there is a front at all, from the sea to the mountains, Death will be everywhere. The long bullets hiss through the air; hand mines and hand grenades find their mark. Projectiles come crashing down from the trench mortars. A portion of the trench shivers for an instant; then is hurled high in the air. Death stretches forth his hand and clutches officers and men—he is ubiquitous. He is to be found in the ruined villages, where the weary soldier is seeking his rest; in the woods, behind the shelters where the field guns are concealed; up in the sky, under the ground—everywhere.

"Last year, in the winter of 1914, as men in Flanders still tell one another, a huge aeroplane suddenly appeared to spring from nowhere and flew proudly against the sky. It showed no signal, but no one fired. Then it seemed to the onlookers, awestricken, that a great white flag was gradually unfurled from beneath its wings. It betokened a truce—peace!

"No sign of the aeroplane was seen this year, and the siege goes on. The soldier stands at his post, fearless, faithful, noble, and he will remain there, fearless, faithful, and noble, so long as the needs of his Fatherland demand it—until he falls.

"Never, either by day or night, should we forget our heroes in the field."



© Underwood and Underwood.

Belgian Snipers at Work in the North of France

FIRST GAS ATTACK ON RUSSIANS

Infuriated by the New German Horror They Stand Their Ground and Drive the Enemy Back

IN April, 1915, the Germans let loose the first gas clouds against the Allied trenches around Ypres and the world shuddered as the stories of the atrocious sufferings of the victims of the new war horror were narrated in the papers. The latest German abomination was not to be confined to the Western front. On the Russian front, too, it soon made its appearance and many a soldier of the Czar writhed in torture and died in agony as had his comrades in Flanders.

How the Russians met the first gas attack was thus described by the American war correspondent, Stanley Washburn in a dispatch from the Russian front:

"ZYRARDOW, POLAND, June 5, 1915.

"One of the finest stories of fortitude and heroism that the war on this front has produced is of how the Siberian troops met the first large scale attack upon their lines in which the enemy made use of the gas horror, that latest product of the ingenuity of the Germans who boast so loudly and so continuously of their *kultur* and the standards of civilization and humanity which they declare it is their sacred duty to force upon the world.

"There has been a lull in the fighting on this immediate front for some time, due to the fact that the Germans have diverted all the troops that they could safely spare to strengthen their concentration in Galicia. Only an occasional spasm of fighting with bursts of artillery firing, first in one point and then another, have created sufficient incident to mark one day from another. During this time the reports of the use of poisoned gases and shells containing deadly fumes have drifted over to this side, and it has been expected that sooner or later something of the same sort would be experienced on the Bzura front. Many times we have had shells containing formaline fumes and other noxious poisons sent screaming over our trenches, but their use heretofore seemed rather in the nature of an experiment than of a se-

rious innovation. Enough, however, has been said about them here, and when the effort on a wholesale scale was made, it found our troops prepared morally, if not yet with actual equipment in the way of respirators.

"The first battle of the gases occurred early on the morning of Sunday, the 30th of May. The days are very long here now, and the first pale streaks of gray were just tinging the western horizon, when the look-outs in the Russian trenches on the Bzura discovered signs of activity in the trenches of the enemy which at this point are not very far away from our lines. War has become such an every-day business that an impending attack creates no more excitement in the trenches than a doctor feels when he is called out at night to visit a patient. Word was passed down the trenches to the sleeping soldiers, who at once crawled out of their shelters and dug-outs, and rubbing their sleepy eyes took their places at the loopholes and laid out, ready for use, their piles of cartridge clips. The machine-gun operators uncovered their guns and looked to them to see that all was well oiled and working smoothly, while the officers strolled about the trenches with words of advice and encouragement to their men.

RED FLAME, THEN FLEECY WHITE SMOKE

"Back in the reserve trenches the soldiers were turning out more leisurely in response to the alarm telephoned back. Regimental, brigade, division and army corps headquarters were notified, and within ten minutes of the first sign of a movement, the entire position threatened was on the *qui vive* without excitement or confusion. But this was to be no ordinary attack; while preparations were still going forward, new symptoms never hitherto observed, were noticeable on the German line. Straw was thrown out beyond the trenches and was being sprinkled with a kind of white powder which the soldiers say resembled salt. While the Russians were still puzzling about the meaning of it all, fire was put to the straw in a dozen



A Cavalry Charge Through Barbed Wire

This regiment of German Uhlans assaulting a Russian battery in East Prussia, suddenly found themselves confronted by barbed wire. Tearing through it at a mad gallop, the leading horses were forced to cut a path through which those behind could follow.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Königsberg, the East Prussian Stronghold

A city of highly strategical importance, it was invested by the Russians in 1914, but they failed to capture it.

places. Instantly from the little spots of red flame spreading in both directions until the line of twinkling fire was continuous, huge clouds of fleecy white smoke rolled up. The officers were quick to realize what was coming, and instantly the word was passed to the soldiers that they must be prepared to meet a new kind of attack. After a rapid consultation and advice from headquarters over the telephone, it was decided that it would be best for our men to remain absolutely quiet in their trenches, holding their fire until the enemy were at their barbed-wire entanglements, in order to beguile the Germans into the belief that their gases were effective, and that they were going to win the Russian trenches without losing a man.

"Officers and non-commissioned officers went through the trenches telling the soldiers what they must expect, and imposing silence on all, and prohibiting the firing of a gun until the enemy were almost upon them when they were to open up with all the rapidity of fire that they could command. In the meantime the wind of early morning air was rolling the cloud gently toward the waiting Russians. . . .

ROLLING WAVES OF POISON

"There was a drift of air in the direction of the Russian trenches, and borne before this the poison rolled like a wave slowly away from the German line toward the positions of the Russians, the gas itself seeking out and filling each small hollow or declivity in the ground as surely as water, so heavy and thick was its composition. When it was fairly clear of their own line the Germans began to move, all the men having first been provided with respirators. . . . Ahead of the attacking columns went groups of sappers with shears to cut the Russian entanglements; and behind them followed the masses of the German infantry, while the rear was brought up, with characteristic foresight, by soldiers bearing tanks of oxygen to assist any of their own men who became unconscious from the fumes."

RUSSIANS SPRING A TRAP

The Germans followed the gas clouds warily, foreseeing no difficulty in capturing the

Russian trenches, in which they expected to find the occupants dead or unconscious from the terrible fumes. But a rude shock awaited them. The narrator continues:

"Then they reached the Russian entanglements, and without warning were swept into heaps and mounds of collapsing bodies by the torrent of rifle and machine gun fire which came upon them from every loophole and cranny of the Russian position.

"The Russian version of the story is one that must inspire the troops of the Allies, as it has inspired the rest of the Army over here. Some time before the Germans actually approached, the green yellow cloud rolled into the trenches and poured itself in almost like a column of water; so heavy was it that it almost fell to the floor of the trenches. The patient Siberians stood without a tremor as it eddied around their feet and swept over their faces in constantly increasing volumes. Thus for some minutes they stood wrapping handkerchiefs about their faces, stifling their sounds, and uttering not a word while dozens fell suffocating into the trench. Then at last in the faint morning light could be seen the shadowy figures of the Germans through the mist; then

at last discipline and self-control were released, and every soldier opened fire, pumping out his cartridges from his rifle as fast as he could shoot. The stories of heroism and fortitude that one hears from the survivors of this trench are exceptional. One Siberian who was working a machine gun had asked his comrade to stand beside him with wet rags and a bucket of water. The two bodies were found together, the soldier collapsed over the machine gun, whose empty cartridge belt told the story of the man's last effort having gone to work his gun, while sprawling over the upset bucket was the dead body of the friend who had stood by and made his last task possible.

"Officers in the headquarters of regiments and divisions tell of the operators at the telephones clinging to their instruments until only the sounds of their choking efforts to speak came over the wire, and then silence. Some were found dead with the receivers in their hands, while others were discovered clutching muskets fallen from the hands of the infantry that had succumbed. In this trying ordeal not a man, soldier or officer, budged from his position. To a man they remained firm, some overcome, some dying, and others already dead. So faithful were they to their duty, that before the reserves



The Fate of a German Outpost in the Galician Campaign

reached them the Germans were already extricating themselves from their own dead and wounded, and hurriedly beating a retreat toward their own lines. From the rear trenches now came, leaping with hoarse shouts of fury, the columns of the Siberian reserves. Through the poisoned mist that curled and circled at their feet, they ran, many stumbling and falling from the effect of the noxious vapors.

SIBERIAN RESERVES TAKE VENGEANCE

"When they reached the first-line trench, the enemy was already straggling back in retreat, a retreat that probably cost them more dearly than their attack; for the reserves, maddened with fury poured over their own trenches, pursued the Germans, and with clubbed rifle and bayonet took heavy vengeance for comrades poisoned and dying in the first-line trench. So furiously did the Siberians fall upon the Germans that several positions in the German line were occupied, numbers of the enemy who chose to remain dying under the bayonet or else falling on their knees with prayers for mercy.

Somewhat to the south of the main gas attack there came a change in the wind, and the poisoned fumes blew back into the trenches of the Germans, trenches in which it is believed the occupants were not equipped with respirators. The Russians in opposite lines say that the cries of the Germans attacked by their own fumes were something horrible to listen to, and their shrieks could have been heard half a mile away.

"Thus ended the first German effort to turn the Russians out of their positions by the use of a method which their rulers had pledged themselves in treaty never to adopt. The net results were an absolute defeat of the Germans, with the loss of several of their own positions, and a loss in dead and wounded probably three times greater than was suffered by the Russians. Even although it was unexpected and unprepared for, this first attempt was an absolute failure; the only result being an increase of fury on the part of the Russian soldiers that makes it difficult to keep them in their trenches, so eager are they to go over and bayonet their enemies."

THE CAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL

Surrender of Over 130,000 Austrians Under Circumstances which Suggested Complete Demoralization of the Army

WHEN the great fortress of Przemyśl in Galicia fell to the Russians in March, 1915, there was rejoicing all over the Allied countries. Przemyśl was a fortress of the first class and with it the Russians bagged 130,000 Austrian prisoners, one of the record captures of all wars. The name of the place was promptly changed to Peremyshl, the Russian form, and the captors set about administering the place as a Russian city, not knowing that they were to remain its masters a bare three months.

Bernard Pares, an Englishman who was with the Russian Armies in advance and retreat, gave an idea of the importance of the great Galician fortress to the Russians in a dispatch sent by him from the front to London on March 30, 1915, a few days after its fall. He wrote:

"The fall of Przemyśl, which will now no doubt be called by its Russian name of Peremyshl, is in every way surprising.

"Even a few days before, quite well-informed people had no idea that the end was coming so soon. The town was a first-class fortress, whose development had been an object of special solicitude to the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Of course it was recognized that Peremyshl was the gate of Hungary and the key to Galicia; but, more than that, it was strengthened into a great point of debouchment for an aggressive movement by Austro-Hungary against Russia; for the Russian policy of Austria, like her original plan of campaign, was based on the assumption of the offensive. It was generally understood that Peremyshl was garrisoned by about 50,000 men, that the garrison was exclusively Hungarian, and that the commander, Kusmanek, was one of the few really able Austrian commanders in this war.

The stores were said to be enough for a siege of three years. The circle of the forts was so extended as to make operations easy against any but the largest blockading force; and the aerodrome, which was well covered, gave communication with the outside world. An air post has run almost regularly, the letters (of which I have some) being stamped 'Flieger-Post.' . . . The practical difficulties offered to the Russians by Peremyshl were very great; for the one double railway line westward runs through the town, so that all military and Red Cross communications have been indefinitely lengthened. . . .

THE LAST SORTIE

"For weeks past the fortress had kept up a terrific fire which was greater than any experienced elsewhere from Austrian artillery. Thousands of shells yielded only tens of wounded, and it would seem that the Austrians could have had no other object than to get rid of their ammunition. The fire was now intensified to stupendous proportions and the sortie took place; but, so far from the whole garrison coming out, it was only a portion of it, and was driven back with the annihilation of almost a whole division.

"Now followed extraordinary scenes. Austrian soldiers were seen fighting each other, while the Russians looked on. Amid the chaos a small group of staff officers appeared, casually enough, with a white flag, and announced surrender. Austrians were seen cutting pieces out of slaughtered horses that lay in heaps, and showing an entire indifference to their capture. Explosions of war material continued after the surrender.

"The greatest surprise of all was the strength of the garrison, which numbered not 50,000 but 130,000, which makes of Peremyshl a second Metz. Different explanations are offered; for instance, troops which had lost their field trains and therefore their mobility are reported to have taken refuge in Peremyshl after Rava Russka, but surely the subsequent withdrawal of the blockade gave them ample time for retreat. A more convincing account is that Peremyshl was full of depôts, left there to be supports of a great advancing field army. In any case no kind of defense can be pleaded for the surrender of this imposing force.

"The numbers of the garrison of course reduced to one-third the time during which the

food supplies would last; but even so the fortress should have held out for a year. The epidemic diseases within the lines supply only a partial explanation. The troops, instead of being all Hungarians, were of various Austrian nationalities; and there is good reason to think that the conditions of defense led to feuds, brawls, and in the end open disobedience of or-



Austrian Prisoners Taken By the Russians at the Surrender of Przemyśl

ders. This was all the more likely because, while food was squandered on the officers, the rank and file and the local population were reduced to extremes, and because the officers, to judge by the first sortie, took but little part in the actual fighting. The wholesale slaughter of horses of itself robbed the army of its mobility. The fall of Peremyshl is the most striking example so far of the general demoralization of the Austrian army and monarchy.

"Peremyshl, so long a formidable hindrance to the Russians, is now a splendid base for an advance into Hungary."

CAUGHT IN A SHELL-STORM

Eyewitness Account of the Fighting in Galicia When Mackensen Hurled Back the Russians Under Grand Duke Nicholas

BERNARD PARES, an English war correspondent, was with the Russian Armies in the terrible days of 1915 when the full fury of Mackensen's onslaught along the Dunajec burst upon their devoted ranks, tearing huge holes in their lines, obliterating entire regiments, sending the Armies of Grand Duke Nicholas back from the plains of Galicia won by them in brilliant fashion but a few months before. One of the most vivid pictures of actual fighting produced by the war is the following, written by Pares when the Teuton tide was at its height on the Dunajec and the Russians, outgunned, outnumbered but undaunted, were grimly seeking to push it back:

"May 3 (1915)

"The advance of the Russians over the Carpathians was sure to draw a counter-stroke and it has come just where many have expected it, but with tremendous force. This is because it is not so much the work of the tired Austrians, but rather the biggest effort that Germany has yet put forth in her attempts to bolster her ally. We have all been preparing for May, and Germany and even Austria have evidently made great preparations. The food supply in the Austrian army has been much improved; the proportion of Germans on the Austrian front has been enormously increased; heavy artillery has been concentrated; and the Emperor and Hindenburg have been reported to be here.

"I set out with a nice bright-eyed chauffeur who did a splendid day's work with me. We had the main road for some distance, and none of the varieties later seemed to trouble him. We went along a valley, and in a house standing high up by a church we found the staff of the Division. I had friends; and I was soon dispatched with a tall determined Cossack to the point where the road climbed the hill. Here we left our machine, and in a hundred yards or so we had the whole scene before us.

"There was a hut on the top of the hill; sitting in front of it one could see for at least

ten miles in either direction. The Division was holding a front of eight miles with the Z's on the left, the O's in the middle, the R's on the right and the I's in reserve. The O's, who were just beyond a hollow, occupied a low line of wooded heights a thousand yards in front of me. The Z's held a lower wooded ridge, the R's connected with the O's over a valley and were posted along a less defined line, of which the most marked feature was a village with a little church tower. Against these three regiments were nine, mostly German, and backed by the most formidable artillery. Beyond each of the flanks of the Division one could see at intervals black clouds of smoke; one thick stream of smoke that stretched into the skies came from some distant petroleum works.

ARTILLERY ACTION OBSCURES SCENE

"The whole line of the R's was being pounded with crash after crash, sometimes four black columns rising almost simultaneously at intervals along it; under each would break out little angry teeth of sparkling flame; the only thing that seemed not to be hit was the church tower, which, as each cloud died down, came out simple again in the bright sunshine. The Z's were in patches of smoke that sometimes disappeared for a time.

"What was happening to the O's was not so clear; so after watching the shells and shrapnel bursting along the line and on the slope for some hours, we descended by some winding gullies, drawing a shrapnel as we passed over a low shoulder, and soon reached the staff of the O's. Under the nearer wall of a hut, a group of officers was working the telephones, while a number of soldiers lay on logs around. The colonel came forward to me with a preoccupied smile: 'A convoy for the flag,' he explained, and turning to his men; 'you have the flag there?' Then he took me into the open and pointed at the ridge some six hundred yards away: all his left was at grips with the enemy who had come through at several points, and on the right his men were fighting at the close

range of two hundred yards in the wood beyond the crest."

TELEPHONING AMID SHELL-FIRE

Amid a constant roar of shells the correspondent crouched down and listened to the field telephones working incessantly about him. Each of the battalion commanders in the sector reported in turn. One said his machine

ported that his line was penetrated at more than one point, but was holding out. The R telephone gave no answer at all. Life there was unlivable, the trenches were destroyed, and on my way I had heard from soldiers a report that when taking ammunition to the R's they had seen the Austrians in our lines. Shells and shrapnel were crashing all round us, especially on our rear; a great cloud rose where I had sat at the top, and a hut that I had passed on



© Underwood and Underwood.

A German Field Telephone in East Prussia

guns had been put out of action, another that his line was pierced, a third that he was still holding, but hard pressed. Turning to his guest, the Russian colonel explained that his last reserves were engaged. Pares continues:

"A message came that his right flank was open and being turned. He seized the telephone and called to the reserve regiment: 'Two companies forward at the double,' reporting his action directly to the staff of the division. There was a peculiar humanness about all these messages; in form they were just ordinary courteous conversation. The Z Colonel re-

the way down broke out in full flame. Nearer down there fell four black explosives at regular distances of fifty yards, 'the four packets' as one officer called it. Our cover would all have gone with a single shot, and the men crouched to avoid the falling splinters from each shell. In this depressing atmosphere there went on the conversation between the colonel and the divisional staff: 'I can get no contact with the R's. Cavalry is reported on both of my flanks. The R's have had to retreat.' The answer was an order to retire at nightfall. Three hours at least had to run. The order was communicated in French over each bat-

talion telephone. The colonel apologized for his elementary French; anyhow it was the French of a brave man. As disquietudes increased, the permission came to retire at once; but the colonel answered that this could not be done: he was in hot defensive action, and the enemy would follow on his heels; at present he was holding his own.

BACK TO SAFETY

"Twice on the telephone the fatal word 'surrounded' had been used. My hosts urged me to go. 'We have each a different duty,' they said. It was with little heart that I faced for the slope, turning a few yards off to salute these brave men once more. They were some wounded struggling up the gullies, one with a maimed foot, whom we helped along but who had to sit down at times and smoke. As we began to approach shelter, we suddenly saw on the hills to the west of us men coming down the slope towards us. 'Perhaps ours, perhaps the enemy,' said my Cossack, who never turned a hair throughout the day. We got our lame man up the big hill, but as soon as we had passed the crest he said that his strength failed him, and sat down with several others round a well.

"The next thing was to look for the motor. We were now in comparative safety; for we were out of the line of fire, and the valley to the north of us was full of our own people. Officers galloped forward, looking at the line of our retreating field trains. In the valley there was a long train of wounded. I at last found our motor in the midst of it. We packed in the men with the worst wounds that we noticed; they lay without a groan, and one soldier said: 'Thanks to Thee, O Lord; and eternal gratitude to you.' A young soldier with an eager face pressed forward with a litter,

begging us to take his wounded officer, whom he had brought five miles from the distant lines of the R's. 'Harchin'—that was his name—was like a loving son, with his captain, walking by our side or standing on our step for mile after mile and all the while helping to hold the litter in position. He told us that no living man could have driven the R's from their position: but that the whole area was covered with shells till trenches and men were levelled out of existence. The companies left comparatively intact had all joined on to the O's. Of the O's themselves we could only hear vague rumours; it was said that most of them had made their way back.

"There was no panic, no hurry in the great throng, as it retired. Each was ready to help his neighbour. Crossing a long hill we had to transfer some of our wounded to an empty cart which we commandeered, the men moving without a word. In the night Harchin kept holding up his officer and giving any comfort that he could. 'It's quite close now, your nobility, it's a good road now,' he would say. We reached a hut where the kind Polish hostess showed us beds for our wounded; Harchin was constant and tender in his care, and I left the two together to await the arrival of the doctor. A private with a crushed face refused to lie on his bed for fear of spoiling it, and sat holding his bleeding head in his hands.

"Through the darkness and past an incessant train of army carts, which without any shouting did all they could to give us passage, I made my way to the corps of the staff and to the next Division; where I slept long into the morning. It was only later that we knew the full scope of our losses. The Division had against it double its number of infantry and an overwhelming mass of artillery. It had held its trenches till it was almost annihilated."

"VERBOTEN" IN GREAT BRITAIN

The war meant for stay-at-home Englishmen much more than watching out for Zeppelin raids and obeying the rules regarding food. We are told, for example, that due to the war and the measures taken by the government, people were forbidden to talk about naval or military operations in a restaurant, railway-carriage, or any other place; repeat any official report of battle, incidents, and projects; say anything to make any person believe they are connected with any Government department; say anything which might cast aspersions upon the forces of the Allies or prejudice their good relations with neutral Powers; spread any report of a *Zeppelin* scare; ask either soldiers or sailors anything about the disposition of units or ships; ask any officer to tell them something about the war "which the public does not know"; write to people living in special military areas asking questions about military or naval matters, or send information from such areas about them; use a cipher-code in sending letters to a neutral country; possess any cipher-code which could be so used; or send a letter abroad containing any matter written in invisible ink.

IN THE WAKE OF THE FOE

Sufferings of the Inhabitants of the Marne District, Overrun by the Germans, Described by a Spanish Writer

AFTER the Germans had fallen back to the Aisne following their defeat at the Marne a well-known Spanish journalist, Enrique Gómez Carrillo, was among the many who hurried from Paris to the towns and villages from which they had been driven. Scenes of ruin and awful tales of what the inhabitants had been through during the short German occupation met him at every step. Here is his account of what he saw and heard in the region of Esternay.

"The military motor car which is taking us to the scene of yesterday's tragedy . . . glides along the admirable road, driven by an artilleryman. The quiet plains of the Ile-de-France stretch away on either side in gentle undulations. Nothing in the picture before our eyes speaks of violence, cruelty and death. Everything indeed under the autumn sky and among the golden foliage, breathes the sweetness of life. Sometimes we might almost be in a park, so richly has the humble hand of toil adorned the landscape. The trees are grouped into harmonious bouquets. The most modest walls are wreathed with ivy. Before the poorest hovels the last flowers of the year open their corollas with melancholy grace.

"It was the season of sowing, and we were struck by the absence from the scene of the robust sower, the figure which in the old allegories seems to typify the energy of the fertile earth. Only old men and women now guide the plow; all who can carry a gun are fighting in the distant trenches.

"In the villages too the streets are empty and only wrinkled or feminine faces look out from the windows to see us pass.

"Wait until we come to the districts which were occupied by the Germans,' says our guide, and looking at his watch, he adds: 'We shall very soon be there.'

"We speed through several villages without stopping. In each a tiny church uplifts its old stone belfry in the darkening space. The farms, with their gray walls and heavy square towers,

look like castles. Infinite calm, absolute quietude, breathe from the humble cottages. Forgetting what we have read as to the recent sufferings of the whole region, we feel the sweet tranquillity of French village life stealing over us. How far we are from Paris—and how far, how very far, from war.

"But suddenly the car pulls up.

"Now,' says our captain, 'we are going to walk a bit. Here about Esternay, we shall have a great deal to see.'

"And, indeed, hardly have we taken a few steps when we are surprised by the most melancholy sight. One after another ruined dwellings make their appearance. At first we see only dismantled walls, heaps of rubbish, burnt roofs. The general view is lamentable. But the details are even more so. Through the huge cracks in the façades the drama of each rustic home presents itself with sinister distinctness. Furniture and personal belongings, kitchen utensils, agricultural implements, all the treasures of the house are heaped together in fantastic confusion. We see that the invasion surprised these unhappy people as the lava-torrent of Vesuvius surprised the inhabitants of Pompeii. On one kitchen stove a saucepan full of stale bread shows that at the tragic moment the peasant was preparing his soup. A little farther, near a charred wooden stool, a doll lies with outstretched arms. An old cloak still hangs from a nail, spared by the fire that has consumed the dwelling. The caprice of the flames is more evident here than in those vast Canadian forests, where a few pines always remain intact after a forest fire. Sometimes the most fragile thing in some poor home is the one that has survived: a picture on the wall, a branch of palm over a bed, a flower on a chimney-piece."

A VILLAGE TRAGEDY

The Spanish journalist talked with the only inhabitants remaining in this desolate village—two little old women with livid faces. "The others," one of them told him, "have dis-

appeared. Some are dead. The rest . . . God knows where they are . . ."

And she went on to tell him about her companion, the other old woman, who had been rich, for she possessed six cows, a new house, a well-stocked poultry yard, and a young son.

"The day the Germans arrived they occupied everything. . . . They did nothing to me . . . they only drove me out of my house . . .

cannon in the direction of Esternay. . . . Then the Germans came out of our houses. . . . It was along this road that the first fled. . . . A shell burst in this yard. . . . In the evening some cyclists arrived in haste, and took from a cart several cans of petroleum with which they began to set everything on fire. . . ."

While the old woman was talking, narrates Carrillo, the other, of whom she was telling, stood motionless, as if the story had nothing



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

Homeless French Peasants Fleeing from the Germans in the Marne Country

but she . . . she had hidden in the cellar with her boy; they dragged her out brutally and tied her to an apple tree. They said she was rich, that she must show them the place where she had hidden her money. . . . The poor thing had spent it all building her new house. . . . At the last they unbound her, then they tied her son up and shot him. . . . He was eighteen, he might have served as a soldier. . . . He was left there dead, his head hanging over on his breast, against that tree. . . . The Germans laughed to see him transformed into a scarecrow. . . . I asked them to let us bury him but they would not. . . . For two days we saw him thus, until the moment when we began to hear the

to do with her misfortunes. Not a muscle of her face moved. "Her eyes were dry," he says, "and on her lips was something that I can liken only to a dead smile.

"She has not regained her power of speech since then," her companion explained. The Spanish journalist continues:

"We, too, were incapable of speech. There were seven of us and all of us in our way through the world had seen great tragedies and great griefs; we had all heard cries of rage and cries of agony; we are all professionally steeled against painful impression. . . . Yet, in



From Punch, Feb. 19, 1915.

The Outcast

A place in the shadow.

[Germany's violation of the rules of war laid down by the Hague Convention aroused the indignation of the world and foredoomed her to ultimate defeat.]

the presence of this humble grief, we felt an anguish that made our eyelids quiver.

"The captain who was conducting our caravan was the first to master his emotion, and he reminded us that the evening was far advanced.

"We must go," he cried.

"Silently we came back to the place where we were to spend the night, without having seen the battlefield of the Marne from the heights which dominate one of the most impor-

tant strategic points. The image of the desolate village haunted us. The damp landscape intersected with marshes which the twilight rays tinged with red, suggested blood. From time to time we saw on the crest of some hill the towers of a castle. Shadows began to steal over the woods of ancient oaks.

"It is cold," said one of our companions, wrapping himself in his goatskin coat.

"We all felt the cold, cold in our bodies, a deeper cold in our souls."

IN A GERMAN PRISON CAMP

The Comment of a French War Prisoner Upon the Patient Endurance of the Russian Under the Severest Privation

THESE extracts are from the diary of a French prisoner in one of the big German prison camps. The diary fell into the hands of the Paris correspondent of the *Retch*, a leading journal of Petrograd, in the fall of 1915, who forwarded it to that newspaper. It was printed under the head-line "Read and Judge."

"Oct. 15 (1915). Leave all hope behind you who enter here. . . .

"Imagine an enormous square 400 yards long and 250 wide, fenced with barbed wire. Divide this square into eight equal parts and place in every one of these several hundred people, all dressed in uniforms. Build forty-eight wooden barracks and unite them by passages. Place sentinels forty feet from each other, and cultivate police dogs. In each of the four corners of the square place a machine gun. Behind the fence, outside, erect the kitchen, hospital, bath, Kommandantur. This is our camp, a clearing house for prisoners. Not a flower, not a tree, not even grass. Monotonous semiliquid autumn mud. Surrounding us a plateau. On the horizon the tile roofs of the houses of Merezburg. . . .

"We are guarded by old men from the Land-sturm. They good-naturedly talk to us like this: 'We have a howitzer of 60 centimeters. We placed it in Calais and from there bombarded London. . . . As to you Frenchmen, you, like the Austrians after Sadowa, will conclude peace with Germany, for Paris—kaput! . . .'

"Paris kaput! Paris kaput!" This is the only refrain you hear after each talk. . . .

ONLY SHIRT AND TROUSERS LEFT

"Nov. 1.—To-day Russian prisoners were brought in. They had not eaten for four days. They have no epaulets, no buttons, no caps. Many of them have no shoes and no coats. They stand around us and silently watch us eat. They ask for nothing. When we give them bread they bow and say 'Spasibo.' I cannot forget one of them, to whom the Germans have left nothing but a shirt and a pair of trousers. Through the holes his naked body can be seen. His feet are wrapped in rags. Trying to warm himself, he pressed his hands to his breast and jumped in front of our window. The day was gray. Clouds were creeping in the skies. In an hour I again looked out of the window. The same Russian, in his only shirt, was still jumping in the next inclosure. He was shaking like a November leaf.

"In the evening the Russians chanted their prayers. When they finished their songs, the Arabs in the next barrack began to sing.

"Nov. 14.—To-day one Russian prisoner, dying from hunger, devoured more than forty herring thrown out in the refuse. Toward evening he died. The guards explained to us: 'It is all England's fault. England blockades us. What do you expect—that we should feed you while we ourselves are soon to have nothing to eat?'

STRANGE BITS OF NEWS

"Jan. 27.—The guards communicate to us news that does not appear in the newspapers. 'England has been surrounded by 2,000 sub-

marines; 400 Zeppelins recently attacked London. Verdun—kaput! Paris—kaput! There is a rumor: President Poincaré wrote a letter to Wilhelm praying for peace. Half a million Russians captured.' We answer: 'So, so! Kolossal!' But Mohammed-ben-Halil, a twenty-year-old Algiers sharpshooter, cannot control himself and shouts in broken French: 'Toi—kaput! Brot—kaput! Germany—kaput!'

toes? A Russian will do it. You wish to fry a herring? A Russian will fry it for you. The Russian will make you a mandolin from tin boxes. He will carve a most exquisite plaything from a piece of wood, and from a horseshoe he will forge a cross. The Russian is more hungry than the Frenchman or Englishman. He receives no parcels. He has no money at all. And how submissively, how patiently, he bears



© Underwood and Underwood.

British Prisoners Interned at Göttingen

Poor Mohammed! He is always in a state of hunger.

"Feb. 1.—We scarcely see the English at all, but the Arabs and Russians are our neighbors. The Arabs sit immovable on the floor all day long. They seldom converse among themselves. Still more rarely do they speak to us, and never ask any questions of the Germans.

"The Russian are a sociable and smart lot. Many of them have already learned the necessary French words, and they rather freely express themselves in German. They are ready for everything. You wish to boil some pota-

his burden. Every day he prays to God. 'What do you pray about every day?' I asked one Russian. 'I pray to God to forgive my sins.' The Russians are children. And how little do we know these children!

"Feb. 10.—It is snowing. The quarters are enveloped in white, and because of it our life has become still more monotonous. Merezburg cannot be seen now. It is drowned in the snowflakes. To-morrow will be Sunday. For the hundredth time the burghers will come to examine us as if we were beasts. When, finally, shall we return home? Or, really, is it—'Leave all hope behind, you who enter here?'"

"THEY SHALL NOT PASS"

The Story of Verdun, a Chapter of History Which Has Immortalized the Brave Defense of the French

LUDENDORFF, writing in 1918, declared that Germany's great blunder at Verdun—perhaps the greatest of the many made by her during the war—was her failure to break off the attack on the French fortress when it changed from an irresistible advance to a wearing-down battle, a battle of attrition. By persistently trying to take Verdun despite appalling losses, against a resistance rising to such pinnacles of heroism as to send admiration flaming through the world, the German High Command played straight into the hands of their opponents. They allowed Verdun to be transformed from a savage battle into a hallowed symbol. They saw its military aspect dwindle, its spiritual meaning burst forth, its name blazoned everywhere as the bulwark of civilization, the stronghold of democracy. They continued however to drive their armies doggedly against its walls, doomed thousands upon thousands of Germans to death, because they could not bring themselves to acknowledge defeat.

That is why Verdun must be regarded not merely as a battle—though it was one of the most tremendous ever fought—but as the vividly dramatic embodiment of the supreme vision of its French defenders—the presage of the ultimate collapse of German ambitions. That there was a section of French military opinion in favor of abandoning the Verdun salient at the time of the opening of the German attack has often been stated; that the heads of French policy behind the battle front, appreciating the vast significance to France and the world of holding the fortress, overrode all purely military objections, is equally well known. French military opinion bowed to forces transcending strategy and tactics; the order was given to hold Verdun to the bitter end. With that decision every possibility of a German success to compensate for the neces-

sary huge sacrifice of life in continued assaults completely vanished.

The Germans failed to grasp this fateful change in the character of the battle. Robbed of the element of surprise that signalized the beginning of their efforts, confronted with a defense growing hourly more resolute, at grips with an enemy being constantly reinforced, and who yielded ground only after it was soaked through and through with German blood, the German High Command grimly persisted in its endeavor to reduce the fortress—persisted until the flower of the German Army was broken and shaken to its core and the advance was turned into inglorious retreat under the counter-attacks of the inspired French soldiery.

GERMAN AND FRENCH PREPARATIONS

The French positions around Verdun formed a big salient, jutting into the enemy lines between the Argonne on the west and St. Mihiel on the east. Not only was this salient of great natural strength for defense but it constituted a potential menace to the German positions in France, as it afforded an advantageous sally-port for a possible French attack. In choosing it for the objective of their great offensive of 1916 the Germans were not deceived as to the strength of the fortress; it was, indeed, its strength that lured them forward. They appreciated the effect on French morale, on neutrals, on the world at large, of the capture of Verdun, often called "the gateway of France." Its reduction, they argued, would open to them the road to Paris, utterly break French resistance, and make a peace advantageous to Germany imperative.


So it was against Verdun that they turned all the resources of their tremendous military

machine. They made a concentration of men and guns and material that had never before been paralleled in war. Behind the lines they trained picked divisions for the coming attack, rehearsing them to the minutest detail, while the Kaiser looked on exultingly.

The Army of attack was under the command of the German Crown Prince, surrounded by a staff of the best officers in the German Army, headed by the octogenarian Count von Haeseler. The fall of Verdun was to be made a Hohenzollern triumph.

ment, which smashed French trenches to powder, the German infantry sprang forward. In spite of the awful punishment to which they had been subjected for hours by the German artillery, the French met the impact with extraordinary bravery. In their ruined front lines they disputed the German advance, but their heroic endeavors were useless. By nightfall of the 21st the Germans had captured the front line at several points.

Next day the fighting was resumed with furious intensity. The German commanders con-



By U. S. Signal Corps Artist.

Verdun from the River Meuse

The French, after the initial German successes in 1914 against the Belgian fortresses, had realized that fortifications were not what they once had been, and took the precaution to modernize the Verdun defenses. Under General Sarrail, who was in command at Verdun at the beginning of the war, a fortified system had been developed, stretching in a wide curve outside the girdle of forts immediately encircling Verdun. It was against this outer rim of fortifications that the first German blows fell.

THE FIRST GERMAN ATTACK

The German attack opened on February 21, 1916. After a terrific preliminary bombard-

stantly fed fresh troops into the furnace, absolutely callous to the terrible losses. Their regiments, though everywhere meeting magnificent opposition, succeeded in capturing a number of important French positions. The advance continued, until the Germans had wrested from the French the whole of the first line, and taken some thousands of prisoners, though at the cost of losses such as might have appalled even the most obstinate commander. The positions captured included Haumont Wood, Brabant-sur-Meuse, Beaumont salient, Haumont, Samogneux and Ornes. The situation may be summed up by saying that the French, thrust from their forward positions, had dropped back from the arc to the chord of their outer line of defense.

The enemy next turned his attention to objectives of far greater importance, the Douaumont plateau and the Côte de Poivre (Pepper Ridge). The former, surmounted by the fort of Douaumont, belonging to the main system of Verdun defenses, was destined to win an immortal name. On the 24th of February the

In that phrase the French defense of Verdun—in fact, the French stand against the invaders all along the hundreds of miles of front from Switzerland to the sea—became crystallized. It became an inspiring watchword. It nerved men on other fronts to fight to the death. It will be inseparably connected



© Underwood and Underwood.

The German Crown Prince and His Staff

Note the iron cross which the Kaiser's son is wearing in this picture (he is third from the left). His father decorated him for the valor he was supposed to have displayed in his attacks against the French at Verdun.

Germans hurled themselves against Douaumont.

"THEY SHALL NOT PASS"

But, in the interval since the first attack, the French determination to hold Verdun had become inflexible. Joffre, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of France, had sent General Castelnau, one of his most trusted lieutenants, to Verdun to study the situation there. Castelnau sought General Pétain, in charge of the defense, and held with him a colloquy from which sprang one of the most thrilling proclamations of French resolve. Pétain was asked whether all was well. He answered in the affirmative, adding the famous words:

"They shall not pass!"

with Verdun as long as there is anybody left in the world to reverence devoted valor.

JOFFRE'S ORDER OF THE DAY

It is perhaps well to bear in mind, in connection with the phases of this great and prolonged battle, Joffre's Order of the Day to the Verdun defenders early in March, in which he said:

"For three weeks you have been undergoing the most formidable assaults which the enemy has yet attempted against us. Germany counted on the success of this effort, which she believed to be irresistible. She hoped that the capture of Verdun would revive the courage of her allies and convince neutral states of German su-

periority. She has reckoned without you. Night and day, in spite of a bombardment without precedent, you have resisted all attacks and maintained our positions. The struggle is not yet at an end, for the Germans need a victory. You will succeed in wresting it from them."

The Germans needed a victory—that was the secret of the appalling slaughter to which they submitted in the frenzied effort to secure it. Pétain's plan was not so much to prevent the Germans gaining ground as it was to make them pay for what they got. Buchan puts it

The Germans surged forward to the attack of Douaumont. Though thousands fell, others got a footing on the plateau. On the afternoon of February 21st, after as deadly fighting as had ever been seen anywhere, a Brandenburg regiment slipped through a rift in the lines and got into the fort of Douaumont. Proudly the German *communiqués* announced that the "key position of the main Verdun defenses" was in German hands.

But the boast was premature. Though the fort of Douaumont was held by the enemy, the



A French Observation Balloon at Verdun


well in his history of this battle, when he says of Pétain:

"His attitude was that of the trader who has wares to sell to anyone who will give his figure. He regarded no village or crest, not even Verdun itself, as immune from this grim bargaining. The Germans may have any ground they want—so ran his argument—provided they pay a high enough price. It was the destruction of the enemy forces, not the sacrosanctity of a strip of land, which would gain France the victory."

He was prepared to fall back a little provided he could take sufficient toll of the enemy. That was the case at Douaumont.

French still fought with the most superb courage. The Brandenburgers had all they could do to hang on where they were, so their hold on the fort could not be turned by the Germans to further advantage. Fighting continued until the 29th, especially about the village of Douaumont, which the Germans needed badly to exploit the success of the Brandenburgers. But they could not carry it.

The Germans were forced finally to desist. Their colossal attack on the center of the French lines defending Verdun on the right bank of the Meuse had failed. In fact, their whole attack on Verdun had failed, but they did not know it.



Map Illustrating the First Phases of the Battle of Verdun

THE ATTACK SHIFTS TO THE LEFT BANK

Having failed to reduce the central defenses by frontal attack, the Germans calculated on turning them by a series of heavy attacks against the French positions on the left bank of the Meuse. On that side of the river the first French line ran through a string of villages lining the Forges brook—Forges, Malancourt, and Bethincourt. Behind this line lay a much stronger series of positions, including Mort Homme (Dead Man's Hill), and Hill 304, ever to be remembered in the annals of war. A third line, still further in the rear, embraced the strong positions of Montzeville, Bourrus Wood and the Fort de Marre.

As in former attacks, the Germans began with an intense bombardment, during which the Mort Homme, the wood of Cumières and the Côte de l'Oie (Goose Ridge), which was also a part of the French second line, were deluged with an infernal fire. This was kept up from March 2d to 6th, when the German infantry sought to retrieve its repulse on the opposite bank of the Meuse by a furious attack. Both Forges and the nearby village of Regnéville fell to the enemy. From this vantage point the Germans then launched the first of their many and terribly costly attacks on the Mort Homme.

While this attack was gathering headway, that on the eastern bank of the Meuse was re-

sumed. From March 8th to March 10th successive waves of German infantry were hurled against the little Fort de Vaux, close to Douaumont, which now had assumed in German eyes the importance which Douaumont had previously held. The French defended this post with unflinching tenacity. The battle spread along the line—to Pepper Ridge, Haudromont Farm, the blood-soaked Douaumont plateau. Everywhere the Germans drove forward in masses, utterly regardless of loss of life; everywhere the French met them with withering fire. Except for minor advances the Germans were stopped in their tracks. The fighting in the village of Vaux rose to a pitch of fury noteworthy even in this most furious of battles; but the French still clung to the ruined village.

ATTACKS ON THE MORT HOMME

In the meantime, on the other bank of the river, the Germans sought to take the Mort Homme. They not only failed, but the French, developing a sudden power in counter-attack, swept them from the positions which they had gained in the Crows' Wood and stopped all German hopes of advance in that quarter for the time being. After another tremendous effort on March 10th there came a lull. The Germans had again been defeated.

On March 14th another German attack

was directed against Mort Homme. The assailants carried the position known as Hill 265, and, in a moment of exuberant over-confidence, announced to the world that Mort Homme was theirs. But the French, as a matter of fact, still held the crest of that vital position. On the 16th the Germans again attacked. They were bloodily repulsed. Then they drove against Hill 304. In vain. Again there was a lull.

Once more the Germans, on March 28th, sought to drive the defenders from the positions on the left bank of the Meuse. Not only were they unsuccessful, but the French, now fighting with ever-greater confidence, rushed forward in splendid counter-attacks. In the region of the Avocourt Wood these moves almost took on the character of a counter-offensive, the Germans being hard pressed to hold their lines. The drive of the French gave them the important post known as Avocourt Redoubt. Despite minor advances, the Germans failed utterly to make any serious impression on the defenses of the left bank

of the river, and Verdun seemed as far from their grasp as ever.

The month of April was ushered in amid fighting of a ferocious character. The Germans pounded the French lines on both banks of the river. In spite of staggering losses, they nowhere could make an important gain. The second month of the battle drew to a close. The defense still stood firm. Unmistakably the failure of the Germans began to be apparent. "Each item of the grandiose strategy has crumbled," says Buchan. "The scheme which was to give Verdun into their hands in four days had failed to give it in forty-eight and April 9th marked the end of the third stage of the battle with the failure of the attempt to take Mort Homme by the lateral movement after the abandonment of the frontal attack. There were further wild rushes in April followed by periods of inertia, but in both action and inaction the Germans were bleeding to death. So ebbed the first battle of Verdun, the longest continuous battle in history but one of the least spectacular."



The German Crown Prince on the Verdun Front

Note the horse shoe attached to the side of the car.

Something of the spirit that animated the French at this time may be understood from the order issued by General Mangin to the men of the 5th Division of the Third Corps on April 21st. It read:

"You are about to reform your depleted ranks. Many of you will return home, and will bear with you to your families the warlike ardor and the thirst for vengeance which inspire you. But there is no rest for us French so long as the barbarous enemy treads the sacred soil of our fatherland. There is no peace for the world till the monster of Prussian militarism has been laid low. Therefore prepare yourselves for new battles, when you will have full confidence in your superiority over an enemy whom you have so often seen to flee and surrender before your bayonets and grenades. You are certain of that now. Any German who enters a trench of the 5th Division is dead or a prisoner; any ground seriously attacked by the 5th Division is captured ground. You march under the wings of Victory."

THE GREAT BATTLES IN MAY, 1916

But the Germans refused to break off the fight, "cut their losses," and confess their failure to break through "the gateway of France." Instead, they set about making even greater concentrations of guns, munitions and men. Once more they looked to the west bank of the Meuse for success, dreaming that a break of the French lines there would flank the defenders out of the positions so magnificently held on the east bank and force the French to give up the little city on the Meuse which had already cost Germany a price far beyond her calculations.

The new onslaught began on May 17, 1916, almost three months since the opening of the battle. It began with an artillery preparation transcending anything of the kind ever seen. The French positions were simply buried in high explosives; the roar of the cannonade could be heard for many miles behind the lines. Then the German infantry rushed forward. Their objective was again the grim Mort Homme, still barring their way to the vital lines of the Verdun defenses.

From a narrow front near this key position the fight soon spread along the lines west of the Meuse, until the country all the way from Cumières to Avocourt was in a murderous

blaze. More than sixty German batteries were pounding at the French lines, yet the French soldiers, driven from their front lines, bunched their machine guns a short distance in the rear and met the advancing German infantry with a deadly hail. On May 20th the Germans, after appalling sacrifices of men, got a lodgment in the French first lines below the crest of Mort Homme. Pausing for breath, they again went forward, scorning still more terrible losses, got into the second line, and were pinned down.

On the western side of the hill a German attack, delivered with great force, succeeded in penetrating the French front lines. The summit of Mort Homme was now untenable for both sides; it was swept by German and French artillery fire and became No Man's Land.

A FRENCH OFFICER'S ACCOUNT

The fury of the fighting in this section, which surpassed the worst that had preceded it, was thus graphically described by a French officer:

"Nothing that the manuals say, nothing that the technicians have foreseen, is true to-day. Even under a hail of shells troops can fight on, and beneath the most terrific bombardment it is still the spirit of the combatants which counts. The German bombardments outdid all provisions.

"When my battalion was called up as reinforcements on May 20th, the dugouts and trenches of the first French line were already completely destroyed. The curtain fire of the Germans, which had succeeded their bombardment of the front lines, fell on the road more than two kilometers behind these. Now and then the heavy long-distance guns of the Germans lengthened their fire in an attempt to reach our batteries and their communications. At eight o'clock in the evening, when we arrived in autobuses behind the second or third lines, several shells reached our wagons, and killed men.

"The excellent spirit of the battalion suffered not at all, and this is the more to be noted, since it is far easier to keep one's dash and spirit in the actual battle than when one is just approaching it. I have read a good many stories of battle, and some of their embroideries appear to me rather exaggerated; the truth is quite good enough by itself.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Vista of the Plain of the Woivre

The attempt of the German Crown Prince to break the French lines in the sector of the Verdun forts, resulted in the most terrible battle of the World War. It continued for months. The character of the country outlying to the north is shown here; the river Meuse is in the distance, while in the middle foreground is a line of French trenches.

"Although they were bombarded beforehand, my men went very firmly into action. The cannonade worked on the ears and the nerves, getting louder with every step nearer the front, till the very earth shook and our hearts jumped in our breasts.

"Where we were there were hardly any trenches or communication trenches left. Every half hour the appearance of the earth was changed by the unflagging shell fire. It was a perfect cataract of fire. We went forward by fits and starts, taking cover in shell holes, and sometimes we saw a shell drop in the very hole we had chosen for our next leap forward. A hundred men of the battalion were half buried, and we had scarcely the time to stop and help them to get themselves out.

"Suddenly we arrived at what remained of our first-line trenches, just as the Boches arrived at our barbed-wire entanglements—or, rather, at the caterpillar-like remains of our barbed wire.

"At this moment the German curtain fire lengthened, and most of our men buried in shell holes were able to get out and rejoin us. The Germans attacked in mass formation, by big columns of five or six hundred men, preceded by two waves of sharpshooters. We had only our rifles and our machine guns, because the 75's could not get to work.

"Fortunately the flank batteries succeeded in catching the Boches on the right. It is absolutely impossible to convey what losses the Germans must suffer in these attacks. Nothing can give an idea of it. Whole ranks are mowed down, and those that follow them suffer the same fate. Under the storm of machine gun, rifle and 75 fire, the German columns were plowed into furrows of death. Imagine, if you can, what it would be like to rake water. Those gaps filled up again at once. That is enough to show with what disdain of human life the German attacks are planned and carried out.

RAMPARTS OF GERMAN CORPSES

"In these circumstances German advances are sure. They startle the public, but at the front nobody attaches any importance to them. As a matter of fact, our trenches are so near those of the Germans that once the barbed wire is destroyed the distance between them can be covered in a few minutes. Thus, if one is willing to suffer a loss of life corresponding to the number of men necessary to cover the space between the lines, the other trench can always be reached. By sacrificing thousands of men,

after a formidable bombardment, an enemy trench can always be taken.

"There are slopes on Hill 304 where the level of the ground is raised several meters by mounds of German corpses. Sometimes it happens that the third German wave uses the dead of the second wave as ramparts and shelters. It was behind ramparts of the dead left by the first five attacks, on May 24th, that we saw the Boches take shelter while they organized their next rush.

"We make prisoners among these dead during our counter-attacks. They are men who have received no hurt, but have been knocked down by the falling of the human wall of their killed and wounded neighbors. They say very little. They are for the most part dazed with fear and alcohol, and it is several days before they recover."

FRENCH COUNTER-ATTACKS AROUND DOUAUMONT

On May 22d the battle spread to the right bank of the Meuse again. The French—now under the command of General Nivelle, who had succeeded Pétain—had prepared with great secrecy a powerful counter-attack, which was to retake Fort Douaumont, where the Brandenburg regiment, which had captured it in February, still kept a precarious hold. The French had discovered a way of exploding the German sausage balloons, "the eyes of the enemy," which hung over the French lines, so that the Germans were unable to report to their chiefs the concentrations of men and guns effected by Nivelle for the contemplated blow.

It fell with crushing suddenness and at once won success. With shouts of triumph the French scrambled over the crumbling walls of the fort and swept the Germans back on both sides of it. But the enemy reacted promptly and effectively. After murderous fighting, which again cost the lives of thousands of the assailants, Bavarian troops succeeded in forcing their way into the fort again on the 24th.

RENEWED FIGHTING AT MORT HOMME

In the meantime the battle had blazed up again on the left bank and once more the lines from Cumières to Avocourt were shaking with thunder and engulfed in flame. On May 23d the Germans launched a colossal attack against



Underwood and Underwood.

An Army Travels on its Stomach

Soldiers, even on active duty, fight only occasionally, but they have to be fed three times a day and this involves most carefully laid plans. The French Army was noted for the regularity with which it served meals, even in the front lines during battles. Here we see a squad of soldiers around a field kitchen just back of the lines at Verdun.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

Shells for the Defending Guns at Verdun

France was saved by her artillery. In 1916 the French output of small artillery shells was said to be $30\frac{1}{2}$ times what it was at the beginning of the war, the production of large shells 44 times as great, and that of heavy guns 33.

the coveted Mort Homme positions, and managed to take part of the French first line, but were driven out again by prompt French counter-attacks.

On the night of the 23d they again advanced in enormous masses, intent on capturing the village of Cumières, from which they still expected to launch a decisive attack against the inner ring of Verdun's defenses. While the night was lighted with the flash of guns and made hideous with the hellish roar of cannon, the dark masses of Germans plunged

forward, passed clean through the village of Cumières and swept toward the railway station of Chattancourt.

It was a critical moment. The French knew it. Reacting with desperate courage, they drove back at the advancing foe and succeeded in wresting from him part of the ground gained by the great night attack. On the 27th the French, in another dashing counter-attack, recaptured the ruined village of Cumières. Once more the Germans had been thwarted.

But next day the German regiments again rushed forward, debouching from the Crows' Wood; once more Mort Homme was the scene of a ferocious fight. The attack was broken, but it reformed, and, with five fresh divisions, drawn from other parts of the Western front, the Kaiser's generals again smashed against the French lines. The artillery preparation once more broke all previous records; the infantry waves, advancing with utter disregard of losses, surged into Cumières, sweeping the French defenders away. But the assailants could not take root on the slopes of Mort Homme and the bitterly contested lines around that village. Before them the gallant French still held out, disputing every inch, counter-attacking, forming new lines. Nowhere on the west bank could the Germans win a success commensurate with what they had won on the east bank—and the gains there, they must have reflected bitterly, were far from compensating them for the oceans of blood spilled.

THE FURIOUS FIGHT FOR VAUX

The third month of the terrible struggle ended and still the Germans persisted. On June 1st they moved to the attack of the little Fort de Vaux on the east bank. They took French positions on the Caillettes Spur, and then, in a murderous hell of fighting, burst into the village of Vaux.

The battle, awful beyond words before, now became a red, insensate struggle of men maddened out of human semblance. In Vaux village, every inch of street, every house, wall, cellar, was disputed. Men uttered strange, wild noises remote from human speech, went at each other's throats with fingers dripping red, dropped, locked in each other's arms, tearing at each other's eyes. By the 2d of June the Germans had worked their way to the very lip of the fort. Inside, the French, under Major Raynal, one of the most heroic of an army of heroes, put up a fight that thrilled the world. For days he and his men fought without reinforcements, without a drop of water, while the enemy, supported constantly by fresh masses, bit his way nearer to the heart of the little fort.

At last, beyond reach of aid, taxed beyond all endurance, Major Raynal and his

little garrison yielded. The Germans, deeply impressed with his heroism, allowed him to keep his sword. They took him prisoner into Germany and there apprised him that France had awarded him the Legion of Honor. Besides this, the French Government, departing from a rule hitherto observed during the war, mentioned Raynal by name in a *communiqué*. His insignia of the Legion of Honor was conferred upon his wife at a review at the Invalides in Paris, the gallant major being still a prisoner in the hands of the enemy.

THE LAST GERMAN EFFORTS

After the capture of Vaux the Germans, utterly exhausted, settled down for a rest. They did not attack again until June 19th, when they advanced in enormous masses against the lines on the east bank around the defensive work of Thiaumont and the village of Fleury. The attacks increased in fury until the 23d.

On that day General Nivelle, anticipating the last desperate effort, issued this order to his army:

"The hour is decisive. The Germans, hunted down on all sides, are launching wild and furious attacks on our front, in the hope of reaching the gates of Verdun before they themselves are assailed by the united forces of the Allies. You will not let them pass, my comrades. The country demands this further supreme effort. The army of Verdun will not allow itself to be intimidated by shelling, or by the German infantry whom for four months it has beaten back. The army of Verdun will keep its fame untarnished."

His confidence was well placed, but on the 23d a solid mass of 100,000 Germans surged forward on a front scarcely three miles wide. This huge wave absolutely engulfed the Thiaumont position. Two days later Fleury fell, after its defenders had exacted an awful toll from the enemy.

The situation was now serious. Had the Germans been able to press the advantage gained, they might have driven such a wedge into the defenses on the east bank of the Meuse as to force the French to give up there and fall back, surrendering Verdun. But the losses of the Germans had been too great;



From L'Illustration, Paris.

Fighting a Battle by Telephone

That "the old order changeth, yielding to the new," was never better demonstrated than during the World War. Formerly a general personally led his troops, but to-day, at his headquarters far behind the lines, he directs the movements of his entire command by telephone, thus keeping in contact with the ebb and flow of the tide of battle.

they were too dazed and shaken to realize how badly the French lines had been hit. The supporting attack that might have given them victory was not launched.

There came a breathing spell, precious for France. Then the French counter-attacked with characteristic vigor; the enemy was pinned down to his newly-won positions.

And there ended the great German enterprise to capture Verdun—the "gateway to Paris." On July 1st the British and French opened the battle of the Somme. All that Germany could do was to endeavor to stem this new onslaught. She had no reserves and no spirit left for further offensive moves against the Meuse fortress, which had become

the tomb of her hopes. France had stood firm.

"If ever a monument is built to commemorate the defense of Verdun," remarked an American in those days, "it should reach clear to the skies."

The French did not rest on their laurels. Their proud spirit could not brook the enemy peering down on Verdun from the Douaumont plateau and the rest of the positions won by him at such appalling cost. During the rest of 1916 a series of counter-offensives, skilfully planned and brilliantly executed, took the French, step by step, back into those positions. Just before the year closed they could proudly announce that their heroic armies stood practically on the line from which the Germans, ten months before, had launched the first of a long series of futile and costly assaults.

And this fine incident, narrated by Buchan, may give brilliant finish to the mind picture of the French victors at Verdun. It was practically the last episode. On December 17th, by a counter-attack the Germans had recovered

a ruined farm of the Les Chambrettes sector, which was the last point from which observation towards Douaumont and the Chauffour Ford was possible. For six days a Zouave battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Richard, had held the sector, and now refused to be relieved till they had recovered the position.

"On the afternoon of Monday, the 18th, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, win it back they did, and such an attack was never witnessed before by mortal eyes. Every man was a muddy ghost, weary to death, and chilled to the bone. Long ago, in Marlborough's wars, the cry of '*En avant les gants glacés!*' had attended the charge of the Maison du Roi. Now it was '*En avant les pieds gelés!*' that the leader shouted. The frozen feet did not fail him. Men crawled on their knees, men used rifles as crutches; but, limping and stumbling, they swarmed over Les Chambrettes and made it theirs. That last exploit of the battle was the greatest of all, and for a parallel we must turn to the Berserk chronicle of some fierce Northern saga."



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Capture of an "Impregnable" German Trench at Verdun

This drawing by Paul Thiriat, special artist with the French Army, shows the first of 700 Germans who had occupied an underground stronghold coming out to surrender.

THE HORRORS OF WAR

An Englishman's Hideous Discovery of the Ghastly Results of the Fighting in a Ruined Russian Village

A GRIM picture of war is this tale of a reconnaissance on the Russian front, told by John Morse, an Englishman who enlisted in the Russian ranks. Morse's visit to the ruined village which he describes occurred in the early part of the war, when Russians and Teutons were swaying back and forth in Poland, struggling desperately for mastery.

"In the afternoon a Cossack arrived, and delivered a written message to the Colonel, the contents of which he did not divulge; but at night he called for a dozen volunteers who, he said, must be men of enterprise, not afraid to sacrifice themselves if necessary. These men were placed under the command of a young officer, Captain Folstoffle, and proceeded along the bed of a frozen brook, our feet being muffled with pieces of sheep's skin. Naturally I supposed that we were near the enemy; but Folstoffle spoke not a word of either French or English, and no communication of any kind was made to me or to the men: we were left to glean our information from the 'march of events.'

"The booming of the guns continued, at intervals, all night, and to the north-west the sky was crimson with the reflection of a large fire—a burning town, I imagined. The only sign of life I saw was a large animal (a wild boar, I think), which rushed out of the cover of some rushes when disturbed by our approach.

"The whole country was covered with snow, which was loose, and about a foot deep. This was a draw-back, as we must have shown up darkly to an enemy: at the same time it increased our chances of seeing the approach of persons or soldiers, not clothed in white, though this hue was often used by the Germans to conceal themselves when the country was snow-clad. We had left our bivouac at about nine o'clock, and marched on until 2 a.m., when Folstoffle decided to halt for a rest. The spot chosen for this purpose was a clump of bushes with a small, two-storied farmhouse about 300

yards distant. It was necessary to examine this house, and I volunteered for the service, making myself understood by signs and the few words of Russian I was now master of. I started alone, but one of the men followed close behind me, holding his rifle at the 'Present,' ready to fire instantly if need should require it, though it seemed improbable that any of the enemy were in the house. As we approached, however, I was astonished to see a man hanging out of one of the windows, and another leaning over him from behind. Both were partly covered with snow, and it hardly required more than a glance to show that they were dead. A few yards nearer, and I could see that their clothing was in tatters, and fluttering in the night breeze.

A GRUESOME DISCOVERY

"The weather had cleared up, and was now bright; and the reflection from the snow enabled one to see objects with considerable distinctness, though some distance away; and I noticed several curious-looking heaps, or mounds, near the house, from which a horrible stink emanated, as it did from the building itself.

"The place had been subjected to a bombardment; all the windows were smashed out, and one door lay flat on the ground; the other hung by a single hinge only, and we had no difficulty in entering. The soldier had a pocket-lamp, and he struck a light by means of flint and tinder, a contrivance which is still in use in Russia. The body of a huge man lay at the foot of the stairs. He was nearly naked, and much decayed; and we could not tell if he had been friend or foe. The whole place was in much confusion. There had evidently been hand to hand fighting in all the rooms; and upstairs there were the remains of about a dozen men heaped together in the apartment where the two corpses first noticed were hanging out of the window. All were in an advanced state of decay, and must have been dead weeks, if not months. The horrible fetor of the

place was unendurable, and we were glad to return into the fresh air, the soldier being greatly upset. I thought it advisable to return and report before making a further search of the house and its environs; and Folstoffle decided to wait until the morning before examining the neighborhood.

"The spot where this discovery was made was between Klodava and Krasuyvice. No doubt there had been fighting all over this district, but none of those composing our party had taken a part in it. In the morning we found nearly a hundred bodies scattered about, and lying in two heaps in what appeared to have been the garden and orchard of the farm: but the place was completely wrecked. The sight was, on a small scale, as dreadful as any I witnessed during the war. Many of the dead were skeletons, or nearly so: animals, probably dogs and pigs, had been at work on others; and all were pretty well in the last stage of putridity. Many retained the positions in which they had died and stiffened.

"One man, with no eyes left in the sockets of his skull, was holding one arm straight up in the air; another had both arms and legs raised as he lay on his back—a position which would have been comical if it had not been so dreadful and tragical. In one heap were two men clasping each other in what had evidently been a death struggle. Another still grasped the bayonet with which he had killed a foe: and an officer had his sword raised and his mouth wide open as if giving an order at the instant of his death. The appearance of all was so extremely ghastly that it cannot be described. Though mostly covered with snow I saw many faces which were blue, green, black

in hue, and had lost all resemblance to human features.

"Russians and Germans lay there in about equal proportions; and there we were compelled to leave them: for we had no tools, nor was the ground in a condition for rapid grave-digging. There may have been more bodies in some of the neighboring ravines and woods; but we had no time to look for them. From what I afterwards saw, I have no doubt that the dead were often left unburied; a dreadful thing, for there is always a host of ravenous dogs in Russian villages; and as many of these were now ownerless, they had run wild. Besides these there were wild boars and wolves, always ready to take toll of the battlefield; to say nothing of the crow and the raven.

"Folstoffle's orders had been to return before midday on the 23rd; but it was after that hour before we turned to rejoin our main body. About four o'clock we met a section coming to look for us, as Colonel Krastnovitz had become anxious.

"The object of the reconnaissance was said to be accomplished; we had found that there were no enemies in that district; or, at any rate, in our immediate neighborhood; and this information was corroborated by that of half a sotnia of Cossacks, who, it seems, had been acting in conjunction with us, though we had seen nothing of them since starting on our little expedition.

"But our leaders must have had a belief that the enemy was at hand: for we received orders to fall back on our deserted village, and put it into a state of defense, which we did by loopholing what remained of the walls, and digging trenches round the outskirts."



© Underwood and Underwood.

A British Convoy on the Road near St. Omer

THE SIEGE OF KUT

The British Garrison Gave Up the Defense Only When Starvation Broke Down Their Endurance

FROM time to time in their long battle history, soldiers of the British Empire have withstood bitter and wasting sieges. It is a tradition of British military honor that a defended garrison shall not be surrendered while there remains even a forlorn hope of fighting out or being relieved—let the suffering and cost of holding out be what they may. There are amazing instances of the stubborn refusal to surrender, in spite of death and famine, and the final relief when nerves were at cracking tension.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Mohammedans Discussing the Military Situation During the Siege of Kut-el-Amara

But there are instances, too, when, endurance and hope alike exhausted, there has been the heart-break of hoisting the white flag. Kut, in Mesopotamia, with its 8,070 British and Indian troops, was one of these. Buchan tells the story briefly, but fully enough. He says:

"The garrison had fought a most arduous campaign during the preceding summer, and they had just finished the march to Ctesiphon,

the battle, and the feverish retreat. For weeks already they had been living on poor rations and enduring the extreme fatigue of which the human body is capable. All December they had been bombarded, and had repulsed repeated attacks. There were many wounded and much sickness. But the spirit of the little force never flagged, and they set themselves to make the best of the wretched Arab town and their intolerable conditions. On the ground by the liquorice factory they played a kind of cricket and hockey, as long as their strength permitted them, and they tried to supplement their stores by fishing in the river. The gentle art of Izaak Walton was never pursued under stranger circumstances.

"From the first day of 1916 onward Townshend's main task was to fight famine. The enemy shelled the place nearly every night with heavy guns, and there were destructive bombing raids by Turkish airplanes; but starvation was the grimmest foe. At first there was plenty of horse meat. On January 24th a large store of grain was discovered; but it could not be ground till millstones were dropped by our aircraft. General Townshend set about planting vegetable seeds to provide some relief from the scurvy that was threatening. On February 5th each British soldier was receiving a twelve-ounce loaf of mixed barley and atta, a few dates and groceries, and one pound of horse meat; and each Indian a pound of flour and a small allowance of turmeric, chillies, and ginger. By this time the place had run out of rice and sugar, and there was only milk for ten days in the hospital. In the first week of March the flour ration was reduced, and after Aylmer's failure at Dujailah there was a further reduction all round. On April 8th the mill had to stop working for want of fuel, and hunger began in dead earnest.

TO ESCAPE BY SWIMMING

"After April 20th many of the Arabs, with starvation in front of them, tried to escape down the river by swimming. There had all

along been a desperate scarcity of tobacco, though cigarettes used to be dropped by airplanes, and towards the end men were smoking as substitutes lime leaves, ginger, and baked tea-dregs. Even in January English tobacco was selling at eight shillings an ounce. Soon all the horses and mules had gone. One of the last to be slaughtered was an Indian mule, which had been in three frontier campaigns, and which the butcher twice refused to kill.

HOPES OF RELIEF

"On February 14th the King had sent a message of thanks and encouragement to General

AFTER 143 DAYS

"The end came on April 29th. At 11:40 a. m. Townshend sent out a wireless message: 'Have destroyed my guns, and most of my munitions are being destroyed; an officer has gone to Khalil, who is at Madug, to say we are ready to surrender. I must have some food here, and cannot hold on any more. Khalil has been told to-day, and a deputation of officers has gone on a launch to bring food from *Julnar*, ship sent night April 24th, to carry supplies to garrison Kut.'

"A little later he wired: 'Have hoisted the



The Bridge Across the Tigris

Structural steel has not yet reached its maximum usefulness in Mesopotamia.

Townshend, who had replied cheerfully by wireless. The garrison, almost to the end, believed that they would be relieved. The floods did not affect them greatly, for Kut stands on slightly higher ground than the rest of the plain; they were even an advantage, since they compelled the Turks to withdraw their lines a considerable distance. But about the middle of April, when all the troops were weak with famine, even the stoutest heart had to recognize that the limits of endurance had been reached. The last effort of Goringe was to try to break the blockade with a river steamer, the *Julnar*, on April 24th. It was a hopeless task, since the boat had to run the gauntlet of the enemy guns on a winding river against a strong flood, and she went ashore four miles east of the town.

white flag over Kut fort and town, and the guards will be taken over by a Turkish regiment, which is approaching. I shall shortly destroy wireless. The troops go at 2 p. m. to camp near Shumvass.' It was a very weary and broken force which laid down their arms: the remnant of the historic 6th (Poona) Division, which had begun with a year of unbroken conquests—together with a number of British Territorials. Before surrender the troops occupying the first lines had been too weak to march back with their kits, and had held their position for a fortnight. In all, the garrison at the date of Kut's fall consisted of 2,070 British troops of all ranks, and some 6,000 native troops of the Indian army.

"The Turks, after their fashion, behaved

with chivalry and decency. Khalil, their commander, treated General Townshend with extreme respect, in view of his gallant resistance. The sick and wounded were sent downstream to Gorringe, and food and tobacco were at once distributed. Townshend and his staff were taken to Constantinople, and the rest to internment in an Anatolian camp.

"Kut had resisted for 143 days—a fine record

when we consider the condition of Townshend's force at the beginning of the siege. It shared with Przemyśl the distinction of being the only place in the war which was taken by blockade; but, unlike Przemyśl, its surrender brought no stigma to the garrison. They resisted to the utmost limits of human endurance, and officers and men shared the same hardships. Its fall was a misfortune, but not a disaster."

"GASSED"

Pierre Loti's Description of the Awful Agonies of the First Victims of Germany's Use of Poison Gas as a Weapon of Warfare

AFTER the so-called "first gas attack" by the Germans in the second battle of Ypres (April, 1915) the press of the world was filled with accounts of the awful agony to which poison gas, the new German weapon of warfare, subjected those who inhaled it. The description of its effects printed here is from the pen of Pierre Loti, one of France's most eminent writers:

"A place of horror which one would think Dante had imagined. The air is heavy—stifling; two or three little night lamps, which look as if they were afraid of giving too much light, hardly pierce the hot, smoky darkness which smells of fever and sweat. Busy people are whispering anxiously. But you hear, more than all, agonized gaspings. These gaspings escape from a number of little beds drawn up close together on which are distinguished human forms, above all, chests, chests that are heaving too strongly, too rapidly, and that raise the sheets as if the hour of the death rattle had already come.

"It is one of our hospitals on the battle line, improvised as well as was possible on the morrow of one of the most infernal of German abominations; all these children of France, who look as if they are at the last gasp, were so terribly injured that it was impossible to carry them further away. This great hall, with its crumbling walls, was yesterday a storehouse of hogsheads of champagne; these little beds—some fifty in number—were put together in feverish haste, made of branches that still keep their bark, and look like rustic garden furniture.

"But why this heat, which the stoves send forth and which makes breathing almost impossible? The reason is that it cannot be too hot for asphyxiated lungs. And this darkness, why this darkness which gives an air of the inferno to this place of martyrdom, and which must so hinder the gentle, white-clad nurses? It is because the barbarians are there in their burrows, quite close to this village, whose houses and church tower they have more than once amused themselves by pounding with their shells, and if, with their ever-watchful field glasses, they saw in this sad, November twilight the lights appearing in the windows of a long hall, they would instantly scent a field hospital and shells would rain on the humble sick beds; we have learned how they love to sprinkle grapeshot on hospitals, Red Cross convoys, churches!

"So that one can hardly see here through a sort of mist, spread by water boiling in heaters. Every moment nurses bring huge, black air balloons, and those who are struggling in agony stretch out their poor hands to beg for them; it is oxygen which makes them breathe better and suffer less. Many of them have these black air balloons resting on their panting chests, and in their mouths they greedily hold the tubes through which the saving gas escapes; you would say that they were great children with milk bottles; this throws a sort of grotesque buffoonery over these scenes of horror.

SOME OF THE EFFECTS OF GAS

"Asphyxiation has different effects on different constitutions which require different forms of treatment. Some of the men, almost

naked on their beds, are covered with blisters or smeared all over with tincture of iodine. There are others—these, alas, are the most seriously injured—who are all swollen, chests, arms, and faces, and who look like India rubber dolls blown up. India rubber dolls, children with nursing bottles! Although these are the only true images it seems almost sacrilegious to employ them when anguish weighs upon your heart and you long to weep, to weep for pity and to weep for wrath! Yet let these comparisons, brutal as they are, engrave themselves deep in our memories by their very strangeness, so that they may the longer nourish indignant hatred and the thirst of holy retribution!

"For there is a man who spent years in preparing all this for us, and this man continues to live. He lives, and as remorse is without doubt unknown to his vulture soul he does not even suffer, unless it be from fury at having failed in his attempt. Before unchaining death upon the world he had coldly made his combinations, foreseeing everything. 'If, however,' he said to himself, 'my rhinoceros-like rushes and my huge apparatus of murder should in the impossible case hurl themselves against a too magnificent resistance, then, perhaps, I should dare, relying on the poltroonery of the neutrals; I should dare, perhaps, to affront all the laws of civilization and to employ other means. In any case, let us prepare.'

"The great rush, in fact, did fail, and timidly at the beginning, fearful, in spite of all, of the whole world's disgust, he tried asphyxiation, after having justified himself, of course, by his habitual lies, accusing France of having made the beginning. . . .

AWFUL TORTURES

"Our dear soldiers with burned lungs, gasping on their little rustic beds, are very grateful when, following the doctor, you come close to them, and they raise their gentle eyes to you when you take them by the hand. Here is one swollen like a balloon, unrecognizable, doubtless, for those who had only seen him before this frightful swelling began, and, if you touch even as lightly as possible his poor, distended cheeks, you feel under your fingers the vibration of the gases which have filtered in between skin and flesh.

"'Good; he is better since this morning,' says the doctor, and he continues in a low voice, for the nurse: 'I begin to think, Madame, we shall save this one also; but you must not leave him for a moment.' Oh, needless advice, for she has not the slightest intention of leaving him,

this white-clad nurse, under whose eyes there are already dark shadows caused by eight-and-forty hours of truceless watching. Not one of them will be left, no; to be certain of that one has only to look at all these young doctors, at these orderlies, a little worn out, it is true, but so attentive and courageous that they do not lose sight of one of them.

"And, thank God, they will save almost all of them! (Of 600 asphyxiated that night more than 500 are out of danger.) As soon as they can be moved they will be taken away from this hell of the battle front, where the Kaiser's shrapnels fall so willingly, even on the dying; they will be laid more comfortably in quiet hospitals where they will still suffer much, indeed, for a week, a fortnight, a month, but which they will presently leave, more cautious, more prudent, and eager to return to the fight.

"It may be said that the trick of asphyxiation has failed like that of the great, savage rushes; it has not brought the result which the Gorgon's head expected. And yet with what skillful calculations it has been tried on each occasion, always at the most favorable moments! We know that the Germans, masters of spying and ceaselessly informed of everything, never fail to choose for their attacks of whatever kind the days of relieving guard, the hours when newcomers, facing them, are still in the disorder of their arrival.

BRUTALITY CRYING FOR VENGEANCE

"So the evening when this last crime was committed six hundred of our men had just taken their advance position after a long and tiring march; all at once, in the midst of a salvo of shrapnel which aroused them from their first sleep, they made out here and there little sounds of whistling, as if from treacherous steam sirens, and the death gas was pouring around them, spreading its thick, gloomy, gray clouds. At the same time, in the midst of this fog, their lights waned to dim, small points. Bewildered, then, already suffocating, they thought, too late, of the masks which had been given them and which, besides, they did not greatly believe in; they put them on too awkwardly, some of them even, by an irresistible instinct of self-preservation, when they felt the burning of their lungs, yielded to the desire to run, and these were the most terribly injured because of the excess of chlorine inhaled in the deep breaths of running.

"But the next time they will not be caught, neither of these men, nor any of our soldiers; with masks hermetically sealed they will stand

immovable around heaps of fagots prepared beforehand, the sudden flames of which neutralize the poisons in the air, and there will be no result beyond an hour of discomfort, painful to pass through but almost always without fatal consequences. . . .

"Our poor, asphyxiated soldiers, gasping on their narrow cots, how willingly I would have shown them to all, to their fathers, to their

sons, to their brothers, to raise to paroxysm their holy indignation and thirst for vengeance; yes, I would show them everywhere, and let their death rattle be heard, even to the impassive neutrals, to convince of their folly or their crime so many obstinate pacifists, to spread broadcast the alarm against the great barbarism which has broken forth over Europe!"

THE LIBERATION OF JERUSALEM

The Quiet and Dignified Entry of General Allenby into the Holy City While a Picturesque Throng Looked On

AFTER the spectacular victories which opened his campaign in Palestine, General E. H. H. Allenby, commanding the British forces operating against the Turks in the Holy Land, entered the holy city of Jerusalem on December 11, 1917. His entry, an epoch-making event in history, was absolutely without pomp. The British commander was on foot and the whole ceremony was conducted in a quiet and matter-of-fact way that was essentially English.

The simple procession, the joy of the populace, and the historical significance of the event were clearly brought home to readers in the dispatch written from the Holy City on the day of its capture by W. T. Massey, a war correspondent with Allenby's Army. In this dispatch he said:

"Jerusalem, Dec. 11, 1917.

"Four centuries of Ottoman dominion over the Holy City of Christians and Jews and 'the sanctuary' of Mohammedans has ended, and Jerusalem the Golden, the central site of sacred history, is liberated for Christians and Moslems alike from the thralldom of the Turk. War has removed the Holy City from the sphere of the Turk's blighting influence, but, though there was the sound of the bitter clash of arms around it, no British bullet or shell was directed against the walls. An epoch-making victory, which will stir the emotions of countless millions of Christians and Moslems throughout the world, has been achieved without so much as a stone being scratched or an inch of soil destroyed, and the sacred monuments and everything in Jerusalem connected with the Great Healer and His

teachings are being passed on to future generations untouched by our Army's hand. In none of her previous seventeen captures has the City of Jerusalem escaped absolutely unscathed, and it is to the glory of British arms that this most venerated place on earth should come through the ordeal of battle unharmed by even the disturbance of a particle of its ancient dust. . . .

ALLENBY'S ENTRY INTO THE HOLY CITY

"I write this after witnessing the official entry of General Allenby, his staff, and the military commanders of the detachments of French and Italian troops. It was a ceremony fully worthy of the cause for which we are fighting. In this hallowed spot, whence the Saviour's preaching of peace on earth and goodwill toward men was spread through the world, there was no great pageantry of arms, no display of the pomp and circumstance of a victorious army. The Commander in Chief and a small staff, a guard of less than 150 all told of Allied troops, a quiet ceremonial of reading the proclamation of military law and of a meeting with the notables of the city and the heads of the religious bodies, and the official entry was over. There were no thunderous salutes to acclaim the world-stirring victory, which will have its place in the chronicles of all time.

"No flags were hoisted, and there was no enemy flag to haul down. There were no soldier shouts of triumph over a defeated foe, but just a short military procession into Mount Zion, a portion of the city 200 yards from the walls, and out of it.

"The ceremony was full of dignity and simplicity, though it was also full of meaning. It



© Underwood and Underwood.

General Allenby Entering Jerusalem

The British commander's official entry into the Holy City was without military pomp or ceremony. Allenby led his staff on foot through the City gate and took formal possession with an Anglo-Saxon simplicity that allayed the fears and won the hearts of the people.

was a purely military act, with a minimum of military display, but its significance was not lost on the population, who saw in it the end of an old régime and the beginning of a new era of freedom and justice for all classes and creeds. No bells in the ancient belfries rang, no *Te Deums* were sung, no preacher came forth to point the moral to the multitude, but right down in the hearts of the people, who cling to Jerusalem with the deepest reverence and piety, there was unfeigned delight that the old order had given place to the new. . . .

"Between the offer to surrender and the formal acceptance there was sharp fighting in the outskirts of Jerusalem, the Turks fighting more stubbornly than at any period of these operations, and meeting the bayonet with bayonet. London troops were sent to the north of the city, and as they debouched from the defile they were heavily attacked by Turks lining the ridge, and a strong machine-gun fire was poured into them from the Mount of Olives. The ridge was carried by a superb bayonet charge, and by noon the Turks were pushed back so far that we occupied ground 7,000 yards north of the city walls. Welsh troops were operating from the south and east, and drove the Turks down the Jericho road.

ALLENBY'S WELCOME

"This was the military position on Dec. 9, at noon. Through the suburbs the people flocked into the highway and welcomed the Commander-in-Chief's representative by the time-immemorial method of clapping hands, while old women and girls threw flowers and palm leaves on the road. The ceremony of surrendering the city was very brief. The General gave the Mayor instructions for the maintenance of order, and had guards placed over the public buildings outside the Holy City, but no soldier of the King passed within the walls that day. Though the sound of guns had hardly ceased, the people were left secure and happy. The Turk was driven further northward and eastward on Dec. 10, otherwise the situation was unchanged today, when, at high noon, we had the unforgettable picture of the Commander-in-Chief's official entry.

"It was a picturesque throng. From the outskirts of Jerusalem the Jaffa road was crowded with people, who flocked westward to greet the conquering General. Somber-clad youths of all nationalities, Armenians and Greeks, stood side by side with Moslems, dressed in the brighter raiment of the East. The predominance of tarbush in the streets added to the brightness

of the scene. It was obvious that they regarded the day as an important occasion, for they wore their best robes, and I saw many of them abandon their natural reserve and join in the vocal expression of welcome."

CHEERING CROWDS IN THE STREETS

Genuine pleasure was evinced by the crowd at Allenby's approach, declares Massey. The usually stolid Arabs, even, showed signs of real joy. There were cries of "Bravo!" and "Hurrah!" In short, the welcome had nothing artificial about it; the correspondent tells of seeing three old Mohammedans with tears of joy streaming down their cheeks, clapping their hands, too deeply moved to utter a sound.

"General Allenby entered the town on foot. Outside the Jaffa Gate he was received by the Military Governor and a guard of honor formed by men who have done their full share in the campaign. Drawn up on the right of the gate were 110 men from the English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh counties who were fighting for the right yesterday. Opposite them were fifty men afoot, representing the Australian and New Zealand horsemen, who have been engaged in the Empire's work in the Sinai Desert and Palestine almost since the war burst upon the world. Inside the walls were twenty French and twenty Italian troops from the detachments sent by their countries to take part in the Palestine operations. Close by the Jaffa Gate, whose iron doors are rarely opened, is the wide breach made in the old walls to permit the Kaiser's entry when he was visiting Jerusalem in 1898. This was not used for today's historic procession, General Allenby entering by the ancient gate which is known to the Arabs as 'The Friend.'

"Inside the walls was a crowd more densely packed in the narrow streets than outside, but fully as enthusiastic. The Commander-in-Chief, preceded by his aides-de-camp, had on the right the commander of the French detachment and on his left the commander of the Italian detachment. Following were the Italian, French, and American Military Attachés and a few members of the General Staff. The guards of honor marched in the rear. The procession turned to the right into Mount Zion and halted at the El Kala Citadel. On the steps at the base of the Tower of David, which was standing when Christ was in Jerusalem, the

proclamation of military law was read in four languages in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief and many notables of the city. It was as follows:

ALLENBY'S PROCLAMATION


To the Inhabitants of Jerusalem the Blessed and the People Dwelling in its Vicinity:

The defeat inflicted upon the Turks by the troops under my command has resulted in the occupation of your city by my forces. I, therefore, here now proclaim martial law, under

monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer of whatsoever form of the three religions will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faith they are sacred.

Guardians have been established at Bethlehem and on Rachel's Tomb. The tomb at Hebron has been placed under exclusive Moslem control.

The hereditary custodians at the gates of the Holy Sepulcher have been requested to take up



Southern Palestine and Philistia

which form of administration it will remain so long as military considerations make necessary.

However, lest any of you be alarmed by reason of your experience at the hands of the enemy who has retired, I hereby inform you that it is my desire that every person should pursue his lawful business without fear of interruption.

Furthermore, since your city is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many centuries, therefore do I make it known to you that every sacred building,

their accustomed duties in remembrance of the magnanimous act of the Caliph Omar who protected that church.

"While the proclamation was being read guns were booming to the east and north, and droning airplane engines in the deep blue vault overhead told of our flying corps denying passage for observers in enemy machines to witness an event which gladdened the hearts of all Jerusalem. Reforming, the procession moved up Zion Street to the Barrack Square, where General Allenby received the notables and heads of the religious communities. . . . The presentations over, the procession returned to the Jaffa Gate, and General Allenby left Jerusalem. Thus

ended a simple and impressive ceremonial, the effect of which is far-reaching.

THANKFUL INHABITANTS

"I was talking in David Street when a Jewish woman, seeing that I was English, came up

want, caught me by the hand and said, 'God has delivered us. Oh, how happy we are!' This was uttered with whole-hearted fervor. An American worker in the hospital who knows the people well assured me that there was not one person in Jerusalem who in his heart was not devoutly thankful for our victory. He told



© Underwood and Underwood.

Advance Dressing Station for the British Forces in Palestine

This station was near the front lines and was built in dugout style, well barricaded by piles of sandbags to protect against enemy fire.

and said: 'We have prayed for this day. To-day I shall sing "God save the gracious King! Long live our noble King!" We have been starving, but now we are liberated and free.' The woman clasped her hands across her breast as she said this and repeated, 'This is our day of liberation!' An elderly man in a black robe, whose pinched face told of a long period of

me that on the day we captured Nebi Samwil three wounded Arab officers were brought to the hospital. One of them who spoke English said, 'I can hip, hip, hurrah for England now.' The officer was told to be careful, as there were Turkish wounded inside, but he replied that he did not care, and in his unrestrained joy he called out: 'Hurrah for England!' . . ."

The Swiss system of universal military training divides the Swiss militia into three classes according to age. Men from twenty to thirty-two years form the *élite*, or first class. The next group, the *landwehr*, are men between thirty-three and forty. Men from forty to forty-eight form the reserve. Sanitary, transportation and veterinary first year classes attend recruiting schools for sixty days, the infantry for sixty-five days, artillery and fortress troops seventy-five days and cavalry ninety days. After the first year the *élite* serve eleven days annually. All branches of the *landwehr*, except cavalry, serve eleven days every four years.

FURIOUS FIGHT AT FORT DE VAUX

A French Officer's Vivid Word Picture of His Experiences During a Terrible Bombardment at the Battle of Verdun

THE fighting around Verdun during the terrific German attacks on that city in 1916 reached a ferocity hitherto unparalleled in the war. Ground was fought for inch by inch, soaked in the blood of assailants and defenders, taken and retaken in a fury of death and destruction. One of the points deemed especially important in the defenses of the city was Fort de Vaux; it was captured by the Germans after a desperate struggle, waged hand to hand even to the innermost parts of the stronghold. The letter reproduced below was written by a French officer who helped defend Vaux on the day before it fell to the enemy:

"We had scarcely arrived at the right of Fort de Vaux, on the slope of the ravine, when there came an unprecedented bombardment of twelve hours. Alone, in a sort of dugout without walls, I pass twelve hours of agony, believing that it is the end. The soil is torn up, covered with fresh earth by enormous explosions. In front of us are not less than 1,200 guns of 240, 305, 380, and 420 caliber, which spit ceaselessly and all together, in these days of preparation for attack. These explosions stupefy the brain; you feel as if your entrails were being torn out, your heart twisted and wrenched; the shock seems to dismember your whole body. . . . And then the wounded, the corpses!

"Never had I seen such horror, such hell. I felt that I would give everything if only this would stop long enough to clear my brain. Twelve hours alone, motionless, exposed, and no chance to risk a leap to another place, so closely did the fragments of shell and rock fall in hail all day long. At last, with night, this diminished a little. I can go on into the woods! The shells still burst all around us, but their infernal din no longer makes any impression on me—a queer trait of the human temperament. After that we are lodged in fortified caves where we pass five days in seclusion, piled

on top of each other, without being able to lie down.

"I bury three comrades in a shell hole. We are without water, and, with hands that have just touched the poor mangled limbs, we eat as if nothing were wrong.

ACROSS THE BARRAGE FIRE

"We are taken back for two days into a tunnel where the lacrymal shells make us weep. Swiftly we put on our masks. The next day, at the moment of taking supper and retiring to rest, we are hastily called into rank; that's it—we are going to the motion-picture show. We pass through an infernal barrage fire that cracks red all around in the dark. We run with all speed, in spite of our knapsacks, into the smother of broken branches that used to be a forest. Scarcely have we left a hole or a ditch when shells as big as a frying pan fall on the spot. We are laid flat by one that bursts a few yards away. So many of them fall at one time that we no longer pay any attention to them. We tumble into a ravine which we have named Death Ravine. That race over shell-swept, open country, without trenches, we shall long remember.

"At last we enter the village—without suspecting that the Germans are there! The commanding officer scatters us along the steep hill to the left and says: 'Dig holes quickly; the Boches are forty yards away!' We laugh and do not believe him; immediately, cries, rifle shots in the village; our men are freeing our colonel and captain, who were already prisoners. . . . Impossible! Then there are no more Frenchmen there? In two minutes the village is surrounded, while the German batteries get a rude jolt. It was time! All night long you hear tools digging from one end to the other; trenches are being made in haste, but secretly. After that there is a wall, and the Germans will advance no further.

"The next morning a formidable rumor—the Boches are coming up to assault Fort de Vaux.



From Drawing by Walter Hale.

"Little Venice" on the Meuse—The Havoc Wrought by One Shell

The newspapers have told the facts; our 75s firing for six hours, the German bodies piling up in heaps. Horrible! but we applauded. Everybody went out of the trenches to look. The Yser, said the veterans, was nothing beside this massacre.

"GERMAN CHIEFS MUST BE HANGMEN"

"That time I saw Germans fleeing like madmen. . . . The next day, the same thing over again; they have the cynicism to mount a battery on the slope; the German chiefs must be hangmen to hurl their troops to death that way in masses and in broad daylight. All af-

ternoon, a maximum bombardment; a wood is razed, a hill ravaged with shell holes. It is maddening; continuous salvos of 'big chariots'; one sees the 380s and 420s falling; a continuous cloud of smoke everywhere. Trees leap into air like wisps of straw; it is an unheard-of spectacle. It is enough to make you lose your head, yet we patiently wait for the outcome.

"WE WILL ALL FIGHT TILL WE DIE"

"The barrage fire cuts our communication with the rear, literally barring off the isthmus of Death Ravine. If the attacks on our wings succeed, our two regiments are prisoners,

hemmed in, but the veterans (fathers of families) declare that we shall not be taken alive, that we will all fight till we die. It is sublime.

"Keep up your courage, coolness, and morale, boys, and we will drive them back in good time."

"It is magnificent to see that our last recourse is a matter of sheer will; despite this monstrous machinery of modern war, a little moral effort, a will twenty years old that refuses to weaken, suffices to frustrate the offensive! The rifles do not shoot enough, but we have machine guns, the bayonet, and we have vowed that they shall not pass. Twenty times the alarm is given; along the hillside one sees the hands gripping the rifles; the eyes are a little wild, but show an energy that refuses to give way.

"Suddenly it is already night. A sentinel runs up to the outposts: 'There they are! Shoot!'

"A whole section shoots. But are the outposts driven in? Nobody knows. I take my rifle to go and see. I do not catch a ball. I find the sentinels flat on their faces in their holes, and run to the rear gesticulating and crying out orders to cease firing. The men obey. I return to the front, and soon, a hundred yards away, I see a bush scintillate with a rapid line of fire. This time it is they. Ta-ca-ta-ca, bzzi—bzzi. I hold my fire until they approach, but the welcome evidently does not please them, for

they tumble back over the ridge, leaving some men behind. One wounded cries 'Frantchmen!'

"I am drunk, mad. Something moves in the bushes to the right; I bound forward with set bayonet. It is my brave Sergeant, who has been out to see whether the Boches have all run away. . . . These are truly the most interesting moments of war; no longer the waiting, the anguish of bombardment, but the thrill of a free march into a glorious unknown—oh, that intoxication! I sing the *Marseillaise*, the boys jubilate, all the successive attacks have failed. After this evening the offensive is going to slacken for several days.

"The next day we are relieved at last. Another race with death, this time with broad daylight shining upon the horrible chaos, the innumerable dead, and a few wounded here and there. Oh! those mangled bodies, still unburied, abandoned for the moment. The danger excites us. A shell falls squarely among us, jarring us and bathing us in flame. My knapsack gets a sliver of hell; I am not touched; it is a miracle. In the evening we arrive at the ford of D. and have another race. The next day, at Verdun, the Germans are still shelling us at the moment when we mount the auto trucks. In the course of all these actions our losses certainly have been high, but they are nothing compared with the frightful and unimaginable hecatomb of Germans I have witnessed."

IN THE CRADLE OF THE WORLD

In the Footsteps of Tommy Atkins Among the Ancient Cities of Mesopotamia, Where Bible History was Made

THE British in Mesopotamia fought amid ruins of cities that were great and opulent before history began to be recorded. They traversed the legendary site of the Garden of Eden. Where they trod Babylon and Nineveh once stood. Names famed in Biblical history met Tommy Atkins on every hand.

In an article entitled "Mesopotamia; the Land Between the Rivers," which appeared in the *Cornhill Magazine* while the British were still campaigning in these regions of hoary antiquity, Major General Sir George MacMunn wrote interestingly of the historic

ground over which Briton and Turk were fighting.

"All England," he said, "knows about Mesopotamia, and a place called Kut; and a goal called Bagdad, and a hot place they pronounce Basra. They know also just a few vignettes from the history of what is now getting on for three years. The early glories of Shaiba, the quick turned triumph and quicker tragedy of Ctesiphon, and the long-drawn agony of Townshend's Kut.

"Some inkling perhaps they have of that period of building by Sir Percy Lake and Gen-

eral Maude. The forming of a large marine, the assembling of railway material, the eternal quarrel with marsh and flood and sandbank. But the real Mesopotamia, 'the miles and miles and miles,' through which Atkins is for the nonce tramping, as tramped Greek and Roman legions, back in the ages, is, as yet, unsung. And yet fate and prophecy bid fair to ordain that the English shall know something more of Mesopotamia, that historic 'land between the

ments that date from the captivity take heart of grace and tender for contracts and peddle tinned salmon and cigarettes for Atkins.

TIME SETS ITS MODERN STAMP UPON THE ANCIENT

"The population of this great seafaring port is a mixed one. Jewish, Greek, and Chaldean traders jostle for the business of war. Kurd and Arab, Lur and Bakhtiari labor and build



© Underwood and Underwood.

In Mesopotamia with the British

This British official photograph taken at Zahroom shows the famous native silversmiths at work.

rivers,' which men also call Turkish Arabia. . . .

"Into the Turk-clogged progress-desiring port of Basra has come the daily increasing activity of a large military base, which must, however, usurp all use of the port till war be done. The improvements for war purposes are, however, chiefly those that are needed in peace, save perhaps that time the future works are built with speed rather than durability as governing factor. Wharves, waterworks, electric lighting, metaled roads, bridges, dockyards spring up on all sides, and the great Jew settle-

and garden. It is a bustling population, for the flourishing date gardens at all times bring trade and shipping, and the 'Tree of Life' feeds and finds fuel and building material for tens of thousands.

"To the medley of peoples, the British have added many. Every race in India has contributed to the army, and with them also negro troops and watermen from the West Indies, and Chinese artisans to build huts and work in the dockyards. Roads and railways push up along the waterways. River steamers from the rivers of India and Burma, from the Irrawadi,

from the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra, chunk against the current of the Tigris.

"The Nile too has added to the gayety of rivers, and, if you please, County Council steamers have come under their own steam from Battersea to Basra, aye and Bagdad too, remarkably fine boats for their size. . . .

"To feed with all the munitions of war an army fighting five hundred miles away, and also feed the railways with material, this river fleet from the waterways of the Empire works all day and far into the night, and porters from the four corners of India and Africa load barges and unload ships for this, the real river war of history.

"And all the while the Tigris and the Euphrates roll on down to the sea, as they have rolled since Eden, to the almost historic days of the Deluge, since Abraham went north from Ur of the Chaldees, and Hammurabi ruled in Shinar, since the glory of Shumer and Accade, and the Empires of Shalmanesear, and Ashurbanipal and the hosts of Syria. The British rail along the Euphrates passes at the foot of the great pyramidal pile of brick at Ur, on which stood the Temple of the Moon. The great square bricks stand set in bitumen, many of them bearing in cuneiform the royal stamp of Nebuchadnezzar, the enthusiastic restorer of ancient temples. The temple pile remains eighty feet above the mounds of dust that cover the foundations of erstwhile prosperous Ur, the river port that ruled a tidal estuary.

"At Ur is to be seen one of those small cross checks on ancient history, which in one way or another is a feature of Mesopotamian archaeology. Among the layer of bricks firmly set in bitumen are to be found intact pieces of matting even as the reed matting of to-day. Old Herodotus records among those many minor details, which are a satisfying feature in his history, that the Chaldeans place matting in the bitumen setting of every tenth layer of bricks. It is pleasant with one's own eyes to be able to testify to the accuracy in detail of the late Mr. Herodotus.

"On the way from Kut to Bagdad the dreary embankments of dead and dry Babylonian canals close the horizon, and often have furnished ready-made entrenchments for belligerents. All the world knows how the British and Turks fought within sight of the great Arch of Ctesiphon, the Arch of the Hall of Audience of the Sassanian capital.

"The curse of the Bible prophets—their cities I will make into heaps—has been amply fulfilled in Mesopotamia. Babylon, Nineveh, War-ka Lagash, Eridhu, all are mere heaps of gray

dust, from which the spade alone extracts history. The Palace of Khosru almost alone stands as a ruin, in the usual acceptance of the word. The great Arch of Ctesiphon is modern as Mesopotamian history goes, a mere fifteen hundred years of existence, but it stands as it was built of foot-square bricks, set in the comparatively newly devised mortar that had replaced the bitumen. It stands a huge hall of one single arch and one of the great façades of its right front with it. High up in the walls, defying time as bravely as the brick work, lie great timbers that must be cedar of Lebanon, and perhaps the oldest woodwork extant. Among the ruined mud walls of the city site stand sandbagged gun emplacements and the empty tins of derelict bivouacs.

THE SITE OF SELEUCIA

"Opposite Ctesiphon, which the Turks call Suleiman Pak, lie the ruins of Seleucia, the great Greek capital, where Seleukos founded his dynasty on the death of his master Alexander, and moved the seat of Greek government from Babylon to the Tigris. Naught remains but heaps of dust and a mighty wall now cut by the Tigris immediately opposite Ctesiphon, and that curious sense of Greek dominion which stretches far over Asia to the Frontiers of Afghanistan and the Punjab itself. And over away from Seleucia a very few leagues lies the battlefield of Cunaxa where, a few centuries before Seleucia came into being, Xenophon started back over the mountains to distant Trebizond.

"In the midst of this shadow and presence of extreme antiquity, Atkins marches unconcerned, somewhat disturbed by Bible names that the Army has given to unnamed sites round Kut. It is desirable for artillery purposes to identify such mounds as may exist, but when these are officially called Sodom and Gomorrah, Atkins may be excused from writing home that he is in the midst of Bible scenes. . . ."

AEROPLANES AS AIDS TO RESEARCH

Wherever the British went in Mesopotamia, says General MacMunn, the soldiers found ancient bricks, coins and vases. Their trench spades turned up relics that would have delighted the heart of the archaeologist. And he tells this of this surprising and little-known result of modern warfare on the ancient plains:

"The aeroplanes themselves add to historic research in a manner hardly realized. The giant city sites of Assyria, acres of ruined fields, yield no plan to the wanderer therein, and even traverse and theodolite can hardly find the secrets of plan and design which the aeroplane photos map clearly. Lines of walls that are hardly visible on the flat show clearly to those above, and the ground plan of Opis and Samarah are becoming an open book.

names in use of the stars they march under are the names that the Chaldean astrologers gave them—so far away in the mist of time that human imagination almost fails to grasp the story.

"It is before the ancient stories that the Bible of the Captivity and the prophets are records but of yesterday. The Tombs of Ezekiel on the Euphrates, of Queen Esther and the prophet Daniel at Susa are extant shrines. On the



© Underwood and Underwood.

Desert Arabs Visiting Bagdad

The land watered by the Tigris and the Euphrates is peopled by strange tribes whose civilization is quite as primitive as it was two thousand years ago.

"The Assyrian and Chaldean blocks at the British Museum will have very different meaning to those who have motored to Babylon, flown over Nineveh, or climbed to the top of the Temple of the Moon at Ur of the Chaldees. . . ."

ANCIENT CHALDEA

Continuing his description of ancient Chaldea, he says:

"Such are the fascinating reflections that fill the minds of many, who realize that the very

lower Tigris, the most beautiful of all vignettes is the hedge-sparrow dome of the Tomb of Ezra, set in a small grove of palms for all the world to see. Jews of the Captivity fill every town and ply that gift of trade they learned in Babylon, and ancient rabbis step from old-world blocks. . . .

"Of Bagdad itself who may speak? It is literally the modern Babylon, built with bricks stolen therefrom, or from Seleucia and Ctesiphon and the dead cities of the plains, as Port Said is built from Tel Tennis, and as new cities



Lieut.-General Sir William R. Marshall, K. C. B.

General Maude's successor in command of the British forces in Mesopotamia.

from old, all the world over. Its dome and its minarets stand out among its palm groves from afar. A few of its mosques and vaulted khans date from Haroun-al-Raschid, but the city, though picturesque, is modern save for the bricks that lie under its whitewashed walls. They have seen Nebuchadnezzar in all his glory, yet the city they have built is upstart. The Great Gate of Murad, closed since the conqueror entered, was blown up by the Turks, perhaps lest the English should open it to enter by that way in solemn significance, the which is

not an Anglo-Saxon train, for the Anglo-Saxon rarely does anything of intention that is solemnly significant.

"Above Bagdad, where the army now waits what may befall, the ruin field is thick also. Nineveh lies ahead by Mosul, and Calneh of Assyria, and all that Assyria stood for in building and magnificence, changing to the memory of Greece and Rome. The Tomb of Julian the Apostate bears witness to one of Rome's failures on the Tigris. Though Vespasian penetrated to Shushan and the Diz, yet was Meso-

potamia always a scene of disaster to the Imperial troops, a land which overstrained endeavor. . . .

"Chaldea is full of Temple ruins. The dead course of the Nahrwan canal and its ghostly village mounds but wait the touch of the irrigation engineer. The Arabs bear many but

raise few, and a generation of dispensaries and kindly medical aid will populate the banks of the canals that are to be. Even those there be who dream of finding a real home for the long-stapled cotton, that other great want of modern economics, and one for wheat, that Herodotus guarantees to bear three hundredfold."

THE FRENCH LOUVAIN

German Cruelty in Senlis, Near Paris, Told By a Famous Spanish Writer
—Execution of the Mayor and Other Hostages by Invaders

THE little town of Senlis was one of the worst sufferers from the German invasion of France. The Germans brought to its peaceful streets destruction and murder. Fire swept through it, blood was spattered on its walls and roadways. Many times the story of its heroic mayor, shot by the invaders, has been told. Here is the story of a visit to Senlis, soon after its martyrdom, by Enrique Gómez Carrillo, a well-known Spanish journalist:

"We have arrived. . . .

"The municipal officer who receives us tells us with legal coldness what happened at the beginning of September. The tragic circumstances which placed a portion of communal power in his hands do not seem to have disturbed his provincial calm. The scarf he wears is still stained with blood, and traces of the terrible scenes enacted in his office are still visible. He, however, receives us as if we had come to ask him for a marriage certificate or a surveyor's valuation. And, to tell the truth, his simple, austere, and sober official dignity, far from shocking, pleases us. We feel at once that we shall not be told fantastic stories like those that some of the pre-prandial customers at the inn poured forth to us:

"'Ah, gentlemen,' said these worthy citizens, 'if you could have seen the horrors that took place here.'

"And, interrupting each other every moment, they spoke of old women burnt alive, of little girls mutilated, of men buried in the courtyards of their houses, of priests strung up by the heels even in the midst of their blazing churches."

Still keeping his calm, the town councillor told this story to the Spaniard and his companions:

"After the battle of Crépy-en-Valois, when the English troops entrusted with the defense of this district retired southwards, the town understood that it could offer no resistance, and began to make arrangements for surrender. The mayor, M. Odent, an upright and vigorous old man, in whom all had perfect confidence, was the first to resign himself to the painful sacrifice, without uttering useless lamentations. When a German colonel entered the town, M. Odent went out to meet him; he declared that the population, which was much reduced at the time because of the exodus of the richer element, would refrain from all hostile action against the conquerors. The colonel, a rough Prussian, asked if he had published a notice enjoining his fellow-citizens to refrain from all dangerous manifestations. As all the printing works were closed, such a notice had not been printed. At this moment shots were heard in the neighborhood.

"'The inhabitants are firing on our men,' cried the Prussian, and seizing his revolver, he added, threatening the official with it: 'If you move I will kill you.'

"Thereupon a Saxon patrol began to march through the streets seeking the notable citizens to take them as hostages; and as they did not know the people, they arrested all they met in an absurd manner, poor workmen and rich tradesmen alike. Three citizens who tried to hide in a tavern when they saw the Germans were at once shot as suspicious characters. The women, hearing what was going on, closed their windows and hid in their cellars or garrets.



Drawn by Walter Hale.

Senlis Cathedral on Sunday Morning

An officer who had been sent out of the town to see where the shots had come from, came back in a few minutes saying there had been an encounter between an English rearguard and a German advance guard.

"'Never mind,' said the colonel, 'I consider this an act provoked by the inhabitants, and I hold the town responsible. The Mayor and the hostages will be sent at once to headquarters.'

THE DEATH OF THE MAYOR

"This order was carried out. More than twenty of our citizens bound elbow to elbow, were marched to Chamant, preceded by our poor M. Odent. What happened there would be incredible if I had not heard it from those who survived the ordeal. An officer forced all the prisoners to lie down in the mud, and after hearing the report sent him by the colonel, gave orders to shoot a few of them on the spot. Another officer intervened, saying it would be better only to shoot the Mayor.

"On hearing these words the Mayor rose and declared that he was quite ready to die, his one request being that they should spare the other hostages, who had done no wrong. The officer who had proposed his death approached him and shot him dead with a revolver; then, by order of the general, five others were executed. The survivors remained lying on the ground, by the corpses of their comrades, until at nightfall they were released."

After that the Germans began to sack the unhappy town of Senlis.

"An Army doctor," continued the councillor, "who was billeted on the arch-priest of the cathedral, told the worthy abbé that his chief had determined to treat Senlis as they had treated Louvain. 'The pretext,' he said, 'is that the inhabitants fired on our soldiers; but the real object is to make an example and terrorize the invaded districts.' The arch-priest hastened to the Hôtel du Nord, where the general was lodged, and offered his own life to save his parishioners from the horrors of fire. The officer to whom he spoke jeered at him, and advised him to go to his church and pray for the souls of Joffre and Poincaré. The truth is that most of these Germans were drunk. Not content with what they found in the cellars of the town, they sent to the Château de Chamant, famous for its stock of old liqueurs, and got over a thousand bottles of old Cognac. As to cham-

pagne, the number of cases they took from the shops is simply incalculable. The officers went themselves to fetch these, and made the owners carry them to their quarters, generally giving them a kick or two as sole payment. The rank and file were content to loot the local taverns.

"Close by here, in the Rue de Paris, there was a rich owner of a wine shop, in whose house a group of Germans established themselves for two days, to eat and drink their fill. When there was nothing left, the drunkards flew into a rage; they killed the master, an unfortunate, called Simon, and wounded his servant, one Vaner. At another wine shop, a sergeant rode in on horseback and struck his head. When his comrades saw him covered with blood they fired at the mirrors, and tried to kill the owner of the shop, but fortunately he was able to escape.

"But the most terrible day was that on which they had to clear out of the town at the approach of our victorious troops. They set fire methodically to the houses where they had been quartered. You will see for yourselves what horrors. . . . And mingled with these horrors, as is always the case, there was something grotesque. On September 3rd, at about eight o'clock in the evening, some soldiers who were passing along the Rue Appont-au-Pain singing, imagined they saw some men lurking in the workroom of M. Durand, a tailor, ready to attack them. 'Go into the shop and hold up your hands,' they cried. The mysterious men never stirred. Then the soldiers began to fire, but the more they fired the more stoutly the men held their ground. At last a sergeant approached, sword in hand, and saw that his adversaries were merely the tailor's dummies. . . . There was a general laugh . . . but, alas! to avenge themselves for this irony of fate, the Germans set fire to the shop and killed the tailor. . . .

"The Press of the whole world has reported these murders, especially that of the Mayor. On the other hand I have not seen the slightest allusion to the unhappy beings who perished as living ramparts for the Germans. When they entered the town the German soldiers seized every one they met on the road, and made them march in front of them, so that they might be killed by the bullets of the French garrison. . . .

"Drinking, looting and burning are the elements of their campaign. In their frenzy they spare neither churches, convents nor homes. . . ."

NOT WAR, BUT BARBAROUS FRENZY

The Spanish writer and his companions wandered over the town, silent and blackened by fire. He continues his narrative thus:

"Whole streets are now mere tracks of desolation. Everything became the prey of the flames; the noble buildings which preserved the memory of the glorious days of the bishopric, the admirable monuments whose emblazoned walls were the pride of the whole district, all that was splendid, and with it all that was humble,

the little houses built with the fruits of years of patient economy, the almost rustic shops of the poorer quarters, everything, in short, which was within range of the incendiary bombs. But here the spectacle is even more dreadful than in other cities, for it is at once obvious that man, rather than cannon, has been the destructive agent; that not war, but the frenzy of the barbarous horde, is to blame. The army doctor told the arch-priest the truth. The Prussian generals had determined to leave an example in the plains of the Ile-de-France, no insignificant example like Courtacon; they decreed the mutilation of the beautiful ancient city, dear to the heart of the poet."

"BYNG'S BATTLE"

Dramatic Appearance of Britain's Squads of Tanks Before Cambrai in November, 1917, Graphically Described by Philip Gibbs

AMONG all the correspondents who reported the great battles of the war none attained greater popularity than Philip Gibbs, of the London *Daily Chronicle*, whose dispatches appeared in this country in the *New York Times*. Starting early in the war Gibbs wrote almost daily until the very end, covering the battle of the Somme, the heights about Vimy Ridge and Arras, and the Passchendaele Ridge, the dogged British stand to stem the German onrush of the spring of 1918, and the brilliant victories of the summer of that year which finally disposed of the Kaiser's armies. Gibbs's dispatches, filled with the breath of battle and a charm and chivalry peculiarly his own, were devoured by readers all over the world and gave their author an enviable reputation among his fellow-craftsmen. Below are parts of a typical Gibbs dispatch, chronicling the breaking of the Hindenburg line before Cambrai in November, 1917, by General Sir Julian Byng in the "Battle of the Tanks."

"The enemy yesterday (Nov. 20, 1917) had, I am sure, the surprise of his life on the Western front, where without any warning by ordinary preparations that are made before a battle, without any sign of strength in men and guns

behind the British front, without a single shot fired before the attack, and with his great belts of hideously strong wire still intact, the British troops suddenly assaulted him at dawn, led forward by great numbers of tanks, smashed through his wire, passed beyond to his trenches, and penetrated in many places the main Hindenburg line and the Hindenburg support line beyond.

"To my mind it is the most sensational and dramatic episode of this year's fighting, brilliantly imagined and carried through with the greatest secrecy. Not a whisper of it had reached men like myself, who are always up and down the lines, and since the secret of the tanks themselves, which suddenly made their appearance on the Somme last year, this is, I believe, the best-kept secret of the war. . . . How could the enemy guess, in his wildest nightmare, that a blow would be struck quite suddenly at that Hindenburg line of his—enormously strong in redoubts, tunnels, and trenches—and without any artillery preparation or any sign of gun power behind the British front?"

"The enemy had withdrawn many of his guns from this 'quiet' sector, and he did not know that during recent nights great numbers of tanks had been crawling along the roads toward Havrincourt and the British lines below Flesquières Ridge, hiding by day in the copses of this wooded and rolling country beyond Pé-

ronne and Bapaume. Indeed, he knew little of all that was going on before him under the cover of darkness.

GERMANS TAKEN BY SURPRISE

"Most of the prisoners say that the first thing they knew of the attack was when, out of the mist, they saw the tanks advancing upon them, smashing down their wire, crawling over their trenches and nosing forward with gunfire and machine-gun fire slashing from their sides.



Major-General Sir Julian Byng

"The Germans were aghast and dazed. Many hid down in their dugouts and tunnels, and then surrendered. Only the steadiest and bravest of them rushed to the machine guns and got them into action and used their rifles to snipe the British.

"Out of the silence which had prevailed behind the British lines a great fire of guns came upon the Germans. They knew they had been caught by an amazing stratagem, and they were full of terror. Behind the tanks, coming forward in platoons, the infantry swarmed, cheering and shouting, trudging through the thistles, while the tanks made a scythe of machine-gun

fire in front of them, and thousands of shells went screaming over the Hindenburg lines beyond.

"The German artillery made but a feeble answer. Their gun positions were being smothered by the fire of all the British batteries. There were not many German batteries, and the enemy's infantry could get no great help from them. They were caught, German officers knew they had been caught, like rats in a trap. It was their black day. . . .

DAYS WITHOUT SLEEP


"Standing on the battlefield, I heard from a young pilot a tale of his adventure in this battle, and all through his tale ran one refrain—it was his need of sleep. He spoke the word 'sleep' as if it were some spell word, holding all the beauty of life. For nine days and nights before the surprise at dawn he had been working to get his engine right, to get his guns right, to fix things up, as he said, speaking with a grim, worn look at the box of tricks by his side. Half an hour before he went over he was seen by the enemy in Havrincourt Château away on a hill in front of him by the white glare of the Verey lights. He had tried to stop every time the light went up, but they saw his movement and instantly a field gun opened on him. Its shooting was marvelous, and I saw how near the shells had fallen to the track of that tank. The young pilot was sitting outside his tank with his sergeant, but presently he said: 'I guess we'll get inside. This is getting too hot.'

"As they advanced to battle the pilot and sergeant and one other man were the only ones awake. All the rest were fast asleep—dead and drugged by sleep after their long ordeal.

"That seems to me the queerest thing I have heard in this battle—that and the experience of a tank which was hit twice by direct hits. The first shell burst inside the tank after passing between the arm and body of the pilot, and by an amazing chance did not wound a soul. Another shell came inside and again no one was hit.

"Later the officers and crew got out to deal with their tank, which had become stuck between two banks up by Havrincourt Village, while the enemy was still fighting there. Machine-gun bullets whipped round them like a swarm of wasps, but only one man was hit and he was only slightly touched.

"'It was a million to one chance each time,' said the pilot, 'a miracle which you can't count on again.' . . .



Sketch by Muthhead Bone.

"I'Enfant Terrible" of the Battlefeld

The tanks were one of the great surprises of the war and proved of immense value in offensive warfare.

Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

A DRAMA BEYOND IMAGINATION

"The drama was far beyond the most fantastic imagination. This attack on the Hindenburg line before Cambrai has never been approached on the Western front, and the first act began when the tanks moved forward before dawn toward the long, wide belts of wire, which they had to destroy before the rest could follow.

"These squadrons of tanks were led into action by the general commanding their corps, who carried his flag on his own tank—a most gallant man, full of enthusiasm for his monsters and their brave crews, and determined that this day should be theirs. To every officer and man of the tanks he sent this Order of the Day before the battle:

"The Tank Corps expects that every tank this day will do its damndest."

"They did. As the pilot of one of them told me, they 'played merry hell.' They moved forward in small groups, several hundreds of them, rolled down the German wire, trampled down its lines, and then crossed the deep gulf of the Hindenburg main line, pitching their noses downward as they drew their long bodies over the parapets, rearing up again with their long forward reach of body, and heaving themselves on to the ground beyond.

"The German troops knew nothing of the fate that awaited them until out of the gloom of dawn they saw these great numbers of gray inhuman creatures bearing down upon them. A German officer whom I saw today, one out of

thousands of prisoners who have been taken, described his own sensations. At first he could not believe his eyes. He seemed in some horrible nightmare and thought he had gone mad. After that from his dugout he watched all the tanks trampling about, crunching down the wire, heaving themselves across his trenches and searching about for machine-gun emplacements, while his men ran about in terror, trying to avoid the bursts of fire and crying out in surrender.

"Some of the German troops kept their nerve and served their machine guns, firing between the tanks at British infantry, but the tanks dealt with them and silenced them. Some of the German snipers fired at the British at a few yards and the infantry dealt with them masterfully. But, for the most part, the enemy broke as soon as the tanks were on them and fled or surrendered.

"A few of the tanks had bad luck, and I saw these cripples this morning where they were overturned by shellfire or had become bogged. Elsewhere I saw one or two which had buried their noses deep into the soft earth and lay overturned or lay head downward over deep banks down which they had tried to crawl. But the tank casualties were light, and large numbers of them went ahead and fought all day up Flesquières Ridge and round the château of Havrincourt, where the enemy held out for some time, and across the bridges of Marcoing and Masnières and right on up to the neighborhood of Noyelles and Graincourt and beyond Ribecourt."

WITH THE TURKS ON GALLIPOLI

A Graphic Word-Picture of the Scene at the Dardanelles During the Naval Bombardment of the Turkish Forts

GRANVILLE FORTESCUE, a war correspondent, saw the fighting on the Gallipoli peninsula from within the Turkish lines while the Allies were trying to win through to Constantinople in 1915. Piloted by Turkish and German officers, he got an excellent view of the Straits and saw the bombardment of the Turkish defenses by the ships of Great Britain and France. He stood on the site of ancient Troy, rich in memories of ancient war,

reëchoing to the thunder of the most modern of guns.

Fortescue wrote an absorbing account of his experiences on Gallipoli from which these passages are taken:

"The road winds up heights past the newly-made graves. Here the Turks killed in the first bombardment lie buried. Suddenly at the hill-top the mouth of the Straits comes into view. Sedd-ul Bahr and Kum Kale bend together, so

close that it seems one might hurl a stone across the waters that separate them. A haze covers the land, but Hellespont shimmers in the sun.

"Far on the horizon, under a canopy of smoke, lie three ships. Grim gray monsters on guard. Above them an arch of smoke curves over the water toward the highest hills on the Gallipoli shore. These mark the passage of shells fired at the Turkish trenches. Without a pause the gunfire endures. It is too far to distinguish

Watching the serious earnestness, with which these hard-bitten clods go through their drill, leaves an impression boding no good for the Allies that may fight them. The checking of the first landing and the rebuff the British fleet received in the Dardanelles has filled the Turkish soldier with confidence hitherto unknown. Above all they are proud of having driven the French off Kum Kale. . . .

"The Turkish troops are drafted from the training camp straight to the trenches. Time



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Turkish Fortress of Sedd-ul Bahr, Gallipoli

Showing a gun carriage of a heavy cannon inside the fortress destroyed by shells from the British fleet. This fort was one of those reduced by Allied gun-fire.

the details. Only the ships, the smoke and the crouching land stand out in the picture. Down from the hill our road leads past the Turkish camp. It is pitched along the banks of Simois, in a country as pretty as an English park. The tents are covered with branches from oak and plane trees that cluster at the river side.

"This is my first view of the Turkish troops in mass. They are a grim impressive lot. The khaki uniforms are worn with pride and a curious Turkish helmet, a sort of cap the shape you would make for a child out of a folded newspaper, covers the head at a jaunty angle.

and again an errant shell falls into the little camp, giving the recruits their baptism of fire. Two German officers in Turkish uniforms ride past on an inspection of the coast defenses. On this side of the Straits the Germans confine themselves to manning the batteries. The infantry are all under their own officers.

ON THE WALLS OF TROY

"The road now runs through Erenkeui, a deserted village. Before me rides a green-turbaned *hajah* (chaplain). Our horses' hoofs

bring hollow echoes from the houses. Out of the town down a steep hill we ride past the Red Crescent hospital to the plains of Troy. Then on to the hills of Ilium. The plain is spotted with shell-holes and where stood the strong built walls of Troy now runs a line of trench. Underfoot, poppies, larkspur and mustard flowers are woven into a gorgeous carpet that covers the broken ruins.

"From where Argive Helen sat and watched the brass-clad Greeks land from their beaked ships we gaze across Hellespont to the newest picture of war. War is a story little changed in 3,000 years. Our vaunted civilization fades when 'blood-stained Mars affronts the skies.' Below me across old Skamander's marshes is



© Underwood and Underwood.

A British Trench on Gallipoli

Kum Kale. Houses are jumbled heaps of rock and plaster. From out there shines the glittering eye of a Turkish heliograph. Beyond this flashing signal is Hellespont with Sedd-ul Bahr a jutting yellow ridge that cuts the blue of surrounding seas. Spotting the sea are a dozen ships. A double-funneled gray-black battleship with spreading fighting tops, the *Majestic*, is the master vessel. Around it are grouped the transports. They cluster about the warship like women and children round a protecting warrior. . . .

"Each ship is in a fever of activity. Line after line of ships and boats pass and repass between the group of vessels and the beach at the base of the cliff. Cranes swing outward and inward, dragging up from the murky holds all the impediments of war and dumping them

into the waiting tows. Khaki-clad soldiers crowd the rails of transports or troop down the ladders to the waiting boats. Launches dart hither and thither from ship-side to shore and bustling tows and bullying transports. Apart from this turmoil lies a white ship with a dark green band painted on her hull. She flies the French flag astern with a red cross at her foremost top. Circling around all are watchful destroyers, long flat craft with three rakish funnels. These are the guardians from the destruction that lurks beneath the waters. Three mine sweepers push cautiously up Hellespont with their cranes swung overboard. To complete the picture a seaplane circles over the busy ships. It has come from a camp perched on the top of Sedd-ul Bahr. I can see two such camps. . . ."

THE ALLIES' FORMIDABLE PROBLEM

The precarious nature of the Allied foothold on Gallipoli at the time of his visit was quite apparent to Fortescue, who says:

"Here on a desolate ridge live a handful of fighters bent on winning this bleak peninsula for England. The pitiless sun shines on the bleached canvas. The road winds in and out of the ridges leading to the trenches that cut off the peninsula point. I estimate this to be three miles in from Sedd-ul Bahr. It is a pitifully small bit of land that the Allies hold. Not more than the toe of the promontory. Yet it is the most vital section of the peninsula—the very key to the Dardanelles.

"Sedd-ul Bahr can be made a Gibraltar of the Straits. But now from the line that faces the English the Turks pour the lava of death. New hordes march out from Krithia every day, determined to sweep the thin khaki line off the cliffs into the sea. But great cones of steel come hurtling through the sky, driving the Turks to cover. This rain of iron fragments, while the light lasts, goes on without pause. The smoke from the exploding shells makes a haze above the yellow earth where the trenches zigzag. Every wave of the waters seems to reverberate with the noise of the bursting charges.

"Rifle and machine gun fire makes but a tinkling treble in this grand chorus of war music. Up and down the Ægean battleships steam, sending salvo after salvo from their turrets. Howitzer batteries hidden along the shore reply, splashing the smooth sea with high fountains. All these seem to fall short of the ships.

The work of the warships is fascinating. They look like prehistoric sea monsters. The gray-black sides and fighting tops tower out of the waves. A canopy of smoke enfolds them as they steam up and down firing as they go. Six are at work now smothering Krithia. The heights of the peninsula steam like sulphur springs. The swelling chorus of the cannon deepens into one continuous bass note. While

shells are flying, tows are ferried without pause from ship to shore. Group after group of khaki figures are swallowed up in the ravines. A howitzer hidden among the brush on the shore before me fires shells sporadically on boats. But the Turkish shells fall wide.

"The scene is the same until sundown. The pregnant silence holds the world. With the coming darkness I turn from Troy."

THE CANADIAN TRIUMPH

One of the Spectacular Incidents of the War Was the Great Feat of the Canadians in Capturing Vimy Ridge

WHEN the news came that England had taken the decisive step the British world was morally certain she would take, Canada made quick response—first by the tens of thousands and then by the hundreds of thousands, as the magnitude of the war was more fully understood. By July, 1916, Canada was maintaining a Corps of four divisions supplemented by a Cavalry Brigade and a large number of forestry and railroad men. These Canadians were valiant men and possessed that quality of initiative which is characteristically American (for the Canadians, albeit not Yankees, are essentially American). They were early marked in the Allied forces for certain distinctive merits; one, the excellence of their Intelligence Service; another, their originality and enterprise; but their chief value was, perhaps, their moral effect upon the troops—British or French—who were in the radius of their fighting influence. Inspiring and sustaining the spirit of troops at the front is a service of inestimable importance and this the Canadians did right martially, compensating for their lack of numbers by the determined energy of their action, their dash, their daring, their fearless adventure. Their casualties in the first battle of Ypres were 40 per cent. of the combatant strength.

But the great event in the experience of the Canadians was the taking of Vimy Ridge, one of the gold-letter achievements on the Western front, so rich in miracles of valor. They had come through the Ypres and the Somme fight-


ing, and for the spring offensive of 1917 the new Canadian front stretched from north of the Lovette Ridge to the east of Roelincourt, where had occurred the most desperate fighting of the French offensive of 1915. There were the Souchez Valley, the Labyrinth, La Targette, Souchez village, etc. Much of the terrain was coal mining land, full of fosses, slag-heaps, wrecked pit-heads and shafts. It was the country gossip that a large part of the region was undermined with tunnels, part natural in the chalk formation, part the work of religious bodies in the Middle Ages. One tradition had it that a tunnel ran from Mont St. Eloi, some distance behind the lines, to Arras, and that Arras was connected by other tunnels with the great natural caves on the hillside of Vimy. What secret dangers might wait in these mysterious underground avenues!

Vimy Ridge was an eminence 475 feet high, giving its occupants a commanding view of many miles. It had changed hands several times in the course of the war, but was now, and for some time had been, held by the Germans. The importance of the position was very great—it was the military key to that part of France. The Germans had full view of the British lines below and could see miles beyond them. As long as the ridge remained in German hands the whole country round, including Arras to the south, was menaced. Its capture was a vital matter. The honor of attempting to take it was given to the Canadians and for this they had spent the entire winter in

training, which included raiding. When the raids began the German troops holding the ridge were of an inferior sort, but they were steadily improved as the generally successful raids taught the defenders larger discretion.

THEY REHEARSED THE ATTACK

The Canadians made elaborate preparations for the coming attack. One feature was the



Vimy Ridge and Environs

development of training in the platoon system for infantry, the object being to make each platoon a self-contained team in which officers and men grew to know one another and were so accustomed to work together and understood just how to back each other up most effectively. The enemy position was very carefully observed by raiding parties and by aerial photographers. A duplicate dummy set

of trenches was dug some way behind the lines, and the troops were exercised on these, under conditions resembling as nearly as possible those they would have to face on the critical day. The fullest details of what was to be done, and how it was proposed to do it, were prepared by the General Staff and were circulated among the troops. Brigadiers instructed their battalion officers, and subalterns instructed their platoons, showing them maps, plans, and photographs. The result of this was that every man entered the battle knowing what was expected of him, what conditions he would probably have to meet, and the best methods to adopt. A large number of guns of all calibers were brought up behind the lines, siege groups of heavy and medium howitzers and trench-mortars, counter-battery groups, and numerous six-gun batteries of 18-pounders. Many of these were concealed and not used until the day of battle.

The Germans believed their position on Vimy Ridge to be impregnable. In addition to the natural defensive advantages of the ridge, a considerable part of No Man's Land was broken up by big craters that left only narrow paths over which troops could advance; concrete machine-gun emplacements were in great number to command all approaches; guns were so placed in the woods below the abrupt eastern slope that the angle of the hill protected them from counter-attack by artillery; and in the villages of Vimy and Petit Vimy ruined houses had been converted into fortresses with ferro-concrete walls several feet thick, and doors and shutters of chilled steel.

FOLLOWING THE BARRAGE

At half-past five on Easter Monday (April 9, 1917) the great attack was launched by the Canadians with terrific fire from their massed artillery and from many field guns hidden in advanced positions. The official War Record Office report says: "Our 'heavies' bombarded the enemy positions on and beyond the ridge; and trenches, dugouts, emplacements and roads which for long had been kept in a continual state of disrepair by our fire, were now smashed to uselessness. An intense barrage of shrapnel from our field guns, strengthened by the indirect fire of hundreds of machine guns, was laid along the front. At



Photo by Dickie.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

Canadian Engineers Around a Campfire in Flanders

Ten battalions of railroad and construction units went from Canada for overseas duty. They were officered by civil engineers, many of whom sacrificed lucrative positions to answer the stern call of duty.

the same moment the Canadian troops advanced in line, in three waves of attack."

An observer who saw the Canadians set off in the semi-darkness of the dawn describes them as having gone away "cheering and laughing" through the mud three feet deep in places, that made them "look like scarecrows." There were flurries of snow and rain and more snow over the battlefield. The

dians reached them it "was scarcely possible to distinguish where they had been."

As stated earlier, No Man's Land was mostly craters and shell holes with narrow passages between, and in these holes were pools from the rain of the night before; and "badly wounded men who fell into these shell holes died there; it was impossible to rescue them and impossible for them to escape."



© Underwood and Underwood.

General Pershing and His Staff Visiting General Currie, Commander of the Canadian Overseas Forces

light, while sufficient for maneuvering, was not enough to permit the German gunners and riflemen to fire with accuracy. The Canadians followed close behind the barrage, said to have been the most terrible concentrated artillery fire ever seen. In fact, the bombardment had been of so formidable a character that the counter-battery work of the enemy was reduced very materially by the great, the unexpectedly heavy, rain of British shells, which completely destroyed a large part of the German front trenches, so that when the Cana-

The *London Times* in its account of the engagement says:

"The first part of the advance up to the German front trenches was the easiest of the whole. Even here, however, the Canadians were met at every turn by heavy machine gun fire. The men advancing close behind the barrage became occasionally impatient at their slow pace and tried to pass through it. When they saw the enemy retiring they wanted to follow them. Over most of the way the wire was completely smashed and formed no obstacle whatever.



Photo by Hare.

The Thirty-fifth Canadian Regiment on a Hike in Ontario

The losses of the first Canadian contingent were over one half. Canada sent 640,000 of her finest manhood to France; they covered themselves with glory on many an immortal battlefield.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

"The battalions kept in close touch. Every German machine gun company that was located was systematically attacked with hand grenades and rifle grenades. While sections of a platoon attacked it in the front, picked members of the platoons would creep behind and attempt to rush its company. There were many instances of distinguished gallantry in the fight against the machine guns.

"The German second line, the Red Line, was heavily manned. Immediately the barrage moved, Germans rushed out of dugouts and

SPEEDY SUCCESS

"A quarter of an hour after the attack began German prisoners were coming in. Good reports of progress were sent back from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions. The 4th Division found itself held up, however, by a number of newly-constructed German machine gun emplacements grouped around an elevated position known as the 'Pimple.' The troops strove time after time to make progress here, but the machine gun fire was too strong for them. Towards the



© Underwood and Underwood.

Canadian Guns Rushed to the Front

Canadian motor lorries did splendid work in the successful Allied drive in the fall of 1918 on the Western front. Loaded to the top with guns, ammunition, and food, the trucks kept pace with the advance of the army.

caves. There was a fierce contest at a well-prepared position with close support trench on rising ground which commanded the whole area west to southwest. The trench positions generally were very elaborate, line after line, well joined up with strong machine gun emplacements and elaborate defenses of the most modern type. The Canadians pressed through, walking behind the barrage at a rate little faster than a slow march, each party digging itself in as it reached its objective and cleaning up the ground thoroughly behind it. Each section as it reached its destination started to construct strong machine gun positions there and block the trenches, platoons from it immediately setting out as carrying parties to take back the wounded.

center of the ridge the Canadians swept over and captured a group of caves, and numbers of Germans came out from these and surrendered. These caves, deep under the earth and very extensive, had been, according to local tradition, a place of refuge for Huguenots in the days of religious persecution, where they came from Arras and from the neighboring villages to hide and to worship.

"Apparently the British artillery fire was so effective that it completely destroyed the German means of communication, whether by telephone or runners. When the Canadians, pressing on in spite of the machine gun fire, reached the outskirts of the village of Petit Vimy, officers came out of their elaborate dugouts to see



Home from France

what was the matter and were surprised to find themselves surrounded and captured."

As the London *Times* says, "The Battle of Vimy Ridge was a great triumph." It was a day of glory for the Canadians who, carrying on through weather that fiercely abetted the foe, captured the "impregnable" ridge in nine hours of brilliant fighting, bagged 3,600 prisoners and took a considerable number of field and heavy guns and trench mortars. The Germans fought well, as a whole, the machine gunners and snipers being especially obstinate in the defense.

THE INDIVIDUAL HONORS

Of course there were individual achievements that won official recognition. Four of the Canadians won the V. C. Major T. W. Macdowell, the son of an Ontario Methodist minister, who had received the D. S. O. in November for capturing three enemy machine guns and 50 prisoners, got the coveted Cross for a feat at Vimy Ridge. He, with the aid of two runners, captured two machine guns, two officers and 75 men. Lieutenant F. U. W. Harvey rushed through machine gun fire well ahead of his men, shot the gunner and captured the gun. Lance Sergeant E. W. Sifton also rushed a gun-nest and killed the crew, but in attempting to fight off a small party advancing upon him along the trench he was killed. Private W. J. Milne of the Manitoba Regiment, a farmer at home, crawled on hands and knees to a machine gun,

killed the crew with hand grenades and took the gun; a little while after he duplicated the performance, killing another gun crew and capturing the gun, but very soon after he was himself killed. The official report already quoted concludes:

"The final stage of the attack of the troops on the right was now made. They passed through the wide belts of enemy wire which fringed the plateau by way of wide gaps torn by our heavy artillery at fixed intervals. So they issued on the eastern slopes of Vimy Ridge—the first Allied troops to look down upon the level plain of Douai since the German occupation in 1914. They saw the villages of Farbus, Vimy, and Petit Vimy at their feet, and beyond these the hamlets of Willerval, Bailleul, Oppy, and Mericourt. They pressed on to Farbus Wood and Goulot Wood, and possessed themselves of several hostile batteries and much ammunition.

"By an early hour of the afternoon all our objectives, save those of the left of the attack, were in our possession, and the task of consolidating and strengthening our gains was well in hand. Throughout the day the most courageous and devoted coöperation was rendered to the Canadian Corps by a brigade and a squadron of the Royal Flying Corps.

"The night saw all of Vimy Ridge, with the exception of a few trenches on Hill 145, secure in Canadian hands."

The next day, April 10th, the Canadians proceeded to dispose of the "exception," and the whole of the ridge, including Hill 145, was "secure in Canadian hands."

DOING AND DYING AT GALLIPOLI

The Glorious Sacrifices of the Australians Reveal a Stirring Chapter of Dogged Courage in the Face of Hopeless Odds

WHEN a poet takes up the historian's pen we learn that some of the most glorious pages of a nation's annals are those that have to do with its failures and disasters. He makes us realize that it is not the victory or the triumph so much as it is the way adversity is met that tests the character, proves

the moral quality and summons to judgment the soul of a people.

John Masefield, poet, wrote *Gallipoli* (published by Macmillan). You cannot read that book and not thrill with the consciousness that the Gallipoli campaign, calamitous in the extreme, will swell the hearts of men

with pride of race when some of the triumphs of the Allies have been forgotten.

Leonidas and his 300 Spartans were annihilated, but the defense of Thermopylæ is precious to the world's memory. Waterloo was the destruction of the French Empire, but the stand of the Old Guard is immortal. Not more useless these than the vaster sacrifice at Gallipoli. Yet their very futility is an assurance of the perpetual inspiration to the minds of men of these three examples of indomitable and devoted courage.

That which crowns the great tragedy with a truly sublime radiance is the knowledge that the men, without the inspiration of even a forlorn hope, fought and died as if achieving a victory. For months it had been only too apparent to the world, that this campaign, under the conditions of the undertaking, was one of the gravest of blunders—and the men at Gallipoli came in time to realize that they were faced with the impossible. But there, as in older time, the proud answer to the proud question:

Was there a man dismayed?
Not tho' the soldiers knew
Some one had blundered.
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,—
Theirs but to do and die.

Like dedicated souls, even as those of the older time, they advanced boldly and well into the jaws of death, into the mouth of hell—such a hell as never soldiers before them strove to storm and subdue; and when at last all that were left of them were driven back down the ragged steep they had climbed at such a ghastly cost, they did not come empty handed—they brought down from the heights of Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen, the ridge of Sari Bair, one of the most splendid jewels in Britain's diadem of honor.

THERE WERE NO ILLUSIONS

Contrast the disaster with the setting out. Early in April of 1915 the Expeditionary force assembled in Egypt preparatory to being moved to the advance base at Mudros, on the Isle of Lemnos, under the command of Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, ideal soldier. There were in the strangely mixed army English, regulars

and volunteers, Irish, French, Senegalese and those wonders from far colonies, the "Anzacs," as they are known to fame. Considering the object to be attained it seemed a pitifully small army—but 120,000 all told—so small because neither Gen. French nor Joffre dared spare men from the sorely pressed Western front. This expedition was to support the naval attack on Gallipoli, an attack that began in March and perhaps had no greater result than to warn the Turks and bid them prepare for an effectual defense. The force was at its base, Mudros, in mid-April. The men had no illusions about the task before them. They realized the gravity of their position, the perils they were to dare. There was a period of anxious waiting for favorable weather conditions, and then came the eventful day when sky and sea permitted the appointed work to begin. Of this setting out let John Masefield tell:

THE DEPARTURE FROM MUDROS

"In fine weather in Mudros a haze of beauty comes upon the hills and water till their loneliness, if unearthly, is so rare. Then the bay is like a blue jewel and the hills lose their savagery, and glow, and are gentle, and the sun comes up from Troy, and the peaks of Samothrace change color, and all the marvelous ships in the harbor are transfigured. The land of Lemnos was beautiful with flowers at that season, in the brief Ægean spring, and to seaward always, in the bay, were the ships, more ships, perhaps, than any port of modern times has known; they seemed like half the ships of the world. . . .

"Now in all that city of ships, so busy with passing picket boats, and noisy with the labor of men, the weighing of the anchors began. Ship after ship, crammed with soldiers, moved slowly out of harbor, in the lovely day, and felt again the heave of the sea. No such gathering of fine ships has ever been seen upon this earth, and the beauty and exaltation of the youth upon them made them like sacred things as they moved away. All the thousands of men aboard them gathered on deck to see, till each rail was thronged. These men had come from all parts of the British world, from Africa, Australia, Canada, India, the Mother Country, New Zealand, and remote islands in the sea. They had said good-bye to home that they might offer their lives in the cause we stand for. In a few hours at most, as they well knew, perhaps a

tenth of them would have looked their last on the sun, and be a part of earth or dumb things that the tides push. Many of them would have disappeared forever from the knowledge of man, blotted from the book of life none would know how—by a fall, or chance shot in the darkness, in the blast of a shell, or alone, like a hurt beast, in some scrub or gully, far from comrades and the English speech and the English singing. And perhaps a third of them would be mangled, blinded and broken, lamed, made

FOR THE GLORY OF SERVING

Those who saw them go were deeply moved; they realized the full import of the spectacle; and as the expedition got under way they tried to show that they understood. Masfield writes:

"As they passed from moorings to the man-of-war anchorage on their way to the sea, their feeling that they had done with life and were



View of Anzac Looking Towards Suvla Bay

At this cove the Australians and New Zealanders landed and encamped. At the right rise the steep slopes of the Gallipoli peninsula commanded by the Turkish positions.

imbecile or disfigured, with the color and the taste of life taken from them, so that they would never more move with comrades nor exult in the sun. And those not taken thus would be under the ground, sweating in the trench, carrying sandbags up the sap, dodging death and danger, without rest or food or drink, in the blazing sun, or frost of the Gallipoli night, till death seemed relaxation and a wound a luxury. But as they moved out these things were but the end they asked, the reward they had come for, the unseen cross upon the breast. All that they felt was a gladness of exultation that their young courage was to be used. They went like kings in a pageant to the imminent death."

going out to something new, welled up in those battalions; they cheered and cheered till the harbor rang with cheering. As each ship crammed with soldiers drew near the battle-ships, the men swung their caps and cheered again, and the sailors answered, and the noise of cheering swelled, and the men in the ships not yet moving joined in, and the men ashore, till all the life in the harbor was giving thanks that it could go to death rejoicing. All was beautiful in that gladness of men about to die, but the most moving thing was the greatness of their generous hearts. As they passed the French ships, the memory of old quarrels healed, and the sense of what sacred France

has done and endured, in this great war, and the pride of having such men as the French for comrades, rose up in their warm souls, and they cheered the French ships more, even, than their own.

"They left the harbor very, very slowly; this tumult of cheering lasted a long time; no one who heard it will ever forget it, or think of it unshaken. It broke the hearts of all there with pity and pride: it went beyond the guard of the English heart. Presently all were out, and the fleet stood across for Tenedos, and the sun went down with marvelous color, lighting island after island and the Asian peaks, and those left behind in Mudros trimmed their lamps knowing that they had been for a little brought near to the heart of things."

ANZACS LAND UNDER RIFLE FIRE

At one o'clock on the morning of April 25th, the ships arrived off their appointed rendezvous. The soldiers were roused from sleep and were served with a last hot meal. The Australians about to go into action for the first time were cheerful, quiet, confident. Nowhere was there a sign of nerves or undue excitement such as might have been expected. Twenty minutes later the signal to lower the boats, swinging from their davits, was given. The troops were drawn up in serried ranks on the quarter decks, backed by the great 12-inch guns. Ranged with the soldiers were the bluejackets and marines—they were to take charge of the boats and steer them to shore when they were cast off by the towing pinnaces. The start was made at 3 o'clock, the operation having been timed to have the landing just before daybreak so that the Turks, if forewarned, could not see to fire before the Australians had obtained a firm footing.

There was tense silence as the boats in tow "looking exactly like long snakes gliding relentlessly after their prey" neared the shore, the battleships slowly moving after them. Suddenly an alarm light flashed from the top of the grim hills, and three minutes later came a heavy burst of rifle fire. It came from Turks entrenched near the shore. Most of the bullets went high, but men in the packed boats were hit. Says an observer:

"The Australians waited neither for orders nor for the boats to reach the beach. They sprang into the sea and waded ashore, formed in

rough line and rushed straight on the flashes of the enemy's rifles. Their magazines were not even charged, so they just went in with cold steel, and I believe I am right in saying that the first Ottoman Turk since the last Crusade received our Anglo-Saxon bayonet in him at five minutes after five o'clock on April 25th. It was over in a minute. The Turks in this first trench were bayoneted or ran away, and a Maxim gun was captured.

"Then the Australians found themselves facing an almost perpendicular cliff of loose sandstone, covered with thick shrubbery, and somewhere half way up the enemy had a second trench strongly held, from which they poured a terrible fire on the troops below and the boats pulling back to the destroyers for the second landing party.

"Here was a tough proposition to tackle in the darkness, but these colonials are practical above all else, and they went about it in a practical way. They stopped a few moments to pull themselves together and to get rid of their packs, which no troops should carry in an attack, and then charged their magazines. Then this race of athletes proceeded to scale the cliffs without responding to the enemy's fire. They lost some men, but did not worry, and in less than a quarter of an hour the Turks were out of their second position, either bayoneted or in full flight."

OTHERS NOT SO FORTUNATE

Owing to the rugged and abrupt character of the coast line there were only five (V, W, X, Y, Z) suitable landing beaches, and the plan was to have the work of transferring the soldiers from boats to the shore at the designated points as nearly simultaneous as possible. The attempted landing at Beach V (Irish and English troops) was disastrous. A murderous fire practically annihilated the first company, many of the second company were drowned in the effort to reach shore by swimming and after vain efforts the debarkation there was abandoned. The Dublin Fusiliers suffered terribly at their landing beach. W beach (Lancashire and Worcester troops) was a veritable death trap. The toll was heavy but the men "carried on," performing what Sir Ian Hamilton regarded as one of the finest feats of arms ever achieved by British soldiers.

These brilliant feats of desperate daring, but the first of many thrilling deeds, were not, unhappily, the auspices of the long campaign's

conclusion. The story of Gallipoli told in foregoing chapters has made that clear. It is to be remembered that the enemy attacked from the several landings was not caught napping, and that he was well prepared and numberlessly entrenched among artificially improved natural fortifications and barriers of the most forbidding and formidable character. The Turks occupied commanding heights. The way to them was up pathless, rugged hills, through broken and tangled valleys, with

dips in the ground will hide the others. Let him, before he advances, look earnestly along the line of the hill, as it shows up clear, in blazing sunlight only a mile from him, to see his tactical objective, one little clump of pines, three hundred yards away, across what seem to be fields. Let him see in the whole length of the hill no single human being, nothing but scrub, earth, a few scattered buildings, of the Levantine type (dirty white with roofs of dirty red) and some patches of dark Scotch pine, growing as the pine loves, on bleak crests.



© Macmillan.

Australians Assaulting the Turks at Anzac Two Days Before the Evacuation

bluffs several hundred feet high, with scant or no shelter from the blistering heat of a torrid sun-blaze by day or the penetrating chill of the nights during the changes of that protracted siege. Masfield graphically portrays what it was to be a soldier there.

"Let the reader imagine himself to be facing three miles of any very rough broken sloping ground known to him, ground for the most part gorse-thyme and scrub-covered. . . . Let him say to himself that he and an army of his friends are about to advance up the slope towards the top, and that as they will be advancing in a line, along the whole length of the three miles, he will only see the advance of those comparatively near to him, since folds or

Let him imagine himself to be more weary than he has ever been in his life before, and dirtier than he has ever believed it possible to be, and parched with thirst, nervous, wild-eyed and rather lousy.

THAT DWINDLING BAND

"Let him think that he has not slept for more than a few minutes together for eleven days and nights, and that in all his waking hours he has been fighting for his life, often hand to hand in the dark with a fierce enemy, and that after each fight he has had to dig himself a hole in the ground, often with his hands, and then walk three or four roadless miles to bring up heavy boxes under fire. Let him think, too, that in all those eleven days he has never for an

instant been out of the thunder of cannon, that waking or sleeping their devastating crash has been blasting the air across within a mile or two, and this from an artillery so terrible that each discharge beats as it were a wedge of shock between the skull-bone and the brain. Let him think too that never, for an instant, in all that time, has he been free or even partly free from the peril of death in its most sudden and savage forms, and that hourly in all that

blasted dead, or lying bleeding in the scrub, with perhaps his face gone and a leg and an arm broken, unable to move but still alive, unable to drive away the flies or screen the ever-dropping rain, in a place where none will find him, or be able to help him, a place where he will die and rot and shrivel till nothing is left of him but a few rags and a few remnants and a little identification-disc flapping on his bones in the wind. Then let him hear the intermittent



© Underwood and Underwood.

Lowering the Dead Into a Trawler, for Burial at Sea, in the Dardanelles

The British casualties in the great adventure at Gallipoli exceeded 125,000.

time he has seen his friends blown to pieces at his side, or dismembered, or drowned, or driven mad, or stabbed, or sniped by some unseen stalker, or bombed in the dark sap with a handful of dynamite in a beef-tin, till their blood is caked upon his clothes and thick upon his face, and that he knows, as he stares at the hill, that in a few moments, more of that dwindling band, already too few, God knows how many too few, for the task to be done, will be gone the same way, and that he himself may reckon that he has done with life, tasted and spoken and loved his last, and that in a few minutes more may be

crash and rattle of the fire augment suddenly and awfully in a roaring, blasting roll, unspeakable and unthinkable, while the air above, that has long been whining and whistling, becomes filled with the scream of shells passing like great cats of death in the air; let him see the slope of the hill vanish in a few moments into the white, yellow, and black smokes of great explosions shot with fire, and watch the lines of white puffs marking the hill in streaks where the shrapnel searches a suspected trench; and then, in the height of the tumult, when his brain is shaking in his head, let him pull him-

self together with his friends, and clamber up out of the trench, to go forward against an invisible enemy, safe in some unseen trench expecting him."

FRUITLESS HEROISM, NOTHING GAINED

And so through the terrible months of magnificent endurance in the face of failures that were tragedies of heroism, superb martyrdoms, audacious thrusts of defiance against the impregnable, with naval and military losses as early as May 31st aggregating 38,635 officers and men—heavily increased in the next three months—the fortress of Achi Baba, the most powerful in the world, was unshaken, the French and the British Allies holding but a small corner of the area they had set out to conquer. The Turkish losses up to June 30th were estimated at 70,000. The August fighting was the most costly part of the Gallipoli campaign. In the first three weeks of that month the casualties of the Allies were 40,000. "It was an intensity of loss greater than the First and Second Battles of Ypres," says a critical commentator, "and, considering the numbers engaged, greater than that of the advance at Loos in the following month. It was, moreover, a fruitless sacrifice, for nothing was gained." Nothing material was gained, truly; but something inestimable was won for the "ward of tradition," for in this month of August occurred, among other things, that supreme adventure, the battle for the peaks of Chunuk Bair, and Koja Chemen and the ridge of Sari Bair.

The plan of this battle had as its objective Chunuk Bair (a hill 900 feet high) and Koja Chemen (referred to in dispatches as Hill 305), 971 feet high, the top peak of the ridge. At Suvla Bay, further up the coast, were 30,000 rifles under Major General de Lisle—these were the left wing. The Anzacs, holding the edge of a plateau, were 25,000 strong and formed the right. The troops in the center, or Cape Helles region, about 40,000, were to conduct a strong offensive against their old objective, Achi Baba, in the hope to concentrate there the attention of the Turks, and let the attack of the Anzacs on Koja Chemen have the nature of a surprise. An expert says "the plan was bold, but entirely legitimate, and its details were worked out with great care by Sir Ian Hamilton's Headquarters

Staff. The operations were to be simultaneous. In that fact lay the element of danger. Failure of exact coöperation would imperil if not defeat the enterprise." That failure to co-operate—the reason for which has not yet been given satisfactorily—is precisely what made the tragedy of Chunuk Bair and practically concluded the campaign of Gallipoli as a fiasco.

ANZACS RUSH THE LONE PINE POSITION

The Helles section began its attack on Achi Baba the afternoon of August 6th with the desired result of inducing the Turks to send the bulk of their new reserves to Achi Baba, but not without losses. At five that afternoon the Anzacs, according to programme, after the Helles action was well started, began their attack—entering upon the most desperate and in many respects the most brilliant struggle that Gallipoli had seen. After half an hour's bombardment the Australians—every man with a white band on his sleeve—raced across the open space to the enormously strong trenches of the Turks at the Lone Pine defense. There were covered trenches, roofed with logs as a protection against shrapnel, and while fighting to break through the Anzacs were wholly without shelter and exposed to artillery and machine-gun fire. The Australians fired through loopholes and gaps and jumped down through chance openings into the trenches. In a quarter of an hour the first Turkish line had been carried, and before night-fall the Lone Pine position had been won. Says Masfield:

AND THE AUSTRALIANS HELD ON

"They held on for the next five days and nights, till Lone Pine was ours past question. For those five days and nights the fight for Lone Pine was one long personal scrimmage in the midst of explosion. For those five days and nights the Australians lived and ate and slept in that gallery of the mine of death, in a half darkness lit by great glares, in filth, heat and corpses, among rotting and dying and mutilated men, with death blasting at the doors only a few feet away, and intense and bloody fighting, hand to hand, with bombs, bayonets and knives, for hours together by night and day. When the Turks gave up the struggle the dead were five to the yard in that line or works; they

were heaped in a kind of double wall all along the sides of the trench: most of them were bodies of Turks, but among them were one-quarter of the total force which ran out from the Pimple on the evening of the 6th."



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Crown Prince of Turkey

The Turkish heir to the throne is shown in the center. On his left is Colonel Djevad Bey, on his right, Captain Nourey Bey.

The Turkish loss in this action was estimated at 5,000. Sir Ian Hamilton in his report said of this achievement:

"One weak Australian brigade, numbering at the outset about 2,000 rifles, and supported only by two weak battalions, carried the work under the eyes of a whole enemy division, and maintained their grip upon it like a vise during six days' successive counter-attacks." Seven Victoria Crosses were won there. And while these things were doing at Lone Pine,

other Australians, two columns of them, and a New Zealand Brigade were moving up gullies and climbing perpendiculars to the assault of Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen.

The day was one of the hottest the troops had experienced in that deadly summer. It was as if the atmosphere were a vast burning-glass converging the sun's rays upon the troops laboring up to the attack. They struggled against obstructions of low scrub, wire entanglements and natural barriers of stone. It was impossible to advance in formation; it was necessary often to follow mere goat paths through the tangle. Then, too, there was the fire from enemy guns. Under this the men fell in such numbers that some one has said extravagantly that the ascent was made slippery with blood. But they fared on and up, those boys from the antipodes, and they took the ridge just west of Chunuk Bair. But where was that left wing that was to come up from Suvla Bay and be ready to take the defenses of Chunuk Bair in flank? Not a sign of it yet—delayed by the difficulties of the way—the Indian column, the Gurkhas, was the first to come through, but utterly exhausted. Necessarily a halt. But at dawn of the next day (Aug. 8th) the attack on Chunuk Bair began—was waged fiercely and successfully; the height was won, and the soldiers caught a vision of the Hellespont. What the cost was may be calculated from the fact that one battalion, the Wellingtons, that was 700 strong numbered but 53 when the fight was done; and of the 7th Gloucester every officer was killed or wounded and the battalion reduced to small groups commanded by privates. There was another of the wonders of those men of Gallipoli from the New Army—"they fought right on from midday till sunset without *any* officers," said Sir Ian Hamilton.

THE HELP THAT DID NOT COME

If only now the left wing, the men from Suvla Bay, were to join in the attack the Turks would be at such a disadvantage that victory and the opening of the Dardanelles were something better than a possibility. The precious hours were rushing to waste and the left was still to come. What held it back? Here is the pitiful answer:

"In the great heat and through a country so arduous, no movement could be long sustained. It must resolve itself into a series of dashes, with intervals for rest and reorganization. There was no water in those parched nullahs, and every drop had to be brought up the ridges from the beaches." Possibly there is a better answer, one more in official form, but whatever the explanation the Suvla Bay aid was too late.

August 9th dawned with the same pitiless heat, but the attack on Koja Chemen began. The summits were won and briefly held. The men who did not die were driven back. Had the Suvla Expedition been there, "the left flank of the Anzacs would have been safe, and we should have been astride the Central ridge of the peninsula." The total casualties here up to the evening of August 9th were 8,500. And the Turkish strength on Koja Chemen was increasing. The troops began to realize that the effort planned as an effectual blow had failed. The next day they knew it. Early in the morning of that day the Turks began a counter-attack. A report says:

"They came on in close formation, line after line, with the wild valor of fanatics. Our battalions were driven back from Chunuk Bair, and the Turks poured down the slopes to where Rhododendron Ridge juts from the parent *massif*. Their object was to gain the Sazli Beit Dere, and so cut off the British left from the rest of the Anzac forces. General Baldwin fell at this stage of the action. The Indians on the slopes of Hill Q were also driven back, and for a moment it looked as if the attack would succeed. But the enemy, pouring solidly down the slopes, offered a superb target for our gunners. A stream of high explosives and shrapnel burst from our land batteries and the ships' guns. In the Indian section ten machine guns caught them in flank at short range. The attack could not retire, for fresh men kept sweeping over the crest and driving the wedge forward to its destruction. Soon it slackened, then broke, and with fierce hand-to-hand fighting among the scrub we began to win back the lost ground. By midday the danger was over. It had been grave indeed, for the last two battalions of the Anzac general reserve had been sent up in support. Of one party of 5,000 Turks who had swarmed over the crest but 500 returned. That afternoon the fighting ceased from the sheer exhaustion of both sides."

WHEN THE END REALLY CAME

In his account of this engagement Masfield says:

"They came on in a monstrous mass, packed shoulder to shoulder, in some places eight deep, in others three or four deep. Practically all their first line were shot by our men, practically all the second line were bayoneted, but the third line got into our trenches, and overwhelmed the



© Underwood and Underwood.

Mohammed V

The Sultan of Turkey.

garrison. Our men fell back to the second line of trenches and rallied and fired, but the Turks overwhelmed that line too, and then with their packed multitude they paused and gathered like a wave, burst down on the Wiltshire regiment, and destroyed it almost to a man. Even so, the survivors, outnumbered 40 to 1, formed and charged with the bayonet, and formed and charged a second time, with a courage which makes the charge of the Light Brigade seem like a dream. But it was a hopeless position, the Turks came on like the sea, beat back all before them, paused for a moment, set rolling down the hill upon our men a number of enormous round bombs, which bound-

ed into our lines and burst, and then following up this artillery they fell on the men around the Farm in the most bloody and desperate fight of the campaign.

"Even as they topped Chunuk and swarmed down to engulf our right, our guns opened on them in a fire truly awful, but thousands came alive over the crest and went down to the battle below. . . . Then our line broke, the Turks got fairly in among our men with a weight which bore all before it, and what followed was a long succession of British rallies to a tussle body to body, with knives and stones and teeth, a fight of wild beasts in the ruined cornfields of the Farm.

"Nothing can be said of that fight, no words can describe nor any mind imagine it, except as a roaring and blazing hour of killing. Our last reserves came up to it, and the Turks were beaten back; very few of their men reached their lines alive. The Turks dead lay in thousands all down the slopes of the hill; but the crest of the hill, the prize, remained in Turk hands, not ours."

That was in reality the end. Four or five days after this Sir Ian Hamilton made a most urgent appeal to England for the instant embarkation of another 100,000 men. He declared that with the reinforcements asked for and 50,000 fresh rifles he could "clear a passage for our fleet to Constantinople." The opposed forces were then approximately 110,000 Turks, 95,000 Allies. But the Ministry could not or would not send more men to Gallipoli.

Finding that he could expect no help from England, Sir Ian Hamilton resolved to renew the attack with the men he had. There was bitter fighting thereafter, with much that was brilliant and some that was successful, but the fates remained implacable, and loath as England was to admit the necessity the evacuation of Gallipoli was inevitable.

There is nothing more astonishing in the history of the World War than the almost incredibly complete success of that evacuation. It is in every way more wonderful and more deserving of record in classic history than the retreat of Xenophon's Ten Thousand from the Persian disaster. We need not consider the steps leading up to it,—the recall of Sir Ian Hamilton, the appointment in his stead of General Sir Charles C. Monro, the visit of Lord Kitchener to the Dardanelles to

see for himself the bitterness of assailants of the Ministry—enough to say that Lord Kitchener reported from Mudros in November in favor of the evacuation. It had to be done with utmost secrecy, that the Turks have no intimation of it, otherwise it would have been impossible to remove the army without subjecting it to murderous assaults by an exultant enemy. Therefore there were engagements by day and removals of troops, armaments, etc., by night to the ships in the bay. It was accomplished without loss. Referring to the evacuation, General Monro in his special order said:

A TRIUMPHANT FEAT

"The arrangements made for withdrawal, and for keeping the enemy in ignorance of the operation which was taking place, could not have been improved. . . . Regimental officers, non-commissioned officers, and men carried out, without a hitch, the most trying operation which soldiers can be called upon to undertake—a withdrawal in the face of the enemy—in a manner reflecting the highest credit on the discipline and soldierly qualities of the troops.

"It is no exaggeration to call this achievement one without parallel. To disengage and to withdraw from a bold and active enemy is the most difficult of all military operations; and in this case the withdrawal was effected by surprise, with the opposing forces at close grips—in many cases within a few yards of each other. Such an operation, when succeeded by a re-embarkation from an open beach, is one for which military history contains no precedent."

The whole undertaking was actually spread over ten nights, and was divided into three periods. During the first period the winter stores and miscellaneous articles were removed; in the second period everything but a minimum of food and ammunition was shipped, and the first drafts of men were embarked; the final stage, which at Suvla only took two nights, was the embarkation of guns, transport animals, and the main body of troops. The Turks had no suspicion of these deliberate preparations, which were conducted with extraordinary skill and stealth. There were over 80,000 Turks entrenched before the Suvla and Anzac lines, at distances varying from 20 yards to half a mile, or in reserve close behind; and only the most extreme

caution prevented them from discovering what was afoot.

January 9th the beaches were cleared and before four o'clock in the afternoon the last troops, those of the famous 29th Division

(Anzacs), were on board, and Gallipoli with its horrors and its amazements began to recede. The failure was consummated; but out of the chaos rose a star of magnitude to shine fixed in the galaxy of Britain's brilliant deeds.

"WITH OUR BACKS TO THE WALL"

The Military Crisis on the Flanders Front in April, 1918, When Sir Douglas Haig Used a Now Historic Phrase

IT will be the aim of writers on the war, for many years to come, to pick out the crucial moments of the stupendous struggle; the moments when it was touch-and-go as to which combatant would emerge the winner. There is the moment when Foch, his Army well-nigh beaten, passed from the defensive to the offensive at the Marne. There is the magnificent stand of the British in the first battle of Ypres. There is the plugging of the gap at Château-Thierry by the Americans in June, 1918. But, no matter how many of these moments there may have been, none surpassed, in its terrible menace, that moment, in the spring of 1918, when Sir Douglas Haig wrote his memorable "backs to the wall" appeal to his soldiers.

HAIG'S STIRRING APPEAL

The phase of the terrific battles of 1918 which called forth his memorable order of the day opened before Armentières, where the Germans, after a bombardment, which, says Philip Gibbs, the famous war correspondent, was "as atrocious in its fury as anything of the kind since March 21st," poured their infantry through breaches in the lines of the Portuguese and the adjacent British forces, and swept toward the Channel. The days that followed were black with impending disaster. The world awoke to a full realization of what was at stake when Haig's appeal appeared in the newspapers. It read as follows:

A BLACK MOMENT

He wrote it on April 12, 1918. Since the opening of the great German offensive on March 21st, there had not been such a black moment for the Allies. The situation in March, following the terrific German blow at Sir Hubert Gough's Fifth Army, had been serious enough, but it was not long before Foch's defense about Amiens showed that the first fury of the storm was spent. Success in that attack might have given Paris to the Germans, which would have been a cruel blow to the Allies. But, when next they struck, on April 9th, they were driving for the Channel ports. Their loss would have been deadly, perhaps fatal. The capture of Calais might have won the war for Germany. That is what Sir Douglas Haig meant to convey to his men.

"Three weeks ago today the enemy began his terrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, to take the Channel ports, and to destroy the British Army.

"In spite of throwing already 106 divisions into the battle, and enduring the most reckless sacrifice of human life, he has yet made little progress toward his goals.

"We owe this to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops. Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our army under the most trying circumstances.

"Many among us now are tired. To those I will say that victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest. The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support. There is no other course open to us but to fight it out.

"Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs

to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment."

That was a bomb-shell. It destroyed complacency wherever it still existed in the Allied world. Those who had fostered a belief that the German thrust was not serious, that the situation was well in hand, got a violent shock.

Days followed which were torture for those behind the thin lines stretching across

were met by unflinching lines of defenders. For hours the fight raged with ferocity. The defenders held. Arnim threw in his reserves, madly bent on victory. Still the defenders held. Finally, the Germans were driven back, the battle was over, the Channel ports were saved. With their backs to the wall, the British had won.

AS IT LOOKED TO PHILIP GIBBS

Thrilling descriptions of those crucial days were written by Philip Gibbs, perhaps the best-known of all newspaper correspondents in the



German Shells Bursting During the Battle of Messines


Flanders. The enemy's attack continued in undiminished fury. The Germans pounded their way into Bailleul; they swarmed over Messines and Passchendaele Ridges, won a few months before by the British in brilliant fighting; they stormed Mount Kemmel, the dominating position of the entire region. From this vantage-point they gazed down into Ypres, the center of the British defense, the Flemish city which the British had held throughout the war in spite of the most powerful efforts to dislodge them.

Was Ypres to fall at last? Men turned pale as they asked the question. Truly, it was "backs to the wall" now.

After a lull the Germans, at the end of April, launched a final attack on both sides of Ypres, under General von Arnim. They

great war, who was in Flanders throughout the supreme German bid for victory. His dispatches, collected into a book called *The Way to Victory*, serve to bring back to readers the almost incredible fact that these days when Germany rocked the world are no further back than the spring of 1918—Germany, who, a few months afterward, lay helpless at the feet of the very men who stood with their backs to the wall. On April 12th, the day of Haig's famous dispatch, Gibbs wrote:

"The enemy is playing the great game, in which he is flinging all he has into the hazard of war. He has, of course, a stupendous number of men, and while holding his lines across the Somme, after his drive down from St. Quentin, and playing a defensive part against the French on our right, he has moved up



C Underwood and Underwood.

Northern France in Ruin and Desolation

A convoy is seen wending its way through the remains of a village which was literally shot to pieces. The destruction is typical of what happened in hundreds of other places. The Western theater of war stretched over an area of 19,500 square miles, containing over 3,000 cities, villages and hamlets, most of which were damaged by shell fire and many totally annihilated. The property destroyed is estimated to have aggregated \$5,000,000,000.

to the north, with secrecy and rapidity, large concentrations of troops and guns for new and tremendous blows against us. This is continuing his now determined policy to hurl his strongest weight against the British armies in an attempt to crush us before either France or America is able to draw off his divisions by counter-offensives. So now our troops in the North are faced by enormous forces. Nearly

ders and in the flat fields between Bailleul and Béthune, are greatly outnumbered, and can only hold back the enemy by fighting with supreme courage. . . .

"The scene today along the line of this hostile invasion was most tragic, because all the cruelty of war was surrounded by a beauty so intense that the contrast was horrible. The sky was of summer blue, with sunshine glitter-



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Lull Before a Battle

British cavalry in Flanders are waiting under a bank for the word to pursue the retreating Germans. This was in the last weeks of the war when cavalry was frequently called upon to sweep around the enemy's flanks.

thirty German divisions are against them from Witschaete to La Bassée Canal, and with those troops innumerable machine guns, trench-mortars, and massed batteries of field guns, very quick to get forward in support of their infantry.

"It is right and just towards our people to say quite simply, and without rhodomontade or false heroics, that this northern offensive is as menacing as that which began southwards on March 21st, and that our gallant men among those little red-brick villages in French Flan-

ing on the red-tiled roofs of cottages, and on their white-washed walls, and on their little window panes. All the hedges were clothed with green and flaked by the snow-white thorn-blossoms. In a night, as it seemed, all the orchards of France have flowered, and cherry and apple-trees are in the full splendor of bloom. The fields are powdered with close-growing daisies, and the shadows of the trees are long across the grass and the sun is setting. But over all this, and in the midst of all this is agony and blood; on the roads are fugitives,

wounded soldiers, dead horses, guns and transport. There are fires burning on the hillsides. . . . Sometimes today I wished to God the sun would not shine like this, nor nature mock at one with its thrilling beauty of life."

HEROIC FIGHTING BY THE BRITISH

After Haig had made his appeal to the British troops Gibbs wrote:

"The Commander-in-Chief's Order of the Day should reveal to our people and to the world what is happening out here in France—the enemy's objects to seize the Channel Ports, and destroy the British Army, and the frightful forces he has brought against us to achieve that plan, and the call that has come to our troops to hold every position to the last man. 'Many among us are now tired. . . . With our backs to the wall, each one of us must fight to the end.'

"Yes, our men *are* tired—so tired, after a week's fighting and after these last days and nights, that they can hardly stagger up to resist another attack, yet they do so because their spirit wakes again above their bodily fatigue; so tired that they go on fighting like sleep-walkers, and in any respite lie in ditches and under hedges and in open fields under fire in deep slumber until the shouts of their sergeants stir them up again. Some of these men

have been fighting since March 21st, with only a few days' rest. . . .

"It was a drama of noise beating against one's ears and against one's heart. . . . German shells came howling over into fields and villages beyond Bailleul, bursting with gruff coughs, and there was an evil snarl of shrapnel in the mist. . . .

"It was the noise of one of the greatest battles in history, and I listened to it with faith and hope that the enemy would be held back this day by our heroic men out there in those wet fields. Men were coming to their aid. Our guns were coming up, more gunners and more guns for this northern battle. . . .

"These men of ours have exceeded all their previous records of valor, though God knows they have filled three years and more with acts of courage. I should want hundreds of columns of this paper to tell in full all they have done during these last days."

Those days followed upon each other, while people's hearts were in their mouths, until, finally, came the great German defeat outside Ypres. On April 29, 1918, Philip Gibbs had the satisfaction of writing:

"It becomes clearer every hour that the enemy has suffered a disastrous defeat today. Attack after attack has been smashed up by our artillery and infantry . . . and he has not made a foot of ground on the British front."

THE MESOPOTAMIAN DISASTER

Revelation of the Extraordinary Conditions Leading to the Surrender of the British at Kut-el-Amara

THE surrender of General Townshend to the Turks at Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia on April 29, 1916, stung the British nation to the quick. Somebody was at fault; that seemed certain. An investigation was promptly started to ascertain why an expedition, begun with a good prospect of capturing Bagdad and bringing the Turkish war leaders to their knees, should have ended in such disappointment.

From the start no blame attached to Townshend. He had but done his duty; there was nothing but praise for his gallant defense of

Kut-el-Amara until hunger left only one course open to him. But for those higher up the record of events was not so favorable. More than one man in high position quaked uneasily when the commission appointed to investigate the Mesopotamian disaster began its work.

The commission consisted of Lord George Hamilton, Chairman; Lord Donoughmore; Lord Hugh Cecil, M. P.; Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge; General Sir Neville Lyttelton; Sir Archibald Williamson, M. P.; John Hodge, M.P.; and Commander Josiah Wedg-

wood, M. P. It was appointed in August, 1916, and submitted, on June 26, 1917, a report which proved to be one of the most sensational revelations of the war.

APPORTIONING THE BLAME

Summarized, the commission's findings as to the abortive advance on Bagdad that culminated in Townshend's surrender were as follows:

"The advance on Bagdad under the conditions existing in October, 1915, was an offensive movement based upon political and military miscalculations and attempted with tired and insufficient forces and inadequate preparation. It resulted in the surrender of more than a division of our finest fighting troops, and the casualties incurred in the ineffective attempts to relieve Kut amounted to some 23,000 men. The loss of prestige associated with these military failures was less than might have been anticipated owing to the deep impression made throughout and beyond the localities where the combats occurred by the splendid fighting power of the British and Indian forces engaged.

"Various authorities and high officials are connected with the sanction given to this untoward advance. Each and all, in our judgment, according to their relative and respective positions, must be made responsible for the errors in judgment to which they were parties and which formed the basis of their advice or orders.

"The weightiest share of responsibility lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance. The other persons responsible were: In India, the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge), and the Commander in Chief (Sir Beauchamp Duff); in England, the Military Secretary of the India Office (Sir Edmund Barrow), the Secretary of State for India (Austen Chamberlain), and the War Committee of the Cabinet. We put these names in the order and sequence of the responsibility. The expert advisers of the Government who were consulted also approved the advance and are responsible for their advice, but the papers submitted to us suggest that the approval of the naval military experts was reluctant and was perhaps partly induced by a natural desire not to disappoint the hopes of advantage to the general situation which the Government entertained. It is, however, notable that the experts unanimously anticipated no difficulty in the advance on Bagdad, but only in holding it.

"We have included the War Committee of the Cabinet and the Secretary of State for India among those upon whom responsibility for this misadventure rests. It is true that the War Committee and the Secretary of State acted upon the opinion of their expert military advisers, and that the Secretary of State only gave his assent to the advance after he had received an assurance from the General on the spot that he had an available force sufficient for his purpose. But so long as the system of responsible departmental administration exists in this country those who are political heads of departments in time of war, whether they be civilian or military, cannot be entirely immune from the consequences of their own action.

"The Cabinet from the first laid down the principle, from which it never departed, that questions jointly involving civil and military policy should, in existing circumstances, only be decided by the Cabinet. This authority it exercised throughout though at times it largely delegated its powers to the War Committee of the Cabinet."

STARVATION DURING THE SIEGE OF KUT

The Commission did not deal at length with conditions in Kut during its siege, but published, as an appendix, an account of the siege by Col. Hehir, principal medical officer to the besieged force.

He told how the Turks closed in on Gen. Townshend on Dec. 7th, and at first their assaults were numerous and severe; but after three days' fighting about Christmas the enemy was repulsed with such heavy losses that no serious attempts to storm the town were made for the remainder of the siege. The real enemy was starvation, and this compelled the surrender of the place on April 29, 1916, after a most gallant and tenacious defense of 147 days.

These extracts from Colonel Hehir's paper show the straits to which the garrison was reduced:

"During the last month of the siege, men at fatigues, such as trench-digging, after ten minutes' work had to rest a while and go at it again; men on sentry-go would drop down, those carrying loads would rest every few hundred yards; men availed themselves of every opportunity of lolling about or lying down. There were instances of Indians returning from trench duty in the evening seemingly with nothing the



© Underwood and Underwood.

General Townshend, the British Commander at Kut-el-Amara

The original Mesopotamian expedition led by Townshend came to disaster because of British blundering due to over confidence and inadequate preparation. It had almost reached Bagdad when it was forced to fall back on Kut, when, after being besieged by the Turks for 143 days, the British surrendered.

matter who lay down and were found dead in the morning—death due to starvation asthenia. Men in such a low state of vitality can stand little in the shape of illness. . . . All recuperative power had gone. At the end of the siege I doubt whether there was a single person equal to a five-mile march, carrying his equipment. Personally, up to the middle of March I could make a complete inspection of the front-line trenches and fort (about five miles) in the morning; I had then to halve it, and at the end of April, while doing even half, I had to rest on the way. Practically all officers were in the same condition of physical incapacity.

"The behavior of the troops throughout the siege was splendid. The defaulter's sheet of the British soldier was a *carte blanche*, and there was no grumbling; there was almost a complete absence of suicide and insanity.

"The difficulties in rationing the Indian troops were much enhanced by caste prejudices as to food. For a long time many of them refused to eat horse or mule flesh. Had it not been for this, these animals could not only have been used as food for the men, but the grain they consumed could have been devoted to the same purpose.

"Right up to the end of the siege General Townshend and his brigadiers retained the confidence and allegiance of their men. After the terms of surrender had been settled and the Generals were departing in a steamboat as prisoners of war their men formed up along the riverside and gave them a parting cheer as a proof of their unbroken loyalty."

EXPEDITION POORLY EQUIPPED

Every general who appeared before the Commission agreed that the Mesopotamian expedition was badly equipped. Sir Beauchamp Duff said that the Indian Army was organized only for semi-savage fighting, was ill-supplied, to a large extent had second-rate equipment, and was "backward in every particular."

The unpreparedness of the Indian Army for its task in Mesopotamia was primarily due to a long-standing policy of economy and restriction of military preparation to the needs of frontier warfare, for which the Home and Indian Governments were, of course, responsible, and not Sir Beauchamp Duff and the General Staff at Simla. But the unpreparedness for overseas warfare was well known to the Indian military authorities, and when they

undertook the management of an expedition which was to fight against Turkey supported by Germany they ought immediately to have striven energetically to bring the equipment of the expedition up to the standard of modern warfare. Serious defects in military equipment, resulting in unnecessary suffering and casualties among the troops, were allowed to persist month after month during the first fourteen months of the campaign, when the Indian Government was responsible for its management.

The Commission's finding on this part of its inquiry was as follows:

"During the period for which the Indian Government was responsible, the commissariat of the expedition cannot be said to have been up to the standard of our army in France, but there was no general break-down. The ration originally supplied to the Indian troops was deficient in nutritive qualities, and a serious outbreak of scurvy ensued.

"In other essentials the expedition was badly and insufficiently equipped, and little if any effort was made to remedy deficiencies until the War Office took over the expedition.

"Although, up to the time of the advance on Bagdad, the expedition was always numerically strong enough to cope with the Turkish forces, yet this result was only attained after protracted wrangling between the Governments at home and in India, neither of whom appeared willing to accept the task of reinforcing an expedition for the success of which they were jointly responsible.

DEFICIENCIES OF TRANSPORT

"1. From the first the paramount importance both of river and railway transport in Mesopotamia was insufficiently realized by the military authorities in India.

"2. A deficiency of river transport existed from the time the army left tidal water and advanced up river from Kurna. This deficiency became very serious as the lines of communication lengthened and the numbers of the force increased.

"3. Up to the end of 1915 the efforts made to rectify the deficiency of river transport were wholly inadequate.

"4. For want of comprehensive grasp of the transport situation, and insufficiency of river steamers, we find the military authorities in India are responsible. The responsibility is a grave one.

"5. River hospital steamers were an urgent requirement for the proper equipment of the expedition, and were not ordered until much too late.

"6. With General Sir J. Nixon rests the responsibility for recommending the advances in 1915 with insufficient transport and equipment. The evidence did not disclose an imperative need to advance without due preparation. For what ensued from shortage of steamers both as concerns suffering of the wounded and military losses General Sir John Nixon must, in such circumstances, be held to blame.

"7. During the first four months of 1916 the shortage of transport was fatal to the operations undertaken for the relief of Kut. Large reinforcements could not be moved to the front in time to take part in critical battles. . . .

COMPLETE MEDICAL BREAKDOWN

"From a very early stage in the campaign the sick and wounded underwent avoidable discomfort and at times great suffering, owing to deficiencies in medical arrangements, especially as regards river hospital steamers, land ambulance transport, hospitals, and medical personnel and equipment. The sufferings of the wounded from these defects became aggravated after the battle of Ctesiphon, and culminated during the Kut relief operations early in January, 1915, when there was a complete breakdown of the medical arrangements. . . .

"No river hospital steamers were provided for what it was known must be largely a riverine campaign. Consequently, until 1916, the sick and wounded had to use ordinary river transport steamers. These were always overburdened with ordinary transport work, were not infrequently used for carrying animals, and it was not always possible properly to clear them of their accumulations of filth and dung before they were used for sick and wounded troops. No wheeled ambulance transport was provided. It follows that ordinary army transport carts

were the only vehicles available for the sick and wounded where land transport was necessary. There is an overwhelming mass of evidence as to the inhumanity of using these carts for the wounded. Padding for them was not always available. In some cases dead bodies were even used as cushions. Even when padded they were cruel and dangerous for certain classes of wounded. All this must have been well known to Surgeon General Babbie, or might have been easily ascertained by inquiry or experiment. His only action in regard to developing a more suitable vehicle than the bullock tonga was to ask the Maharajah of Benares to provide a special corps of pony tongas, none of which was, however, available in Mesopotamia till long after Sir W. Babbie had left India.

WANT OF FRANKNESS

"In matters affecting the sick and wounded the want of frankness has painfully impressed the commission. A number of instances is given in which defects in medical arrangements were not reported. Perhaps the most striking of these is in connection with the medical breakdown after Ctesiphon, when over 3,500 wounded had to be removed from the battlefield to the river bank, in some cases a distance of ten miles, without proper ambulance transport, and with an insufficiency of medical personnel, of food, and of comforts, so that a large proportion of the wounded had to make their way on foot in spite of their injured condition. When they arrived at the river the available steamer accommodation was gravely inadequate."

TERRIBLE CONDITION OF WOUNDED

How one of these river convoys arrived at Basra is thus described by Major Carter, the medical officer in charge of an ocean hospital ship, which was waiting at Basra to receive the wounded:



A Camel Caravan Resting at the Ancient Fortress of Zobier, near Basra

"I was standing on the bridge on the evening when the *Medjidieh* arrived. She had two steel barges, without any protection against the rain, as far as I remember. As this ship, with two barges, came up to us I saw that she was absolutely packed, and the barges, too, with men. The barges were slipped and the *Medjidieh* was brought alongside the *Varela*. . . .

"When she was about 300 or 400 yards off it looked as if she was festooned with ropes. The stench when she was close was quite definite, and I found that what I mistook for ropes were dried stalactites of human feces. The patients were so huddled and crowded together on the ship that they could not perform the offices of nature clear of the edge of

of terribly bad bed sores. In my report I describe mercilessly to the Government of India how I found men with their limbs splinted with wood strips from whisky boxes, 'Bhoosa' wire, and that sort of thing."

The withdrawal of the wounded to Basra, which resulted in such appalling conditions, was officially reported to the Secretary of State as follows:

"Wounded satisfactorily disposed of. Many likely to recover in country, comfortably placed in hospitals at Amara and Basra. Those for invaliding are being placed direct on two hospital ships that were ready at Basra on ar-



An Arab Gun Dance

How the natives of the desert invoke the spirit of war and attest their loyalty.


the ship, and the whole of the ship's side was covered with stalactites of human feces. This is what I then saw. A certain number of men were standing and kneeling on the immediate perimeter of the ship. Then we found a mass of men huddled up anyhow—some with blankets and some without. They were lying in a pool of dysentery about thirty feet square. They were covered with dysentery and dejecta generally from head to foot. With regard to the first man I examined, I put my hand into his trousers and I thought he had a hemorrhage. His trousers were full almost to his waist with something warm and slimy. I took my hand out, and thought it was blood clot. It was dysentery. The man had a fractured thigh, and his thigh was perforated in five or six places. He had apparently been writhing about the deck of the ship. Many cases were almost as bad. There were a certain number of cases

rival of river boats. General condition of wounded very satisfactory. Medical arrangements under circumstances of considerable difficulty worked splendidly."

Surgeon General Hathaway, the principal medical officer in Mesopotamia, who was responsible for drafting the above telegram, afterward sent to India a detailed report of the evacuation of the wounded; and the commission says: "Nobody reading that report would gather that anything untoward had happened, or that the wounded had undergone any special or avoidable sufferings." The Commission's report says further:

MEDICAL PROVISION CENSURED

"The medical provision for the Mesopotamia campaign was from the beginning insufficient;



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Boundary Between Europe and Asia

The photo shows the narrowest part of the Bosphorus, the waterway uniting the Black Sea and the Sea of the Marmora at Constantinople. On the European side (in front) are situated in beautiful surroundings the residences of many wealthy Turks. The large white building at the left is Robert College (American). Since 1841 no ship of war other than Turkish has been allowed to pass through the Bosphorus (or the Dardanelles) without the consent of the Sublime Porte.

by reason of the continuance of this insufficiency there was a lamentable breakdown, causing severe and unavoidable suffering to the sick and wounded after the battle of Ctesiphon and the battles in January, 1916; there was amelioration in March and April, 1916; but since then the improvement has been continual, until it is reasonable to hope that now the medical provision is satisfactory. The main deficiencies were in river hospital steamers, medical personnel, river transports, and ambulance land transport.

"The Secretary of State showed an earnest and continuous anxiety as to the condition of the wounded, and the only comment that can be made upon his procedure is that he did not fully utilize the official powers at his disposal for the purpose of proposing at an earlier period an investigation into the treatment of the wounded in Mesopotamia.

"To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the general responsibility attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government. In regard to the actual medical administration he showed throughout the utmost good-will, but considering the paramount authority of his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and preemptory.

"A more severe censure must be passed upon the Commander-in-Chief in India, who failed

closely to superintend the adequacy of medical provision in Mesopotamia. He declined for a considerable time, until ultimately forced by the superior authority of the Viceroy, to give credence to rumors which proved to be true, and failed to take the measures which a subsequent experience shows would have saved the wounded from avoidable suffering."

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISASTER

The Commission's findings as to the division of responsibility were:

"The division of responsibility between the India Office and the Indian Government, the former undertaking policy and the latter the management of the expedition, was, in the circumstances, unworkable. The Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain, who controlled the policy, did not have cognizance of the capacity of the expedition to carry out the policy. The Indian Government, which managed the expedition, did not accompany developments of policy with the necessary preparations, even when they themselves proposed those developments. The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in advance, so as to make each successful move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan."

BRITISH GENERALSHIP

A Candid Discussion by an Englishman of the Failures and the Weaknesses of Britain's Military Commanders

By PHILIP GIBBS

FOR many years after this war, perhaps in every generation that follows the men who fought in it, there will be criticism and controversy about its generalship. Mud will be thrown—not in handfuls, but in bucket-loads—upon the French and British generals, perhaps also upon American generals, by officers and men who believe that battalions were needlessly sacrificed in certain actions; that horrible blunders were made from time to time, and that victory might have been gained at less cost if the strategy and tactics of the High Command had been more scientific, and

quicker in understanding the enemy's weakness or strength in certain places on certain days. There is no man at present who can give exact judicial decisions upon the particular conduct of the generals in the fields, whoever they may be, because a mass of minute and technical evidence is required before there can be a summing up of defense or blame in even a small action, still more in a series of battles like those fought on the British front, and that is hardly available.

All that is possible at the present time is to analyze in a broad and general way the

leading qualities of our command, and to touch upon some of the weaknesses and failures of the system, character and actions of the commanders. In this article I propose to put down, not in any dogmatic spirit, some of the conclusions I have reached about British generalship, as far as I was able to observe it during the war. The official war correspondents with the British armies in the field, of whom I had the honor to be one, had considerable opportunity of gauging the quality of the generals in command, because we visited their headquarters constantly during the progress of battles, had a close knowledge of their staffs, and enjoyed personal friendship with many of them who came as guests to our own mess or invited us to theirs.

MEN OF ADMIRABLE CHARACTER

From the point of view of personal character, no body of men could be more admirable, as great gentlemen of the old-fashioned English type—which is a very good type too, in its own way. They had the easy dignity of men who belonged to good English, Irish and Scottish families, and who, for the most part, had been dedicated from youth to the profession of arms, like their fathers and grandfathers, as a hereditary caste. Many of them had served in India, Egypt and South Africa, and had gained distinction first of all in their young days by personal gallantry, and then by administrative talent or prestige in their own profession. The "social pull" had been abandoned during the South African War, and certainly in this war there were no society favorites in our High Command owing their position to petticoat or aristocratic influence in exalted places. Instead, there was a certain clannishness of command, due to the influence of the cavalry as the premier branch of the Army. This was noticeable by the number of cavalry generals among the military chiefs, Sir John (afterward Lord) French and Sir Douglas Haig, both our commanders-in-chief, being of the cavalry school of training and tradition. In a war which depended less upon cavalry (as far as the Western front was concerned) than any war in history, this perhaps was unfortunate, though no commander-in-chief needs deep technical knowledge of engineering, chemistry and other subjects which

enter largely into modern warfare, provided he has the greater quality of generalship, including personal magnetism as an influence over the imagination of his troops, rapidity and sureness of judgment, and the intuitive sense of action which belongs alone to genius. Physically many of our generals were curiously alike. They were men turned fifty, with square jaws, tan ruddy faces, searching and rather stern gray eyes, closely cropped hair



Field Marshal Earl Roberts

Before the war he consistently pointed out England's military weakness, advocating universal training instead of a volunteer army.

growing white, with a little white moustache neatly trimmed on the upper lip.

General Horne, of the First Army; General Byng, of the Third Army; General Rawlinson, of the Fourth Army; General Haldane, of the Sixth Army; General Haiken, of the Eleventh Corps; General Snow, of the Seventh Corps, with many divisional generals, like DeLisle, Nogent, Braithwaite, Ferguson, Congreve and Pinnie, could all be described in that way, in spite of marked individual difference, as all mothers' sons differ from one another.

Mentally they had similar qualities. They had unfailing physical courage—though cour-

age is not put to the test much in modern generalship, which, above the rank of brigadier, works far from the actual line of battle, unless it "slips" in the wrong direction. They were stern disciplinarians, and tested the quality of troops by their smartness in saluting and on parade, which did not account for the fighting merit of the Australians. Most of them were conservative by political tradition and hereditary instinct, and conservative also in military ideas and methods. They distrusted



Major-General Wallace
Commander of the British Western Frontier
Forces in Egypt.

the "brilliant" fellow and were inclined to think him unsafe; and they were not quick to allow young men to gain high command at the expense of their gray hair and experience. They were industrious, able, conscientious men, never sparing themselves long hours of work for a life of ease, and because they were willing to sacrifice their own lives, if need be, for their country's sake, they demanded equal willingness of sacrifice from every officer and from every man under their authority, having no mercy whatever for the slacker or the weakling.

NO GENERAL WITH MAGNETISM

It is unfortunate that among these British generals there was not one whose personality had that mysterious but essential quality of great generalship—inspiring large bodies of men with exalted enthusiasm, devotion and faith. It did not seem to matter very much to the men whether an army commander, a corps commander or a divisional commander stood in the roadside to watch them march past on their way to battle, or on their way back. They saw one of these sturdy men in his "brass hat," with his ruddy face and white moustache, but no thrill passed down their ranks, no hoarse cheers broke from them because he was there, as when Wellington sat on his white horse in the Peninsular War, or as when Napoleon saluted his Old Guard, or even as when Lord Roberts, "Our Bobs," came perched like a little old falcon on his big charger. Nine men out of ten in the ranks did not even know the name of their army general or of the corps commander. It meant nothing to them. They did not face death with more passionate courage to win the approval of a military idol. That was due partly to the conditions of modern warfare, which makes it difficult for generals of high rank to get into direct personal touch with their troops, and to the masses of men engaged. But those difficulties could have been overcome by a general of impressive personality, able to stir the imaginations of men by words of fire spoken at the right time, by deep human sympathy, and by the luck of victory seized by daring adventure against great odds.

No such man appeared on the Western front until Foch obtained the supreme command. On the British front there was no general with the gift of speech—a gift too much despised by our British men of action—or with a character and prestige which could raise him to the service rank in popular imagination. During the retreat from Mons, Sir John French had a touch of that personal power—his presence meant something to the men because of his reputation in South Africa; but afterward, when trench warfare began and the daily routine of slaughter under German gun-fire, when our artillery was weak, and when our infantry was reduced to attack fixed positions of terrible strength, without adequate

support and not a dog's chance of luck against such odds, the prestige of the commander-in-chief faded from men's minds and he lost place in their admiration. It was washed out in blood and mud.

HAIG'S SHYNESS HIS WEAK POINT

Sir Douglas Haig, who followed French, had the disadvantage of inheriting the disillusionment of armies who saw now that war on the Western front was to be a long and protracted struggle, with enormous slaughter, and no visible sign of the end beyond a vista of dreadful years. Sir Douglas Haig, in his general headquarters at St. Omer, and afterward at Montreuil, near the coast, had the affection and loyalty of the staff officers. A man of remarkably good looks, with the fine delicate features strengthened by the firm line of his jaw, and of singular sweetness, courtesy and simplicity in his manner toward all who approached him, he had qualities which might have raised him to the supreme height of personal influence among his armies, but for one defect in his character and the tragic condition of his command. He was intensely shy and reserved, shrinking from publicity in an almost morbid way, and holding himself aloof from the human side of war. He was constitutionally unable to make a dramatic gesture before a multitude, or to say easy, stirring things to officers and men whom he reviewed. His shyness and reserve prevented him also, I think, from knowing as much as he ought to have known about the opinions of officers and men and getting direct information from them. Unfortunately, too, he held the supreme command of the British armies on the Western front when, in the battlefields of the Somme and Flanders, of Picardy and Artois, there was not much chance for daring strategy, but only for hammer strokes by the flesh and blood of men against fortress positions—the German trench systems, twenty-five miles deep in tunneled earth-works and machine-gun dugouts—when the immensity of casualties among British troops was out of all proportion to their gains of ground, so that our men's spirits revolted against these massacres of their youth and they became embittered against the generalship and staff work which directed these sacrificial actions.

PREJUDICE AGAINST THE STAFF

There were times when the sense of bitterness became intense to the point of fury, so that a young staff officer, in his red tabs, with a jaunty manner, was like a red rag to a bull among battalion officers and men, and they desired his death exceedingly, exalting his little



© By Rogers.

Major-General Robertson

Originally an officer's servant and then a trooper, William R. Robertson rose in the caste-bound British service before the war to the rank of major-general, through sheer merit and dogged persistence. He acted as Chief of the General Staff from 1915 to early in 1918.

personality, dressed in a well-cut tunic and fawn-colored riding breeches and highly polished top boots, into the supreme folly of "the Staff" which made men attack impossible positions, sent down conflicting orders, issued a litter of documents—called by an ugly name—containing impracticable instructions, to the torment of the adjutants and to the scorn of the troops. This prejudice against the staff was stacked high by the fires of passion and

despair. A good deal of it was utterly unjust, and even the jaunty young staff officer, with red tabs and polished boots, was often not quite such a fool as he looked, but a gallant fellow who had proved his pluck in the early days of the war and was now doing his duty—about equal to the work of a boy clerk—with real industry and an exaggerated sense of its importance. Personally and with utter



Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig

In August, 1914, he was in command of the British camp at Aldershot where part of the "contemptible little army" was in training.

honesty, I can pay high tribute to many of our staff officers at divisional, corps and army headquarters, because of their industry, efficiency and devotion to duty. And during the progress of battle I have seen them, hundreds of times, working desperately for long hours, without much rest or sleep, so that the fighting men should get their food and munitions, so that the artillery should support their actions, and the troops in reserve move up to their relief at the proper time and place.

All the administrative side of our war was quite marvelous in its method and organization, and the armies were worked like clock-work machines. The transport was good beyond all words of praise, and there was one thing which never failed to reach poor old Tommy Atkins, unless he was cut off by shell-fire, and that was his food. The motor supply columns and ammunition dumps were organized to the last item of efficiency. Our map department was magnificent, and the admiration of the French. Our intelligence branch was, as a rule, excellent, and often almost uncanny in the accuracy of its information about the enemy's disposition and plans. So that the staff was not altogether hopeless in its effect, as the young battalion officers, with sharp tongues and a sense of injustice in their hearts, made out, with pardonable blasphemy, in their dugouts.

Nevertheless, there was a good deal to criticize justly enough, and there is no doubt that British generalship and staff work made many mistakes, some of them no doubt unavoidable, because it is human to err, and some of them due to sheer, simple, regrettable stupidity.

EARLY DESIRE TO GAIN WORTHLESS GROUND

In the early days the outstanding fault of our generals, it seems to me, was their desire to gain ground which was utterly worthless when gained. They organized small attacks against strong positions, dreadfully costly to take, and after the desperate valor of men had seized a few yards of mangled earth, found that they had made another small salient, jutting out from their front in a V-shaped wedge, so that it was a death-trap for the men who had to hold it. This was done again and again, and I remember one distinguished officer saying, with bitter irony, remembering how many of his men had died, "Our generals must have their little V's at any price, to justify themselves at G. H. Q."

In the battles of the Somme they attacked isolated objectives on narrow fronts, so that the enemy swept our men with fire by artillery concentrated from all points, instead of having to disperse his fire during a general attack on a wide front. In the days of trench warfare, when the enemy artillery was much stronger

than ours and when his infantry strength was enormously greater, our generals insisted upon the British troops adopting an "aggressive" attitude, with the result that they were shot to pieces, instead of adopting, like the French, a quiet and waiting attitude until the time came for a sharp and terrible blow. The battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos, in 1915, cost us thousands of casualties, and gave us no gain of any account; and both generalship and staff work were, in the opinion of most officers who know anything of those battles, grievously at fault.

MEN HAD TO DIE THAT THEY MIGHT LEARN

After all, our generals had to learn their lessons, like the private soldier and the young staff officer, in conditions of warfare which had never been seen before—and it was bad for the private soldier and the young battalion officer, who died so they might learn. As time went on staff work improved, and British generalship was less rash in optimism and less rigid in ideas. I am certain from what I know of war that the generalship and staff work of the Second Army, commanded by General Sir Herbert Plumer, was as near perfection as any human organization may be, and all British officers who served in that Army will agree. Sir Herbert Plumer did, I think, more nearly approach the position of a leader of men by personality, than any other commander I can mention, except perhaps General Birdwood—known to all his men as "Birdie," because of his dapper figure—who commanded the Australian Corps. Plumer's old bull-dog face and blue eyes were known to his men, and they liked him and had faith in him, chiefly because he was anxious for their comfort and never "let them down" in all the spade work that must be done to insure success in battle. The battle of Wytschaete and Messines, on June 7, 1917, was the most perfectly organized battle of which I know anything, and was a great and complete victory, owing entirely to preliminary preparations of all details. Sir Herbert Plumer had the advantage of being advised by a Chief of Staff who had real genius, and was, in my humble opinion, the one sustaining brain of the British armies in the fields, although unknown to popular fame. This was Sir John

Harington, who had a brain like a sharp sword, an immense grasp of detail, and a fine nobility of character which was like a flame of burning endeavor. Colonel Mitchell, directing the intelligence branch of the Second Army, was also a man of outstanding ability, and many other staff officers in that Army were brilliant and able men.

The effect of such staff work was apparent throughout the Army, and there was very little



Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood
Commander of the Australian Corps

of that hostility between battalion officers and the staff which was violent in expression elsewhere on the front.

THE TRAGEDY OF THE SECOND ARMY

Unfortunately, by tragic irony, the staff of the Second Army had to direct its energy to the organization of the series of battles in Flanders during 1917 in coöperation with the Fifth Army, under General Gough, on its left. And owing to the state of the ground, mangled into chaos by artillery, with hundreds of brooks overflowing their broken banks and with incessant rains for five months, those

attacks were murderous to our men. And there was the most horrible mess of blood and mud on the way from Ypres to Passchendaele which has ever been seen in the history of war. The enemy was slaughtered in immense numbers, and the battles of Flanders were part of the frightful process of breaking the German spirit, but the cost to the youth of the British Empire was appalling. The Second Army



Lieutenant General Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough, K. C. B.

He commanded the British Fifth Army in the third battle of Ypres, March, 1918, where the Germans almost broke through, imperiling the whole British line.

organized each battle with masterly attention to detail—startling in its contrast to the handling of other troops—but it was an organization of martyrdom to English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Australian and Canadian boys, who suffered 800,000 casualties in that black year of 1917.

I have already dealt elsewhere with the episode of the British retreat in March and April, of 1918, and pointed out certain weaknesses and misfortunes of the Fifth Army,

under the command of General Gough—the taking of a longer time in order to satisfy the French at a time when our armies had been grievously weakened by all those losses, the absence of men of our best fighting divisions sent to the relief of Italy, and the lack of defensive lines strong enough to check the onrush of such overwhelming odds as the enemy launched against us when he attacked with one hundred and fourteen divisions to our forty-eight. During these bad days staff work was strained and broken for a time, owing to the break-down of communications between the fighting units and headquarters, and what orders were given were often late, contradictory and impossible of fulfilment owing to a situation which changed from hour to hour. But in due time—in the last nick of time—the enemy was checked, and British generalship redeemed its reputation by the wonderful sweep back, when, in August of last year, after Foch had struck his deadly blow on the Marne, with French, American and British troops, the whole British line moved forward and gained a series of victories by repeated hammer strokes which, as Marshal Foch declared, broke the enemy to bits.

THE LAST BATTLES

Those last battles, lasting from August 8th to November 11th, were fine in generalship, and for the first time Sir Douglas Haig and his army staff were able to get the enemy on the run by a series of strategical and tactical operations well devised, and carried out to success with the help of the valor of 300,000 young boys who had come out to fill up the gaps in the old ranks, and with the gallant aid of two American divisions—the 27th and the 30th.

So, after all, in spite of all criticism, British generalship was justified, and they gained the last victories over the German generals—those professional war chiefs, who made more blunders than ours, in spite of all their science and all their power. In spite of what I have said in criticism—rather sweeping in its scope—I must not be thought to deny the solid ability of many corps and divisional generals, though in my opinion they did not possess great genius.

Sir Julian Byng, formerly commanding the



Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, K. C. B.

Commander of the Canadian Forces in France.

Canadian Corps and afterward the Third Army, is a man of firm will and some audacity of imagination, and many qualities of the great soldier. General Haldane, of the Sixth Corps, who formerly commanded the glorious old 3rd Division, splendid in a score of battles, is a man of keen intellect, vital energy and ruthless purpose. General Harper, of the Fourth Corps, known affectionately as "Uncle Harper" when he commanded the 51st Highland Division, of death-

less renown in this war, impressed me as a soldier of strong character and decision, and had the trust of his men. General Nugent, of the 36th (Ulster) Division, and General Hickey, of the 16th (Irish) Division, were fine divisional commanders. General Elles, commanding the Tank Corps, proved himself to be a man of extraordinary merit in organization of those new fighting machines, with a simple nobility of soul which endeared him to all his officers.

There were many other able, conscientious, gallant men commanding our divisions. What mainly was wrong with British generalship was the system which put the high command into the hands of a group of men belonging to the old school of war, unable, by reason of their age and traditions, to get away from rigid methods and to become elastic in face of new conditions.

Our staff college had been hopelessly inefficient in its system of training, if I am justified in forming such an opinion from some specimens produced by it, who had the brains of canaries and the manners of Potsdam. There was also a close corporation among the officers of the Regular Army, so that they took the lion's share of staff appointments, thus keeping out brilliant young men of the new armies, whose brain-power, to say the least of it, was on a higher level than that of the Sandhurst standard. Here and there, where the unprofessional soldier obtained a chance of

high command or staff authority, he proved the value of the business mind applied to war, and this was seen very clearly—blindingly—in the able generalship of the Australian Corps, in which most of the commanders, like Generals Hobbs, Monash and others, were men in civil life before the war.

The same thing was observed in the Canadian Corps, General Currie, the corps commander, having been an estate agent, and many of his high officers having had no military training of any scientific importance before they handled their own men in France and Flanders.

This war, however, was not won by great generalship, either among the British, French, or American armies. It was won by the valor of the private soldiers and their young regimental officers. It was won by the faith and spirit of sacrifice of gallant youth, who, in spite of tragic blunders and frightful slaughter, fought their way to victory.

THE NIGHT OF THE ULTIMATUM

Unhesitating, Foreseeing the Consequences, Little Belgium Gave the Only Answer Her Honor Could Conceive

BELGIUM shall rise again; her fields resume their fecund joyousness; her villages and towns and cities revive in beauty and industrial thrift; her hills clothe themselves anew with forest luxuriance; her people again serene in the purposeful ways of peace; but never shall pass from the memory of man the picture of her desolation by the most savage, wantonly brutal and cynically infamous invasion in the history of Civilization.

The tragedy of Belgium can never be set into words, for imagination itself is baffled by the turpitude of that incredible violation. But when the story is told as best it may be, not the least moving feature of it will be the attempt to define the agonized suspense of those few days when hope was desperately held that Germany's honor had not been wholly effaced by the harlotry of lust. Alfred de Bassompierre, a director of the Belgian Foreign Office, has made a memorandum of

that brief period from which the future ideal historian may draw inspiration.

On July 28, 1914, the Belgian Minister at Vienna wired his government that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia. Promptly the Council of Ministers met under the presidency of King Albert and decided to put the Belgian Army on a stronger peace footing. The next day (Wednesday) and the day following, the little Kingdom was in great commotion. On Friday it was known that Germany was preparing for general mobilization, and, strangely, Holland was putting her Army on a war footing. There was apprehension in Belgium, despite the reminder of the guarantee (Germany a signatory) of Belgium's neutrality. That evening the Council decreed the general mobilization of the Belgian Army. At 10 o'clock the Foreign Minister is notified by the English Minister that Sir Edward Grey has asked both France and



© Underwood and Underwood.

Equestrian Statue of the King of Belgium

It has been set up in the quadrangle of Burlington Gardens, London, where it attracted much favorable attention during the Royal Academy Exhibition in 1918. The sculptor is Walter Winans.

Germany if they will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

"NOTHING TO FEAR FROM GERMANY"

The next day, August 1st, France makes answer: she will respect the neutrality of Belgium, but may find it necessary to her attitude to protect her own interests if that neutrality is violated by "another power." Germany keeps silence. The German Ambassador, von Below-Saleske, has been reminded of German promises: that of Bethmann-Hollweg in 1911, that of von Jagow in 1913. The Ambassador has answered that Germany's sentiments have not changed. He makes no answer for Germany, but gives it as his personal opinion that Belgium has nothing to fear from Germany. That day comes news from Petrograd that Germany has declared war on Russia.

Then comes the report of the invasion of Luxemburg. Belgium is stunned. Will Germany dare break over the Belgian frontier? Or is it true that her troops are marching so as to avoid Belgian soil?

"We tried to cling to this hope," says Alfred de Bassompierre, "as drowning men cling at straws. Suddenly an usher opened the door, and said unceremoniously and excitedly: 'The German Minister has just gone in to see M. Davignon.' It was the night of August 2d-3d, in the Foreign Office.

"We all three understood that the fate of our dear little country was about to be decided at that solemn moment.

"Ten minutes, which seemed hours to us, passed. Then, at 7:30, Herr von Below-Saleske's haughty silhouette appeared on the opposite side of the courtyard, under the glass penthouse in front of the Ministers' anteroom, and the German Emperor's representative passed unmoved into the street, where his motor car was waiting. With one bound we were in M. Davignon's room. It was empty, but at the same moment the Minister, who had gone into the next room to call his chief secretary, Comte Le d'Ursel, returned, holding a paper in his hand, and followed by the Count and by M. Costermans, the Under-secretary. All three of them seemed to be overwhelmed.

"'Bad news, very bad news,' said the Minister, who was extremely pale. 'Here is the

German note, of which Herr von Below has given me a summary. They demanded free passage for the German Army.'

"'And what answer did your excellency give?'

"'I took the paper. . . . We have twelve hours for our answer. . . . But I could not restrain my indignation. . . . Germany, who professed to be our devoted friend, proposing our dishonor. Let us translate the note.'

**A HISTORIC MOMENT AT THE BELGIAN
FOREIGN OFFICE**

"The whole scene is indelibly printed on my memory—the faces of the listeners, the thoughts that raced through my brain, even the look of the paper on which I wrote down in French the sentences of the ultimatum. I do not think that I can ever forget one of these details.

"We had completed about a third of the German note when the Prime Minister entered. He greeted us rapidly, and sat down by M. Davignon. M. de Brouqueville crossed his arms, and remained lost in thought, his chin resting on his hand, until the translation was completed.

"When the work was finished, M. de Brouqueville asked me to read the note aloud in French, which I did with profound emotion, though I made an effort to preserve the usual tone of my voice.

"A silence, a long tragic silence of several minutes followed the reading of the document. . . . We had just heard the infamous ultimatum for the first time, and we were thinking. . . . In the mind of each of us, perhaps, the tender memory of our beloved country, in its peace and innocence, was succeeded by some vague idea of the horrors that were coming upon it; but the one dominant thought in our minds was undoubtedly the determination to be worthy of our ancestors in the great days of trial. It was evident that the German note simply made use of the alleged intention of France to march upon the Meuse as a pretext, and that the ultimatum was, in the plainest words, a summons to sacrifice our neutrality in the interests of the formidable Germany. Those who had drawn it up had not for a moment imagined that Belgium, a country occupying so small



Belgium Triumphant

Painting by Edward A. Wilson

Digitized by Google

a space upon the map of Europe, would have dared not to yield without protest to the will of our all-powerful neighbor. Those who read it, on the other hand, having a different mentality, immediately, spontaneously, without hesitation knew that only one answer was possible:—a peremptory and indignant 'No!'

"The Secretary-General broke the silence.

Addressing the Minister of War, Baron van der Elst, he asked him: 'Well, Your Excellency, are we ready?'

"There was a silence, shorter than the first, but not the less impressive. Then M. de Brouqueville, very calm, and perfectly master of himself, replied slowly and in measured tones: 'Yes, we are ready!'"

THE DARKEST DAYS OF ALL

Inside the British Lines When the Germans Threw Their Full Weight
Into the Drive on Amiens in March, 1918

BY PHILIP GIBBS

NOW that victory is ours, we may look back with steady eyes at bad times when it was hard to know the truth and still keep faith and courage. For the British armies in France and Belgium, and for those who counted upon their strength, the darkest days of all began in March of 1918, when the Germans launched their offensive against the British lines and drove us back in hard retreat over a great stretch of country which our men had gained by enormous sacrifice of life through years of fighting. I saw the scenes of that retreat and I confess now that when I saw our men coming back over the old Somme battlefields, when I saw remnants of our fine divisions so exhausted that they could hardly stand and so weak in numbers that they had no chance of resisting the enemy's onslaught outside towns like Albert and Amiens which had been ours since the early days of the war, I was haunted by the thought that perhaps after all our enormous efforts and losses, victory might not be ours.

It was worse a month afterwards when the group of armies under Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, in Flanders, started their northern attack, broke through our lines between Festubert and Givenchy, forced the passage of the River Lys, struck northward and captured Bailleul, swarmed back over Passchendaele and all the ridges round Ypres which had cost England the lives of thousands of her sons to take, and took Kemmel Hill from

the French who had come up to support us. Then, indeed, it looked as though the worst might happen.

Kemmel Hill was the key of all our northern defense and the very key of the coast and the channel ports. With Amiens menaced, the road to Abbeville thinly guarded by spent and broken divisions, and Kemmel Hill in the hands of the enemy, we who were on the ground knew that our fate hung on a thin thread of fortune, a thread depending for its strength on the thin lines of British soldiers, tired, fighting in small groups against great odds, but with no surrender in their gallant souls.

England did not know what touch-and-go it was on the edge of irreparable disaster. I don't think England knows now, nor how hard pressed her men were in those days, nor how great their losses. For though I and other war correspondents described the retreat day by day in great detail we could not tell our people, nor the world, the full measure of our peril, nor the extremity of our weakness; and in any case the spirit of England was so strong in belief of final victory that the gravest disasters did not shake her faith. Those of us in the field then thought that this sublime confidence was almost callous, and it irritated us to anger, knowing the frightful danger and the awful losses; but looking back to that time I see that England was right, and her faith justified.

800,000 BRITISH CASUALTIES IN 1917

What were the causes of the greatest disaster that has ever befallen British arms? The answer to that question is not easy because it involves many factors and events in the past history of the war. It is linked up with the battles of Flanders, fought between July and December of 1917, followed by the adventure in the Cambrai salient which began with a brilliant victory and ended with an unfortunate reverse at the close of the year.



Prince Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria
He commanded the German Armies in Flanders
in the critical days in March, 1918.

The battles of Flanders had been designed to capture the ridges round Ypres and gain the Belgian coast at Ostend and Zeebrugge at a time when a great part of the German Army should be engaged by an important and continuous series of battles by the French in the Champagne district under the supreme command of General Nivelle. By the greatest bad luck, partly owing to the success of Hindenburg's new system of "elastic defense," the French attack did not make progress and came to a dead halt after heavy losses. The British battles of Flanders began late and British troops instead of encountering an enemy who should have been heavily engaged

at the same time opposite the French lines had to attack the strongest German divisions which could be replaced on the orders of the German General Staff by fresh divisions from other parts of the line whenever they were shattered by the British assault.

For nearly five months this happened, our troops attacking and capturing the ridges in the foulest conditions of rain and mud, and although we inflicted enormous losses upon the finest troops of the German Army—I saw their dead in heaps about the "pillboxes" (or concrete block houses) on the way to Passchendaele—our own casualties reached terrible figures and we failed to gain the Belgian coast. Lord Northcliffe's estimate was 800,000 casualties to the British armies in 1917, and seventy-five per cent. of those were on the Western front. The adventure in the Cambrai salient in November of that year, when our surprise attack with tanks broke the Hindenburg line and when our gallant troops after all that fighting in Flanders took 90,000 prisoners and much ground, cost us numbers of valuable lives a week later owing to the counter surprise by General von Marwitz, when our men had to fight desperate rear-guard actions. So at the end of 1917 after all these bloody battles the British armies were terribly weakened in numbers, the gaps in their ranks not being replaced in many divisions by new drafts, and their strength was still further decreased by the loss of three of their finest divisions who were rushed off to Italy under the command of General Plumer to turn the tide of the Italian disaster which had then happened.

FRENCH DOUBTS HURT BRITISH

It was at that time, when the British armies on the Western front were weakest, that Sir Douglas Haig was called upon to take over a longer line of front south of St. Quentin, and it was at that time, in the beginning of 1918, that the Germans transferred many of their divisions from Russia to France and Belgium with the menace of an overwhelming attack upon the British and French lines. The pressure upon Sir Douglas Haig to take over a longer front was insistent. The French believed that England was not "pulling her weight"—poor old England who was strain-



© Underwood and Underwood.

A Mass Attack from the Air

Forty British airplanes on their way to bomb German naval bases.

ing every muscle to keep her mines going to provide coal not only for her own needs but for the factories of France and Italy, and to turn out vast quantities of ammunition and guns, and to maintain a vast and expanding fleet, and to fill up the gaps in an army which had suffered 800,000 casualties in a single year. She was pulling some weight and panting in the process. But the French people, sincerely and without malice, did not think so, and they started a campaign in the press and in political circles, pointing out the length of the line they held (forgetting that length of line does not count so much as the number of enemy divisions engaged on any front) and the greatness of their own sacrifices.

Articles of a bitter tone found their way into the English press—and hurt us pretty badly. There was pressure at Versailles. It came over to the Prime Minister and his advisers in Downing Street, and it was transferred with urgent requests to Sir Douglas Haig. He knew the weakness of his strength with that German menace growing against him, but to satisfy France he yielded to the demand and our troops “side-slipped” and took over the line of battle north and south of St. Quentin down to La Fère on the Oise, where I met our London troops who stared over to

the German lines, so silent there, and said: “When is this blinking battle going to begin?”

“DISASTER IF WE LOSE AMIENS”

Meanwhile the German menace was creeping nearer to us and increasing in its frightful possibilities. In January there were 183 German divisions on the Western front, about equal to the Allied strength. By the beginning of March there were 207 German divisions. Our Intelligence officers did wonderful work at this time and no German unit moved without their knowledge within a week or two of its departure. By espionage in German territory, by aerial reconnaissances, and information obtained from prisoners, they learnt every detail of the German decision to concentrate their full military weight in a last effort to smash their way to victory. They mapped out the enormous increase in the number of ammunition dumps, batteries, aerodromes, light railways, and field hospitals behind the German lines, and they gained knowledge of the intensive training which was being practised by German storm troops for a new method of attack.

As one of our Intelligence officers said to me in February of 1918: “England ought to

be saying her prayers because in another month her fate, and the fate of the world, will be at stake." The evidence for this was overwhelming. Yet in spite of thousands of small facts collected by our Intelligence, all bearing out the same deduction, there was a strange unbelief in the reality of the peril that threatened us among men of responsibility. Mr. Bonar Law said: "I am skeptical of the great German offensive," and the Army itself shared his skepticism.

During the weeks preceding the German onslaught on March 21st I was about the lines from Arras to the south of St. Quentin, against which the enemy's assault was delivered, and had the opportunity of talking to many generals and officers about the probability of a huge German offensive. Out of thirteen of these generals, commanding divisions upon which the attack would fall if it came,

there were only two who believed in its likelihood. The others said: "It is all bluff," or "G. H. Q. has the wind up." Some of them standing as we talked in sight of the German lines, where there seemed to be utter solitude, and "nothing doing" except the usual harassing fire from isolated batteries, were dogmatic in explaining to me why the Germans would not risk their remaining man power in such a gamble which was bound to fail. . . . A few days later the tide of the German Army had rolled over the positions which these generals had held. The British troops were just as optimistic as their leaders. "What will happen," I asked one of them, "if Fritz tries to come across?" "He will catch a cold in the head," said the man, and this answer was typical of all those I received.


A week or so before the opening of the German offensive I had an interview with Gen-



© Underwood and Underwood.

British Blowing Up Ammunition Dumps

During the British withdrawal in the summer of 1918, owing to the mad rush of the oncoming German forces, many ammunition bases were blown up to prevent their falling into the hands of the foe.



© Underwood and Underwood.

All in the Day's Work

A scene during the great battle that developed around the German drive in Flanders in 1918. German wounded who were rescued by the British are lying intermingled with British wounded waiting for transportation to a hospital.

eral Gough, commanding the Fifth Army, on the right of our line, through which the enemy afterwards broke. He was not one of those who disbelieved in the impending attack and he was very frank in facing its possibilities. He showed me maps of his Fifth Army front, pointed out how he had adopted a system of defense by a series of machine-gun redoubts in advance of the main battle positions and how behind that main battle line were three other lines upon which our men could fall back if hard pressed. Then he said: "If the enemy attacks in great strength we shall have to give ground, and the public must be prepared for this. But the giving up of ground will not matter very much so long as we fall back to other good positions and keep our line intact. It will be in no sense of the word a disaster. After all our natural line of defense is the River Somme. If we had to lose that the situation would certainly be serious, but not even then a great disaster. . . . It would be a disaster only if we lost our hold on Amiens."

I am bound to say that these words made me feel rather cold. The mere possibility of losing the Somme crossings so far behind our front at that time was an awful thought, and the mention of Amiens, forty miles back from the line, sent a shiver through one's body. . . . We waited with a dreadful apprehension for the rolling up of the curtain which hid the mystery behind the German lines, and we did not have long to wait.

FORTY-FIVE MILE BRITISH FRONT

The French on our right were as fully aware of the monstrous concentration behind the enemy's front as our own Intelligence officers, but they were convinced that at least half this weight would fall against themselves in the opening stage of the battle. It was a miscalculation. The full weight of the German blow was hurled against the British lines on a forty-five mile front, between Bullecourt, north of Bapaume, and La Fère, south of St. Quentin. That ground was held on the north by the Third British Army under General Sir Julian Byng and by the Fifth Army on the south under General Sir Hubert Gough; and forty-eight British divisions were attacked in the course of this offensive by 114 German

divisions of picked and specially trained storm troops. They were overwhelming odds and the luck of war was on their side at the beginning of the battles. Our new system of defense on the Fifth Army front by which our front line was held by a series of machine-gun redoubts in advance of the main battle positions played into the hands of the Germans' new method of attack, owing to the foggy weather in which the offensive opened.

The enemy's new form of assault, which they had first tried against the Italians with startling success, was by what is now known as "infiltration." That is to say, while they were attacking frontally under the cover of storms of high explosives and gas shells and feeling for weaknesses in their enemy's line they widened any gap they might make and dribbled through machine gunners of high skill and courage with orders to penetrate as deeply as they could and with the assurance that they would be followed and supported by a continuous chain of men also relying exclusively on machine-gun fire.

So it happened that although the greater part of our Third Army front held on to their trenches against the German frontal attacks, which they met with a withering fire causing immense slaughter in the enemy's ranks, they found themselves under deadly machine-gun fire from their left and right flanks by bodies of men who were driving wedges between them in ever increasing numbers which threatened to cut in behind them and bar any way of escape. On our Fifth Army front our system of redoubts and the fog which enveloped them so that our machine gunners could not see twenty yards ahead made this method of attack easy. The German machine-gun sections pushed in between the redoubts, surrounded them, and then drove arrow heads into our main battle positions and continued their policy of "infiltration" while overwhelming masses of men followed up every advantage gained in this way.

GERMANS SWARM LIKE WOLVES

The British troops fought with enormous heroism and the German dead lay in heaps before their lines, but this new method of attack surprised and confused them and divisional staffs were amazed when they received


reports of the enemy having broken through to places behind our battle lines, or as happened several times, gained their first knowledge of this danger by hearing the rattle of German machine-gun fire outside their huts. The garrisons of the forward redoubts had been quickly overwhelmed, but many of them fought to the death as we now know. All telephone wires had been destroyed at once by German gun fire, but by means of a buried cable there came several messages from the Manchester Hill redoubt near St. Quentin.

It was the colonel of the 16th Manchesters who spoke and he said: "We are entirely surrounded, but we are putting up a good fight." Later he said: "Nearly all my men are wounded, and the Germans are swarming round like wolves. They have got into the redoubt." The last message came at 3:30 in the afternoon, eight hours after the beginning of the battle, when the enemy had broken into our main positions and the forward redoubts were far behind the German lines.

The colonel's last words were heroic: "The 16th Manchesters," he said, "will defend the redoubt to the last moment."

By the end of that first day many British divisions had been forced to give ground and fall back to prevent themselves being cut off. In the north the enemy had forced a wedge between the 6th and 51st Divisions on the Third Army front and was driving towards Bapaume.

On the right of our line the Germans had broken through in several places between the 30th and the 36th (Ulster) Divisions and between the 14th and 58th (London) Divisions, near St. Quentin, and were advancing on to Ham towards the crossings of the Somme. A general retreat was decided, with orders to hold the line of the Somme at all costs. It was a difficult and tragic situation for generals and staffs as well as for battalion officers and men. All our well ordered machinery of war was suddenly thrown into disorder like a watch which has lost its main spring. The



© Underwood and Underwood.

A British Supply Train Bringing Up Pontoons for Use at the Front



The "Die Hards"

© Underwood and Underwood.

A famous Middlesex regiment, who earned their nickname by their fighting spirit in the great 1918 offensive which finally ended the war.

headquarters of armies, corps and divisions were on the move like Nomads who pitched their camps at night and retreated hurriedly at dawn because a horde of barbarians was bearing down upon them.

So I met our staffs day by day in the midst of this retreat with maps outspread on wooden boxes surrounded by the litter of their kit and furniture while down the road came a slowly surging tide of traffic like a world on the move as heavy guns, ambulances, wagons laden with hospital gear, aerodromes packed up like traveling circuses, thousands of refugees with their hand-carts, and long transport columns of motor lorries drew back from the advancing German lines. Owing to the destruction of telephone wires and this general confusion of retreat it was difficult for the staff to keep communication with the fighting units and responsibility for action was thrown largely on to

brigadiers and battalion officers. They did glorious work and their courage never failed throughout those days.

"WILL HOLD ON TO THE LAST"

"I am writing this report with one hand and firing a rifle with the other," was a message received from General Griffiths, of the Ulster division, when his headquarters were almost surrounded by Germans. English, Irish and Scottish battalions fought heroic rear guard actions until they were overwhelmed. A colonel of the 6th Division reported: "Situation impossible without reinforcements but will hold on till the last." And he was seen leading 20 survivors against a mass of German troops. That 6th Division lost eighty per cent. of its infantry in 48 hours by desperate fighting against hopeless

odds, and other divisions at this time lost heavily.

When the Ulstermen were relieved by the French 166th Division after five days of rear guard fighting the French general was unable to detrain his men quickly owing to heavy fire on the railway and asked the Irishmen to go on fighting until he could get to their position. General Nugent, commanding the Ulster Division, sent a tragic message: "Do impress on the French general," he said, "that I can give him only 300 sound men."

By this time the worst had happened. In spite of the help of French cavalry and the French 56th Division, which had come up to our aid at Guiscard, we could not stem the German tide which was now in full spate across our old battlefields and our 19th Corps with the 66th and 24th Divisions, with the 50th, 18th and 8th supporting them were after fearful losses in rear-guard actions unable to hold the crossings of the Somme and the enemy passed over the bridges at St. Christ and Brie, which had not been blown up in time. . . . And as General Gough had said: "If

we lose the line of the Somme the situation will be serious."

"STILL STICKING IT! CHEERY-O!"

The way was open to Amiens and the only force that barred the way was a miscellaneous crowd of stragglers collected under a brigadier named Carey, from all those divisions which had lost most of their men in a fighting retreat, supplemented by clerks, orderlies and signalers from headquarters and a gallant section of Canadian armored cars. It was "Carey's force" which saved Amiens in the days of greatest peril until the Australians came down from Flanders to strengthen our line and the French rushed up to defend its southern approaches.

I saw many scenes of that retreat from St. Quentin to Amiens and from Bapaume to Albert and the Ancre and was in the midst of its turmoil and tragedy. They were terrible days when all that we had gained seemed lost. But even then the courage of our men and the heroic sacrifice of the rear-guards who fought



© Underwood and Underwood.

The Scots in Action

A British official photograph taken on the Western front showing a couple of the "Ladies from Hell" doing outpost duty in an exposed position.

to the death so that the German onslaught should be checked made one feel that England could not be defeated whatever happened. It would be absurd to pretend that our men retreated always in good order, and that none of them were panicky when there were gaps in our line and Germans on each side of them. Panic there was here and there among certain bodies of men who fell back too soon from positions they might have held for longer time. Contradictory orders were issued, mistakes were made by generals and staff officers, the crossings of the Somme were lost too easily—though God knows many men died to hold them—and if there had been more forethought in digging trench systems and switch lines behind our battle positions the Germans with all their weight of men might never have driven us back so far.

The British Army was a human machine and as such had its weaknesses. But these English, Scottish and Irish troops fought for the most part with high, grim courage, often in isolated groups standing amidst their dead and dying and selling their own lives dearly unless surrounded and captured. "My men are glorious," said a general of Yorkshire troops, "but so tired that being attacked is the only thing that keeps them awake." The Germans themselves paid a tribute to the Scottish troops of the 51st Division. In a message sent over in a small balloon they wrote: "Good old Fifty-first! Still sticking it! Cheery-O!" All our troops kept "sticking it," with few exceptions, and for many days and nights fell back fighting against overwhelming numbers, weary, dazed, spent, for lack of sleep or rest.

Many of them were in the same divisions

which went to Flanders horribly weakened by all their losses, and encountered the northern offensive under Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, which broke through the Portuguese at Neuve Chapelle and drove through to Merville while other forces swarmed back across the ridges round Ypres. Sir Douglas Haig had no reserves to fall back on. Those poor divisions of ours had to fight day after day until almost exterminated, and it was but a thin, weak line which barred the way to the coast until Marshal Foch in the very nick of time sent up masses of men to make a blue line behind our brown, and at the same time, with a song of thanksgiving in our hearts, we saw American troops pouring into France and knew that if we could hold on a few months all would be well.

LLOYD GEORGE'S 300,000 BOYS FILL GAPS

During those eight weeks of the German offensive against the British lines the losses of the British armies were more than sixty per cent. of their fighting strength. But those great gaps torn in their ranks were filled up by drafts of 300,000 boys whom Lloyd George had "held up his sleeve," as we say, as England's last reserves. They were but lads, mostly untrained, but mixed with the older men, they showed wonderful spirit, and it was they who in a great degree, only a few months later, fighting alongside Canadians and Australians who had been spared the sufferings of the retreat, while American troops were fighting and winning the desperate struggle in the Argonne, helped to inflict the last hammer blows which broke the body and spirit of the German Army.

THE ORDER TO DIE AT THE MARNE

The Battle of the Marne was more than a strategic victory. It was a moral victory. It was won not only because Joffre led the Germans into a sack but because he sent from him down through all the officers to each of his two million men the will to conquer.

On the eve of the battle of the Marne the French officers gathered their men about the bivouacs, and, in the summer night, broken by the roar of cannon, read to them the proclamation issued by Joffre. It thrilled every one with the thought that the fate of France lay in their hands.

"Advance," read the order, "and when you can no longer advance, hold at all costs what you have gained. If you can no longer hold, die on the spot."

THE LAFAYETTE ESCADRILLE

Its Origin and the Men Who Composed the Famous American Flying Unit that Served France Early in the War

VERY early in the war, almost from the outset, a large number of bold-spirited American youths and young men hastened to give their services to the defense of France. For the most of them the only avenue to that service was under the military laws of the Foreign Legion. But enlistment in that unit opened the way to service in other divisions by transfer, and through that avenue passed those brilliant men of the air who were in the service before April, 1917, when the United States entered the war. The list, honorable alike to France and the United States, included Thaw, Lufbery, Masson, Norman Prince, and Frazier Curtis. As the number of American flyers increased, it occurred to some of them—Thaw is credited with the origination of the idea—to form an American Squadron. The organization was effected and was composed of Thaw, Prince, Curtis, Lufbery ("the best of all the American flyers," says Adj. Edwin Parsons, later of the Escadrille), Elliott Cowdin, Kiffen Rockwell, Victor Chapman, Bert Hall, Didier Masson, Johnson, Dudley Hill, Lawrence Rumsey, Clyde Balsley and others. At first the organization was called the "American Escadrille," but Germany protesting, the United States then being a neutral, the name was changed to the Lafayette Escadrille, and as such speedily became famous.

Under its French commander, Captain Thenault, the Escadrille was sent to Luxeuil-Bains, on the Vosges front, mostly for practice work, particularly in group flying, which up to that time had not been taught in the schools, though its importance was so promptly recognized that it was later made a part of pilot training. The next station was at Bar-le-Duc, on the Verdun front, after the German offensive and during the French counter-attack. They were kept busy there for two or three months,

THE FIRST FATALITIES

It was in the Verdun experience that the Escadrille suffered its first fatality. Victor Chapman was killed in a fight against an overpowering number of German machines. He was on an errand of mercy at the time. Two days before, Balsley had been seriously wounded by an explosive bullet that struck him in the abdomen. Chapman had started for the hospital with oranges for his friend when he saw the fight between members of the Escadrille and a superior German force. He flew to the rescue and, valiantly fighting, was shot down.

From Verdun the Escadrille returned to Luxeuil, and in September, Kiffen Rockwell, who had proved himself a bold and splendid fighter, with three German machines officially credited to him, was killed, brought down in a combat near Hartmanns-Weilerkopf, in the Vosges.

In the months following, while the Escadrille was returning from assisting in a bombing raid on the Mauser works at Oberndorf, Norman Prince was forced to land in semi-darkness on a strange field. His legs were broken and he suffered such internal injuries that he died two days later.

These were the sad beginnings that grieved without depressing. The men were fortified to mourn their losses without abating zeal in the cause; for with each of them a flight meant the possibility of no return and they shook hands as if in farewell. But death and accident merely changed without diminishing the complement of the Escadrille. The various training schools always had men eager to join the famed American Flying Corps. The schools were under careful observation, Captain Thenault, Commander of the Lafayette, having a watchful eye for desirable material, and when he discovered a young aspirant who

measured up to the mark he was "demanded" for the Escadrille, and in due course, proper formalities observed, he became a member. The roster of the Escadrille shows how many changes there were due to "killed," "missing," "incapacitated," or transferred. Adj. Edwin Parsons, one of the Aces of the Lafayette Escadrille, tells the story of these changes in a winning history of the Escadrille he wrote under the title of *Fighting Men of the Sky*.

THE FIGHTING PILOTS

There is an honor roll of considerable length of the American aviators killed in the war. There were sixteen out of the Escadrille itself. When we read of the daring combats in the air we get the impression that aviators were a sort of winged knights errant who roamed the skies seeking for fights. They had a very much more important function. They were not only the eyes of the Army but they were the force employed to protect that very important branch of modern military service, the photography planes. The fighting pilot flies higher to command the fullest range of the heavens and the earth. It is his business to protect the machines doing photographic and observation work, for his own side; to destroy enemy planes so engaged and to fight enemy pilots. His work is therefore both offensive and defensive. Adj. Parsons says:

"As a defender of the army from German attack his job is to prevent the enemy machine on lower levels from coming over to regulate German artillery fire, to photograph the French positions, to do scouting work or to machine-gun the men in the trenches. In doing this he has to meet the German fighting machines which are protecting them. In helping the French offensive the fighting pilots protect the French machines which are on the lower level for observation, artillery regulation, photography, and so on, and he has to fight off the swift German attacking machines.

"Two classes of patrols are thus made, one at the high level of about 15,000 feet, where the *pilote de chasse* has as his particular enemy the German fighting pilot, although occasionally he finds up there a scout or photographing machine and the other at from 6,000 to 8,000 feet, where his task is to prevent the enemy observation machine from working. As a rule the fastest and newest machines and the best and the most ex-

perienced pilots are on top and the Germans put theirs there too."

Because of the wintry air into which he had to ascend, the uniform of the pilot when "on the job" was decidedly an elaborate wardrobe. Underneath all, the B. V. D.'s, then the regulation aviation uniform of horizon blue, but without the boots, in place of which were four pairs of socks, first of silk, then of paper, then of wool, and finally a long woolen pair coming to the knees; over these was pulled a pair of soft leather, fur-lined boots. Over the uniform was a heavy paper vest, three sweaters, one with sleeves, and over all a fur-lined combination with legs and sleeves. Around the neck a muffler held the fur collar close to the chin. On the head a silk stocking—quite the fashion among the boys, says Parsons—and over that a woolen flying hood, and then a fur-lined bonnet strapped under the chin, so only the face was uncovered. Four pairs of gloves for the hands, of silk, paper, woolen and fur-lined leather. This protection serves none too much for temperatures of 20 and 22 when one is going at a speed rate of 60 to 100 miles.

Besides the work of the Lafayette Escadrille in making history on the Western front, its splendid performance as a body, the extraordinary feats and accomplishments of its individual members—Lufbery, Hall, Thaw, Rockwell, etc.—it was not unsuccessful as a propagandist. It was at La Fère in May that the whole Escadrille devoted itself to a peace mission. Each plane went up with a generous supply of pink cards bearing a plainly printed message (in German) addressed to "German Soldiers." The message read:

"It is a shameful lie if your superiors assert that the French abuse German prisoners. We are not beasts. Come over to us with confidence. Here you will find a kindly reception, good care and peaceful associations."

From a convenient altitude the cards were showered down upon the German trenches. They were not without effect, for the next night on that sector fifty or more Germans came across, calling *Kamerad*, each holding above his head one of the little pink promissory notes. How many surrendered on the whole front the Escadrille does not know.

THE MARTYRDOM OF SERBIA

The Nation that Fought Lone-handed Against Insuperable Odds and
Made of Its Failure a Monument of Eternal Honor

IN the winter of 1917 a member of one of the diplomatic groups made this prediction: "When the dispassionate, analytical history of this war is written—not in this generation—probably Serbia will be recognized not only as its most tragic martyr, but as the victim of cowardly and pitiless betrayal." There was the intimation that the annihilation of the little Kingdom was due to the infidelity of professed friends among European Powers who abandoned her to her fate when her succor was possible. However that may be, whether or not faith was kept with her when keeping faith meant life, there is no denying the tragic and utter martyrdom of Serbia. By the same token, the heroism of the Serbs is one of the sublime issues of a war that vomited abominations.

The negative answer to the German-inspired Austrian ultimatum was even more courageous than the refusal of Belgium to bow to the German demand. Serbia was less prepared to resist, she had less assurance of support. The Austrians invaded with five Army Corps moving in simultaneously from the north and the northwest. The Serbians had no ammunition for their guns, and but a beggarly supply of cartridges for their rifles. They could offer but little resistance, and necessarily fell back from the formidable incursion, but did so fighting resolutely whenever there was opportunity to use their bayonets. Then utter destruction or unconditional surrender seemed inevitable in the circumstances. Indications were that of the two the Serbians preferred destruction.

They stubbornly resisted where it was possible to do so, but it was late in November, 1914, before a gleam of hope inspired their courage anew as belated supplies of ammunition from the French arrived. Now with shells for their guns and cartridges for their rifles, they stopped their retreat and turned,

turned with such vehemence of patriotic rage that the early days of December were marked by one of the most extraordinary campaigns of the whole war. For a like feat on the Western front there would have been clarions of jubilation throughout the Teuton-hating world. Imagine what would have been said and done in celebration had Belgium single-handed turned and thrown out the German invaders, utterly routing them, and then consider how tamely the Serbians were applauded for their rout of the German Army. In those days comparatively little importance was attached to the southeastern front. It has not yet been made certain that early attention to the possibilities of that front would have had no influence to the speedier termination of the war.

The Austrians had found the invasion of Serbia rather an easy matter. They had advanced without serious obstruction. They had possessed themselves of most of the north-western country. They occupied towns and villages with all the accompaniments of "frightfulness" the Germans practised in Belgium—only they were not so wantonly destructive of sacred edifices. That seems to have been the only indication that their "Kultur" had not carried them to the level of the German moral degradation. In their arrogance of conquest they assumed that the resistance of Serbia was completely broken. Especially were they beguiled when the Serbians strategically abandoned Belgrade, Dec. 1. The Austrians marched in unopposed. They were overconfident of themselves and undervalued the people they were treating as a subjugated and despised nation.

A GLORIOUS RECOIL

The Austrian front was now unduly extended, and was therefore the more difficult

to protect because of hampered communications and movements. Their forces were concentrating on the lower Morava. They were coming in columns down the narrow mountain defiles in leisurely fashion for another smashing attack. They were within forty-five miles of the headquarters of the Serbian General Staff at Kragujevatz. Suddenly, December 3, under Gen. Michitch, who acted against the counsel of the older general, the Austrians



© Underwood and Underwood.

Alexander's Arch, Salonika

Salonika was the main base of operation for the Serbian war zone.

experienced one of the most disillusioning shocks they suffered on any front. The Serbians, the beaten and despised, swarmed from their trenches, rushed forward and fell upon the invaders with a fury that was irresistible. Impeded by mud, caught on the march, the big guns and heavy baggage trains unmanageable for effective service, a burden and an obstruction, the Austrians were thrown into confusion by the deadly impetus of the surprise attack. For a time they resisted stubbornly, but the rejuvenated, re-animated Serbs were not to be stayed, and presently the Austrian

lines broke and fled panic-stricken. They were beaten at every point. The flight was a rout. The pursuing Serbians gave them no rest, and to escape, the fugitive troops abandoned everything that could impede their flight—guns, ammunition, baggage, enormous booty, and the bodies of thousands of dead and wounded marked the retreat. Over 60,000 prisoners, 192 guns, 90,000 rifles and 491 cartloads of ammunition were taken. The Serbians pressed their advantage, and by the end of the year General Michitch was able to report that "There remain no Austrian soldiers on Serbian soil except prisoners." The victory was complete, unqualified. Dec. 15th the Serbians were back in Belgrade.

As there was not another such battle in the war, it seems worth while to reproduce here the fairly detailed account by the correspondent of the *London Times*, who wrote his impressions after his return to Kragujevatz. He begins with the statement that, considering the great strength of the Austrian position and defenses, the early retreat is difficult to explain.

"The Austrians had held well-entrenched positions of undoubted military value. Line after line of rising crests, each commanding the other, all with an excellent field of fire over the country before them, had been held and well fortified. The approaches were always of the most arduous. Yet, more and more impetuously as the battle progressed these strongholds had been successively abandoned, until, shortly after the Lyg and the little village of Gukoshi were left behind, the real, live, panic-stricken rout commenced.

THE COMPLETE ROUT

"One might as well seek to paint the lily as try to describe the scene. Take the tableau near Gorni Toplitza, where the road winds round a commanding promontory which overhangs the valley. Right on the edge of the cliff, protected by a copse of prune trees, the Austrians had placed a battery of field guns, while in the road were placed a score of ammunition wagons, from whence the guns were served by crude little two-wheeled carts. Deploying on the flank of this position, the Serbian gunners had covered it with a terrible enfilading fire, and men, horses, carts, wagons, lay in a mangled heap upon the ground. There were dead horses in the shafts of the carts with dead men's hands still clutching the bridles—all shot down by a

veritable torrent of shell. Some few had tried to escape, and as they ran they jettisoned caps, cartridges, and haversacks, only to meet death themselves ere they could reach the shelter of a neighboring ravine. It was a pathetic, moving picture of bewildered flight.

"Thereafter the Austrians had but one thought—to get outside the range of Serbian guns. Everything was cast off. Cannon were left perfect and uninjured; maxims abandoned in the trenches; accouterments of every description fairly littered the road. Some ammunition wagons were left fully charged; from others the live shell had been pitched out upon the roadway to lighten the load until, with the increasing pressure of the pursuit, the vehicles themselves had been left behind. Jumbled up with this mass of artillery were countless transport wagons and innumerable field ovens. Horses, fallen by the roadside, were left to die if injured, shot if they had but succumbed to fatigue.

"Wounded warriors were abandoned to their fate; dead soldiers uncountable left to add a touch of blue-gray color to the mass of dark-green carriages. There were rifles by the thousand, dropped by their flying owners. Most were whole, others splintered by shot or broken in some of the fierce hand-to-hand fighting that preceded the rout. Ammunition littered the route like the colored tissues of a paper-chase; sometimes in batches where they had been tipped out of the wagons, and again sprinkled over the earth as the fugitives had emptied their belts to ease the burden by a few ounces.

"Thus for mile upon mile. At every few yards some discarded trophy; in every ditch, gun or rifle ammunition; and towards the end the gunners had cut the traces of their teams and fled onwards with the horses. There were few dead to be seen now, for the Austrians no longer stayed to fight. Nothing seemingly mattered save to put a distance between themselves and the pursuing Serbians.

OUT-GENERATED AS WELL

"Before Valievo itself the garrison holding the town had prepared the defense. The approach by the main road had been entrenched and guns were in position. But the Serbs were inconsiderate. They went along the road, it is true; but their main force deployed round the hills and the Austrians were taken as completely by surprise as if they had never heard of their coming. While the fugitives hurried through the town towards Loznitz and Shabatz, a rear-guard of Hungarians on the hills to the north-

west put up an indifferent fight before they, too, fled in disorder. The last of them were caught by the Serbian artillery, and on the rising ground I saw nigh a hundred lying stretched out on the road, shot down as they ran. A few—severely wounded—sat nursing their sores amid their dead comrades, tended only by a little Serbian lad who fetched water to soothe their raging thirst.

"All along this highway of tragedy we had jostled two streams of hapless sufferers. Going in our own direction were streams of refugees, their oxen, in divers stages of life and death, yoked up to every conceivable manner of springless wagon piled high with the few odds and ends of furniture and bedding which they had snatched up when they fled before the Austrian advance. Atop the bundles lay starving and



© Underwood and Underwood.

Serbian Mortars Abandoned in Krusevac Station

sick children, wan with want and exposure; by the side of the conveyances, urging the emaciated cattle along with weird cries and curses, walked sore-footed and weary women-folk returning to the devastated remains of what were once their homes.

"Crossing us came a continuous procession of Austrian prisoners. Now and again there would be a thousand or more marching along in charge of a couple of Serbians. They were men of every age, and of every race which that hotch-potch of nationalities called Austria-Hungary can provide—recruits, common Army, the Landwehr and the Landsturm; Austrians, Hungarians, Mussulmans, Serbs, Czechs, Moravians, Slovenes, Rumanians, Russians, etc. A sorry enough crowd, and of them all I liked best the Bosnian Mussulmans.

"In between the convoys straggled men who had fallen out by the way. Weary, pain-stricken souls, these, who groaned and panted as they staggered along by the aid of a supporting stick hewn from the roadside trees. Many of them,

foot sore, had slung their boots across their shoulders and walked with feet enwrapped in rags of sack-cloth. And ever and anon we passed some blue-gray soldier stretched out by the way, awaiting death, alone and unbed-friended.

"For almost two months until November 11th, when I had to flee with the Headquarters Staff, Valievo had been the center of my wanderings, and it was pleasant to retread its cobbled streets. The town had, however, a strange and deserted appearance. Crowds of Austrians and

left behind them and in which they had obviously lived. The bedrooms which had been occupied by officers and men alike were positively pestilential. Worse, indeed, were the hospitals. Three thousand Austrian wounded had been left in the charge of 13 doctors with ambulance staffs, and yet the men were lying anywhere and anyhow on handfuls of hay, suffering and dying in a condition of appalling filth. It cannot be suggested that Austrian doctors knew no better; but this experience, taken with the many other evidences of indifference to the



Serbian Artillery Entraining for the Front

but a handful of Serbs gave it the air of still being under enemy occupation. Save for one barracks and two houses burned, the place was outwardly intact, and the few inhabitants who had remained had not been molested. But never were external impressions more misleading, for every unoccupied house had been pillaged from floor to ceiling. Room after room had been ransacked, everything of value pilfered, and pictures of the Serbian royal family defaced.

AUSTRIAN FILTHINESS

"What surprised one most, however, was the state of indescribable filth which these people

well-being of the troops which I have observed of late, forces me to the conclusion that, in the eyes of his superiors, the Austrian soldier ceases to be worthy of consideration the moment he is indefinitely put out of action. He is just 'cannonfodder,' as the Prussian has it.

"From Valievo I hastened onwards towards Belgrade, and 48 hours later reached the outskirts of the capital. The previous day (December 14th) had seen fighting of a very determined character. Driven back on to a ring of commanding hills, of which Torlak may be taken as the center, the Austrians had there put up their last defense. These positions were captured the same evening, not, however, without

heavy sacrifice. The Commandant of the Serbian force which attacked this sector stated that his men alone had buried 1,800 dead Austrians, and he described the fighting as the stiffest of the campaign.

"When we arrived in the rear of the Army on the 15th the Serbian gunners were firing through a cloud of fog and rain against the pontoon bridge over the Save, and on a hostile rear-guard without the city. The opposition was soon overcome, and a detachment of cavalry rode in, closely followed by King Peter. The

ceased with the evacuation, brought their all. They had quickly collected masses of chrysanthemums, and with these they bombarded and decorated the incoming heroes until they pranced over a veritable pathway of flowers. The maidens brought the embroidered scarves and sashes which they had worked in preparation for marriage, and these they hung about the cavaliers till the men looked like so many *garçons d'honneur* at a Serbian village wedding. Huge tri-color streamers now hung from the mansions; little bits of dirty flags from the cottages. There



© Underwood and Underwood.

Fighting the Enemy Within the Lines

British labor battalions at work on the great Daubatalie marshes along the Salonika front, preliminary to draining the land for the prevention of malaria.

Serbian Monarch is an old campaigner, and the fact that street fighting was still going on had no more effect on his enthusiasm than the inclemency of the weather. He stayed to trample under foot a Hungarian flag freshly hauled down from the Palace, and then attended a hastily arranged Te Deum at the Cathedral.

"Ninety minutes later the Crown Prince Alexander, accompanied by his brother, Prince George, a strong cavalry escort, and the British Military Attaché, approached Belgrade. They were met on the outskirts by a crowd of poor women and children who, with few exceptions, were the only inhabitants who had remained. These joyous souls, themselves dependent upon a pittance from the municipality which had

was a touch of heartfelt simplicity about this welcome from deserted Belgrade that, to the looker-on, was most impressive."

The Austrian occupation of Belgrade had lasted but fourteen days, and even in the retrospect had something of the unfinished about it. The invaders had evidently settled down for a prolonged stay. Under the guidance of their late military attaché in Serbia, they established themselves in the best available buildings, commenced to repair the roads which they had themselves ripped open by shell fire, and set up a pretense of city administration. On the Torlak hills solid earth-

works protected by barbed-wire entanglements had been constructed, and concrete foundations were ready for the big guns. Yet they had scarcely had time to decide what they would do with Belgrade before the Serbian hosts swooped down and drove them helter-skelter back across the Save.

PLAGUE AS THE AFTERMATH

But the evil genius of Serbia made this victory the means of visitation as terrible to the country as the devastation of war. The great majority of the prisoners were taken in the northwest, and were concentrated in camps about Valievo. In those camps originated the typhus scourge which cost Serbia more lives than were lost in all the fighting of the previous winter and left her hopelessly weakened when the next invasion was launched. Typhus is said to be communicated chiefly, if not wholly, by lice.

The temporary crowding of the prisoners in masses in restricted quarters was unavoidable. In the bitter winter weather they probably herded together even more closely than was necessary. The multiplication of the lice and communication of the disease when once it started, were inevitable. From the prisoners it spread to the Serbian army; and the Serbian soldiers, after the hardships which they had gone through and the scanty diet on which, even after their victory, they had to subsist, were emaciated and in no condition to resist disease. The mortality was dreadful. From the army, as soldiers began to return to their homes on leave, the typhus spread throughout the country. Nobody knows what the actual loss of life from this cause was during the first half of 1915; but it has been estimated that there were probably not less than 200,000 deaths.

SERBIANS WITHOUT MEDICAL CARE

The *London Times* in its history of the Serbian ordeal says of this period:

"Serbia then was almost destitute of doctors. At the outbreak of war there had only been some 350 doctors in the country, and of these over 100 had died on service. What remained were not enough for the needs of the army alone, so the civil population of the country as a whole was absolutely without medical advice

or assistance. In her distress, Serbia appealed to her Allies. Her first request, addressed to France, Russia, and Great Britain, was for 100 doctors from each and for medical supplies. Each country, when appealed to, responded promptly according to its ability, as did also the United States. An International Sanitary Commission was organized with headquarters at Nish, under Sir Ralph Paget as Chairman. The 100 doctors whom France sent were scattered through the towns and villages of the northern part of the country. The United States Commission, with Dr. Richard P. Strong at its head, took over the southern part, working from centers at Skoplie (Uskub), Veles and Monastir. Nish itself was in charge of the Russians, who also had a mission at Kraguievatz. Great Britain poured in hospital units and supplies; and, in addition, sent Col. Hunter with Lieut.-Col. Stammers and 30 doctors of the R.A.M.C., to whom the Serbian Government entrusted the immediate work of fighting the advance of typhus over the country.

"Colonel Hunter acted vigorously. For 15 days all railway communication was stopped, and when it was resumed, until the end of the year, on the main line north from Nish and on the branch lines to Uzitsha, Kraguievatz and Valievo, no carriages were permitted to be used but wooden-seated third-class vehicles, from which every shred of fabric or upholstery was stripped away. These bare wooden interiors were scrubbed and disinfected with formalin every day. A cordon of sanitary and disinfecting stations was drawn across the country from west to east. All soldiers' leave was stopped. In the northern part of the country, above this line, Colonel Hunter's staff set to work and practically disinfected and inoculated (against typhoid and cholera) the whole Serbian army. In all the towns and villages, every restaurant, hotel, or place of public entertainment was compelled to close its doors for certain hours in the forenoon and afternoon, and in those hours the floors, walls, tables, and chairs of every room to which the public had access were scrubbed and disinfected. By these drastic measures the epidemic was successfully checked and was practically confined to the northern half of the country. By the beginning of April, 1915, it was apparent that the scourge was declining. By the beginning of June, typhus was to all intents and purposes extinct.

"All authorities are agreed that no one who witnessed the horrors of the winter 1914-15 in Serbia could ever forget them, nor, probably, can anyone who did not witness them imagine how terrible they were. Serbia was already ex-

hausted by war. Practically the whole manhood of the country was in the army, and agriculture had been left to the very old men, the women, and young children.

"From that moment Serbia could no longer draw any supplies from the north. She had to rely for her imports on the one single-track line of railway from Salonika; and, before she could receive goods by that line, she had to make new trade connections with Great Britain or other

ALL DISEASES IN COMMON

"It was on a land thus destitute and a people thus enfeebled that fell, first, the winter fighting which gave some 40,000 wounded to be cared for in hospitals where no hospitals were, and, second, the still worse scourge of typhus. With the typhus also were other diseases, enteric and scarlet fever and dysentery and, later in alarming proportions, scurvy as a direct result of the



© Underwood and Underwood.

Where Militarism Was Helpless

The scene is on one of Serbia's mud-covered country roads, where a German staff car is in difficulty.

countries—not in itself an easy thing in time of war. The capacity of that railway line was further taxed always to its utmost capacity in the carriage of war materials and hospital supplies, and great quantities of goods also came that way to Bulgaria and for destinations beyond. The difficulty of getting into Serbia, therefore, the ordinary necessities of life, let alone any comforts, was prodigious. The country was almost stripped of luxuries; and for the masses of the people it was a question only of supporting life by the simplest possible means and on the slenderest possible diet.

poverty of the diet. In the first months, and until the early spring, there was no hospital accommodation for treating separately the various kinds of patients. The wounded in battle, the typhus patients, those suffering from small-pox, scarlet fever, enteric, or any other disease—all had to be treated together. Nor were there any hospital staffs or any medical supplies. Devoted nurses, single-handed, without a doctor or surgeon to help, strove to care for, perhaps, a couple of hundred patients of all kinds, who were laid, each touching the next, on the floor of, it might be, a warehouse or school. It was

not in some cases even possible to carry the dead out daily. The dead might lie for hours beside the living; and as soon as a place was vacant some one of the dozens waiting had to be brought in to fill it. The sanitary conditions in some of these so-called hospitals were appalling; and it is not to be wondered at that every country—England, France, Russia, and the United States alike—gave many precious lives of doctors and nurses and hospital assistants before the fight was won.”

Let it be remembered to the lasting honor of Serbia that during this almost unimaginable period of agonizing hardships from plague and semi-starvation, the Serbians treated their prisoners with the utmost humanity. There were no reprisals for the “frightfulness” perpetrated in the brief Austrian occupation. The Austrian officers at Nish were well accommodated and given the utmost freedom about the town. They were well fed though the Serbians were suffering great privation. The privates were treated with leniency, and were employed in a friendly way in many capacities. The sick and wounded had the same treatment in the hospitals that the Serbian sick and wounded received.

A NATION IN FLIGHT

Reduced by plague and famine, needing food as well as munitions, unsupported by the Al-

lies, having pleaded in vain for the strengthening of their wasted army, it is not to be wondered at that the Serbians—splendid, brave, desperately daring as they had proved themselves—were incapable of offering effective resistance to the new onslaughts of Austrians, this time aided by Germans. October 15, 1915, found them in a hopeless because helpless plight. The expected Anglo-French relief expedition had failed them—a failure that disinterested inquiry in years to come may not debate indulgently. When the horde of invaders, stung by the spirit of revenge for the bitter humiliation of the previous year, again swept down there was no escape from massacre but in retreat. As there is no parallel in the war to the magnificent feat of the Serbians in 1914, so there is no parallel to that terrible retreat in October of 1915.

It was not an army in retreat—it was a nation in headlong, maddened flight, a nation driven from its own country. The old men, the women, the little children, destitute, leaving their all, surging through the valleys, struggling up the heights, the soldiers following doing what valor might to retard the advance of an infuriated enemy. Serbia made its way to the coast, a way so arduous, so exhausting, so frightful that the whole extent of it was marked by the bodies of the dead and dying, a highway of holocaust.

WHEN THE ARMISTICE WAS SIGNED

A Generalized Review of the Spirit In Which the News Was Celebrated
the World Over

BY E. A. BARRON

WHEN the Supreme War Council convened at Versailles late in October, 1918, to consider the armistice terms which would be submitted to Austria and Germany, the nations of the world were keyed to high tension of expectancy. It was an intimation that the cessation of war was imminent. On November 3rd the armistice with Austria was signed in the field, and though Germany still continued to hold an arrogant attitude, it was

believed that it was only a question of two or three days before she, too, would subscribe to the drastic terms upon which the Allies would consent to suspend hostilities. The public mind of the world, thoroughly sick of war, was in such a quiver of eagerness and uncertainty that when, on November 7th, the report that Germany had signed was cabled to this country there was a spontaneous outburst of delirious joy from coast to coast, a veritable



American Press Association.

The Stars and Stripes Forever

Flags on Broadway near Forty-second street, New York, on Armistice Day, Nov. 11, 1918. The skyscraper surmounted by the flag is the *Times* building.

frenzy of jubilation the like of which was never known. This report but a few hours later proved to be a canard; nevertheless American enthusiasm was only abated, not suppressed, for the public was confident that, however premature its celebration, the news was substantially true.

It was on November 7th that the German General Headquarters notified the Allies' General Headquarters that the German plenipotentiaries (ten in number, headed by Secretary of State Erzberger) were ready to proceed that day to the point on the front that General Foch would indicate as the place of meeting. At once orders were given to cease fire on that front at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and the plenipotentiaries were directed to present themselves to the French outposts by the Chimay-Fourmies-La Capelle-Guise road. There was a delay on the part of the Germans, however, and they did not arrive at the Allied General Headquarters until 6 o'clock in the morning of November 8th. The terms of the armistice were delivered to them and they were allowed seventy-two hours in which to sign. The Germans deferred to the uttermost their formal admission of German humiliation and sent couriers to Berlin for further instructions, but at 5 o'clock in the morning (Paris time) of November 11th the armistice was signed; and at 2:40 o'clock (Washington time) the announcement was made at Washington, President Wilson being notified immediately by telephone.

NEW YORK'S WILD REJOICING

Before dawn the screaming of whistles, the bellowing of sirens and the roar of guns waked the American people to a knowledge of the fact that the armistice was in force, and that the semblance of Peace had come. There was one poetic note in the riot of noise, a reminder of the ancient days of romance. Two heralds of the new day climbed to the top of the Barge Office Building overlooking the bay and city of New York and with their bugles trumpeted the glad tidings to the waking world.

The scenes throughout the country, every city lending the full might of its population to the carnival of celebration, cannot be described adequately. Words in the superlative

could give but a vague impression of what was indeed a ponderousness of noise and surging masses. In New York, for example, there was an attempt at an ordered Victory Parade that set in brave phalanxes to march the length of Fifth Avenue (the "Avenue of the Allies"). But what boots a formal parade where an entire city is swarming, surging, marching, counter-marching, obliterating space by massed myriads of shouting, singing, screaming men, women and youths banging every conceivable instrument that could add to the discordant, almost unbearable clangor and clamor? It was a veritable chaos of turbulent but good-natured humanity in this wild way attesting its gratitude for peace.

From the windows of tall buildings fluttered to the streets clouds of paper scraps like mammoth snow flakes, some of the central streets being covered to a depth of several inches. Banners and streamers and ribbons of tissue paper everywhere played in the sunlight of the upper air, giving a suggestion of beauty and gala charm to the vision as offset to the inappreciable distractions below.

And down there amid the blare of voices, and clanging tin and the back-fire of motor trucks and automobiles, one memorable feature in quiet reminder of the great significance of these crude demonstrations. A group of young women and girls, wearing knots of red, white and blue as their only decoration, silent, with serene faces, marched up and down as the throng permitted, bearing at their head a cardboard placard on which was written in ink, the lettering, not perfect, the two words, "Thank God!" Some who saw that sign of the sentiments of the moving group of silent young women remembered that in thousands of homes throughout the land were being breathed out prayers of thanksgiving, too profoundly sincere for noisy expression.

In every city of the union, from Boston to San Francisco, from the lakes to the Gulf, were demonstrations similar to that in New York. It was democracy self-assertive. It was a day commemorative of world liberation from the menace that was typified in burning or hanging the Kaiser in effigy. In Chicago, in one of the streets, a score of casks of wine were opened and every one bidden to drink to the death of the Kaiser. The feel-

ing everywhere was that the world was entering a new and dreamed-of era and the vast noise was the hail to the new born.

CELEBRATIONS ABROAD

What is true of the cities of the United States is true of those of France and England and Italy; more sacredly true of Belgium. Paris, the city of carnival and spectacular emotionalism, never was so wildly exuberant, so madly joyous as she was in her triumphal exultation in a peace that meant that the ancient enemy of the French had been beaten to its knees. London was hardly less demonstrative. The people surged from every section to the great city's central part in a tumult of joy, and densely packed in the spaces about the palace of their king, shouted their pride of race to the gray skies. Everywhere was celebration—

political, social, popular—unequaled in London's previous experience, with later fêtes and pageants of a magnificence which recalled the days that only history remembers.

In Berlin, too, and the other cities of Germany there was a grateful thrill that peace had come—but it was a peace of bitterness to them, and gratitude was tempered by humiliation.

There has never been a day in the world's chronology so universally and so enthusiastically, so clamorously celebrated by civilized nations as that of November 11, 1918. Had the demonstrations ended with the day's end there would have been nothing for reproach, little to regret in this amazing phenomenon of human emotion throughout the world. But in many cities, the brutal license and vulgar eyes of the night crowned the day with shame. Civilization is yet far from its possible perfection. Peace has not slain the beast.

THE WAGES OF WAR

What the World War Cost in Human Life Both in Battle Casualties and in Its Indirect Results to Civilians

TO form a clear mental picture of the casualties during the World War is quite impossible. The number of killed and wounded—in excess of 30,000,000—of which the killed alone number over 10,000,000—can be realized only vaguely. In the whole United States, with 100,000,000 people, the number of male adults is approximately 20,000,000, so that the killed and wounded among the nations engaged in the four years' conflict is half again as many as the whole number of male adult Americans—this without regard to deaths among civilians.

There were 27 nations directly engaged in the war, but the number actively engaged were 11 on the side of the Allies and 4 on the side of the Central Powers.

The mobilized strength of the combatants was, for the Allies, just under 40,000,000, and for the Central Powers about 19,500,000. Virtually, the war was fought for four years by Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, whose aggregate mobilized forces numbered

20,767,000. The entrance of the United States in the war added 3,703,273 to the mobilized strength of the Allies; of these 2,003,935, including 32,385 marines, reached the Western front, as appears from the following:

SUMMARY OF ALL FORCES IN U. S. ARMY, NOV. 11, 1918.
1½ (At time of greatest strength. Data supplied by War Dept.)

	Officers	Men	Total
Army personnel in Europe.....	80,842	1,868,474	1,949,316
At sea, en route to Europe.....	1,162	21,072	22,234
Total.....	82,004	1,889,546	1,971,550
Marines (on duty with Army in Europe).....	1,002	31,383	32,385
Total, including Marines.....	83,006	1,920,929	2,003,935
Siberian Expedition.....	298	8,806	9,104
Total A. E. F. in Europe and Siberia.....	83,304	1,920,735	2,013,039
In United States.....	104,155	1,530,344	1,634,499
In insular possessions, Alaska, etc.....	1,977	53,758	55,735
Grand total in Army excluding Marines.....	188,434	3,482,454	3,670,888
Grand total in Army including Marines.....	189,436	3,513,837	3,703,273

An elaborate intensive study was made of the direct cost of the war, both in property and human life, by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The casualties record is based on the official announcements to June, 1919. "While complete accuracy cannot be claimed for the figures, they are probably as accurate as it is possible to make them so soon after the event." The Carnegie figures follow:

BRITISH CASUALTIES, REVISED FIGURES

Revised British figures of British combatant strength and losses were published in England in January, 1920 (republished in this country by the *Boston Transcript*), from which it appears that between August 4, 1914, and August 11, 1918, 5,704,416 men (excluding Colonials) passed through the ranks of the British army. Statistics were

CASUALTIES OF THE GREAT WORLD WAR, 1914-1918.

Country	Known Dead	Seriously Wounded	Otherwise Wounded	Prisoners or Missing
United States.....	107,284 ^a	43,000	148,000	4,912
Great Britain.....	807,451 ^b	617,740	1,441,394	64,907
France.....	1,427,800 ^b	700,000	2,344,000	453,500
Russia.....	2,762,064	1,000,000	3,950,000	2,500,000
Italy.....	507,160	500,000	462,196	1,359,000
*Belgium.....	267,000	40,000	100,000	10,000
Serbia.....	707,343	322,000	28,000	100,000
Rumania ^c	339,117	200,000	•	116,000
*Greece.....	15,000	10,000	30,000	45,000
*Portugal.....	4,000	5,000	12,000	200
*Japan.....	300	•	907	3
	6,938,519	3,437,740	8,516,497	4,653,522
Germany.....	1,611,104	1,600,000	2,183,143	772,522
Austria-Hungary.....	911,000	850,000	2,150,000	443,000
Turkey.....	436,924	107,772	300,000	103,731
Bulgaria.....	101,224 ^d	300,000	852,399	10,825
	3,060,252	2,857,772	5,485,542	1,330,078
Grand Total.....	9,998,771	6,295,512	14,002,039	5,983,600

* Unofficial.

^a Includes deaths at home and in Expeditionary Force.^b Includes colonial casualties as follows:

	Dead	Wounded	Prisoners or Missing
Force			
Great Britain: Canada.....	60,383	155,799	8,671
Australia.....	54,800	158,199	•
New Zealand.....	16,500	41,432	45
India.....	59,296	46,969	•
French Colonials.....	42,569	serious 15,000 otherwise 44,000	3,500

^c Exclusive of deaths at Wallachi while controlled by Germany. Of the 18,000 prisoners taken by Bulgaria, only 7,200 were returned alive, and of the 98,000 prisoners taken by Austria and Germany, 43,000 were reported dead, 15,000 were returned alive, and the remainder were reported as still held. ^d Exclusive of influenza deaths, and those killed in Macedonian retreat. ^e Included in preceding column.

Later figures issued by the United States government estimated the number of American dead at 116,132 and the wounded at 205,950—a total of 322,082. These figures included losses to Army and Marine units to September 1, 1919, as follows:

Killed in action, 35,585, or 11 per cent of the entire list.

Died of wounds, 14,742.

Died of disease, 58,073.

Died of accidents and other causes, 8,092.

"Missing," the announcement records a zero, with the notation "all corrected."

published showing the ration strength of the British army during 1918, the combatant strength and the rifle strength. The ration strength includes the men whose duty it was not to fight, but to supply, equip and in other ways assist the fighting men. The combatant strength includes all fighting troops in the fighting zones. The rifle strength applies to officers and men of the Infantry Battalion alone. These figures are valuable because they enable a comparison to be made during the same period with figures for the United States under the same classifications. It is, as a matter of fact, the rifle strength of an army

which determines its potentiality as a fighting force.

RIFLE STRENGTH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN

Column C gives the rifle strength—that is, the officers and men of the infantry battalions alone.

BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE, 1918.

	A—Ration strength	B—Combatant strength	C—Rifle strength
March 11.....	1,828,098	1,293,000	616,000
April 1.....	1,667,701	1,131,124	528,617
September 23....	1,752,829	1,200,181	493,306
November 11.....	1,731,578	1,164,790	461,748

The following are the comparable figures for the United States drawn up from British official sources:

U. S. ARMY STRENGTH IN FRANCE, 1918.

	A—Ration strength	B—Combatant strength	C—Rifle strength
March 11.....	245,000	123,000	49,000
April 1.....	319,000	214,000	51,000
September 25....	1,641,000	1,195,000	341,000
November 11.....	1,924,000	1,160,000	322,000

The captures of prisoners and guns in France during the victorious offensive against the German army between July 18 and Nov. 11 were, according to the British, as follows:

	Prisoners	Guns
British Armies.....	200,000	2,540
French Armies.....	135,720	1,880
American Armies.....	43,300	1,421
Belgian Armies.....	14,500	474

BRITISH IN ITALY AND THE EAST

In addition, there were 80,000 British combatant troops in Italy who coöperated effectively in the final defeat of the Austrian army, capturing 30,000 prisoners. In Palestine and Mesopotamia about 400,000 British troops on an average throughout 1918 were fighting, and the complete defeat and destruction of the Turkish army was effected by the British alone, and a total of 85,000 prisoners taken.

TOTAL OF TROOPS FROM BRITAIN AND DOMINIONS EMPLOYED IN THE WAR

British Isles.....	5,704,416
Canada.....	640,886
Australia.....	416,809
New Zealand.....	220,099
South Africa.....	136,070
India.....	1,401,350
*Other Colonies.....	134,837

Total..... 8,654,467

* Includes colored troops recruited from Africa, West Indies, etc.

TOTAL CASUALTIES

	Approximate killed, died of wounds. Died	Approximate missing and prisoners	Wounded
British Isles.....	662,083	140,312	1,644,786
Canada.....	56,119	306	149,733
Australia.....	58,460	164	152,100
New Zealand.....	16,132	5	40,749
South Africa.....	6,928	33	11,444
India.....	47,746	871	65,126
†Other Colonies...	3,649	366	3,504
	851,117	142,057	2,067,442

† Includes colored troops from South Africa, etc., but excludes 44,262 African native followers—that is, died and killed, 42,318; wounded, 1,322; missing, 622. The deaths were due mainly to epidemics.

CIVILIAN DEATHS DUE TO THE WAR

Besides the record of military casualties there must also be taken into account in estimating the cost of the World War in human life the number of civilians,—men, women and children,—who died as a direct or indirect result of the war. It will be a long time before the record of civilian losses can be actually determined. Indeed, perhaps it may never be determined. Figures have been published to prove that there have been over 40,000,000 deaths in excess of normal mortality due to influenza and pneumonia induced by the war. Says the Carnegie report:

"Foremost in the toll which it levied on civilian life stands the Spanish influenza of 1918. While the exact underlying cause of this disease is still in doubt, the responsibility for it has generally been fastened on the war. Complete data are not yet available, but the total number of deaths from this cause is known to have exceeded six million. It is said to have had 1,250,000 victims in the United States alone, of which 30,000 deaths occurred in the army at home during 1918.

"Next to this in loss of life stood the massacres of Armenians, Syrians, Jews, and Greeks. Of the two million Armenians dwelling in Turkey, it has been estimated that half perished. According to the Italian Consul at Trebizond, the whole Armenian population of that town, numbering from eight to ten thousand, was destroyed in one afternoon. The total number of these four nationalities which perished during and as a result of the war has been estimated at four million lives by the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief.

"In the Balkans there was a similar loss of life. War, famine, disease, and starvation exacted a toll estimated at over 800,000 in Rumania, which would give the highest percentage of mortality in any country. Early in 1919, it was

reported that the census taken in the new Bulgarian territory showed that the male population of Macedonia had been reduced from 175,000 to 42,500; of Thrace from 494,000 to 225,000; while in Mustapha Pasha only 4,000 males were left out of 33,000. Serbian and Austrian civilians, due to famine, "spotted typhus," privation, and disease, paid a death toll of nearly 1,000,000 lives.

"The last available figures for Russia give the population of Russia in January, 1914, as 175,137,800. The normal rate of growth would have added about 10,000,000 lives to this number during the next five years, so that normally the population in January, 1919, should have numbered 185,000,000. The best estimate, however, shows that the population was probably not more than 180,000,000. The deaths among the civilian population, in excess of normal—in other words, those which may fairly be attributed either directly or indirectly to the war—have been estimated at approximately 2,000,000. This estimate does not include Siberia and Finland. . . . The direct military losses of Russia have been officially stated as 2,762,064, giving total deaths in excess of normal of nearly 5,000,000, which agrees with the estimated loss in population referred to above. In view of the reports which have come out of Russia and Poland this estimate must be regarded as a distinctly conservative one.

"In less than a year and a half after the beginning of the war, it was stated of Poland: 'One-third of a generation, the youngest, has practically ceased to exist, due to famine, pestilence and starvation.' At the end of the war, an American traveling through Poland found that children under six years of age had practically all perished from starvation.

"A similar record obtained for the invaded districts of France. During the German occupation of Lille, the death rate in that city increased from a normal of 19.1 per thousand in 1913, to 27.7 in 1915, and 415 (41.5?) in 1918, owing largely to tuberculosis and epidemics. After the liberation of Lille, an examination of the children of that city showed their development to have been arrested, and about 20,000 children to be classed as 'degenerate' as a result of insufficient or bad food, disease, and malnutrition.

"From Germany similar reports have come of great devitalization in the civilian population due to malnutrition and insufficient food, which has resulted in tuberculosis, intestinal diseases, and other ailments. The loss of life due to these various factors during the war has been placed at 812,296. The same source reports that tuberculosis had increased 50 per cent in children under five years of age, and 75 per cent among children between five and fifteen years of age.

CIVILIAN LOSSES EQUAL TO MILITARY

"In conclusion it may fairly be estimated that the loss of civilian life due directly to war or to causes induced by war equals, if indeed it does not exceed, that suffered by the armies in the field. In view of the facts cited, such an estimate must be regarded as conservative. And yet this does not take into account the appalling effects, some of them unquestionably permanent, of war, famine, pestilence, and disease on the sufferers who did not die. Years, and perhaps generations, will be required before this sacrifice of life can be made good, and the populations restored to normal. It has been estimated that to replace the numbers lost by war casualties in the male population between 20 and 44 years of age, will require ten years for the United Kingdom, twelve years for Germany, thirty-eight years for Italy, and sixty-six for France. The decrease in births during the period of the war down to the end of 1917 is stated to have been 500,000 in the United Kingdom; 1,100,000 in Austria; 1,500,000 in Hungary; 2,600,000 in Germany, and 833,000 in the uninvaded districts of France.

"But not merely is there a retardation in the growth of the population; there results also a race deterioration. The physically fit are withdrawn from civil life and exposed to special danger from death and disease, while the perpetuation of the race is left to those rejected for military service by reason of disease, infirmity, or lack of stature. This distinction was not so important in the recent war, as almost the whole male population between 22 and 44 years of age was drafted into service, but in some respects this made the repercussion of disease on the rest of the population all the more serious. The men who are drafted into the army are of especial importance to the preservation of the racial integrity of the population by reason of their age, vigor and physical fitness.

"If it be assumed that civilian losses were equal in number to those resulting from actual warfare, which were valued at \$33,551,000,000 (see Vol. XII), it would not be improper to add as much again for the capitalized value of civilian life lost during the war. Although many of these were children and old persons, instead of men in the prime of life, this fact is offset by the conservative character of the numerical estimate."

From this the conclusion is reached that the total military and civil loss may be set down as \$67,000,000,000.

PRINCETON UNIV



32101 066154087

